




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


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Terrorism Review

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6 October 1988



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6 October 1988
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
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
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Figure 1
State-Sponsored Terrorist Incidents by Country, 1986-88


Percent
1986



1987



1988*



*Statistics for 1988 are only for the first six months.

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Terrorism Review

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6 October 1988

Focus

State Support for Terrorism


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Most regimes that sponsor or otherwise support terrorism have become less active or more discreet since 1986, largely in response to Western counterterrorist measures and regional political developments. Libya continues to pose the greatest threat to US interests.

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The combination of Western economic sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, and US demarches since 1986 has caused a number of state supporters of terrorism to lower their profiles.

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Libya is a partial exception to the downward trend. Although Libyan-backed groups have not hit US interests since several bombings on the second anniversary of the US airstrike, Tripoli continues to host the virulently anti-Western Abu Nidal organization and other terrorist groups.

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Nevertheless, state support continues to be a major component of international terrorism. Most international terrorist groups receive some form of state assistance—training facilities, weapons, explosive devices, passports, money, or safe havens. This is especially true in the Middle

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East, where nearly every group has links to Libya, Iran, Syria, Iraq, or South Yemen; and in Latin America, where all but a few groups have ties to Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya. b3

Outlook

Governments that sponsor or otherwise support terrorism are now more sensitive about being linked to terrorism than they were in the mid-1980s; few will increase their involvement beyond current levels as long as Western diplomatic and economic pressures continue:

- As Qadhafi continues to build links to terrorist groups around the world, sporadic Libyan-sponsored attacks against Western interests are likely. Barring another US-Libyan conflict, the next intensive round of attacks is not likely to occur until the 1989 anniversary of the US airstrike, if then.
- Iranian sponsorship of terrorism is likely to decrease as long as Tehran perceives a need for international support during peace negotiations with Iraq. Even so, hardline factions in the government may decide to back unauthorized terrorist activities to disrupt efforts to strengthen ties to the West.
- Afghan-sponsored bombings in Pakistan are likely to decline as the regime loses control of Afghan territory adjacent to Pakistan and concentrates on its own survival.
- North Korea suspended plans to disrupt the Olympics, but major operations—such as the bombing of a South Korean airliner in November 1987—cannot be ruled out over the next several months.
- The USSR and Eastern Europe will continue to be unconcerned about end user restrictions on their weapons sales to Middle Eastern terrorist groups and state sponsors. They are not likely to make further counterterrorist concessions.
- Syria almost certainly will continue to back terrorist and guerrilla attacks against Israel but is unlikely to jeopardize its improved Western ties by sponsoring attacks elsewhere. In the event of sustained Western pressure, Syria might move against Japanese Red Army members in Damascus and the Bekaa Valley.
- Iraq is likely to increase terrorist activities as its need for Western support diminishes following any peace settlement with Iran. The probable targets will be Iraqi dissidents, Syria, and Israel.
- Cuba and Nicaragua almost certainly will continue to provide weapons to Latin American insurgents and terrorist groups.
- Algeria, Yugoslavia, and South Yemen will continue to provide safehaven to some radical Palestinian groups because of political affinity and to guarantee against attacks on their soil. Western pressure, however, might contribute to an Algerian decision to close the ANO offices in Algiers. b3

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Highlights


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Significant Developments

Middle East

Libya

Strengthening Terrorist Network Abroad



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
Tripoli will probably use the network to conduct attacks against Libyan dissidents and to support terrorist groups that attack Western targets. The [redacted] officers are likely to serve only in a support role [redacted]

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Latin America

Chile

Far Left Planning Violence



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The Communists and their terrorist affiliate demonstrated their prowess in a nearly successful attack on Pinochet in 1986, and the major Cuban-supplied arms cache discovered by the government the same year underscored their potential for carrying out nationwide operations. Nevertheless, the far left would probably need time to organize a major escalation in violence. The effectiveness of the far left would depend largely on its ability to generate popular support for violence, the extent of foreign support, and the counterterrorist skills of government forces. [redacted]

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Colombia

Government Peace Initiative

President Barco's detailed schedule for demobilizing the four major rebel groups, announced in September, would guarantee political participation and economic benefits to factions that agree to disarm but would not require the military to halt operations against active insurgents. Dialogue with rebel leaders would begin only after the insurgents ceased hostilities, and rebel political proposals would be considered as part of planned constitutional reforms, which are not expected to clear Congress before late 1989. Rebel leaders have not yet formally replied to the government's offer, but the insurgents' legal political party has labeled it a plan of surrender. The main opposition party has refused to support the proposal, which would apparently supplant the short-lived round of talks—attended by political, church, and labor leaders but not by the government—after M-19 guerrillas released prominent politician Alvaro Gomez in July.

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
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Barco probably does not expect the rebels to accept the plan. He is apparently trying to reassert his administration's authority and competence to deal with the insurgency by playing down the importance of earlier opposition-backed talks. Despite the rebels' almost certain refusal of his offer, he is likely to gain considerable public approval, because most Colombians favor dialogue with the guerrillas as well as strong military counterinsurgency measures. Barco probably hopes the plan will improve his international image on the human rights issue, which was damaged by a recent Amnesty International report charging systematic abuses by the armed forces. He is likely to cite the rebels' intransigence to counter charges of intolerance from their legal political party. He probably also hopes his offer will help justify requests for greater military assistance from Washington and other allies—particularly in Europe, where the rebels' party has concentrated efforts to build a political following.

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
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
Africa

Lesotho

Bus Hijacking

The reasons for a bus hijacking in Lesotho on 13 September remain unclear. Four gunmen, a probable splinter group of the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA), hijacked a bus en route to Maseru for Pope John Paul II's arrival and diverted it to the British High Commission, where they demanded to see the Commissioner. The following day, after their demand—and subsequent requests to meet with the Pope and King Moshoeshoe II—had been rebuffed, the hijackers ramm[ed] the compound gates;

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The LLA was formed with South African backing in 1981 to oppose a previous regime and, from exile in South Africa, the group had continued to oppose the current government. The LLA had begun reconciliation talks with Lesotho as South African support dwindled in recent years, and the leadership of the LLA has disavowed supporting the hijacking


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
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
Lebanon: Hizballah at the Crossroads

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Hizballah's growth from a band of violent zealots to a complex movement with aspirations to represent Lebanon's Shias may be diluting its extremism. At the same time, changes in the Lebanese political environment are setting the stage for a reexamination of the group's political tactics, particularly terrorism. Hizballah has not abandoned or disavowed its self-proclaimed goal of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon, but the implementation of such a state remains distant.



Tehran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598 and the cease-fire in the Gulf war in August, moreover, confronts Hizballah with a troubling question about the willingness of its primary foreign backer to continue supporting the group.



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Hizballah's Islamic Republic: An Elusive Goal

There is no good blueprint for constructing a Shia state. Iran, the only existing example of an Islamic republic, is a poor model for Hizballah to follow for several reasons:

- It is unlikely that the political upheaval that preceded and followed the fall of the Shah can be replicated in Lebanon. The Lebanese political system is laced with instability, but the conditions that enabled Iran's Shias to overthrow the system do not exist in Lebanon. Iran is almost 95 percent Shia, but in Lebanon Shias compose a much smaller percentage of the population.
- Substantial theological differences exist between Hizballah clerics and Khomeini, the architect of Iran's Islamic state. The differences are rooted in two divergent threads of modern Shia theology: an avowedly activist school represented by Khomeini and the "Line of the Imam" and a less extremist school represented by Fadlallah—the guiding spirit of Hizballah—and his Iraqi teachers, Ayatollahs Hakim, Khoi, and Bakr-Sadr.
- The Iranian Islamic state contains elements of Iranian nationalism that are not applicable to Lebanon. For example, the suppression of religious minorities—such as the Bahai—in Iran is not repeatable in Lebanon, which has a diversity of powerful

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Hizballah during the past year has experienced several disorienting developments that have accentuated its fundamentalists' need to take stock:

- The growth of its military arm as Hizballah militiamen mounted increasingly sophisticated attacks against pro-Israeli militias in southern Lebanon.
- The kidnaping by its militiamen in February of a US military officer assigned to UN duty in southern Lebanon.
- A serious military and political setback in the south in April as Amal, the pro-Syrian rival Shia militia, forced Hizballah militiamen to lay down their arms after weeks of sharp fighting.
- A stunning turnaround in the southern suburbs of Beirut in May, when Hizballah fighters sharply defeated Amal.
- A spectacular airliner hijacking—also in May—that ended without the hijackers being punished for their actions but no nearer to realizing their goals.
- The entry of Syrian peacekeeping forces in early June into Hizballah's stronghold in Beirut's southern suburbs.
- The defeat in July of an important ally, the pro-Arafat Palestinians, in the camps of West Beirut by the pro-Syrian Palestinian forces of Abu Musa.

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Islamic and Christian religious sects. Similarly, cultural traditions like the Zoroastrian festival of No Ruz, which are powerful expressions of Iranian nationalism and historical unity, are absent in Lebanon.

- Lebanon is occupied by its neighbors, Syria (65 percent of the country) and Israel (10 percent), which oppose an Islamic republic.

These difficulties have not prevented Hizballah officials from making pronouncements about a Lebanese Islamic republic. Hizballah's "maximum program" probably is best represented by radical proponents of such a state like security official Hasan Nasrallah. For Nasrallah, a Lebanese Islamic republic would be a precursor of a political entity encompassing the Islamic world and embodying the aspirations of the pan-Islamic movement. In our view, however, Nasrallah does not represent the mainstream of the movement.

Fadlallah's Vision of an Islamic Lebanon

We believe Shaykh Fadlallah is the keeper of Hizballah's ideological vision and that his views on Islamic government and the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon hold sway within Hizballah. On the basis of his contradiction of the radicals in numerous public statements and scholarly works, we conclude that Fadlallah recognizes that Lebanese power politics, militia style, means the establishment of an Islamic republic requires far more than its mere proclamation.

On the basis of our analysis of Fadlallah's press interviews and scholarly works, we conclude that he recognizes the necessity of finding a way to maintain Lebanon's religious diversity within an Islamic context. Although Fadlallah apparently considers Lebanon an artificial creation of European imperialism, he has not advocated its abolition as a political entity. He has called for an end to the "sectarian system," stressing the need for majority rule—which undoubtedly would give Shias substantial political power. But besides urging the implementation of the Islamic law and recognizing the need to convince Lebanon's Christians that an Islamic state would not be hostile

to their religion as opposed to their militias, he has said little about the detailed workings of such a state.

The differences between the Islamic state as conceived by Fadlallah and Khomeini's Iran, nevertheless, strongly suggest that Fadlallah's political philosophy is less extreme and still heavily influenced by his Iraqi mentors. Unlike Khomeini, Fadlallah's writings indicate that he does not think that Shia clerics should hold the final say over political authority. Even though he clearly favors a state based on Islamic jurisprudence, he does not appear to favor the notion that Khomeini, as the alleged representative of the vanished 12th Imam, should have a higher authority than other political actors.

The views expressed in his book, *Islam and the Concept of Power*, indicate that he sees the first step toward an Islamic republic as the creation of an Islamic political consciousness among the country's Shia masses. The second stage is the formation of a Shia political-military organization—as represented by Hizballah—and the use of this organization to combat un-Islamic influences in Lebanon. The third stage is to position this organization as the primary, if not the sole, representative of Lebanon's Shias. Finally, we speculate that Fadlallah would exploit the demographic weight of Lebanon's Shia community to take over the existing political system and then modify it or to disband the existing system and replace it with an Islamic republic.

Living With Syria

We believe Fadlallah sees Hizballah's relationship with Syria as increasingly central to the movement's continued growth. In the past, Hizballah has relied on Iran's strategic ties to Damascus as a major element in managing its own relationship with the Syrians. We speculate that Hizballah will begin to rely less on Iran as an intermediary following the cease-fire in the Gulf war and have more frequent and higher level contacts

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Fadlallah: Keeper of Hizballah's Ideological Vision

Some people talk about making Lebanon an Islamic republic. We said that Islam carries within it the idea of government, as does any nonreligious ideology. . . . For this, thinking to be transformed into a political reality or a way of life or a position of power requires more than just slogans. Even local political steps are not sufficient. Rather, it takes many factors, among which is to have the majority further this idea, not merely adhere to it—a majority that is in complete sympathy with it. . . .

I think that the idea of an Islamic republic, like the idea of Marxism, does not enjoy an overwhelming majority in its favor within the Lebanese arena. Not even the majority of Muslims supports an Islamic republic. Lebanon's internal situation, the existence of different communities, the complexity of the Lebanese problem as well as the regional and international situation, where decisions concerning Lebanon are made, all neither allow nor aid in the transformation of the idea of an Islamic republic into a reality.

Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah



Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah

with Syrian officials. In our view, a better relationship with Damascus could benefit Hizballah by reducing the likelihood of a confrontation with Syria and by offering potential political leverage against Amal. The willingness of Fadlallah to endorse a limited Syrian presence in Hizballah's Beirut stronghold and his meeting in July with Syrian President Assad suggests that Fadlallah's fundamentalist ideology is no hindrance to living with the realities of power politics in Lebanon.

The Syrian public account of Assad's meeting with Fadlallah implicitly recognized Hizballah's growing stature in Lebanese politics. Syrian concern over the turbulent political environment before Lebanon's presidential election may have prompted Assad to raise the issue of Hizballah's political role in Lebanon. Given his past behavior, Fadlallah probably would decline a larger political role for himself, if it were offered, but would implicitly accept a deal with Syria.

Fadlallah's emphasis on his religious role is intended to hide his decisionmaking role in Hizballah. The Israelis saw the July meeting as an important recognition by both sides of their need to coexist. We believe the meeting is also a strong indication that Hizballah is positioning itself to play a political role on the national level.

Hizballah's Crossroad

Fadlallah's meeting with Assad highlights a dilemma the fundamentalists must confront as they try to implement their vision of a new Lebanon: should they work within the existing political system? To do so risks undercutting the group's Islamic credentials and makes it possible for others to blame Hizballah for the shortcomings of the political system. Not participating makes it harder for Hizballah to acquire the political stature and legitimacy it desires.

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We believe that Hizballah, although reluctant to participate in the Lebanese political system, is unwilling to forgo future participation. To participate, however, it almost certainly must distance itself from its terrorist past. Although Hizballah has a substantial base of support, its involvement in terrorism is a major obstacle to broadening its influence, particularly among Lebanon's stoic southern Shias, many of whom are doggedly loyal to Amal.

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Hizballah is in transition between creating a military-political bureaucracy and positioning itself as the representative of Lebanon's Shias, in our view. The intra-Shia fighting this spring in southern Lebanon—where Amal badly bloodied Hizballah—and in West Beirut—where Hizballah badly bloodied Amal—demonstrated that the fundamentalists have created an impressive militia but have not yet supplanted Amal. The mixed results also suggest that Hizballah's progress, although significant, may have as much to do with Amal's political shortcomings as with Hizballah's appeal. In any case, Hizballah is not close to supplanting Amal on the national political scene.

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Following a Christian Example?

We suspect that, if Hizballah decides to seek a role representing Lebanon's Shias in the political process, the movement may well parallel the course the Christian Lebanese Forces militia has taken. That group has removed much of the stigma of its alleged involvement in terrorism and its ties to Israel by alliances with some Arab states and circumspect behavior. Fadlallah's meetings with Assad could be harbingers of change in Hizballah's sometimes adversarial relationship with Syria, the most important Arab player in Lebanon. Fadlallah's public statement that hostages in Lebanon should not be punished for the shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 may also help alter perceptions of Hizballah as a purely terrorist organization. Likewise, his continuing calls for the release of hostages on humanitarian grounds may help distance him from some of Hizballah's less savory activities.

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Outlook

In our view, Hizballah is nearing decisions about how to proceed to establish an Islamic republic and the extent to which the Shia fundamentalists should

engage in the current political system. A key indicator of Hizballah's pragmatism will be its willingness to participate in the political reform process in Lebanon. Although Fadlallah has claimed that the system itself is the cause of Lebanon's problems, we suspect he will regard talks aimed at restructuring the system as worthy of his participation, particularly if he can position Hizballah as the representative of Lebanon's Shias. We believe he will conclude that it would be unwise for Hizballah to allow Amal to portray itself as the only spokesman for Lebanon's Shias.

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Such a move by Hizballah would also please Syria. Syrian-Hizballah frictions are certain to continue but can be kept within bounds if managed well by Assad and Fadlallah.

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We would not expect Hizballah to abandon its hostage-taking activities. The practice is far too useful and venerable a Lebanese political practice. Nevertheless, if Hizballah proceeds along its present course, we suspect Hizballah will gradually perceive that the political liability of holding Western hostages outweighs the benefits obtained.

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Neither would we expect Hizballah to completely or rapidly abandon its use of terrorism. We believe the group will consider airline hijackings as an option as long as key Hizballah officials seek to free relatives held captive in Kuwait. We believe, however, that the group's reliance on terrorism will decline if it makes progress toward becoming a legitimate political actor.

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If Hizballah's involvement in the Lebanese political system grows, it could precipitate splits in the movement. Radicals such as Nasrallah or hostage-captor Mughniyah might quit the organization. In our view, Hizballah has so far been surprisingly free of political factionalism, but a move toward greater participation in the political system could deepen divisions that have lain dormant. There are important clan and regional loyalties among Hizballah members that at some point could develop into important policy disagreements.

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We suspect that, under the surface of agreement on policy issues, there are differing views on the use of terrorism and on the importance of ties to Iran and Syria that could split the group. Hizballah terrorists could break away from the movement—we suspect that some may already have done so. Western and Arab observers of Lebanese affairs have speculated about competing pro-Syrian and pro-Iranian tendencies in the organization. If Iran substantially reduces its support for Hizballah, there could be more serious internal differences over how the group should weight its relations with distant, sympathetic Iran versus close and powerful Syria, [REDACTED]

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Sikh Militancy: Wrestling
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Sikh militant violence, largely confined to northern India, shows no signs of abating—the number of terrorist-related deaths logged this year already doubles that of all of last year. Sikh disenchantment with the government is rooted in cultural and political forces resisting rapid national integration. The majority of Sikhs, who are concentrated in the state of Punjab, believe that they have a separate identity and history from the rest of India. They believe that they have been cheated in the forging-together of the Indian union and continue to be discriminated against by New Delhi. Their grievances turned violent in the early 1980s, and over the last 10 years the number of militant groups has proliferated. New Delhi has responded to the Sikh challenge with a law-and-order regime that emphasizes police action. The government's inability to come to terms with the political and economic demands of Sikhs has ensured that the militants have a sympathetic environment.

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Roots of Militancy

The radical, often violent, Sikh militancy of the 1980s was born of the frustrations of a highly successful people who believe that they have been unfairly treated in the forging of Indian unity. Sikhs emerged with a separate religious identity in the 15th century, yet the Indian Constitution regards them as Hindus. Their history is one of conquest and empire, not subjugation to others in the subcontinent. At the time of Partition in 1947, Sikhs, who had long agitated for a separate Sikh nation, were convinced to join the Indian union rather than merge with Pakistan or push for independence. The deal struck with India was based largely on the promise of separate status and recognition of Sikh identity. Many Sikhs believe New Delhi has reneged on these promises by gradually undermining the use of their language and seeking to divide the Sikhs politically.

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Sikhs also have been successful economically but they do not believe that they have reaped the rewards of that success. By developing what was largely a desert and exploiting the green revolution, Sikhs, largely farmers, turned Punjab into the breadbasket of India. Their economic success was mirrored in the modernization of their state, the only state to boast potable water, paved roads, and electrification in every village. Punjab, however, lacks industries to process its agricultural production and to diversify investment. The Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, sought in the 1970s to increase Punjab's economic development and agitated unsuccessfully for an increased allocation of federal funds based on Punjab's disproportionately large contribution to federal coffers. Sikhs have also pressed for more industrial development in Punjab as a way to reinvest their gains in the state.

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New Delhi refused Punjabi demands and, in an attempt to break the back of the Akali Dal party, covertly supported a young fundamentalist Sikh priest, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, to divert Sikh political goals. Bhindranwale's arrival coincided with a fundamentalist resurgence in Punjab. Nascent militant groups, like the Babbar Khalsa (see inset) grew out of campaigns to reassert Sikh religious identity and symbols. By 1984 Bhindranwale was a force New Delhi found impossible to control, as his religious emphasis dovetailed with Sikh political and economic grievances and turned into the demand for "Khalistan," an independent homeland for the Sikhs. Bhindranwale paid a price for his success; he was killed in the 1984 Army assault on the Golden Temple.

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
Militant Groups

Militant Sikh groups have periodically surfaced in Punjab but were generally aimed at religious reform. Bhindranwale's successful marriage of religion and


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New Militant Groups



Khalsa.



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Babbar Khalsa. The Babbar Khalsa is the most well organized, well funded, and committed of the terrorist groups. Established in the late 1970s or early 1980s, it is the only militant group with offices in Europe and Canada. The Babbar Khalsa has fundamentalist origins and is not generally considered to be sympathetic to the groups that were strongly influenced by Bhindranwale.

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Babbar specialize in classic terrorist attacks such as indiscriminate firing into crowded street bazaars and bomb attacks on bus and train stations. Babbar Khalsa members were not involved in the late May siege on the Golden Temple. They are, however, credited with the June bomb blasts that followed the temple assault and are suspected in the September bombings in New Delhi.

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Bhindranwale Tiger Force. The Bhindranwale Tiger Force (BTF) emerged as a terrorist group in 1986. Its members are credited with random and deadly terrorist attacks in New Delhi in 1987; the group is not known for its organization or ideology.

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All India Sikh Students Federation. Known as a violent group, the All India Sikh Students Federation is one of the most public of the militant organizations. Members of the group frequently appear on political stages and at most public Sikh meetings. After Bhindranwale's death, the group split into two factions, the Gurjit and Manjit factions, both headed by cousins related to Bhindranwale. Until the summer of 1988 when they were theoretically merged, the Manjit faction tended more than the other faction to support political solutions to the Punjab crises.

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Khalistan Commando Force. The Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) is considered to be a powerful terrorist group nearly on a par with the Babbar

politics spawned a new breed of militant groups. Most of these new groups agitate for a spectrum of political goals, the most extreme of which is the demand for a separate Sikh nation. Some militants, notably the Khalistan Commando Force and the Bhindranwale Tiger Force, have called for an entirely independent state. Other groups, including factions of the All India Sikh Students Federation, are less clear about their goals and support the idea of a "state" where Sikhs

can "feel the glow of freedom" without elaborating on the political setup. Members tend to be young and semieducated and to come from relatively prosperous Jat (farmer) families. Members of militant organizations also come disproportionately from the districts bordering Pakistan—the districts that have been the

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most neglected in terms of economic benefits—and many have criminal backgrounds. The precise number of militant groups is unknown and probably changes daily. Groups that were front page news in 1985 have disappeared to be replaced by newer forces (see inset).

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The militants have no centralized leadership. Their activities are generally uncoordinated, and they frequently have ideological and theological differences. In the last three years, a shadowy group, the Panthic Committee, has emerged in an attempt to give form, and more concerted direction to the terrorists.

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[REDACTED]

least four years and has offices in the United States, Europe, and Canada. The ISO, based in Washington, lobbies for Sikh militant groups and seeks to make foreign governments aware of the ongoing Sikh struggle. [REDACTED], the Panthic Committee appointed a Council of Khalistan in late 1987 to provide some coordination for other international organizations. Its president is an American citizen who also heads the ISO. The most militant and perhaps most violent of these international organizations is the International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF). The ISYF, with offices in North America and Europe, raises money for legal defense of Sikhs. Members of the ISYF have been implicated in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and charged with conspiracy to assassinate high-level Indian officials outside India. [REDACTED]

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Financial and International Assets

Sikh militant groups are well funded and equipped. They raise money within India through bank robberies, extortion, control of temple funds, and drug smuggling. Overseas, Sikhs in Europe and North America also send money or smuggle it into Punjab.

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[REDACTED]

Government Operations Against Sikh Militants

New Delhi has attempted to counter the militant threat in Punjab with a tough law-and-order regime. Since 1984 the security forces have launched three full-scale attacks on the sacred Golden Temple complex and one major combing operation in the State of Punjab to undermine the militants. The June 1984 Golden Temple assault resulted in roughly 1,000 deaths and has been followed by two more operations—in April 1986 and again in May 1988—against militants ensconced in the temple.

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The militants' flush financial situation has enabled the various groups to acquire large quantities of relatively sophisticated weapons. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Militants also have increasingly used explosive devices. During June 1988, four bomb blasts killing 73 persons and injuring 175 were attributed to Sikh militants. [REDACTED] the militants acquire most of their arms and equipment through purchases in Pakistan. [REDACTED]

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A number of international organizations provide funding, moral support, and publicity for Sikh militant organizations. The well-established World Sikh Organization (WSO) lobbies foreign governments and raises money, as does the International Sikh Organization (ISO). The WSO has been in operation for at

Punjab has been under President's Rule—direct rule from New Delhi—for over one year. Currently two of the top three officials in the state of Punjab are high-ranking police officers. In addition to regular state police networks that operate throughout Punjab, the state is patrolled by two sets of paramilitary forces—the Border Security Guards and the Central Reserve

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
Police Force. The judicial system in Punjab has been suspended for those accused of extremist crimes, and New Delhi recently stiffened firearms and antiterrorist legislation. The Congress (I)-controlled Parliament amended the Constitution in May to give New Delhi wide-ranging powers to suspend constitutional rights and civil liberties in Punjab.

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New Delhi's crackdown has failed to reduce terrorist operations. In the years since imposition of President's Rule, the level of terrorist violence has risen geometrically. In 1986 the number killed in terrorist-related violence was 500; in 1987 it jumped to nearly 1,000, and, at its current rate, this year's figure may reach 3,000.

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Demands of Moderate Sikhs

The sympathetic atmosphere in which the militants thrive in Punjab would be undermined considerably were New Delhi to meet some of the demands of moderate politicians. These demands are:

- Release the remaining detainees picked up in June 1984 in the first assault on the Golden Temple.
- Prosecute perpetrators of the November 1984 anti-Sikh riots in New Delhi. During the rampage that followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi, thousands of Sikhs were killed in the streets. Official government figures report that 2,500 were killed; civil rights groups report figures as high as 7,000. Although Congress (I) politicians were often filmed leading the riots, no one has faced prosecution.
- Apologize for the desecration of the Golden Temple during the 1984 assault.
- Carry through on elements of the Punjab accord concluded in 1985. These include, among others, the resolution of a water-sharing dispute, the transfer of land to neighboring states, and the transfer of Chandigarh to become solely the capital of Punjab.

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Outlook

New Delhi's management of Sikh militancy and growing violence is not likely to succeed. Sikh militants operate in a sympathetic environment created by New Delhi's alienation of mainstream Sikhs. As long as New Delhi refuses to meet moderate demands and concentrates instead on the tough law-and-order approach, these mainstream Sikhs will continue to give tacit support to militants.

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As the 1989 Indian national elections approach, Gandhi appears to be beginning to address the Punjab problem to shore up his political position. In mid-September Gandhi traveled to Punjab and sanctioned several industrial projects, one of which is a joint venture with a US firm that will bring thousands of

jobs and increased export capacity to Punjabi agriculture. He allowed the courts to release half of the Sikh prisoners who have been jailed without charge since 1984, and he may release the remaining prisoners. If Gandhi releases the remaining prisoners, he will have met one of the fundamental demands of moderate Sikhs.

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Gandhi, however, will have to take further steps that could cost him politically in order to bring moderate Sikhs back to the mainstream of Indian politics. He could, for example, try to foster the emergence of moderate Sikh leadership by calling for state

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elections. Sikhs would respond positively if Gandhi would distance himself from members of his Cabinet who were implicated in anti-Sikh violence that followed Indira Gandhi's assassination by Sikhs in 1984. Either action would risk alienating Hindu voters.

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Chronology of Terrorism—1988

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Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

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27 August

Northern Ireland: Four bombs explode outside Belfast city hall, in a shopping complex, and in Londonderry following extradition of convicted guerrilla leader Robert Russell to Northern Ireland. Russell escaped from Northern Ireland's Maze Prison in a mass breakout of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) inmates in September 1983 and is to resume his 20-year sentence for the attempted murder of a police officer.

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29 August

Colombia: Members of the People's Liberation Army (EPL) kill mayor's chauffeur and assistant near Canalete.

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30 August

Colombia: Suspected EPL guerrillas shoot and kill 15 employees working on farm around Canalete and burn 15 buildings.

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Colombia: In Santa Maria, Huila Department, approximately 70 members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) attack a police station, killing five civilians and wounding five policemen. The assailants also kidnaped two police officers and stole money from the Agrarian Bank during the assault.

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Colombia: Four National Liberation Army guerrillas kill regional director of the Colombian Institute of Agricultural Reform at an unspecified location.

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31 August

Northern Ireland: Bomb explodes at apartment in Londonderry, killing two persons. PIRA is suspected.

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Northern Ireland: Police defuse car bomb containing approximately 100 kilograms of explosives outside British Army base in Belfast. No group has claimed responsibility.

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6 September

El Salvador: Suspected members of Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front set off two bombs near Ministry of Health in San Salvador, partially destroying two vehicles.

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6 October 1988

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8 September

Colombia: Approximately 80 FARC guerrillas attack police station in Minca, Magdalena Département, kidnaping five police officers and wounding five civilians. The perpetrators destroyed the building and bombed a bridge before leaving the scene.

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South Korea: Two youths throw molotov cocktails over fence of US Army Camp Hialeah in Pusan but cause no damage.

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9 September

Chile: Unknown persons firebomb "no-vote" command leader's home in Santiago, causing minor damage. This is the 10th time in four months that the leader's home has been attacked.

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Northern Ireland: Gunmen shoot and kill prominent member of the Ulster Clubs, a hardline Protestant political group, on crowded commuter train in Belfast. Police suspect PIRA.

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Spain: Bomb explodes outside tax office in Barcelona, causing damage. Police suspect the Catalan separatist group Terra Lliure of planting the device.

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10 September

Spain: Three gunmen assassinate policemen in ambush in the village of Izurza, near Bilbao. One policeman was shot dead in his car as he waited for his colleague, who was killed while placing a telephone call. Police suspect the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).

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10-11 September

South Africa: Three Soviet-made minilimpet mines explode in Lenasia, suburb of Johannesburg, causing minor damage. The incidents took place at a bus company, a government official's home, and a local office of the House of Delegates. A fourth bombing outside the Moroka police barracks in Soweto resulted in no injuries. There were no claims of responsibility.

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11 September

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Japan: Police seize mortar launchers and large amount of explosives during raid on warehouse on outskirts of Niigata City. The warehouse was rented by Chukaku-ha in the name of a construction company.

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12 September

Italy: Two suspected Lebanese terrorists arrested at Rome International Airport for possession of false documentation.

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Lebanon: Lebanese National Progressive Front kidnaps American engineer in Ba'labakk following his wedding to Lebanese woman. The American escaped and was delivered by Syrian officials to the US Embassy in Damascus. The motives for the kidnaping remain unclear.

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Northern Ireland: PIRA explodes bomb in Belfast's city center, injuring eight persons and damaging shops. The device, planted in a taxi, contained 50 to 100 pounds of Semtex explosives.

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Northern Ireland: Bomb explodes at home of Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, head of Northern Ireland's Civil Service, in Helen's Bay, County Down. PIRA claimed responsibility and warned other civil servants whose work involves formulating British military strategy to resign their posts.

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13 September

Colombia: Nineteenth of April Movement guerrillas kill police inspector in Araujo, Cauca Department.

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Gaza Strip: Arson destroys United Nations Relief and Works Agency distribution office in Khan Yunis camp. No group has claimed responsibility.

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14 September

Chile: Unknown persons throw bomb at social club in Conchalí, causing serious damage. The device contained 0.3 kilogram of ammonium nitrate fuel-oil blasting agent.

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
Ethiopia-Italy: Revolutionary Army of the Ethiopian People claims responsibility for kidnaping Italian engineer—reportedly safe and well in captivity—from Lake Tanabelles aid project in June. The group wants the drainage project canceled, believing it will mean "mass deportation, uprooting, maltreatment, and manifest suppression of the Ethiopian people."

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16 September

Argentina: Bomb explodes at high-voltage power pylon in General Las Heras District, south of Buenos Aires Province, causing substantial damage. Police also found and deactivated another bomb nearby.

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France: Bomb explodes at French tax office in Pontivy, destroying four ground floor rooms. The Breton Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility.

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Spain: Gunmen shoot dead former socialist municipal councilor in Santurce, at his family-owned restaurant. The suspected ETA gunmen fled in a stolen vehicle.

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18 September

Turkey: Explosion reportedly occurs at the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara. Embassy officials claimed there was no incident. The Anatolia Agency received an anonymous call claiming responsibility in the name of the Kaaba Liberation Army.

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19 September

South Africa: Limpet mines placed in car explode in underground parking garage at apartment building in Benoni, east of Johannesburg, causing extensive damage. The African National Congress is suspected.

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20 September

Lebanon: Car bomb explodes in Dora district of East Beirut, killing three persons, wounding 25 others, and causing considerable damage. No group has claimed responsibility.

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21 September

Peru: Two bombs on a street merchant's cart explode in downtown Lima, injuring 16 persons and damaging two government buildings. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement and Sendero Luminoso are each suspected.

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South Africa: Bomb explodes outside bus terminal in Johannesburg, injuring at least 19 persons. The bomb, placed in a garbage can, detonated during the evening rush hour. Seven alleged members of the African National Congress were arrested.

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22 September

Lebanon: Military expert defuses a 110-millimeter rocket targeting the Bristol Hotel in West Beirut. No group has claimed responsibility.

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