



Directorate of
Intelligence

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Terrorism Review

9 August 1990

Approved for Release
Date JUN 1999

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Terrorism Review (U)

9 August 1990

| | | |
|----|---|--------|
| 1 | Iranian Support for Terrorism CTC | b3 b1 |
| 3 | Highlights | b3 |
| 7 | Iranian Support for Terrorism: Rafsanjani's Report Card CTC | b3 |
| 13 | Iranian Support for Terrorism CTC | b3 b1 |
| 17 | Iranian Support for Terrorism CTC | b3 b-1 |
| 21 | Chronology of Terrorism—1990 CTC | b3 b3 |

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Terrorism Review (U)

9 August 1990

Focus

The Republic of Yemen: Shutting Down Support for Terrorism

The new Republic of Yemen (ROY) has asserted its commitment to ending Yemeni support for terrorist groups, although the lengthy integration process leaves some room for evasion by sympathizers in South Yemen. President Salih and Foreign Minister Iryani have Sanaa's plans to end the provision of safehaven, training camps, and passports enjoyed by some terrorist groups under the former South Yemeni regime. In the months preceding the Republic's formation last May, the government of South Yemen had already taken some steps to scale down its support for terrorist groups, apparently in response to US and North Yemeni pressure.

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The lengthy time frame envisioned for the process of political and bureaucratic merger could impede full implementation of Salih's stated policy of eliminating all forms of help to terrorists. Moreover, the presence in the new government of some former South Yemeni officials who have supported radical Palestinian groups and would probably be inclined to do so in the future increases the risk that some support might be provided clandestinely.

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Salih's Policies

Both Salih and Iryani have assured Washington that Sanaa will not provide support in any form to terrorist Palestinian groups and will take steps to end any ties South Yemen has had to terrorist groups.

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The government will allow two mainstream Palestinian groups, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to maintain their offices in Aden but will not let them have representation in Sanaa.

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
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Cleanup Begun by Aden

The ROY's current policy builds on Aden's efforts prior to unity. In the months preceding the declaration on 22 May of the Republic of Yemen, the Government of South Yemen took some steps to scale down its support for terrorist groups, apparently in response to US and North Yemeni pressure:

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Given the long time frame—30 months—planned for the bureaucratic integration of the two Yemens and the presence in the new governmental framework of former South Yemeni officials with links to terrorist groups, President Salih may have trouble preventing terrorists from entering the country and operating clandestinely in the South. In addition, some terrorists may be able to remain in Yemen by using passports provided by other countries that support terrorist groups. The new regime will clearly need time to implement control over the southern territories and over South Yemeni officials who supported radical South Yemeni policies prior to unity.

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
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Significant Developments

Europe





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
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**Iranian Support for Terrorism:
Rafsanjani's Report Card** b3

Iranian involvement in terrorism has continued unabated since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini last June. Although Rafsanjani has sought to improve relations with some Western nations since directly assuming the presidency last August, events of the past year prove that Tehran continues to view the selective use of terrorism as a legitimate political tool

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[REDACTED] b3
[REDACTED] Nonetheless, we believe Rafsanjani and Khamenei would closely monitor and approve the planning for an attack against US or Western interests. b3

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b1 [REDACTED] During the past year, Iran has been responsible for [REDACTED] and for sponsoring numerous attacks against Saudi interests and organizations affiliated with Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*. In addition, Iran continues to support Hizballah elements holding 16 Western hostages in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] b1
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Rafsanjani's Record: Targeting "Enemies of the Regime"

The terrorist attacks carried out by Iran during the past year were probably approved in advance by President Rafsanjani and other senior leaders. [REDACTED]

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b3 [REDACTED] The planning and implementation of these operations are, however, probably managed by other senior officials, most of whom are Rafsanjani's appointees or allies. [REDACTED]

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carried out these assassinations. Mughniyah has close ties to Tehran, and the IJO demonstrated its operational capability in Thailand by orchestrating the hijacking of Flight KU-422 from Bangkok in 1988. Prior to the Bangkok assassinations, the IJO had already claimed responsibility for the assassination of a Saudi official in Beirut.

[REDACTED]

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Anti-Rushdie Campaign. Khamenei's reaffirmation of the *fatwa* calling for the death of *The Satanic Verses* author, Salman Rushdie, may have directly resulted in attacks against publishing houses and distributors affiliated with the novel. During the past year bombing attacks occurred throughout Western Europe and Asia. We believe radical Shia elements will continue to carry out anti-Rushdie attacks

Saudi Campaign. Iranian-sponsored attacks against Saudi interests were also renewed under the leadership of President Rafsanjani. The recent retaliatory campaign is probably a result of Riyadh's execution of 16 Kuwaiti Shia—10 of Iranian origin—who were responsible for several explosions during the hajj last July.

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[REDACTED]

Following the executions, senior Iranian leaders began calling for Shia to avenge the deaths of the "martyrs" by carrying out retaliatory attacks against Saudi, Kuwaiti, and US interests. These statements may have encouraged radical Shia elements to carry out a series of attacks against Saudi facilities and personnel.

According to press reports, British officials believe they prevented an anti-Rushdie operation last winter when they arrested and deported nine Iranian students—some of whom may have had connections to Iranian intelligence personnel—for their involvement in planning a Rushdie-related attack

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Cultivation of Radical Palestinians. Rafsanjani has continued to cultivate ties between Iran and a number of radical Palestinian groups. Despite ideological differences between Iran and most radical Palestinian groups, they are united in their desire to reject Arafat's more compromising approach and to eradicate the state of Israel. These groups enhance Iran's operational capabilities because many have experienced operatives, an established infrastructure in the Middle East and Western Europe, and a record of successful attacks. In addition, they provide Tehran with some degree of deniability and, as a result, decrease the risks of military retaliation. A recent increase in the tensions between the Palestinians and

To date, these retaliatory attacks have claimed the lives of four Saudi officials; another was seriously injured when a bomb exploded under the seat of his car.

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It is possible that the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), a Hizballah element headed by Imad Mughniyah,

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
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Israel over Soviet Jewish immigration, and threats by Iran and Hizballah, has increased the possibility for attacks against Western interests. If Iran provides financial and logistic assistance it will probably demand the right to approve the target selection and timing of the attack. ~~_____~~ b3


Continued Detention of the Western Hostages. Rafsanjani successfully orchestrated the release of Robert Polhill and Frank Reed earlier this year. The President's decision to begin the process of resolving this issue probably arose from his belief that the hostages had become a liability. This decision was probably prompted by Rafsanjani's desire to attract foreign investment and to end Iran's international isolation. Following the release of Polhill and Reed, Hizballah and Iranian hardliners once again surfaced their old demands, including the release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and Kuwait. ~~_____~~



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Outlook: More of the Same
President Rafsanjani and other Iranian leaders will continue selectively using terrorism as a foreign policy tool to intimidate regime opponents, punish enemies of Islam, and influence Western political decisions. The government's willingness to employ terrorism reflects the leadership's own views as to the utility of terrorism as well as pressure from the hardliners to continue the aggressive export of the revolution. A lack of resolve on the part of the West Europeans to punish Iran for attacks carried out on their soil during the past year will undoubtedly reinforce the Iranian perception that it can continue its terrorist activities without jeopardizing the possibility of improved relations. ~~_____~~ b3




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**Chronology of Iranian-Supported Terrorist
Activity, June 1989 to June 1990**

Location

Description



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
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France:




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
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
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Terrorist Targets in the 1990s: Some New Focuses?

Bombings of government facilities, assassinations of political and military officials, and hijackings almost certainly will remain the mainstay of terrorist operations in the 1990s. Terrorists are likely to adapt to the changing political and technological environment, however, by focusing on other targets as well. Some groups—primarily in industrialized countries—may gain the technical expertise needed to insert viruses into government computers and corporate data bases. They also may target telecommunications and data-processing systems in a bid to tap into computerized banking and electronic fund transfers.

Expatriate, multinational managers will be highly vulnerable to kidnapping, particularly in parts of Asia and Latin America. Dams, reservoirs, and desalination plants in the water-short Middle East are likely to become attractive targets.

Computer Terrorism

we believe that some groups eventually will regard it as an attractive option, particularly if they lack the capability to launch hijackings or paramilitary attacks. Computer terrorism is defined as the targeting of computer systems and data bases with the intention of disrupting, altering, or destroying data.

Computer Viruses and Other Tactics. Computer viruses—programs that can be set to destroy or alter data stored in a computer's memory—have been inserted into computer systems by mischievous and malicious computer experts, sometimes with devastating effects. In recent years, computer viruses have surfaced in South Africa, Japan, India, Latin America, Eastern and Western Europe, and the United States.

[Redacted]

Some American experts estimate, however, that one new virus has been introduced per week since 1986. Viruses can have serious effects!

[Large Redacted Area]

* According to the Computer Virus Industry Association, viruses in the United States infected more than 85,000 personal computers in 1988 and 176,000 machines in 1989.

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[REDACTED]

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some industry analysts believe that viruses planted by terrorists could attack computers that handle air traffic control, long-distance telephone switching, and electrical power grids. Other targets would include computers that handle stock and commodities exchanges and international currency exchanges. Groups would be able to disguise their involvement because viruses often contain timing instructions, so that it may be months between the time a virus is introduced and the time it is triggered. Viruses are usually inserted by disgruntled workers, and a terrorist organization probably would plant an employee in a company. A virus can also be loaded onto a computer or disk before it is sent to a recipient. In addition, terrorists may try to load a virus onto a public computer bulletin board; most bulletin board systems, however, take extensive precautions to avoid spreading viruses.

Attacks Against Computer Systems.

[REDACTED] One writer on computer technology [REDACTED] predicts a wave of terrorist attacks against key computer installations, disrupting electrical power to millions of people, shutting down transportation systems, and bringing thousands of business and government computers to a grinding halt. Over the past decade there have been several attacks against computer facilities:

In addition to viruses, terrorists may introduce a "worm," "trojan horse," or "logic bomb" into a computer. A worm is a self-contained code. A worm introduced by an American graduate student into the Internet system—a nationwide computer network that links computer centers belonging to federal agencies, universities, and research labs—crippled more than 6,000 computers affecting 180,000 users in North America in November 1988.

A trojan horse is a program that appears to be legitimate, but it contains a malicious code to destroy data. A logic bomb is a program added to an existing program which is triggered when specific conditions are met. For example, when a certain name is missing from personal records, all the data is erased.

The Hacker Threat. Terrorists also could try to break into both secure and nonsecure data bases in an effort to acquire funds illegally and to blackmail organizations.

[REDACTED]

* The Italian Red Brigade is the only other terrorist group that publicly includes the destruction of computer systems as an objective.

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
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are likely to take businessmen hostage to raise funds and, to a lesser degree, to exchange them for imprisoned members. Many groups are likely to keep kidnappings secret, calculating that corporations will be more willing to meet their demands privately. Although US businessmen will remain at risk, we believe Japanese businessmen will face equal, if not greater, threats because of growing identification of Tokyo as the preeminent economic power. Over the next few years, Japanese businessmen will be most vulnerable in parts of the world where they already have a major presence, such as southeast Asia. Japanese businessmen may face additional threats as they expand their markets in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.


Water Facilities

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Terrorists may attack or threaten to destroy lightly defended reservoirs, dams, and desalination plants of these countries in a bid to cause public panic or to undermine governments.

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Environmental Targets

Some terrorist groups, in a bid to attract new supporters and rejuvenate their membership, are likely to exploit the growing issue of environmentalism and claim it as their own.

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So far, there has been only one known attack on water supplies in the Middle East;



Terrorists may also threaten to contaminate water supplies to intimidate moderate Arab countries.

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
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Foreign Businessmen

the threat to international businessmen will increase in the 1990s. In the 1980s, terrorists carried out a relatively small number of attacks against foreign businessmen; for example, 99 American businessmen and eight Japanese were kidnapped. Projected increases in international business travel

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however, will increase the attractiveness of businessmen as easy targets. Terrorist groups



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Chronology of Terrorism—1990

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Below are described selected noteworthy foreign and international events involving terrorists or the use of terrorist tactics. These events have occurred or come to light since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in this publication are not included.

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Western Europe

11 July

Spain: One bomb explodes and another is defused at two Renault dealerships in Bilbao. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) claimed responsibility.

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12 July

Spain: Explosive device, hidden in a shopping cart and remotely detonated, injures Spanish Civil Guard member in Bilbao. ETA is suspected.

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15 July

Northern Ireland: Civilian is shot and killed in his Belfast home by two masked gunmen. The Irish Peoples' Liberation Organization claimed responsibility.

18 July

Turkey: Terrorists raid home in Omerli village, Sanliurfa's Halfeti district, killing two persons and injuring two others.

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24 July

Northern Ireland: Landmine explosion kills a nun and three members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary near Armagh. PIRA was reportedly responsible.

Middle East

18 July

West Bank: Masked youths beat and stab alleged collaborator in Ra's Atiya.

22 July

West Bank: Masked youths kill a Palestinian in his Silwan home. The victim worked for the Jerusalem municipality.

23 July

West Bank: Assailants in Qalqiyah beat to death a Palestinian suspected of collaboration.

29 July

Lebanon: Bomb explodes in office of Abu Nidal organization dissidents at Ar Rashidiyah camp, Tyre, killing one person and wounding four.

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