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Directorate of Intelligence

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Libya: Reviewing Terrorist Capabilities

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A Research Paper

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April 1989
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
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Libya: Reviewing Terrorist Capabilities [REDACTED] b3

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by [REDACTED] Office of
Global Issues [REDACTED] Office of Near Eastern
[REDACTED] with a contribution
from [REDACTED]
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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[REDACTED] Counterterrorist Center, on [REDACTED]

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
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Libya: Reviewing Terrorist Capabilities

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Scope Note

Libyan leader Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi continues to support terrorist activities against US and other Western interests and has become increasingly successful in soliciting attacks by client groups. This paper discusses the development of Libya's terrorist apparatus, trends, and events



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Libya: Reviewing Terrorist Capabilities

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Summary


Information available as of 1 February 1989 was used in this report.

Terrorism has been a key element of Libyan leader Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi's foreign policy since he came to power in 1969. Organizationally he has built a terrorist support apparatus that connects classic security and intelligence operations with overseas structures that focus on propaganda and revolutionary support. Qadhafi has augmented this apparatus by building ties to a wide array of terrorist groups. In some cases he has developed strong bonds with a few groups willing and able to take action. In other cases a more nebulous relationship exists.

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Qadhafi controls a complex, yet flexible, state apparatus—based largely on his personal relationship with his inner circle of advisers—to support his terrorism activities.

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The individual roles of these elements—and the advisers who run them—are blurred,

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We believe that all the departments are ultimately responsive to Qadhafi and that none has had the authority to mount operations without his sanction.

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Through the various elements of his state apparatus, Qadhafi has sought to organize a Libyan-led alliance of radical political, guerrilla, and terrorist groups to confront the United States and enhance his image as leader of the oppressed. Although this goal is beyond Libyan capabilities, Tripoli

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
Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Scope Note	iii
Summary	v
Background	1
Qadhafi's State Apparatus	4
Qadhafi's Use of Clients	6
Radical Palestinian Groups	9
Japanese Red Army	11
Hizballah	11
Provisional Irish Republican Army	11
Others	13
Political Security and the Terrorism Agenda	13
Looking Ahead	15
Appendix	
Libyan Terrorist Activity by Region	17

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Libya: Reviewing Terrorist Capabilities () B3

Terrorism has been a key element of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's foreign policy since he came to power in 1969. He has formed an internal organization to direct, support, and encourage terrorist operations by Libyan agents and clients, gather intelligence, and enlist the support of radicals worldwide. Over the years the ties that Qadhafi has developed to terrorist groups have extended his reach and increased his firepower. He may have achieved sufficient control over a few of his clients to allow him to make the choice of target and timing of an attack. His influence over others has probably resulted in several terrorist operations that have accorded with his goals. B3

Background

Qadhafi's commitment to terrorism as an instrument of policy spans most of his 19-year rule. In 1972 Qadhafi publicly offered to help any anti-Western revolutionary organization—as well as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Black Power movement in the United States—and to equip any Arab willing to strike Israel. Later the same year he delivered on some of his promises by giving sanctuary to the Palestinian terrorists who massacred 11 Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games. Qadhafi dispatched his own agents to strike Israeli targets as early as 1973, when five Libyans were arrested at the international airport in Rome, where they planned to shoot down an El Al jet with a shoulder-fired missile. In 1977 Qadhafi plotted to kill the US Ambassador to Egypt—his first known attempt on a US target—even after assuring the new President, Jimmy Carter, that he wanted to improve relations with Washington. Qadhafi's operatives began to stalk Libyan dissidents in the mid-1970s—following an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Libyan leader—and have focused primarily on exiles since then, killing at least 20. In

* Qadhafi maintains a diverse range of relationships with terrorist groups worldwide. Throughout this paper we use the term "clients" to indicate groups that Qadhafi encourages, supports, and probably influences to some degree but does not necessarily control. B3

1985 Qadhafi apparently decided to back more destructive, indiscriminate attacks by clients. Tripoli provided passports to Abu Nidal organization (ANO) terrorists who attacked the El Al ticket counter at the Vienna airport in December 1985. In the spring of 1986, Tripoli to the attack on the La Belle disco in Berlin, leading to the US airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi on 15 April. B3

The airstrikes stunned Qadhafi and resulted in a spasm of retaliatory violence followed by a period of quiescence. In the 10 days after the strikes, Qadhafi was linked to a number of terrorist attacks:

- Libyan involvement in the shooting of a US Embassy communicator in Khartoum on 16 April.
- British Foreign Secretary Howe publicly linked Libya to the murder of two British teachers and one US hostage in Lebanon on 19 April.
- Two Libyans were apprehended on 18 April as they attempted to attack the US officers club in Ankara with handgrenades obtained from the Libyan People's Bureau (LPB) there. The Libyans said they had been instructed to cause the maximum number of casualties, especially among women and children.
- Libya may have had a role in the shooting in Sanaa of a US Embassy communicator on 25 April.

The level of Libyan terrorist activity fell dramatically after 25 April. The reduction was probably the result of several factors, including:

- Qadhafi's preoccupation with Libya's internal situation.
- The fear that Libyan links to terrorist clients were too visible.

Libya: Terrorism-Related Events

- | | | | |
|------|---|------|--|
| 1969 | <i>Qadhafi overthrows King Idris.</i> | | <i>Libyan aircraft bombs Omdurman, Sudan, in attempt to destroy radio station operated by Libyan dissidents.</i> |
| 1973 | <i>Qadhafi reportedly orders the commander of an Egyptian submarine stationed in Libya to sink the QE2. President Sadat countermands the order.</i> | | <i>Members of the London Libyan People's Bureau (LPB) kill a British policewoman while they shoot at anti-Qadhafi dissidents from the LPB windows.</i> |
| 1976 | <i>Libyans attempt to kidnap a former member of Qadhafi's inner circle who attempted to overthrow him in 1975.</i> | | <i>Libyan ship mines the Red Sea.</i> |
| 1977 | <i>Libyan plot to kill US Ambassador to Egypt uncovered.</i> | 1985 | <i>Libyan diplomat attempts to mail letter bombs to Tunisian journalists critical of Qadhafi; Tunisia severs relations.</i> |
| 1979 | <i>Qadhafi publicly announces antidissident campaign.</i> | | <i>Egyptians foil a Libyan attempt to kill a prominent dissident and trick Qadhafi into admitting the plot publicly.</i> |
| | <i>US Embassy in Tripoli attacked.</i> | | <i>Libya linked to ANO attacks on Rome and Vienna airports.</i> |
| 1980 | <i>Last two US diplomats withdrawn from Tripoli.</i> | | <i>US Navy attacks Libyan torpedo boats and SAM site after Libyan gunners fire on US planes in the Gulf of Sidra.</i> |
| | <i>French and Tunisian Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned while security forces stand idly by.</i> | 1986 | <i>Libya linked to an attack against La Belle disco in Berlin that kills two US servicemen.</i> |
| 1981 | <i>US warplanes down two Libyan fighters that attack them over the Gulf of Sidra.</i> | | <i>US warplanes attack targets in Tripoli and Benghazi.</i> |
| | <i>Libya linked to plot to kidnap or kill US Ambassador to Italy.</i> | | <i>Libya linked to series of anti-US, anti-UK attacks.</i> |
| 1984 | <i>Qadhafi resumes antidissident campaign with bombings in London and Manchester.</i> | | |

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Libyan terrorism activity drops.

Terrorist activity gradually resumes.

Libya linked to attack on British base in Cyprus.

1987 *Terrorist activity increases—includes contingency planning and surveillance of US, French, and British interests.*

Libya linked to attack on French restaurant in Djibouti.

French authorities seize freighter containing 150 tons of weapons from Libya destined for use by PIRA.

Libya linked to attack on US private volunteer organization in Chad.

1988 *Two senior Libyan agents arrested in Senegal carrying silenced pistol and explosives probably for attacks against French targets.*

Libya linked to attacks on US facilities in Italy, Spain, Peru, Costa Rica, and Colombia—probably meant to commemorate the second anniversary of US airstrikes.

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almost simultaneous Libyan-instigated drawdown of LPB personnel worldwide. The drawdown was probably prompted in part by a fear that inept agents would be linked to other terrorist attacks, exposing Tripoli to additional retaliation.

- Heightened security measures in potential target countries.
- Lack of substantial—as opposed to rhetorical—foreign support for Libya in the face of US military action.



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Qadhafi's tactical standdown, however, lasted barely three months and clearly did not reflect a strategic rejection of terrorism.



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The hijacking resulted in the deaths of 22 persons.

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The pace of Libyan activity picked up through 1987. Qadhafi blamed US and French support to the Government of Chad for a series of military disasters he suffered there during the spring. Tripoli was linked to two subsequent attacks in Africa that were probably intended to punish Paris and Washington for their roles in thwarting Libyan ambitions. In March a French restaurant in Djibouti was attacked, and in October a bomb exploded inside a building belonging to a US private volunteer organization in Moundou, Chad. Also in October French authorities seized a freighter containing 150 tons of weapons that were a gift from Qadhafi to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

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- Uncertainty regarding US action should Tripoli be linked to another anti-US attack.
- Damage to Qadhafi's primary terrorist infrastructure—the LPBs—caused by the expulsion of scores of Libyan diplomats from Europe and an


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Qadhafi's interest in striking French targets in Africa continued into early 1988. In February two senior Libyan agents were arrested at the airport in Dakar, Senegal, attempting to smuggle explosives and a silenced pistol into the country.

symbolism of these targets would be particularly pleasing to Qadhafi since the planes that attacked Libya in 1986 were from these services.




We strongly suspect that Qadhafi, despite a public posture of moderation, sponsored—or at least encouraged—a series of attacks by client groups against US targets in 1988 on or near the second anniversary of the airstrikes:

- On 14 April, an activist member of the Japanese Red Army (JRA) detonated a car bomb outside a USO club in Naples that killed one US service-woman and four Italians and wounded at least 20 others.
- On 15 April, an unidentified group bombed a US Air Force communications facility near Torrejon, Spain.
- On 14 April, gunmen set off explosives in the USIS facility in Medellin, Colombia, after evacuating the building.
- On 16 April, in Lima, Peru, two binational centers were bombed. The Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru—a group with longstanding ties to Qadhafi—claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On 19 April, a bomb exploded outside a USIS binational center in San Jose, Costa Rica, injuring five persons, including two US citizens.

Qadhafi's State Apparatus

In carrying out his terrorist campaigns Qadhafi has relied both on his own internal terrorist support apparatus and on his relations with terrorist groups.



and the attack in Spain targeted the US Air Force. The

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
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Looking at the organizations as a group underscores the fact that Qadhafi has developed a complex, yet flexible, apparatus—based largely on his personal relationship with his inner circle of advisers—to support his terrorism activities. Through this apparatus Qadhafi has directed, supported, and encouraged terrorist operations by Libyan agents and clients; gathered intelligence; and promoted propaganda to subvert hostile governments and enlist radicals in furthering Libya's goals. The overlapping functions of the apparatus have allowed Qadhafi to remain at its center by encouraging competition among his henchmen, who are eager to curry favor with their leader, and he thus controls his subordinates by arbitrating their disputes.

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We believe all parts of the apparatus have been ultimately responsible to Qadhafi and that none has had the authority to mount operations without his sanction.

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Qadhafi's Use of Clients

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Through the various elements of his state apparatus, Qadhafi has sought to organize a Libyan-led alliance of radical political, guerrilla, and terrorist groups to confront the United States and enhance his image as


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
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
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
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leader of the oppressed. Although this goal exceeds Libyan capabilities, Tripoli apparently has developed ties to a few select allies

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[redacted] who have a shared interest with Libya in targeting US personnel and facilities and who have proved their ability to carry out terrorist attacks. Such ties allow Tripoli to augment its striking power while minimizing the Libyan operational role—and Washington's ability to prove Libyan complicity. Qadhafi probably believes that using non-Libyan terrorist groups also enhances his image. He often publicly portrays attacks by groups anywhere in the world as spontaneous events in an ongoing war against colonialism and Zionism and paints himself as a leading player in this war whose revolutionary ideals are shared by the "oppressed" worldwide. [redacted] b3

Radical Palestinian Groups

Radical Palestinian groups have served as Qadhafi's primary clients for terrorist attacks. Support for anti-Arafat Palestinian groups has been a fairly consistent Libyan policy since the mid-1970s. [redacted] b3



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Although Qadhafi probably has not been able to achieve the degree of control over his clients that he has sought, they have given him the ability to project power that he would not otherwise have. The Libyan leader's influence with these groups—based primarily on his ability to provide them support—is not always sufficient to solicit attacks. Qadhafi's ability to do so is circumscribed to some extent by a desire on the part of some clients to protect their independence, by differences in political agendas, and by different views on how to achieve shared goals, as well as by the Libyan leader's mercurial temperament and reputation as an unreliable patron. [redacted]

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Despite these inevitable tensions, many of the client-sponsor relationships have proved mutually beneficial. [redacted] b3

Recent ANO operations appear to reflect accordance with Qadhafi's terrorism agenda. Among the ANO's recent targets have been a British club and a hotel used primarily by Westerners in Khartoum and a cruise ship off the coast of Greece. [redacted]

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[redacted] we suspect he encouraged or at least applauded them as dramatic reminders of Western vulnerability and the power of terrorists who share his goals. [redacted] b3

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


In other cases, support takes such forms as training, funding, weapons, safehaven, false documentation, or ideological promotion—again, with varying degrees of regularity. [redacted]

Other Palestinian Groups. Qadhafi continues to fund several radical Palestinian groups [redacted] b1, b3 and almost certainly pressures them to attack Western interests. Qadhafi has consistently supported

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anti-PLO radical groups since the mid-1970s, when he decided that Yasir Arafat had become too moderate.

Most of their operations have been aimed at Israel and the occupied territories. However, Libyan pressure on some of these groups to attack Western targets may have been successful in at least one case:

Japanese Red Army

During the past two years, Tripoli may have sponsored or encouraged several attacks against US interests that have been linked to activist members of the JRA.

Qadhafi has probably maintained contact with members of the JRA since 1985.

According to press accounts, the Libyan leader gave a hero's welcome to the lone JRA survivor of the Lod Airport massacre upon his release from an Israeli jail in May 1985.

Hizballah

Qadhafi has periodically worked with elements of the radical Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hizballah in Lebanon on an ad hoc basis; strong ties have not developed because of political and religious differences.

Qadhafi has hired Hizballah elements to help him obtain control of Western hostages.

All three were murdered two days after the US airstrikes in 1986. Hizballah, however, is not a natural ally of Tripoli. Like most Lebanese Shia, its members blame Qadhafi for the disappearance in 1978 of the Imam Musa Sadr, the spiritual leader of the Lebanese Shia community, and dislike Qadhafi's political views. Either reason would be sufficient to stop further development of relations. The elements of the group that apparently cooperate with the Libyans are probably only mercenaries.

Provisional Irish Republican Army


Although Qadhafi almost certainly has little operational influence over PIRA, he has supplied it some of the most sophisticated weapons in his arsenal. Tripoli has provided weapons to PIRA since at least 1973, when Irish authorities intercepted a ship containing 5 metric tons of Libyan arms off the coast of Ireland.

In October 1987, French authorities seized a coastal freighter bound for Ireland carrying 150 tons of arms and explosives, including heavy machineguns, flamethrowers, and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles. PIRA's enhanced weapons capabilities have compelled British forces to augment their defensive posture and adopt new security measures. Qadhafi's support to PIRA most likely grows out of his belief that the United Kingdom is a colonialist power that supports Libyan dissidents.

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
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Others

Qadhafi has supported a number of other terrorist or subversive groups around the world that have anti-Western biases. [REDACTED]

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recovered from the airstrikes as well as from his disastrous military defeat by Chad in 1987. In particular, the following developments have been instrumental in restoring Qadhafi's political strength:


- Antiregime sentiment in the armed forces has receded. The cease-fire with Chad in September 1987 relieved one of the most salient grievances the officers corps held against Qadhafi; and in early 1988 Qadhafi instituted economic and political reforms that have increased his general support. [REDACTED] Recent riots involving fundamentalist elements in Libya do not yet appear to have undermined Qadhafi's authority. Although Qadhafi's domestic standing could be quickly threatened—by renewed fighting in Chad in which Libyan troops fared badly, for example—his control of the regime is probably the most secure it has been since the US airstrikes.

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- Foreign pressure on Qadhafi has eased. In the past 18 months Qadhafi has moved to restore diplomatic relations with Iraq and Tunisia and participated in both the Arab League extraordinary summit in Algiers in June 1988 and two subsequent Maghreb five-party summits. He has eased his predicament in Chad by recognizing President Habre and escaped condemnation at the Organization of African Unity summit in May 1988 despite being linked to an aborted terrorist operation in Senegal. He has also hosted visits by the heads of state of nine African countries. [REDACTED]

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We believe that, as with Qadhafi's other client groups, pressure on them to conduct terrorist operations against targets of his choosing in exchange for his continuing support has brought a mixed response.



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West European sentiment is also softening; Italy hosted an official visit by Qadhafi's principal deputy, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, in November. [REDACTED]

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Qadhafi's hard-won current strength could be quickly undermined, however, if he is clearly linked to a new terrorist act and comes under renewed foreign pressure. [REDACTED]

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Political Security and the Terrorism Agenda

Despite recent incidents of internal unrest, Qadhafi has grown politically more secure during the past year, and that will enable him to devote more time to implementing his terrorism agenda. He has clearly

Indicators of Change

Given the consistency of Qadhafi's opposition to US and Western interests—and his longstanding policy of giving aid to foreign radicals—he is unlikely to reduce his support for terrorism.

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[REDACTED]

Recent Libyan concessions, such as recognition of Chadian President Habre's government, also point to a Libyan willingness to compromise under pressure. Although we are skeptical, Qadhafi may reduce Libyan terrorism in the hope of establishing better relations with a new US administration.

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In an approach to a new administration, Qadhafi would insist on a cessation of US political, economic, and military pressure on Libya. Tripoli, of course, will try to minimize its concessions and may simply offer to stop direct targeting of US personnel and facilities. Tripoli would probably argue—falsely—that past operations were not authorized by Qadhafi and that political reforms implemented this year will prevent future abuses. Although Qadhafi might, for a time, honor an agreement to cease directly targeting US personnel, he would probably continue to support terrorist groups willing to target Americans

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and deny responsibility for their actions. Qadhafi's current political strength and terrorist activities, his past practice of dishonoring diplomatic agreements, and his recent public statements all suggest that he is unlikely to alter his anti-US orientation.

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Should Qadhafi make overtures to the United States to improve relations, indicators that Qadhafi is serious would include:

- Punishment of Libyan diplomats and intelligence operatives caught in terrorist operations

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At present Tripoli uses all its resources to protect these officials, confirming their actions have official sanction.

[REDACTED]

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• The arrest or discharge of senior [REDACTED] officials. This might well be generated by domestic politics unrelated to gestures to Washington, but it would suggest that those ideologues most closely associated with Libyan terrorism were out of favor.

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• Ending direct encouragement by Libyan officials of terrorist attacks on US targets.

• Dropping Libyan contacts with US radicals.

• Cessation of efforts to recruit radicals worldwide for training in Libya.

• Closure of some of the commercial front companies most blatantly involved in intelligence/terrorist operations.


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we would not expect Qadhafi to drop Libyan support to radical Palestinians, whose cause has broad support in Libya.

- *Return of prominent Libyan exile 'Abd al-Munim al-Huni to a position in the Libyan regime. Huni has consistently made cessation of Libyan terrorism and disbandment of the Revolutionary Committees a prerequisite for his return to Tripoli.*



Qadhafi has given clear indications of his commitment to terrorism and to confrontation with the United States in public and private statements. During a trip to Tunisia in December 1988, Qadhafi virulently attacked the United States and other Western governments in an address to the Tunisian Parliament.



On 9 January 1989, Qadhafi threatened to "destroy anything American we can reach" if the United States attacked the Libyan chemical weapons plant at Rabta.

Looking Ahead

We expect Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks to continue as long as Qadhafi is confident of success and deniability and perhaps even increase to the extent that his influence over client groups worldwide grows. The Libyan leader is well positioned with a reliable internal apparatus and sufficient political security to sponsor deniable terrorist attacks. In addition, Qadhafi is implacably committed to ending "colonialism"—US, French, and British influence—and unifying the Arab world, as well as destroying the state of Israel. Although he has periodically ordered tactical standdowns or diplomatic initiatives to improve the regime's image, Qadhafi has consistently returned to terrorism as a primary tool for achieving his goals.

We believe that the greatest risk to US interests is in Western Europe and Central America and that the risk to US interests in Africa is increasing. Although security measures in Europe have been improved since 1986, the wealth of soft targets, easy access to the Western media for the maximum propaganda dissemination, and the availability of an established infrastructure continue to make that region an attractive venue for attacks.

Qadhafi could easily stage the dramatic trial and punishment of a diplomat or intelligence agent caught in a terrorist operation without changing the orders that instigated the operation. Qadhafi has often "punished" senior Libyan officials by placing them under house arrest with no concomitant reduction in their power.



Indicators that Qadhafi plans to be even more aggressive might include:

- *The reassignment of agents or officials caught in Libyan terrorist operations to influential positions overseas or in Tripoli.*
- *An increase of incentives or rewards offered to client groups, perhaps coupled with measures designed to punish organizations that fail to meet Libyan terrorism demands.*
- *The continued presence in positions of power of officials known to be associated with terrorist operations.*

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Concerning Central America, Tripoli probably believes there is an excellent opportunity to undermine US influence at little cost and to force Washington to focus its resources closer to home. Because Africa offers Tripoli a number of operational advantages—including numerous soft targets, porous borders, an existing infrastructure, and a wealth of potential surrogates—it has been the site of increased Libyan terrorist interest over the last 18 months—activity characterized by weapons smuggling, contacts with subversives, and establishment of front companies.

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Qadhafi almost certainly will continue to use client groups to attack US targets and in the near term will probably continue to provide support such as money, training, documentation, and conventional weapons to a wide range of terrorist groups.

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Qadhafi almost certainly will approach the new US administration in an effort to improve relations. He may privately offer to stop Libyan support for terrorism against US targets in return for a cessation of US political, economic, and military pressure. Nevertheless, Qadhafi's current strength and activities, his past practice of dishonoring agreements, and his recent public statements all suggest that he is unlikely to alter his general anti-US policy or permanently cease supporting terrorism.

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Appendix

Libyan Terrorist Activity by Region

The Middle East and North Africa

Although many of Qadhafi's clients are based in the Middle East, US targets are probably at less risk there from Libyan or Libyan-supported terrorists than in other parts of the world. Qadhafi's Middle East clients—primarily radical Palestinians—are more likely to strike in areas where it is easier to find soft targets, and the chances of involving supportive Arab governments are lower. A notable exception is in Lebanon, where a few elements of Hizballah, seeking monetary reward, have targeted US citizens for the Libyans.

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In 1988 the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) launched a new wave of terrorist operations that targeted Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab interests after a standdown of more than a year.


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In mid-April, Black September—an ANO cover-name used for attacks on Jordanian targets—claimed responsibility for two explosions in Amman.

On 15 May in Khartoum three ANO members carried out separate attacks against the British Sudan Club and the Acropole Hotel.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

Since late 1987, Qadhafi has tried to increase his political influence in Africa by combining aggressive diplomacy and intimidation. Because Africa offers Tripoli a number of operational advantages—including numerous soft targets, porous borders, an existing infrastructure, and a wealth of potential surrogates—it has been a key site for recent Libyan terrorist activity. The Libyan leader's long-term objectives are to weaken US, French, and Israeli influence and rid the region of what he considers nonprogressive regimes; he particularly seeks to strengthen his position in Chad by undermining African support for President Habre. The greatest risk to US targets is probably from local Libyan-supported or sponsored groups; however, the ANO has also conducted an attack in Sudan: (S NF)

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wealth of soft targets, easy access to the Western media, and [redacted] the availability of an established infrastructure continue to make the region an attractive venue for attacks.

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We strongly suspect that Qadhafi sponsored two bombings that occurred in Western Europe on the second anniversary of the US airstrikes.

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[redacted] the attacks—which would be the first involving Libya in Europe in nearly a year—indicate Qadhafi has improved his ability to conduct deniable operations there through client groups.

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The arrests in Dakar [redacted]


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may have temporarily degraded Libyan capabilities there.



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Qadhafi may also have prompted a client group to detonate two bombs at a US Air Force communications facility near Torrejon, Spain, on 15 April 1988. Although no group has claimed responsibility, the target and timing of the attack suggest Libyan involvement. The US Air Force was the target of the Torrejon attack.

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[redacted] The symbolism of the attacks on both these targets would be particularly pleasing to Qadhafi since the planes that attacked Libya in 1986 were from these services.

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Western Europe

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Just before these attacks, Qadhafi publicly predicted that progressives the world over would strike US facilities—and denied Libyan responsibility.


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Although security measures have been improved since 1986, the

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two passersby. The Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA) claimed responsibility. In early 1986, the MRTA claimed that it carried out several attacks on US targets in Peru to protest US policy toward Libya.

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


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
Latin America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi has shown an increased interest in operations in the Western Hemisphere. Tripoli clearly believes the region offers an excellent opportunity to undermine US influence at little cost and to force Washington to focus its resources closer to home.

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


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Central America. Qadhafi has long supported many groups in Central and South America with both the capability and the will to strike US targets, and we strongly suspect Libyan pressure was behind attacks against US targets in Colombia, Peru, and Costa Rica on or near the anniversary of the airstrikes against Tripoli. On 14 April 1988, gunmen set off explosives in the US binational center in Medellin, Colombia, after evacuating the building.


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On 16 April, in Lima, Peru, two binational centers were bombed, injuring


Caribbean. Qadhafi continues efforts to recruit Caribbean clients who are capable of striking US or French interests.

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

Most of Qadhafi's efforts have focused on the French-speaking islands, which have a tradition and political climate more conducive to violence than exists in the English-speaking islands.

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Local groups supported by Qadhafi—especially those with longstanding ties and a history of attacking US targets—are probably the greatest risk to US interests in the region.

Qadhafi's Middle East clients currently lack the infrastructure for effective operations in Central America, South America, or the Caribbean.

Asia and the Pacific

In the Pacific and Asia, as he has in other regions, Qadhafi has sought clients whose activities exacerbate local problems and expand his influence while undermining that of the West. His efforts to establish an infrastructure capable of supporting terrorism, however, have been seriously hurt by his inability to open new LPBs and by the closing of an established LPB in Canberra by Australian officials in 1987. Despite these setbacks, Qadhafi retains contacts with groups capable of striking Western interests in the region.

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