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Security Conditions in the
USSR, Poland, Austria, and Iran

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SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE USSR,
POLAND, AUSTRIA, AND IRAN

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SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE USSR, POLAND, AUSTRIA, AND IRAN

This paper estimates the likelihood of incidents which would endanger or seriously embarrass President Nixon during his planned visits to Salzburg, Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Teheran, and Warsaw. It concludes that in none of the cities to be visited is there likely to be a substantial threat to the physical security of the President and his party. In no case, however, can we entirely rule out the possibility of a violent act by a psychopath, a political extremist, or a hired assassin.

In Salzburg, the Presidential party will have the protection of a small but efficient security service and the goodwill of the great majority of the populace. But various youth groups and the Communist Party are planning Vietnam demonstrations to which they hope to rally supporters from elsewhere in Western Europe, and we cannot exclude the possibility that an unruly situation might develop.

Large-scale demonstrations in the USSR cannot occur without the regime's prior approval, and thus will not occur at all. Any demonstrations will be carefully controlled. Though the matter of Vietnam may cause some negative feelings, the average Soviet citizen can be expected to display interest, curiosity, and an orderly attitude toward the Presidential party.

In Teheran, the government has had recurring problems with terrorists, but the Shah's security apparatus is tough, experienced, and capable of maintaining order in most circumstances.

In Warsaw, the security controls will be nearly as strict as in the USSR, and the people will be especially well disposed toward the visit. Indeed the great popular enthusiasm which the Poles may show—deriving from their enduring anti-Russian as well as pro-US feelings—could cause the regime difficulties, perhaps in controlling crowds around the President, and perhaps in the tenor of Polish-Soviet relations.

COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC COUNTRIES

USSR (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev)

1. Security arrangements for the Presidential party in Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev will be supervised at the highest levels. Ultimately responsible will be Yuriy Andropov, Candidate Member of the Politburo and Chairman of the Committee of State Security (KGB). Most of the civilian and uniformed manpower directly involved will be KGB personnel, drawn in large part from the Ninth Directorate, which also protects Soviet officials. Andropov will also rely to some extent on the services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) which oversees routine police functions. Soviet security organizations are quite large and have long had the capability to monitor the activities of both Soviet citizens and foreigners; the KGB's ability to maintain internal security has, if anything, been strengthened over the last few years. Andropov's men are fully capable of handling large crowds anywhere in the USSR and, if necessary, providing them as well.

2. But even the large, efficient security apparatus of the USSR is not omnipotent. Under the Brezhnev regime there have been isolated acts of public defiance by Soviet dissidents (e.g., the small protest in Red Square in August 1968 against the invasion of Czechoslovakia). And in January 1969 someone apparently posing as a militiaman fired shots at a motorcade of cosmonauts and leading Party officials, among them Brezhnev. Though we think such incidents highly unlikely, we thus cannot exclude the possibility of some action in defiance of the regime's wishes—a desperate act by an individual or a display by a particular group of its own special grievance. Soviet Jews in Kiev or Moscow, for instance, might attempt to dramatize their desire to emigrate. Or radical Arab students might try to focus attention on their antipathy toward US Middle Eastern policy.

3. The average Soviet citizen in all three cities to be visited will most likely display interest, curiosity, and an orderly attitude toward the US visitors. This would be the norm for Muscovites in the presence of a distinguished Western delegation. Leningraders by temperament might appear some-

what more restrained than the Muscovites, and the Ukrainian inhabitants of Kiev somewhat more demonstrative. But differences in behavior in these three cities are not likely to be pronounced. The attitude of the populace in all three cities may, of course, be cooler, being influenced by recent developments in the Vietnamese situation and the official Soviet propaganda treatment of them. It is possible that some small demonstrations, led for instance by Vietnamese student groups, would be allowed. If so, they would be most carefully controlled.

4. But large-scale public demonstrations—which could not occur without the regime's prior approval—will not take place. The Soviet leaders, given their evident anticipation of a full agenda for discussions with the President, will want to make certain that the overall climate for the visit remains calm and "businesslike".

Poland

5. Ultimate responsibility for the security of the Presidential visit to Warsaw probably will be entrusted to Politburo member Franciszek Szlachcic, a close associate of Gierek. Szlachcic will be calling on various parts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to provide uniformed and plain-clothes personnel as needed. He might also draw upon a light infantry force, the Internal Defense Troops, subordinate to the Minister of National Defense

6. Both forces were used extensively in December 1970 to handle riots in several Polish cities. Relations between the populace and the security forces, and perhaps among components of the security forces themselves, remain slightly edgy on that account. But Gierek has purged a number of officials believed responsible for the harsh treatment meted out to the demonstrators, and we do not believe

that Polish crowds will seek to use the Presidential visit as the occasion for reopening old quarrels.

7. On the contrary, we believe that the Polish people and the regime together will extend the warm hospitality traditionally given to distinguished US visitors. Moreover, the Gierek regime appears to be more interested than its predecessor in better relations with the US. The US Embassy in Warsaw cites, among other indications of improved US-Polish relations, the cordial receptions given to Secretaries Volpe and Stans in November and December 1971 and to the crew of Apollo 15 in January 1972.

8. Perhaps the main security task of the regime will be to minimize any anti-Soviet overtones in too large an outpouring of popular enthusiasm. A reliable source has reported that this is precisely the concern of officials within the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We have no indication that Polish officials believe that such public displays could seriously threaten the physical security of the Presidential party, although they may suggest that his exposure be limited on Corpus Christi Day (1 June), when crowds will be large anyway.

Austria

9. We expect no organized threat to the President's safety during his stay in Salzburg. Most Austrians are well disposed to the US and flattered that their country has been chosen for the Presidential rest stop. They will join the government in trying to make the visit a success. The small but efficient Austrian security service has good sources in virtually all dissident groups (including the Communist Party) and a reputation for being as firm as it has to be.

10. There will, however, be efforts to embarrass the President on the issue of Vietnam.

Both the Communist Party and a coalition of youth and student groups are planning demonstrations during the President's visit; the latter may attempt to establish a headquarters at the University of Salzburg. Neither of these organizations would be likely to draw a big crowd from among Austrians alone, but both are trying to rally supporters—perhaps including American students—from elsewhere in Western Europe. The size and virulence of the demonstrations may be the greater because of the intensification of hostilities in Vietnam; the chances of access to the President will obviously depend on what public appearances he may make in Salzburg. The Austrian security forces have had limited experience in controlling large crowds, and we cannot rule out the possibility that an unruly situation might develop or that some fanatic* might try to take advantage of it. Yet the aims of the demonstrators would probably be to generate publicity favorable to themselves and to embarrass the President rather than to menace him. And the pro-Moscow Communist Party would not want actually to endanger Mr. Nixon on his way to meet Soviet leaders.

Iran

11. The Shah, firmly in control of Iran, has a tough and experienced security apparatus. The police, who have benefited from US training programs, are capable of keeping order under most circumstances, and are backed up by the Iranian Armed Forces which

*Among the possibilities might be a Palestinian extremist, an Iranian dissident, or an American youth opposed to US policy in Vietnam.

form the Shah's ultimate base of power. The military establishment is loyal to the throne; its higher-ranking officers are hand-picked and screened by the Shah for their fidelity to his person. And undergirding the whole structure is the far-flung and experienced SAVAK, the secret police, which has been given extensive authority for the control of political as well as criminal elements. SAVAK has in the past demonstrated its ability to uncover and cope with threats to security.

12. There is now no overt organized domestic opposition to the Shah. Nor is there notable hostility among Iranians toward the US in general or President Nixon in particular. Members of one or another Arab extremist group might try to slip into Iran to cause trouble, but the Iranian Government is alert to this possibility. A somewhat greater potential security threat to the Presidential visit probably lies in the small groups of Iranian radicals who in recent years have stepped up clandestine activity against the Shah and have carried out a number of acts of political terrorism. (A military judge was assassinated last year after sentencing convicted extremists.) In the past several months, the Teheran government has moved against such extremists, executed 10 of them, and put on trial some 100 more youths branded as "Maoists" and subversives. Some terrorists doubtless remain at large, but the government's severe measures appear to have dampened their activity and we do not think that they will actually disrupt security during the President's visit. SAVAK appears to have many penetrations of extremist circles and will be on maximum alert to prevent any incidents.

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