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CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 11-14-68:
SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

SUPPLEMENT

ESTIMATED SOVIET EXPENDITURES FOR THE
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES, 1963-75

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ESTIMATED SOVIET EXPENDITURES
FOR THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
1963-75

Summary

The expenditures implied by estimates of the Soviet general purpose force levels for 1968--ground, tactical air, naval, and military transport aviation forces--are expected to be 5.5 billion rubles. This figure, equivalent to approximately 16.8 billion dollars, is about 30 percent of total defense and space spending for the year. Ground forces account for about 50 percent of the total general purpose category, naval forces about 30 percent, and tactical aviation and military transport aviation about 10 percent each. It is estimated that by 1972, general purpose outlays will have increased to 6.0 billion rubles (18.7 billion dollars) and will continue to account for about 30 percent of the rising defense and space total. (See Figure 1, next page.)

The projected increase in ground force expenditures is mainly a result of an estimated rise of 250,000 in military manpower, reversing the downward trend that began after the Korean War. Procurement


Note: This supplement presents the expenditure implications of the Soviet general purpose forces estimated by the OSR contribution to 'IE 11-14-68 October 1968).

The period 1963-72 is discussed in detail, with more general comment on the trends of the mid-1970's. All costs related to the general purpose forces are reflected in the expenditure implications, with the exception of expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and for command and general support.

Ruble values are given in new rubles established by the Soviet currency reform of 1 January 1961 and are in constant 1955 prices. Unless otherwise indicated, dollar values are given in constant 1966 prices. Detailed statistics and a discussion of the methodology of the estimates are presented in the Appendix.

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of land armaments is expected to increase slightly, from an estimated 0.10 billion rubles (0.36 billion dollars) in 1963 to a figure not exceeding 0.15 billion rubles (0.52 billion dollars) through the mid-1970's. These modest levels result from the expected continued Soviet reliance on mobilization of civilian vehicles and reserve personnel in cases of emergency.

Tactical aviation expenditures are expected to total 0.5 billion rubles (1.3 billion dollars) for 1968 but to be more than 0.8 billion rubles (2.2 billion dollars) by 1972. Procurement, although down since 1965, accounts for virtually all of this increase. This results from the start of full production of the Foxbat and two other types of tactical aircraft.

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Expenditures for military transport aviation (which includes most of the Soviet military helicopters) in 1968 are estimated at 0.6 billion rubles (1.6 billion dollars)--exceeding those for tactical aviation for the same year. This reflects some increase over 1967 due to the program for the new AN-22 Cock heavy transport. In the early 1970's, further increases are expected to result from the resumption of spending on medium transports.

Soviet expenditures for the general purpose naval forces (excluding ballistic-missile submarines, which are considered strategic attack forces) appear to be fairly stable, although declining somewhat. Nevertheless, the Soviets are expected to develop a sizable fleet of new attack submarines by the mid-1970's--mainly at the expense of surface ship construction. This year, the general purpose naval forces are spending at an estimated annual rate of 1.8 billion rubles (5.2 billion dollars).

Estimated military manpower for the Soviet general purpose forces will have increased from 1.7 million men in 1963 to nearly 2.2 million men in 1972. Most of the increase is in ground forces manpower and reflects the judgment that the Soviets will continue to be concerned with the situation on the Chinese border and with the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces.

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I. Total Expenditures for General Purpose Forces

Estimated expenditures for the Soviet general purpose forces, while fluctuating, show a modest upward trend over the period 1963-72. In 1963, the Soviets spent an estimated 5.5 billion rubles (16.4 billion dollars) on these forces. By 1972, the figure is expected to reach 6.0 billion rubles (18.7 billion dollars), maintaining about a 30 percent share of rising total defense and space expenditures. On the average, for the ten-year period 1963-72, ground forces will have accounted for almost half of total spending; naval forces 30 percent; and tactical aviation and military transport aviation about 10 percent each.

In the early 1970's annual spending for the ground forces is expected to be about one-half billion rubles (about 2 billion dollars) higher than in 1963 (see Figure 2, opposite page). This increase accounts for nearly all of the increase in total general purpose forces spending over this period. Slight changes in the other elements tend to offset each other. During this period, ground forces expenditures as a share of total general purpose forces spending will have grown from 42 percent in 1963 to about 50 percent in the early 1970's. Each of the other elements will have declined slightly.

On a category basis, operating expenditures (such as outlays for personnel, spare parts, and expendables like food and POL) accounted for more than half of the total expenditures for the period 1963-67 and are expected to increase by about 0.32 billion rubles (more than 1.3 billion dollars), to 60 percent of the total by 1972. This results from the projected increases in the manpower force and the increasingly higher operating costs of its more sophisticated weapons systems. The introduction of these more sophisticated systems is expected to raise operation and maintenance costs per man by 13 percent during the period 1963-72.

The estimated levels of investment in new equipment for the ground forces are based on the judgment that the Soviets will continue to rely on mobilization of vehicles and reserve personnel from the civilian economy for a significant proportion of the general purpose support vehicles which might be needed in emergency situations.

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
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Figure 2


Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Elements of the General Purpose Forces, 1963-75

BILLION 1955 RUBLES


GROUND FORCES




TACTICAL AVIATION



MILITARY TRANSPORT AVIATION



NAVAL FORCES



*New rubles established by the Soviet currency reform of 1 January 1961.

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II. Expenditures by Mission Elements

A. General Purpose Ground Forces

Expenditures for the general purpose ground forces are expected to have increased nearly 25 percent during the period 1963-72. This represents a reversal of the long-term downward trend in ground forces expenditures which began with the manpower reduction following the Korean War and continued through 1961.

Virtually all of the increases in expenditures for the ground forces are in operating expenditures, where personnel costs account for about three-quarters of the total for the category. This is the result of present and projected increases in military manpower related to the buildup along the Sino-Soviet border and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is probable that the Soviets will have to carry a heavier direct burden in Eastern Europe in the future. Ground forces manpower stood at an estimated 1.1 million men in 1963 and is expected to rise to 1.6 million by 1972, an increase of nearly 40 percent.

If new items of equipment are introduced, anticipated procurement costs will increase accordingly. In 1963, procurement of land armaments amounted to an estimated 0.10 billion rubles (0.36 billion dollars), and in 1972, this figure is expected to be 0.12 billion rubles (0.42 billion dollars), an increase of 13 percent. This increase allows for a measure of equipment modernization but it reflects the judgment that the ground forces will not have all the general support vehicles needed for sustained full-scale operations.

The ground forces at present are dependent on the requisition of vehicles from the civilian economy to make up deficiencies. The extent of this dependence was evident prior to the Soviets' intervention in Czechoslovakia, when they had to commandeer a great many civilian vehicles. The dependence on civilian vehicles illustrates the Soviet emphasis on procurement of combat and combat support rather than general purpose equipment.

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Equipment modernization also has been slow as illustrated by continued production of older items of equipment. A case in point is the T-54/55 tank series --adopted in 1949, modified somewhat in 1958, and not expected to go out of production until this year.

B. Tactical Aviation

In 1968, expenditures for tactical aviation are expected to decrease 17 percent from the 1967 level, to 0.52 billion rubles (1.3 billion dollars) as a result of temporarily reduced aircraft procurement. Expenditures are expected to continue this downward trend through 1969, but then begin an increase continuing into the mid-1970's. A level of 0.85 billion rubles (2.2 billion dollars) is expected to be reached in 1972.

Expenditures for tactical aviation over the ten-year period 1963-72 are expected to absorb between ten and fifteen percent of the general purpose forces total. The estimated increase in the level of expenditures for the 1970's will result from procurement and deployment of the Foxbat, along with another new fighter and a new ground attack aircraft.

More sophisticated avionics, weapons, and fabrication result in procurement and operating costs per aircraft substantially greater than for earlier models. A Foxbat, for example, is estimated to cost about four times as much as a MIG-21 Fishbed and ten times as much as a MIG-15 Fagot. Operating costs in 1972 are estimated to be one-third higher per aircraft than in 1963.

C. General Purpose Naval Forces

Soviet expenditures for general purpose naval forces are expected to be fairly stable throughout the period 1963-72. They are estimated at about 1.8 billion rubles (5.2 billion dollars) in 1968--about the same level as for 1967. The 1967-68 outlays are the highest estimated since the mid-1950's. Construction of the last cruise-missile submarine units, the two helicopter carriers, and the lead units of the Kresta and Kashin guided-missile ships contributed to the high levels.

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Naval expenditures for 1968--excluding ballistic-missile submarines, which are considered strategic attack forces--represent less than 10 percent of total Soviet expenditures for defense and space. It is estimated that total naval mission expenditures will remain relatively stable in the near future (see Figure 2, page 5). They are estimated at around 1.7 billion rubles (5.0 billion dollars) for 1972--seven percent of the total defense and space expenditures estimated for that year.

The expenditure distribution pattern of the naval mission total expected for 1968 is as follows: about 20 percent each for the major surface ship element, the submarine element, and the naval aviation element; 15 percent for the minor surface ship element; and 25 percent for joint support.


The 20-percent shares for submarines and major surface ships in 1968, however, are not typical. Submarine construction is below normal because the construction programs for the E, J, and F classes are nearing completion, and the new C, V, and B classes are just getting into production. Surface ship construction, on the other hand, is higher than normal, principally because older ships are being converted and refitted with missiles at the same time that construction of new missile ships and the helicopter carrier is under way.

Since 1963, general purpose submarines have accounted for an average of about 25 percent of annual naval mission expenditures, while major surface combatants have averaged about 18 percent. Over the next few years, with the new attack submarines in full production, the general purpose submarine element is expected to continue to account for about 25 percent of the increasing total annual expenditures.

Major and minor surface ship outlays are expected to remain fairly stable through the mid-1970's although declining somewhat. Major surface ships average 0.30 billion rubles (1.1 billion dollars), and minor surface ships average 0.23 billion rubles (0.89 billion dollars) per year. Naval air expenditures are expected to decline. Joint support probably will increase slightly, reflecting the addition of submarine support ships to complement the large numbers of nuclear submarines entering the fleet.

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Projected naval expenditures through the 1970's include spending for a sizable force of modern attack submarines and continuing modernization of the surface fleet. It is estimated that by 1975 the Soviets will have about 90 new attack submarines --well over half nuclear--at a cost of over 1.8 billion rubles (5.9 billion dollars). Outlays of this size for an attack submarine force with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and antiship missions is larger than estimated expenditures for the Soviet ballistic-missile submarine force for the same period.

It appears that new surface ship construction will decline while the large submarine programs are being carried out. Most of the projected surface fleet

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modernization is to be achieved by the conversion of the Krupnyy-class and Kotlin-class destroyers to SAM units. These relatively low-cost conversion programs should add increased flexibility to surface fleet operations.

The only expected new construction programs for major surface ships are the Kresta-class guided-missile cruiser, the Kashin-class SAM destroyer, and Petya-class ASW escort. Total construction outlays for these programs are expected to average less than 0.09 billion rubles annually for the period 1968-72.

D. Military Transport Aviation (MTA)

Spending for MTA in 1968 is expected to total 0.59 billion rubles (1.6 billion dollars), an increase of almost 7 percent over 1967. This increase--largely the result of the projected procurement of the first Soviet heavy transport and some light transports--is offset somewhat by an anticipated reduction in procurement of medium transports.

Total estimated expenditures for MTA for the period 1963-72 amount to 6.2 billion rubles (16.4 billion dollars), or an annual average expenditure of about 0.6 billion rubles (1.6 billion dollars). Annual MTA expenditures from 1963 through 1967 declined at an average rate of seven percent per year and are expected to remain rather steady until about 1972, when an increase will begin, reflecting resumed investment in medium transports.

It is apparent that the Soviets will have to spend considerable amounts to improve their airlift potential. The introduction of the AN-22 Cock heavy transport and continued spending on MI-6 Hook/MI-10 Harke helicopters may indicate the Soviets' concern over the inadequacy of their current airlift capability.

During the 1963-68 period, operating costs accounted for a larger share of the total than did investment costs--60 percent, as opposed to 40 percent. This relationship is expected to continue through the early 1970's.

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III. Manpower Implications

Estimated military manpower for the Soviet general purpose forces increased from about 1.7 million men in 1963 to 1.9 million men in 1968 and is expected to climb slowly to nearly 2.2 million men in 1972. The ground forces' requirements for more manpower is the major factor contributing to this increase.

Manpower for the ground forces increased from about 1.1 million men in 1963 to an estimated 1.3 million men in 1968, and the upward trend is expected to continue into the mid-1970's. The Soviets have augmented their existing strength by bringing some low-strength divisions to an increased level of readiness. Soviet concern about forces along the Chinese border and the reliability of the Eastern European forces are contributing factors.

Tactical aviation manpower is believed to have increased slightly from about 95,000 men in 1963 to about 105,000 in 1968. After 1970, the expected phasing out of the Fagot and Fresco will result in a decline in manpower, but the decline will be offset partially by the introduction of the Foxbat in 1970 and the postulated deployment of new fighter and ground attack aircraft in the mid-1970's.

Manpower assigned to the naval forces increased from about 350,000 in 1963 to about 370,000 in 1968 but is expected to decline in the early 1970's. The general purpose submarine force is the only element in the naval mission with steadily increasing manpower--from about 40,000 men in 1963 to around 50,000 in 1972. This increase results from the deployment of additional cruise-missile submarines through 1969 and deployment of new attack submarines through the end of the period. The manpower required for surface ships is essentially constant and is expected to fluctuate around 200,000 men through the mid-1970's. Naval aviation manpower increased from almost 30,000 men in 1963 to about 40,000 at the present time, reflecting the deployment of the TU-16 Badger and TU-22 Blinder bombers and the TU-95 Bear D and BE-12 Mail reconnaissance aircraft. Manpower requirements are expected to decrease through 1975 as large numbers of Badgers are phased out, but increases in helicopters assigned to ASW forces will moderate the decline.

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Manpower for military transport aviation decreased from about 130,000 men in 1963 to about 120,000 in 1968 but is expected to regain its 1963 level in the mid-1970's as a result of an estimated increase in the numbers of heavy transports and helicopters.

IV. Comparison of US and Soviet Expenditures,
1963-68.

Soviet expenditures for general purpose forces make up about 30 percent of total defense and space expenditures in 1968, while US general purpose expenditures, mainly because of the Vietnam conflict, account for 40 percent of total defense and space expenditures. For 1963, in both the US and the USSR, expenditures for general purpose forces accounted for about 30 percent of total defense and space expenditures.

Spending for general purpose forces by the US averaged about 25 billion dollars* per year from 1963 through 1968, while the USSR spent, on the average, the equivalent of about 16 billion dollars** per year during the same period.

* *In current prices.*

** *For comparability with the US, this figure excludes expenditures for nuclear weapons.*

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Appendix

Statistical Tables

The expenditures for the general purpose forces are presented in both rubles and dollars because there are major differences between the US and the USSR in price structures. Ruble values are the appropriate measure of the military program mix and of the expenditure implications as they appear to the Soviets. Dollar equivalent values reflect the general size of the Soviet forces as if they had been purchased in the US and provide a basis for comparison with US programs.

Table 1 summarizes the estimated numbers of selected items of equipment that underlie the expenditure estimates. The detailed expenditure data on a force element basis are given in ruble terms in Table 2 and in dollar equivalent terms in Table 3. The data are given on a resource category basis in ruble terms in Table 4 and in dollar equivalent terms in Table 5.

The postulated deployment represents OSR's judgment as to the single most representative projection of forces from among the ranges provided in the basic OSR contribution to the estimate. These single points have been selected solely for costing purposes. No more confidence should be attached to the statement of forces thus projected than to the more generalized ranges contained in the basic OSR contribution. Values are in constant price terms, and all expenditure changes reflect program changes and not changes in prices over time. The ruble values have been computed at constant 1955 prices. Dollar values express equivalent costs in the US in constant 1966 prices.

The expenditure data in the tables are expressed in billions to two decimal places. This level of detail makes it possible to gain some perception of small movements in underlying data. The uncertainties are such, however, that no other significance should be attached to the second decimal place.

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The validity of the expenditure estimates depends on the validity of the statement of the forces, the accuracy of the price data, and the time frame of the estimate. Overall, the estimates for the past and current programs are considerably more reliable than the projections into the future, which naturally have a broader range of uncertainty. Review of new information on the size and technical characteristics of Soviet forces will necessitate revisions of these estimates. Normally this is done twice a year.

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Table 1

Estimated Numbers of Selected Items of Soviet Equipment and Manpower a/
Midyear 1963, 1968, and 1972

| | <u>Mid- 1963</u> | <u>Mid- 1968</u> | <u>Mid- 1972</u> |
|------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | <u>Units</u> | | |
| Tactical fighters | | | |
| Old | 1,790 | 715 | 525 |
| Current | 665 | 1,885 | 2,025 |
| Future | | | 160 |
| Total | <u>2,455</u> | <u>2,600</u> | <u>2,710</u> |
| Naval forces | | | |
| Helicopter carriers | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Guided-missile cruisers | 4 | 8 | 19 |
| Guided-missile destroyers | 14 | 27 | 44 |
| Guided-missile patrol craft | 132 | 170 | 194 |
| Cruise-missile submarines | | | |
| Nuclear | 8 | 33 | 33 |
| Diesel | 13 | 25 | 25 |
| Torpedo-attack submarines | | | |
| Nuclear | 9 | 18 | 42 |
| Diesel | 313 | 252 | 237 |
| Naval aircraft | 677 | 877 | 880 |
| Military transport aviation | | | |
| Transport aircraft | | | |
| Light and very light utility | 2,900 | 1,700 | 1,400 |
| Medium | 600 | 900 | 925 |
| Heavy | | 5 | 40 |
| Total | <u>3,500</u> | <u>2,605</u> | <u>2,365</u> |
| Helicopters | 1,600 | 1,950 | 2,375 |
| | | <u>Thousands</u> | |
| Manpower | | | |
| Ground forces | 1,140 | 1,328 | 1,573 |
| Tactical aviation | 96 | 106 | 106 |
| Naval forces | 346 | 367 | 364 |
| Military transport aviation | 130 | 118 | 123 |
| Total | <u>1,712</u> | <u>1,919</u> | <u>2,166</u> |

a. The deployment figures in this table were specified for the purpose of deriving the single-valued expenditures series presented in this contribution. These data fall within the ranges of the estimates appearing in the basic contribution. They should not be interpreted as being an equally reliable but more precise statement of the forces.

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Table 2
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Element a/
1963-75

| | Billion 1955 Rubles ^{b/} | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| Ground forces | 2.30 | 2.38 | 2.51 | 2.64 | 2.66 | 2.65 | 2.75 | 2.91 | 2.99 | 2.86 | 2.78 | 2.74 | 2.73 |
| Tactical aviation | 0.76 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.65 | 0.77 | 0.85 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 0.70 |
| Military transport aviation | 0.73 | 0.68 | 0.65 | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.59 | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.60 | 0.66 | 0.69 | 0.61 | 0.58 |
| Naval forces | 1.68 | 1.70 | 1.76 | 1.75 | 1.81 | 1.77 | 1.74 | 1.70 | 1.67 | 1.65 | 1.61 | 1.59 | 1.60 |
| Submarines | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.41 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
| Surface ships | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.62 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.58 | 0.54 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.47 |
| Naval aviation | 0.23 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.17 |
| Naval joint support | 0.45 | 0.44 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.47 | 0.49 |
| Total | 5.47 | 5.62 | 5.81 | 5.66 | 5.65 | 5.53 | 5.59 | 5.84 | 6.02 | 6.02 | 5.95 | 5.79 | 5.62 |

a. Expenditures for the general purpose forces include all outlays for personnel, procurement, operation and maintenance, construction, and nuclear weapons, but exclude expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and ballistic-missile-launching submarines systems that have a strategic mission role. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

b. New rubles established by the Soviet currency reform of 1 January 1961.

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Table 3
Dollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Element a/
1963-75

| | Billion 1966 Dollars | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| Ground forces | <u>7.58</u> | <u>7.83</u> | <u>8.11</u> | <u>8.53</u> | <u>8.67</u> | <u>8.80</u> | <u>9.32</u> | <u>9.68</u> | <u>9.86</u> | <u>9.85</u> | <u>9.81</u> | <u>9.78</u> | <u>9.76</u> |
| Tactical aviation | <u>1.83</u> | <u>1.96</u> | <u>2.03</u> | <u>1.70</u> | <u>1.56</u> | <u>1.27</u> | <u>1.22</u> | <u>1.51</u> | <u>1.85</u> | <u>2.15</u> | <u>2.25</u> | <u>2.21</u> | <u>1.83</u> |
| Military transport aviation | <u>1.94</u> | <u>1.81</u> | <u>1.73</u> | <u>1.50</u> | <u>1.46</u> | <u>1.56</u> | <u>1.55</u> | <u>1.53</u> | <u>1.59</u> | <u>1.74</u> | <u>1.82</u> | <u>1.61</u> | <u>1.55</u> |
| Naval forces | <u>5.04</u> | <u>5.02</u> | <u>5.15</u> | <u>5.16</u> | <u>5.36</u> | <u>5.19</u> | <u>5.16</u> | <u>5.11</u> | <u>5.05</u> | <u>4.99</u> | <u>4.87</u> | <u>4.76</u> | <u>4.75</u> |
| Submarines | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.33 | 1.21 | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.19 | 1.32 | 1.42 | 1.44 | 1.45 | 1.47 | 1.48 |
| Surface ships | 1.86 | 1.88 | 1.96 | 2.08 | 2.21 | 2.18 | 2.14 | 2.06 | 1.96 | 1.92 | 1.82 | 1.73 | 1.71 |
| Naval aviation | 0.56 | 0.58 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.81 | 0.85 | 0.70 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.44 | 0.42 |
| Naval joint support | 1.23 | 1.17 | 1.20 | 1.16 | 1.29 | 1.13 | 1.13 | 1.12 | 1.07 | 1.08 | 1.09 | 1.11 | 1.14 |
| Total | <u>16.39</u> | <u>16.62</u> | <u>17.02</u> | <u>16.88</u> | <u>17.05</u> | <u>16.81</u> | <u>17.25</u> | <u>17.84</u> | <u>18.35</u> | <u>18.73</u> | <u>18.75</u> | <u>18.36</u> | <u>17.90</u> |

a. Expenditures for the general purpose forces include all outlays for personnel, procurement operation and maintenance, construction, and nuclear weapons, but exclude expenditures for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and ballistic-missile-launching submarines systems that have a strategic mission role. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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Table 4
Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Category a/
1963-75

| | Billion 1955 Rubles b/ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| Investment expenditures | 2.74 | 2.80 | 2.91 | 2.63 | 2.53 | 2.26 | 2.20 | 2.38 | 2.52 | 2.44 | 2.34 | 2.15 | 1.97 |
| Procurement | 2.62 | 2.69 | 2.80 | 2.52 | 2.42 | 2.15 | 2.09 | 2.26 | 2.40 | 2.32 | 2.22 | 2.03 | 1.85 |
| Ammunition | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 |
| Land armaments | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.15 |
| Naval ships and boats | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.37 |
| Aircraft | 0.70 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.5C | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.48 | 0.65 | 0.69 | 0.56 | 0.41 |
| Missile systems | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.20 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.20 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.08 |
| Electronic equipment | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.20 |
| Nuclear weapons | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.39 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Other | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| Facilities | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| Operating expenditures | 2.74 | 2.83 | 2.92 | 3.03 | 3.14 | 3.26 | 3.39 | 3.46 | 3.52 | 3.58 | 3.61 | 3.63 | 3.65 |
| Personnel | 1.76 | 1.79 | 1.81 | 1.86 | 1.90 | 1.95 | 2.06 | 2.12 | 2.15 | 2.18 | 2.19 | 2.19 | 2.19 |
| Operation and maintenance | 0.97 | 1.04 | 1.10 | 1.17 | 1.24 | 1.30 | 1.34 | 1.36 | 1.38 | 1.39 | 1.42 | 1.45 | 1.47 |
| Total | 5.47 | 5.62 | 5.81 | 5.66 | 5.65 | 5.53 | 5.59 | 5.84 | 6.02 | 6.02 | 5.95 | 5.79 | 5.62 |

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. New rubles established by the Soviet currency reform of 1 January 1961.

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Table 5

Dollar Valuation of Estimated Soviet Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, by Category a/
1963-75

| | Billion 1966 Dollars | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| Investment expenditures | 6.49 | 6.47 | 6.66 | 6.15 | 6.05 | 5.40 | 5.27 | 5.52 | 5.86 | 6.02 | 5.96 | 5.53 | 5.04 |
| Procurement | 6.25 | 6.26 | 6.46 | 5.96 | 5.83 | 5.20 | 5.07 | 5.32 | 5.64 | 5.79 | 5.74 | 5.31 | 4.82 |
| Ammunition | 0.48 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.58 | 0.59 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| Land armaments | 0.36 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.43 | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.52 |
| Naval ships and boats | 1.64 | 1.56 | 1.50 | 1.45 | 1.50 | 1.27 | 1.34 | 1.41 | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.33 | 1.26 | 1.25 |
| Aircraft | 1.85 | 1.72 | 1.73 | 1.32 | 1.27 | 1.02 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 1.26 | 1.69 | 1.82 | 1.50 | 1.07 |
| Missile systems | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.32 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.19 |
| Electronic equipment | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.30 |
| Nuclear weapons | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.39 | 0.32 | 0.33 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.21 | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Other | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.94 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 1.05 | 1.09 | 1.11 | 1.13 | 1.14 | 1.14 | 1.13 |
| Facilities | 0.23 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.20 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 |
| Operating expenditures | 9.91 | 10.15 | 10.38 | 10.74 | 11.02 | 11.42 | 11.98 | 12.30 | 12.49 | 12.72 | 12.79 | 12.83 | 12.85 |
| Personnel | 7.94 | 8.07 | 8.17 | 8.41 | 8.60 | 8.87 | 9.35 | 9.63 | 9.77 | 9.96 | 10.00 | 9.99 | 9.98 |
| Operation and maintenance | 1.95 | 2.08 | 2.19 | 2.32 | 2.43 | 2.55 | 2.63 | 2.67 | 2.71 | 2.76 | 2.80 | 2.83 | 2.86 |
| Total | 16.39 | 16.62 | 17.02 | 16.88 | 17.05 | 16.81 | 17.25 | 17.84 | 18.35 | 18.73 | 18.75 | 18.36 | 17.90 |

a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

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