


**Top Secret 231**

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [REDACTED]

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.			DATE



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday December 28, 1976 [REDACTED]

**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**


Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**Top Secret**

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

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USSR: Bukovsky-Corvalan Exchange

1.5C

[REDACTED] Soviet dissidents have reacted with pleasure to the release of Vladimir Bukovsky but are astonished that Moscow agreed to exchange him for jailed Chilean Communist leader Luis Corvalan.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] there is no consensus among the dissidents as to why Moscow agreed to the exchange, but most of them were surprised that the Soviets were willing to make a concession in return for Corvalan's release. They felt that Corvalan in the long run would have been more useful to the USSR as a jailed martyr than as an exile living in the Soviet Union.

[REDACTED] A majority of the dissidents believe that a Soviet desire to give General Secretary Brezhnev's 70th birthday celebrations on December 19 an added fillip was an important reason for going along with the exchange. A minority view is that Moscow was signaling President-elect Carter that it might be willing to exercise greater leniency in human rights matters, particularly through quid pro quo arrangements. Few dissidents believe that pressure from Western public opinion played a major role in this case.

[REDACTED] Most of the dissidents believe the exchange was probably a move that would not be soon repeated. Some have speculated that the Soviet authorities, in order to minimize the importance of the exchange for the future, might henceforth sentence dissidents to periods of internal exile instead of imprisonment. Moscow, they said, could then deny that a given dissident is a prisoner and thus a candidate for an exchange.