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(14)

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(classification)


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[REDACTED]
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1. [REDACTED] COMMENT: REPORTS APPEARED IN THE [REDACTED] PRESS ON 31 MAY 1973 THAT RADIO AGRICULTURA WAS REMOVED FROM THE AIR BY NATIONAL POLICE UNDER ORDERS FROM THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, AT APPROXIMATELY 2130 HOURS THE NIGHT OF 30 MAY. THE REASON GIVEN WAS THAT THE STATION HAD BROKEN THE LAW FOR SECURITY OF THE STATE BY ANNOUNCING THAT TWO MINERS HAD BEEN KILLED BY THE ARMY IN RANCAGUA, WHEN IN FACT ONLY ONE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE PROVINCE OF O'HIGGINS, OF WHICH RANCAGUA IS THE CAPITAL, WAS DECLARED AN EMERGENCY ZONE ON 31 MAY AND WAS PUT UNDER MILITARY CONTROL DUE TO THE STRIKE BY WORKERS OF THE EL TENIENTE COPPER MINES.

[REDACTED] 1.5 (c)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

2. PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE PERSONALLY ORDERED THE CLOSURE OF THE SANTIAGO RADIO STATION RADIO AGRICULTURA ON THE NIGHT OF 30 MAY 1973. AFTER HE WAS TOLD BY ANIBAL P A L M A, SECRETARY GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT THAT THE STATION WAS MAKING ERRONEOUS AND INFLAMMATORY NEWS REPORTS RELATIVE TO THE SHOOTING IN RANCAGUA IN WHICH ONE PERSON WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER SERIOUSLY WOUNDED BY MEMBERS OF THE CHILEAN ARMY. ALLENDE ORDERED THE CLOSURE AS A SIGN OF GOVERNMENT BACKING OF THE ARMY IN RANCAGUA. ALLENDE FELT SUCH A MOVE WAS NECESSARY SINCE HE HAD RECENTLY REFUSED A REQUEST BY ACTING COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY, GENERAL AUGUSTIN P I N O C H E T, TO GRANT THE ARMY UNRESTRICTED AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THE STRIKE PROBLEM AFFECTING THE EL TENIENTE COPPER MINE. POPULAR UNITY (UP) LEADERS, AND PARTICULARLY LUIS B A E Z A, INTENDENT OF RANCAGUA AND A MEMBER OF THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCCH), HAD BEEN AGAINST TURNING OVER POWER OF MEDIATION TO THE ARMY AND CONVINCED ALLENDE TO TURN DOWN GENERAL PINOCHET'S REQUEST. INSTEAD, THE GOVERNMENT ORDERED PINOCHET TO ACT WITH A FIRM HAND IN THE ZONE, EVEN IF THIS MEANT TAKING A HARD STAND AGAINST SUPPORTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

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3. THE ARMY INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE ARMY WOULD NOT RETAIN CONTROL IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. THE ARMY FURTHER SAID THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS, THE ARMY WOULD CONSIDER MEDIATING THE SITUATION WITHOUT GOVERNMENT CONSENT.

4. U.P. SUPPORTERS IN RANCAGUA COMPLAINED THAT THE STRIKING WORKERS WERE RECEIVING CONSIDERABLE FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE THE CITY, AND CONSEQUENTLY WERE BEING BETTER FED THAN THOSE U.P. MINERS WHO WERE CONTINUING TO WORK. THE GOVERNMENT ASKED THE ARMY TO STOP ALL TRUCKS GOING INTO THE AREA. HOWEVER, ARMY REPRESENTATIVES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EMERGENCY ZONE REFUSED, ARGUING THAT MATERIAL SUPPORT WAS BEING RECEIVED BY THE STRIKERS FROM ALL AREAS OF CHILE AND THAT IF ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO STOP IT, THE DISCONTENT WOULD SIMPLY SPREAD.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE CONFLICT IN O'HIGGINS PROVINCE, GOVERNMENT LEADERS WERE ALSO CONCERNED THAT THE WORKERS OF THE CHUQUICAMATA COPPER MINE MIGHT START A FULL-SCALE SYMPATHY

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STRIKE ON 4 JUNE IF THE EL TENIENTE STRIKE IS NOT RESOLVED PRIOR TO THAT DATE. THIS COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS IN ANTOFAGASTA AND CALAMA AND THE POSSIBLE DECLARATION OF A ZONE OF EMERGENCY IN THIS AREA. [REDACTED] COMMENT: GOVERNMENT LEADERS WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE SUCH A STEP SINCE THEY ARE AWARE THAT THE LEADING MILITARY OFFICERS IN THIS AREA ARE ANTI-GOVERNMENT.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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

6. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO INFORMED THAT 200 ARMED MEMBERS OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR) AND SOCIALIST PARTY (PS) PARA-MILITARY BRIGADES RECENTLY MOVED INTO THE SAN PEDRO AREA OF PANGUIPULLI NEAR CHILLAN. THIS MOVE HAS ALARMED THE FARMERS IN THE AREA AND CAUSED THE OPPOSITION FORCES TO MOBILIZE. THE GOVERNMENT FEARED THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO AN ARMED CONFRONTATION.

7. ALL OF THE ABOVE PROBLEMS LED PRESIDENT ALLENDE TO BELIEVE THAT CERTAIN INCIDENTS COULD LEAD TO A CHAIN REACTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND CREATE A SITUATION WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT CONTROL. ALLENDE WAS ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE FACT THAT HE DOES NOT ENJOY THE SAME PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP

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WITH GENERAL PINOCHET AS HE HAS WITH GENERAL CARLOS PRATS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY, WHO IS CURRENTLY ON AN OFFICIAL TRIP IN EUROPE. AS A RESULT, ALLENDE IS CONSIDERING CUTTING SHORT GENERAL PRAT'S CURRENT TRIP ABROAD. HE IS ALSO CONSIDERING ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE EL TENIENTE STRIKE BEFORE THE 4 JUNE DATE WHEN THE CHUQUICAMATA WORKERS WILL DECIDE WHETHER THEY WILL JOIN IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE EL TENIENTE STRIKERS. AS A FINAL MEASURE, ALLENDE HAS GIVEN THOUGHT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF GIVING ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO THE MILITARY, INCLUDING CHANGING HIS CURRENT CABINET TO A NON-POLITICAL CABINET CONSISTING OF MILITARY AND TECHNICAL MINISTERS WITH THE MILITARY HAVING AS MANY AS EIGHT CABINET POSTS, IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.  COMMENT: ALLENDE'S CURRENT STATE OF MORALE IS EXTREMELY LOW, AND HE FEELS QUITE DISCOURAGED BY THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISIS. AS A RESULT OF THIS LOW MORALE AND ALLENDE'S GENERALLY POOR STATE OF HEALTH, THE PRESIDENT FEELS THAT HE MUST DELEGATE POWER IN ORDER TO RESOLVE PRESENT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE U.P.)

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