

PAGES 1 & 2

1.5 (c)

DENIED IN FULL

DOCUMENT DATED 9 July 73

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE JUN 11 1998

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], THE AIR FORCE DID NOT RECEIVE ADVANCE WARNING OF THE PLANS BY THE ARMY'S SECOND ARMoured BATTALION TO ATTACK THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON 29 JUNE, BUT AIR FORCE GENERALS HAVE NONETHELESS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT ALLOWING THE HAWKER HUNTERS AIRCRAFT TO AT LEAST OVERFLY THE DOWNTOWN AREA OF THE CITY DURING THE UPRISING. THE REASON THIS WAS NOT DONE WAS BECAUSE THE AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DID NOT REALLY KNOW WHAT WAS TAKING PLACE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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ALMOST THE ENTIRE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS EXTREMELY ANGRY WITH COLONEL LUIS R A M I R E Z, COMMANDER OF THE "TACNA" ARTILLERY REGIMENT, FOR THE NEEDLESS DEATHS HE CAUSED IN PUTTING DOWN THE UPRISING.)

3. DURING THE EVENING OF 29 JUNE ADMIRAL RAUL M O N T E R O, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE NAVY, ASKED THE AIR FORCE GENERALS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO MEET WITH THE ADMIRALS PRESENT IN THE CITY, WHILE HE AND GENERAL CESAR R U I Z, AIR FORCE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, WENT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. AT THIS MEETING, THE ADMIRALS AND AIR FORCE GENERALS OPENLY TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO OVERTHROW THE U.P. GOVERNMENT, BUT THEY CAME TO

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



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(classification)

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THE CONCLUSION THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT THE ARMY AND THAT THE ARMY WAS NOT PREPARED AT THAT TIME FOR SUCH ACTION.



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COMMENT: BOTH RUIZ AND MONTERO WERE VERY ANGRY OVER THE FACT THAT PRESIDENT SALVADOR A L L E N D E HAD PRESENTED THEM TO THE CROWD DURING THE 29 JUNE PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION. THEY SAID THEY WOULD HAVE HAD TO RESIGN HAD THEY REFUSED TO JOIN THE PRESIDENT ON THE PLATFORM, AND THEY FELT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THEM TO WORK FROM THE INSIDE RATHER THAN BE REMOVED.) AGREEMENT WAS EVENTUALLY REACHED AT THE MEETING TO ASK GENERAL CARLOS P R A T S, ARMY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, TO NAME FIVE ARMY GENERALS TO MEET WITH A LIKE NUMBER FROM THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY TO DISCUSS MILITARY CONCERN OVER THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

4. ON THE MORNING OF 30 JUNE PRATS AGREED TO THE MEETING AND SUGGESTED THAT IT BE HELD THAT EVENING. GENERALS AUGUSTO P I N O C H E T, MARIO S E P U L V E D A, OSCAR B O N I L L A, SERGIO A R E L L A N O, AND SERGIO N U N O REPRESENTED THE

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ARMY; GENERALS JORGE GUSTAVO L E I G H, AGUSTIN R O D R I G U E Z, CLAUDIO S E P U L V E D A, NICANOR D I A Z, AND FRANCISCO H E R R E R A ATTENDED FOR THE AIR FORCE; AND ADMIRALS PATRICIO C A R V A J A L, ISMAEL H U E R T A, DANIEL A R E L L A N O, CARLOS L E O N, AND HUGO C A B E Z A S REPRESENTED THE NAVY.

5. DURING THE 30 JUNE MEETING NO PLOTTING DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD BECAUSE THE ADMIRALS AND AIR FORCE GENERALS DID NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ALL THE ARMY GENERALS PRESENT. AT THE MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT EACH OF THE SERVICES WOULD PREPARE A MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHILE AND ITS BEARING ON NATIONAL SECURITY. THE MEMORANDA WERE TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY 2 JULY, AT WHICH THE THREE WOULD BE COMBINED INTO ONE MEMORANDUM. A COMMITTEE OF TWO GENERALS FROM THE ARMY, TWO FROM THE AIR FORCE AND TWO ADMIRALS WERE TO DO THE CONSOLIDATION. AS IT TURNED OUT, THE AIR FORCE PREPARATION WAS THE MOST COMPLETE AND IT WAS USED AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION. THE FINAL MEMORANDUM WAS BASED ON NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS AND WAS VERY RESPECTFUL IN TONE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD. IT PROVIDED A BACKGROUND ON THE SITUATION AND WAS OUTLINED INTO

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ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SECTIONS.

6. WHEN THE CONSOLIDATION HAD BEEN COMPLETED, COPIES WERE GIVEN TO THE THREE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF. RUIZ AND MONTERO OBJECTED TO TWO PARAGRAPHS - ONE DEALING WITH THE MILITARY IN THE CABINET, WHICH INDICATED THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR SUCH PARTICIPATION THE MILITARY WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN ALL MINISTERIAL POSITIONS. THE SECOND DEALT WITH THE NEED TO REMOVE ALL FOREIGN EXTREMISTS, ESTIMATED TO BE AT 15,000, FROM CHILE. THE OFFICERS INVOLVED AGREED TO REMOVE THE TWO PARAGRAPHS. HOWEVER, WHEN RUIZ AND MONTERO WENT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE THE AFTERNOON OF 2 JULY, THEY DISCOVERED THAT GENERAL PRATS HAD SHOWN HIS COPY TO ALLENDE AND DEFENSE MINISTER JOSE T O H A, BOTH OF WHOM VOICED THEIR ANGER OVER THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH WERE TO HAVE BEEN REMOVED.

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THAT THE ARMY WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE CABINET. THIS DECISION WAS MADE KNOWN TO THE PRESIDENT THE MORNING OF 3 JULY. THUS, WHEN THE THREE COMMANDERS IN CHIEF MET THE PRESIDENT DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 3 JULY, HE WAS ALREADY AWARE THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN HIS CABINET.

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(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] COMMENT: PRATS INSTRUCTED GENERALS ORLANDO U R B I N A, SEPULVEDA, PIKERING, AND BONILLA TO INFORM PRESIDENT ALLENDE OF THE ARMY'S DECISION NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS DONE ON THE MORNING OF 3 JULY. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
8. DURING 4 AND 5 JULY PRESIDENT ALLENDE MADE NO EFFORT [REDACTED] TO TRY AND PERSUADE THE MILITARY TO CHANGE THEIR MIND ABOUT ENTERING THE CABINET. [REDACTED] COMMENT:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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9. ON 6 JULY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE THREE SERVICES AGAIN MET TO DISCUSS MATTERS, DESPITE THE OBJECTIONS OF GENERAL PRATS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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THE TWO PARAGRAPHS

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[REDACTED]

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(classification) (dissem controls)

WHICH HAD BEEN QUESTIONED WERE BEING REMOVED. HOWEVER, PRATS NOTIFIED THE OTHER TWO MILITARY SERVICES THAT HE WAS ILL AND WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO SIGN THE MEMORANDUM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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