




Directorate of
Intelligence



M



Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSR

A Research Paper



POOR ORIGINAL



November 1987
Copy 388

Approved for Release
Date June 1999

~~75~~
24



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-~~
~~ORCON~~

Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSR

A Research Paper

Reverse Blank

November 1987

Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSR [REDACTED]

Summary

*Information available
as of 15 September 1987
was used in this report.*



For several decades Western radiobroadcasting into the USSR has played a key role in weakening the regime's monopoly of mass communications—historically a major Communist instrument of social mobilization and political control. By providing large numbers of Soviet citizens with an alternative source of information and ideas, the Western radios have made it impossible for the regime to determine exclusively how much and what sort of news reaches the Soviet population. Western radiobroadcasting thus makes it more difficult for the regime to censor opposing points of view while propagating official values and ideology, and, in this way, shape popular attitudes and behavior. [REDACTED]

Several factors have gradually expanded the influence of Western broadcasting:

- Urbanization and the spread of education have broadened the horizons of many people, making them more interested in the outside world, especially in things Western.
- Fear that listening could lead to reprisals has increasingly diminished. With the renunciation of Stalinist terror, the regime lost its ability to regulate closely the lives of its citizens, and, as it retreated from the effort to do so, many people gradually began to take advantage of the de facto expansion of freedom.
- The stale offerings of Soviet propaganda and culture in the Brezhnev years caused many citizens to tune out the official media and turn to independent sources of entertainment and news outside the regime's purview.

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-~~
~~ORCON~~

- Western governments since 1980 have modernized the radios' broadcasting facilities to expand their territorial coverage and reach more listeners, while improvements in the standard of living for selected groups enabled more Soviet citizens to purchase shortwave radio receivers—unrestricted because the USSR relies extensively on shortwave radio for its own domestic communications. [REDACTED]

Today about 30 percent of the adult Soviet population—over 80 million people—listen at least once a week to foreign radio, usually Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Deutsche Welle (DW), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), or Voice of America (VOA). Listening is especially common among officials, the intelligentsia, and youth—groups whose political reliability is critical to the future stability and cohesion of the Soviet system. Rates of listening are also high among non-Russian nationalities in the Western borderlands and among religious believers, elements of the population whose vulnerability to Western influences has long concerned the regime. [REDACTED]

It is impossible to measure precisely the extent to which Western broadcasting has affected Soviet public opinion. Western surveys of the attitudes of Soviet citizens, however, have shown a strong correlation between listening to Western radios and the holding of unorthodox views on particular political and social issues. Moreover, reporting from Soviet sources suggests a cumulative, if indirect, impact on the overall orientation of those who listen—increased skepticism about Soviet official pronouncements and a diminishing sense that the capitalist world is alien and hostile. [REDACTED]

Speeches of top Soviet leaders in the several years before and after Gorbachev's accession have expressed considerable apprehension that the United States and its Western allies are using radiobroadcasting as one of a number of weapons designed to publicize and exploit Soviet internal problems in an effort to undermine the Soviet regime from within. Gorbachev's own remarks, although not as sharp as those of some of his Politburo colleagues, indicate that he shares this concern. [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

Instead of trying to seal off the population from outside news, Gorbachev's main strategy is to improve the credibility of Soviet media and to enhance the attractiveness of Soviet culture through a policy of "openness." The *glasnost* policy serves many purposes, but a major impetus has been the desire to compete more effectively with foreign media for the Soviet domestic audience. Past Soviet leaders have argued that exposing social problems, criticizing official abuses, and more openly discussing politically sensitive aspects of party history would provide grist for foreign radios. But Gorbachev maintains that it is precisely the suppression of information about domestic problems that opens the door to foreign propaganda. Thus, supporters of *glasnost* argue that it is in the regime's interest to preempt foreign radios by moving rapidly to provide early coverage of important events and to interpret them in ways that put the regime in the best light.


Gorbachev also has made organizational and personnel changes in the propaganda apparatus and is working to upgrade the technical capabilities of Soviet media:

- He has merged two Central Committee departments in an effort to achieve better coordination of foreign and domestic propaganda.
- He has carried out a major purge of Brezhnev holdovers in key positions in the editorial and propaganda bureaucracies.
- By using satellites and expanding multichannel television programming, the regime is extending the reach and variety of Soviet television.

A more dramatic change has been the cessation of jamming of BBC and VOA, although jamming of RFE/RL and DW continues. Gorbachev undoubtedly realized that jamming had been only partially effective; in fact, more Soviet citizens listened to Western radios in 1985 than before comprehensive jamming resumed in 1980. Considering this, Gorbachev presumably calculated that the benefit of jamming (limiting but not preventing popular exposure to Western news) was outweighed by the liabilities. These adverse consequences included feeding popular cynicism about Gorbachev's much-touted commitment to *glasnost* and acknowledging in effect that the regime had something to hide and feared competing with the West in the world of ideas. Moreover, Gorbachev probably realized that jamming damaged the regime's reputation abroad, and he may even have surmised, as have some other Soviet officials, that jamming actually stimulated interest in the foreign "voices" because of the lure of "forbidden fruit."

Gorbachev has also used more standard methods of countering the Western radios:

- Not surprisingly, the end of jamming has been accompanied by propaganda attacks on Western radios. These onslaughts often include detailed rebuttals of the arguments made by the radios rather than the generalized *ad hominem* attacks previously relied on. Press attacks have also become both more strident, as illustrated especially by the campaign to hold the radios responsible for fomenting the mass demonstrations in the Baltic republics that took place in August 1987.



- Moscow has used diplomacy—both threats and blandishments—to try to rein in the foreign stations. In an effort to legitimize blocking those stations that are still jammed, Moscow has attempted to mobilize the support of various Third World countries for a “New World Information Order” that would sanction jamming “subversive” propaganda of “imperialist” countries.
- Gorbachev has refined a counterpropaganda campaign launched in 1979. The thrust is to turn the tables on Western critics, putting them on the defensive by highlighting alleged human rights violations in the West.

Several interrelated considerations probably will continue to influence Soviet policy toward Western stations in the future:

- An assessment of the public's mood will continue to be most important in decisions about whether to jam the radios. Moscow has been particularly inclined to extend jamming during periods when the USSR was undertaking external actions that it feared would be viewed negatively by the Soviet public. Jamming was extended at the time of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and again shortly after the 1980 declaration of martial law in Poland. Thus, a new crisis in Eastern Europe, especially one that led to the use of Soviet military force, would be most likely to cause the reimposition of comprehensive jamming.

- Moscow's evaluation of each station's message and its impact on the Soviet population is an important consideration. The Soviets continue to have a greater desire to jam RFE/RL because it is a surrogate home station that they see as more threatening. Thus, Moscow has jammed RFE/RL continuously since it went on the air in 1953, whereas jamming of other stations has been intermittent.
- There has been a strong correlation between the level of East-West tension and decisions about jamming. Thus, Moscow stopped jamming most major Western stations after the SALT agreement was signed in 1973. The recent decision to cease jamming VOA and BBC was probably influenced by a desire to improve the atmosphere for arms control negotiations.
- Cost and energy considerations may loom fairly large. Although hard to estimate, the expense of jamming is probably high enough to be a concern in a period of resource constraints in the USSR. Some reporting suggests the loss of electrical power due to the Chernobyl' accident affected Soviet jamming decisions. [REDACTED]

Without a political crisis in the Soviet leadership, a major downturn in East-West relations, or a breakdown of political and social order in Eastern Europe, the regime is most likely to pursue a course of continuing or refining the current policy toward the radios:

- The Soviets may decide to stop jamming DW to bolster their reputation for openness. They detest and probably fear RFE/RL, however, and probably believe they can persuade many foreigners as well as Soviet citizens that *glasnost* does not require allowing what they portray as "anti-Soviet" propaganda to flow unchecked into the country.
- [REDACTED]

- At present, options for moving toward greater repression are also limited by the fact that the Soviets still rely on shortwave radio for many domestic broadcasts. Within a decade or so, however, the regime may be able to eliminate this reliance. It is continuing to hard-wire the country so that signals travel by cable rather than through the atmosphere. But even if the Soviets stop domestic production of shortwave receivers, the large existing stock would give many citizens access to foreign broadcasting for years to come. [REDACTED]

For the foreseeable future, then, a substantial minority of the Soviet public probably will be able to receive Western news and analysis via shortwave radio. The cessation of jamming will result in a gradual growth in the Soviet audience. The ease with which programs can be picked up will more than offset the loss of the thrill of listening to the stations in defiance of regime efforts to block them. There is, however, an upward limit to the growth in audience size for Western broadcasting. Listening is already widespread among the urban, educated classes; peasants and less educated city dwellers have much less interest in listening. [REDACTED]

Glasnost is not likely to diminish the appetite for news from Western stations. Greater candor in Soviet domestic media cannot completely close the credibility gap between official propaganda and the population's desire to hear another point of view. Since Gorbachev is not likely to remove *all* constraints on public discussion of sensitive political issues, such as the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule, there will continue to be an interest in Western reporting and analysis. In fact, by increasing public attention to political issues, *glasnost* is likely to stimulate greater interest in both domestic and foreign media. In Eastern Europe, where the media generally have been more open than in the USSR, the audiences for Western broadcasting remain large. [REDACTED]

The penetration of the USSR by Western broadcasting is part of a broad process—including technological improvements in communications, urbanization, education, and growing global economic interdependence—that is breaking down the isolation of the Soviet population. In combination with these other developments, Western broadcasting is enlarging the size of the critically thinking public, diminishing suspicion of the outside world, and placing pressure on the regime to take into account the desires of its people in making policy. [REDACTED]

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Summary	iii
Scope Note	xi
Introduction	1
The Western Radios and Who Listens to Them	1
Which Stations Broadcast to the USSR?	1
Size of the Audience	2
Why the Large Audience?	3
Factors Limiting Jamming's Impact on Audience Size	4
The Impact of Listening	5
A Better Informed Public	5
Credibility of the Radios	7
Depends on Ability To Verify Information	7
Depends on Makeup of Audience	9
Depends on Individual Station	10
Effect on Attitudes	12
Regime Concern About the Radios	13
Reasons for Concern	13
Degree of Concern	16
Sensitivity About Particularly Vulnerable Audiences	17
Officials and Intellectuals	18
Youth	19
Minority Nationalities	24
Religious Believers	38
The Armed Forces	31
Recent Regime Policy	32
Efforts To Restrict Radio Listening	33
Jamming	33
Legal Sanctions	36
[REDACTED]	37
Counterpropaganda and Propaganda	40
The Emergence of a New Type of Counterpropaganda	40
Revamping Organizations and Personnel	40
Upgrading Technical Capabilities and Programming	41

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-~~
~~ORCON~~

Recent Counterpropaganda Themes	43
Increasing the Credibility of the Official Media	47
The Move Toward Openness	47
The Purposes of <i>Glasnost</i>	48
The Risks of <i>Glasnost</i>	50
The Impact of <i>Glasnost</i>	51
Recent Diplomatic Initiatives	52
Soviet Multilateral Diplomacy	53
Pressure on Particular Countries	55
Looking Ahead: Factors Influencing Future Policy Toward the Radios	57
Assessment of the Public's Mood	57
Evaluation of the Station's Content	58
Foreign Policy Considerations	58
Cost and Energy Constraints	60
Options Available to Gorbachev	60
Ending All Jamming	60
The Conservative Option	61
Making Refinements in the Current Course	63
Conclusions and Outlook	64

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~
~~NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-~~
~~ORCON~~

**Gorbachev and the Problem
of Western Radiobroadcasting
Into the USSR**

Scope Note

In focusing on radiobroadcasting, this study concentrates on what is now the main conduit of Western influence and the most evident intrusion of the information revolution on the Soviet Union. Subsequent work in this field will examine the impact of other information technologies that are in a nascent stage of development in the USSR—particularly videocassette recording, the transmission of TV signals by satellite directly to the Soviet population, and the possible use of computers to disseminate “unauthorized” information among members of the Soviet public.

This study evaluates Gorbachev’s policy of “openness” (*glasnost*) only insofar as it applies to the Western radios. DI Research Paper SOV 86-10041X (Secret NF NC OC), August 1986, *The Debate Over “Openness” in Soviet Propaganda and Culture* provided a broader treatment of the genesis of *glasnost*.

*Western Radio Stations Targeted to the USSR**

The four major Western stations:

Voice of America
Radio Liberty, United States (broadcast from Munich, West Germany)^b
British Broadcasting Corporation, Great Britain
Deutsche Welle ("German Wave"), Cologne, West Germany

The minor Western stations:

Radio Australia
Austrian Radio (ORF)
Belgian Radio (RTBF)
Radio Canada International
Radio Finland
Radio France International
Greek Radio (ERT)
Voice of Israel
Italian Radio (RAI)

Radio Japan
IBRA Radio, Malta
IBRA Radio, Portugal
Radio RSA, South Africa
Radio Sweder: International
Swiss Radio International
Voice of Turkey

Religious radio stations

Adventist World Radio (AWR)
KNLS ("New Life Station"), Alaska
Radio Monte Carlo, Monaco
Radio Vatican
Trans World Radio, Monaco
Voice of the Andes, Ecuador

Other

United Nations Radio

* List excludes "spillover" from two commercial US stations (WYFR and KGEI) and from some government stations (for example, Denmark). Even though such signals can be picked up in the USSR, this programming is not intentionally targeted to the USSR in either Russian or one of the other languages spoken there. List also excludes radio stations from several less developed countries (for example, Iran, Iraq, and South Korea) whose programs are targeted to the USSR or are audible there.

^b The Baltic Services of Radio Free Europe are closely affiliated with Radio Liberty; the latter's signals are beamed to Soviet territory except for the three Baltic states.

Source: World Radio TV Handbook



Gorbachev and the Problem of Western Radiobroadcasting Into the USSR

Introduction

Beginning with the years of detente, Soviet citizens have gained greater access to information from outside sources than ever before. The most important channel has been foreign radiobroadcasts, which reached, with varying degrees of audibility, much of the Soviet public—even during the period of heavy jamming from 1980 to early 1987, when the Gorbachev regime stopped jamming many major Western radio stations. How to respond to foreign broadcasts represents a continuing dilemma for the regime. Renewing jamming of all foreign broadcasts would feed popular cynicism about Gorbachev's much-touted commitment to the free flow of ideas and become a sore point in relations with Western countries, especially the United States. But refraining from jamming some stations runs the risk of further increasing Soviet citizens' exposure to information—about living standards and civil liberties outside the USSR—that enables them to evaluate the regime's propaganda more critically.


The Western Radios and Who Listens to Them

Which Stations Broadcast to the USSR?

Close to 30 Western nations broadcast to the USSR in Russian, in one of the Soviet minority national languages, or in their own (Western) language (see inset). About an equal number of less developed countries, as well as some clandestine radio stations, also broadcast to Soviet territory. In large part because most stations can be heard only in small parts of the country or for short periods of the day, the main impact on the Soviet public comes from a handful of the more powerful Western stations.

In terms of program hours, the leading external broadcaster to the USSR is Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), on the air some 500 hours

Figure 1
The Four Major Stations: Weekly Program Hours to the USSR



^aIncludes weekly broadcasting hours for all language services targeted to the USSR. RFE/RL total includes RFE's three Baltic-language services but not its programs to Eastern Europe.

in an average week,¹ followed by Voice of America (VOA), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the West German station Deutsche Welle (German for "German Wave"; the station is hereinafter abbreviated DW) (see figure 1).

¹In October 1984, the RFE/RL corporation transferred the three Baltic Services from RL to RFE to conform to US Government policy that does not recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the USSR.

~~Secret~~

At the same time, at least during periods of heavy jamming of major Western stations, some of the smaller ones have an influence disproportionate to their relatively weak broadcasting signal. Judging from a variety of reporting, Radio Sweden, Radio France, and Radio Canada International all have fairly sizable audiences, presumably because none of these stations have been subjected to jamming in recent years. Radio Vatican, also unjammed, has an extensive schedule of religious programming to the USSR, broadcasting daily in Armenian, Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Latvian.

Some non-Western stations—especially Iranian ones—have a sizable following in Soviet Central Asia, largely because of programming about Islamic affairs of interest to Soviet Muslims. US Embassy officers traveling in Central Asian republics have been told that Iranian and Afghan radio stations are easy to pick up.

Size of the Audience

Estimates by RFE/RL's audience research unit indicate that about 30 percent of the adult Soviet population—over 80 million people—presently listen to foreign broadcasts at least once a week.¹ VOA has long had the most listeners in the Soviet Union, followed by RFE/RL, BBC, and DW. The most recent audience survey indicates that about 32 million Soviet citizens (16 to 17 percent of those over age 15) tune in to VOA at least once a week. For RL and the Baltic services of RFE, the comparable figure is 22 million (about 11 percent of those over 15); for BBC—20 million (10 percent); and for DW—8 million (about 4 percent). The total audience for all the major Western stations is not the sum of all these figures, however, because of considerable audience duplication (see inset).

¹ The slightly higher share that listens to any station at least once a year (between 30 and 37 percent, according to information from the late 1970s) shows that the overwhelming majority of listeners tune in at least weekly. Unweighted data for 1980-87 show an even bigger audience—about 50 percent of Soviet adults—listening at least once a week. This share, however, is based on a sample of people most likely to listen in the first place—urban, highly educated Party members primarily from the European parts of the USSR.

Measuring the Size of the Audience of the Major Western Stations

A research section within RFE/RL (formally called "Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research," or "SAAOR") conducts annual surveys to determine the size of the listening audience for RFE/RL, VOA, and BBC. Because of the closed nature of Soviet society there is no way to directly measure audience size, and survey research estimates are required. SAAOR interviews citizens temporarily traveling outside the USSR as well as emigres and uses a computer simulation to extrapolate the listening behavior of the Soviet population as a whole.

There is considerable duplication among the audiences of the various radios. For example, about three-quarters of RL's average weekly audience listens to at least one of the other three major stations—VOA, BBC, and DW. Because until recently all the major broadcasters were systematically jammed, listeners commonly have searched for a clear signal from any foreign station. Many listeners also listen to more than one language service of the same station. For example, 91 percent of the RL listeners from one of the Caucasian republics who responded to a 1986 survey said they listened to the Georgian, Armenian, or Azeri service, and 56 percent said they listened to RL in Russian.

The regime itself estimates that a high share of citizens tunes in to Western radio stations. During a lecture on the East-West ideological struggle given by the Znaniye (Knowledge) Society in January 1986, an official lecturer stated to a Soviet audience that in the 1970s approximately 60 percent of the Soviet population (presumably adults) listened to one or more stations. He claimed that the growth of the audience abated in the 1980s. These figures are considerably higher than Western estimates.

~~Secret~~

Why the Large Audience? Because of the vast expanse of its territory, the USSR relies extensively on shortwave for domestic use. The important role that shortwave transmission plays in transcontinental communication within the USSR is analogous to the role telephones play in the United States. Soviet industry mass-produces shortwave receivers, citizens have no trouble purchasing them, and the more than 30 models on the market are sufficient to meet consumer demand. The regime's purpose in providing such a large supply of shortwave receivers is to enable communication between citizens living in farflung areas of the country, not to facilitate the reception of information from abroad. Nevertheless, the fact that an estimated 75 to 80 percent of Soviet citizens has access to shortwave radios¹ helps explain why the Western radio stations have made major inroads in the USSR. During 1985, over 1,100 Soviet emigres who responded to a survey conducted by RFE/RL's research unit reported using over 100 different brands of shortwave sets to tune in to Western radio.

The tendency of Soviets to discuss among family members and friends the information they learn from the radios helps to extend the audience for Western broadcasting by creating a "multiplier effect."

[REDACTED]

Soviet media acknowledge the widespread nature of such practices and berate those who disseminate "false rumors" picked up from hostile "radio voices."

¹ This is the share of the public that either personally owns a shortwave radio or has access to a communal receiver. In the latter case, the individual loses control of the dial to the regime and is much less able to tune in to Western radio. We do not have firm information on how many shortwave radios there are in the USSR or how many individuals or families own private sets, but estimates for privately owned sets during the period since the late 1970s range from around 70 million to 100 million. Citizens need to go through a minimum of redtape to acquire one, whether they go to "second-hand" commissary stores, ordinary retail outlets, specialized electronics shops, or the black market.

The tape-recording of broadcasts (called *magnitizdat*) and the passing of tapes among Soviet citizens also expand the audience for Western radio stations. According to Soviet statistics, almost 4.7 million tape recorders were produced in the USSR in 1985, up from only 100,000 in 1959 and 2.5 million in 1975. Articles in the Soviet press have suggested that many of these machines are used to record radio programs. In November 1985, for example, a party newspaper in the north Caucasus area admitted that young people listen to tapes of foreign broadcasts, and a survey conducted in 1984 by a Soviet sociologist in the Karaganda oblast revealed that tape recorders are used to record religious foreign broadcasts for further dissemination. Because a tape recorder can be hooked up to a timer, listeners can record broadcasts late at night or in the early morning, when audibility often is better.


The tape-recording of Western radiobroadcasts could become more widespread in the future. The Soviet press has indicated that the regime plans to make audiocassette recorders more readily available.² Furthermore, in recent years, Soviet factories have begun manufacturing combined radio receivers-cassette recorders.

By training Soviet youth to operate shortwave equipment, the regime itself plays a role in expanding the audience for foreign radiobroadcasting. Radio technology classes are part of the curriculum for many students, and many Soviets have learned to improve shortwave reception for their own and other people's receivers because of their involvement in officially sponsored ham radio clubs. Each year DOSAAF (the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy) trains a certain number of radio operators in the 17 to 18 age group for the armed forces.

² According to Soviet statistics, 1.3 million audiocassette recorders were produced in 1980, 3.1 million were made in 1984, and almost 3.8 million in 1985.

The greatly diminished social stigma and danger associated with listening to the stations also expands the radios' audience. Unlike Stalin's time, listening to foreign broadcasts is not against the law. Under Khrushchev, people began listening with less fear, but still secretly, and with detente the word began to get around that it was safe. [REDACTED]

Many Soviet citizens in recent years have still sensed some danger about passing information picked up from abroad. [REDACTED]



Overall, however, a much freer atmosphere had developed even before Gorbachev's accession. Many young people, in particular, listen blatantly. [REDACTED] described the situation as follows:

On the main street [of an oblast center not far from Moscow in 1975] . . . hundreds of adolescents stroll during the evening in groups. [In] every group there is somebody who constantly clasps a transistor to his stomach . . . and every transistor is constantly tuned to 'the Voice' or some other Western station and is sure to be blasting out at full volume.

In effect, with the renunciation of terror as an instrument of social control, the regime lost its ability to regulate closely the lives of individuals and retreated from the effort to do so. [REDACTED]

Basic changes in the character of Soviet society in the decades since Stalin's death have increased the population's interest in news from the outside world. Urbanization and expanded education broadened the horizons of many people, and essentially transformed at least a portion of the traditionally passive and inert "masses" into a public of citizens with diverse interests and individual identities. This fundamental

change was evident in the trend toward "privatization" that became particularly noticeable under Brezhnev. Larger numbers of Soviet citizens became preoccupied with private and individualist pursuits rather than the "civic duties" to which the regime tries to channel public activity. More people became dissatisfied with the stale offerings of official Soviet culture and disenchanted with Soviet propaganda. The increase in audience size for the Western stations that occurred in the 1970s reflected a widespread desire to tune out the official media and turn to alternative sources of entertainment and news outside the regime's purview. [REDACTED]

Factors Limiting Jamming's Impact on Audience Size

The regime attempted from 1980 until recently, to restrict radio reception by jamming, but jamming was never completely effective. For technical reasons related to the propagation of radio waves (see page 62), reception is usually fairly good at night despite jamming. Moreover, jamming is markedly less effective in the countryside than in cities. Even in cities, it cannot completely cover the entire area and leaves local "holes" of audibility. Furthermore, the public was able to overcome jamming in several ways:

- Members of the intelligentsia often took their short-wave receivers along during weekend trips to their dachas (country cottages).
- Some people tape-recorded programs at locations where audibility is good—such as in the countryside or in those urban locations where jamming is ineffective—so they could listen at a later time. People in the countryside taped programs for their friends in the cities.
- Many Soviets switched to stations that were not jammed at all or were subject to relatively little jamming.
- Some Soviets took advantage of the fact that radio-broadcasts in languages not widely spoken in the USSR were not jammed. For example, it was possible to listen to DW's German programming and



RFE's Polish service. Similarly, the regime sometimes jammed a language only in a republic where it is the most common language. A Ukrainian living in Moscow might have been able to hear a broadcast in his native tongue, for example, even though the same program was jammed in Kiev.

- Many people also shifted to higher radiofrequencies on which jamming is less effective. Although most receivers manufactured in the USSR do not contain the higher shortwave bands, many listeners purchased foreign-made sets or had their radios adapted to receive these frequencies by freelance "moonlighters" who are experienced with electronic equipment.
- Some former Soviet citizens report they overcame jamming by purchasing the highest obtainable quality of receiver or by installing devices to improve reception. Among the latter devices are simple directional antennas that can be made at home from wires and a wooden frame or more sophisticated frequency filters.

Moreover, for many people jamming merely increases the attraction of listening.

Access to Western information that is difficult to obtain is a status symbol of sorts.

The Impact of Listening

In addition to broadcasting factual information not supplied by Soviet media, the radios introduce listeners to a different frame of reference that may cause them to look at information from a perspective unlike that propagated by the regime. By providing the population with a source of news and ideas independent of the state, radiobroadcasting has played a major role in encouraging the emergence of autonomous public opinion in the USSR.

A Better Informed Public

Western radio is especially effective in helping the public check the veracity of rumors and find out more about cryptic or incomplete accounts of important

news events that are hinted at in the official media. This function has become more important in recent decades with the emergence of a better educated public that is less willing to accept at face value what they read in the Soviet press.

The radios' function of enabling Soviets to check on rumors grows in importance during momentous international or domestic events such as the nuclear accident at Chernobyl (see inset). RFE/RL's audience research shows that Western radio stations enjoy larger audiences during such periods:

- Many Soviet citizens found out about the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from Western broadcasting. While Soviet media initially acknowledged only that Soviet troops had been "invited" to fight the counterrevolution and avoided all mention of direct combat, those who tuned in to Western stations learned that Soviet troops were encountering armed opposition and engaging in battle.

- During the 1980-81 Polish crisis, many Soviet citizens kept abreast of events by following Western radiobroadcasts.

- In 1977, when *Pravda* ran a single sentence stating that Soviet President Podgorniy had "resigned at his own request," VOA's assessment of the ouster attracted a large audience, according to a Western reporter.

*Chernobyl' and the Western Radio's
Impact on the Populace*

Western radio played a significant role in informing the Soviet public about the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant accident of April 1986, both by providing early reporting on the disaster and by prodding the USSR to provide information through its own media. According to an RFE/RL survey taken that June, 38 percent of 214 respondents—all Soviet citizens temporarily traveling outside the country—cited Western radio as their primary source for learning about the disaster in the first three weeks, compared to 31 percent who cited Soviet television, the second-largest source. These high figures suggest that some members of the public who normally do not listen to Western radio did so in the face of the initial information vacuum about Chernobyl' in the domestic media. Among individual stations, VOA was mentioned as the primary information source (by 13 percent of the sample), followed by RL (9 percent), Radio Sweden (7 percent), and BBC (5 percent). As befits its function as a "surrogate home service," RFE/RL tailored its programming to contain practical advice such as how to wash vegetables that might be contaminated with radiation; VOA and BBC, on the other hand, focused more on the accident itself.

In the Western areas of the Ukraine and the Baltic states, where Polish radio is audible, Warsaw's relatively franker treatment of the disaster and the announcement that the Polish Government was undertaking health and safety precautions for the public probably had a significant effect on the populace.

Typical of the complaints about the Soviet media's reticence were those from a young Russian engineer:

Soviet television clearly tried to disguise events in Chernobyl', but we all understood that it was serious. From Western radiobroadcasts I realized that the Soviet media were forced by Sweden's insistence to explain the high levels of radiation. I'm convinced we would have found out nothing and would have died like flies if the radiation hadn't raised an outcry in Europe.

In December 1986, an old woman attending a Znaniye lecture asked the doctor at the lectern to verify a claim she had heard on VOA that the Chernobyl' accident would cause more cases of cancer in the USSR.

The broadcasting of an erroneous UPI report of 2,000 fatalities, however, probably had some negative effect on the radio's credibility. One respondent to the RFE/RL survey said: "I first heard of the accident from VOA and RL which, as always, exaggerated events: they spoke of 'thousands killed.'"

Initial Western radio reports of high casualties at first alarmed many ordinary Russians living in Yalta; when they learned that some of these reports were inaccurate, they reportedly expressed indignation that "Western governments," through the news media, had "slandered the USSR and unnecessarily alarmed people."

Confusion, however, probably was a more typical response. In the words of another respondent to the RFE/RL survey:

At first I . . . didn't know what to believe. I thought that if there was no official announcement then nothing terrible had happened . . . It's possible that some of the first Western reports were exaggerated, but I doubt it was on purpose. Anyway, those reports were probably closer to the truth than TASS's stupid release.

The Regime's Response


The regime did not acknowledge that an accident had taken place in Chernobyl' until heightened levels of radiation in Sweden alerted the West to a problem and ensured that Western media would publicize the incidents abroad and inside the USSR itself. Early statements from Moscow contained progressively greater amounts of detail, indicating that the regime felt increasingly pressured to respond to information reaching listeners over shortwave radio.

As Moscow recovered from its initial bungling of public relations, it took the offensive to attack Western coverage of the accident. Official statements accused RL, VOA, and DW of trying to sow panic among the population and "split the socialist community by kindling enmity." These attacks represented an attempt by the regime to capitalize on the xenophobia common to many parts of the Russian populace and to deflect public attention to regime shortcomings by blaming the West for blowing up the Chernobyl' story for the political purpose of defaming the USSR.

Credibility of the Radios

Depends on Ability To Verify Information. Foreign radio's credibility in the USSR depends partly on the degree to which listeners can independently verify at least some of the information they hear. When listeners are able to verify reported events, the stations' believability carries over to accounts of events about which they are not personally aware.

Many citizens try to listen to reports from various Western stations to compare them with the Soviet version and with one another.



Many Soviet citizens listen to foreign radios immediately before or after tuning into *Vremya*, the Soviet national TV newscast, to compare the official and foreign accounts of major events.

Many Soviets often believe the truth lies somewhere in between the contradictory versions they hear. Most people in Kiev who listened to Western radios did not completely believe either side, but accepted "half of what was reported by each." In the initial days of a big news story, many listeners are apt to be especially confused about what to believe. For example,

estimated that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan most Moldavians who did not listen to Western radios believed the Afghan population had asked Moscow to help it defend its revolution against its external enemies, while those who listened to DW or RL had mixed feelings. As illustrated in the early days of the Chernobyl' accident, differences between Soviet and Western versions of news events and occasional discrepancies among Western accounts often add to the public's uncertainty about the real state of affairs.



Impact of Listening on Attitudes: Four Case Studies

The audience evaluation unit of RFE/RL (SAAOR) conducts periodic interviews to gauge public attitudes in the USSR on a wide range of subjects. These polls invariably show a significant difference in attitudes toward current political issues between those who listen to Western radios and those who do not. The following four case studies are illustrative.

The Right To Strike. According to a 1981 survey, listeners to foreign radio stations, particularly RL, are much more inclined to approve the right of Soviet workers to strike than nonlisteners. Similarly, half of the nonlisteners opposed this right, but only about two-fifths of all listeners did. Attitudes toward the right to strike are summarized in the following tabulation:

	Percent		
	RL Listeners	Listeners to Other Stations*	Nonlisteners
Total	100	101	101
Favorable	37	12	12
Unfavorable	40	38	49
No opinion	23	51	40

* Listeners to VOA, BBC, or DW, but not RL.

Source: RFE/RL survey taken in 1981.

The KAL Incident. Of 224 respondents answering a question about the credibility of the Soviet version versus the Western version of the 1983 downing of the South Korean jet, 79 percent of nonlisteners believed the Soviet account compared to only 18 percent of listeners. The Western version was believed by 52

percent of listeners but only 6 percent of nonlisteners. Consistent with the responses to this question were responses to another question on whether the sample agreed with Soviet policy. Attitudes toward the KAL shutdown are presented in the following tabulation:

	Percent	
	Listeners	Nonlisteners
Total	100	101
Approve	22	70
Don't know	31	20
Disapprove	47	11

Source: RFE/RL audience research data.

Afghanistan. In 1984 SAAOR used a sample consisting of almost 3,000 respondents to determine popular attitudes about the war in Afghanistan. Listeners to Western radio disapproved of the USSR's involvement there at a rate nearly three times as great as that of nonlisteners. Inversely, nonlisteners displayed three times more approval of official policy than listeners. Attitudes toward the USSR's prospects for success in Afghanistan are shown in the following tabulation:

	Percent	
	Listeners	Nonlisteners
Total	100	100
No clear success	47	17
Uncertain	40	39
Clear Soviet success	13	44

Source: RFE/RL audience research data.

RFE/RL conducted another survey in 1986 that yielded similar results. Disapproval of the war increased among both listeners and nonlisteners between 1984 and 1986, but the rate of approval for nonlisteners was still over three times higher than among listeners (approximately 45 percent compared to 15 percent). Conversely, about 55 percent of the listeners disapproved of Soviet policy, compared to only 25 percent of nonlisteners.

Nuclear Threat. In 1983 SAAOR conducted research on public attitudes concerning the danger of nuclear war based on a sample of almost 3,000 individuals. Both listeners and nonlisteners agreed that the threat had increased—at the identical rate of 56 percent. However, the reasons cited varied considerably. Only 13 percent of the Western radio listeners believed Western aggressiveness was the reason for the heightened danger of nuclear war, compared to 40 percent of nonlisteners, as shown in the following tabulation:

	Percent	
	Listeners	Nonlisteners
West to blame	13	40
International tension to blame	31	22

Source: RFE/RL audience research data.

This suggests that analyses of international security issues provided by Western radio had some effect in countering Soviet media attempts to whip up "war hysteria" among the Soviet population and enabled listeners to Western radio to take a more nuanced view of international affairs.

In general, broadcasts are most credible when they relate to circumstances about which the listeners have the most personal knowledge. Thus, a broadcast about food shortages would be relatively easy to understand, while an explication of the American two-party system much harder.

Depends on Makeup of Audience. The credibility of the various stations varies according to the social class and political orientation of the listening audience. For many Soviet citizens who are curious about the West and for intellectuals who desire political liberalization, the stations' association with Western governments probably enhances their credibility.

For many other Soviets—especially workers, rural dwellers, the elderly, and the poorly educated—a strong sense of patriotism, suspicion of things foreign, and habits of political conformity reduce the appeal of the Western stations. For example, a Western press report on how Soviet citizens reacted to the South Korean airliner incident in 1983 found that many blue-collar workers accepted the government's rationale for downing the plane and rejected the views put forth by VOA, BBC, and other Western stations.

In some cases, the radios lose credibility because they discuss Western political concepts for which the Soviet public lacks a frame of reference. According to various comments by Soviet emigres and independent evaluations of RFE/RL programming, announcers sometimes employ terms that are either outside the listeners' realm of experience or have not been adequately explained—such as "parliamentary democracy" or "Republican Party." For some Soviet citizens, tone and linguistic quality may detract from a station's credibility. For example, officials from the US Consulate in Leningrad who visited Riga, Latvia, in March 1987 were told that VOA's Latvian announcers tend to be pre-World War II emigres who use

~~Secret~~

*The Impact of Listening on Attitudes: Results
From the Soviet Interview Project*

Data from the Soviet Interview Project (SIP)—in which 2,800 individuals who emigrated from the USSR between 1979 and 1982 were interviewed—support the hypothesis that listeners to Western stations as a whole hold views more divergent than nonlisteners from mainstream official Soviet positions. SIP data indicate that RL listeners are particularly "liberal," and that those who do not listen to any Western station hold the most "conservative" views.* For example, only 6 percent of nonlisteners said they ever attended an unofficial art show while living in the USSR, compared to 22.5 percent of listeners; and only 13 percent of nonlisteners agreed with the statement that, of all Soviet military officers, none or hardly any were honest, compared to 24 percent of those who listened to any foreign station.

* Although most of those interviewed were Jews, SIP researchers have concluded from extensive statistical testing that the results accurately represent the views of adult Soviets who lived in large and medium-sized cities in the European part of the USSR at the end of the 1970s. This cross section of Soviet citizenry is called the "referent population." Although SIP results should not be extrapolated to all of Soviet society, they do offer statistically reliable conclusions about the "referent population."

This tendency, however, is more pronounced for some issues than others (see table 1). The cleavage of views according to radio listening habits seems to be stronger in areas relating specifically to citizens' contacts with state authority than in areas that affect respondents less tangibly. For example, the attitudinal differences among those who listened to RL, VOA, or no station are quite apparent for questions measuring:

- Participation in protest activity.
- Respect for key Soviet institutions such as the police, KGB, military, and trade unions.
- Domestic spending priorities (For example, does the USSR spend too much or too little on agriculture, reducing crime, improving health and education?).
- Attitudes toward Stalin.

The differences in attitudes are less apparent, however, in the women/family cluster of issues, some of the "book-banning" questions, and in attitudes toward foreign policy (see table 2).

dated phraseology. These announcers' emphasis on the earliest possible return of Latvian independence also made many Latvians uncomfortable, according to this source.

Depends on Individual Station. Except for dissidents and Western-oriented intellectuals, the general public in the USSR evidently trusts RL less than other Western stations. This is doubtless in part because Soviet media attacks on RL, which are harsher and more frequent than on other stations, have raised many suspicions that RL is in the business of subversion rather than news reporting. RL's focus on critical coverage of Soviet internal affairs reinforces these suspicions. Moreover, many ordinary citizens lack the conceptual framework and sophistication needed to

understand many of RL's philosophical and politically oriented programs. A dissident has noted the unfortunate irony that peasants, the class least able to comprehend RL broadcasts, live in the countryside where reception of RL is clearest. [redacted] reported in early 1986 that, among residents of Leningrad, RL is even less popular than Soviet radio because the public has become annoyed with RL's constant "anti-Soviet propaganda."

[redacted] affirmed that some listeners did not care for RL because it is so "aggressively anti-Communist."

~~Secret~~

Table 1
Responses to Selected Questions in the Soviet Interview Project,
Comparison by Western Radio Station Listened

Percent Agreeing With
the "Liberal" Response

	All Listeners	Non-listeners	RL Listeners	VOA Listeners
Attitudinal questions				
USSR spends too much on defense	93.4	78.8	95.2	93.5
USSR spends too little on health	75.7	46.1	78.4	76.0
Agree that many Soviets live in poverty	58.0	34.5	64.2	58.3
Respondent was dissatisfied with Soviet medical system	42.7	14.1	47.1	43.1
Agriculture should be privately owned	78.1	54.2	82.8	78.4
Heavy industry should be privately owned	33.5	19.5	36.4	33.8
Local party secretary is someone to avoid	48.6	36.3	51.7	48.7
Hard work is irrelevant to joining the CPSU	43.2	23.8	47.5	45.5
No one in the Politburo is honest	43.2	18.4	48.1	43.4
No leaders of local Soviet organs are honest	21.4	12.0	24.8	21.4
None/hardly any in militsiya are honest	55.9	30.4	61.3	55.9
No/hardly any KGB leaders are honest	64.8	40.2	68.8	64.9
None/hardly any in military are honest	24.0	12.9	26.5	23.9
Government should allow antigovernment books	89.6	69.1	92.0	89.9
Government should allow books with explicit sex	48.9	27.8	52.0	49.5
Disagree that Stalin was blamed for things he didn't do	77.8	69.6	80.1	78.8
Workers should have the right to strike	64.6	42.9	68.2	64.9
Government should abolish residence permit system	84.9	70.9	86.9	85.2
Behavioral questions				
Respondent failed to vote four or more times	19.7	12.6	22.9	20.5
Respondent read samizdat/tamizdat material	35.2	5.3	40.6	35.6
Respondent attended unofficial art show, and so forth	22.5	6.2	26.6	22.6

* We do not believe the large Jewish component in the SIP sample biased the general finding that RL listeners are most liberal, followed by listeners to other stations and then nonlisteners. In fact, in a series of random cross-checks we performed, this trend was even stronger for non-Jews in the SIP sample than for all respondents collectively.

Source: Soviet Interview Project data

Better educated Soviets, including officials, may be more receptive to RL's broadcasting.

VOA enjoys especially great popularity among those interested in entertainment more than political commentary. [redacted] praised VOA for

Table 2
Questions For Which SIP Listener Responses Do Not Follow the Expected "Liberal-Conservative" Pattern

Percent Agreeing With the "Unorthodox" Response

Question	All Listeners	Non-listeners	RL Listeners
Family or friends' connections are very important in joining the party	24.5	24.3	26.8
Soviet women have fewer opportunities than men	42.7	63.0	41.5
Agree there's nothing wrong with men working under women supervisors	62.6	65.7	60.2
Married women don't need to stay home with children	27.0	29.8	24.6
The government should allow books with brutality/violence	20.8	14.9	18.8

Source: Soviet Interview Project.

broadcasting "more music than rhetoric." Other intellectual emigres, while conceding that VOA is the most popular station, regret what they regard as its lack of enough critical analysis of the USSR and an excess of music.

BBC gets especially high ratings for objective reporting, particularly about international events.

* Another probable explanation for why VOA is generally more popular than RL among Soviets is that many members of the public incorrectly assume that VOA is the US Government's official radio station. Frequent Soviet attacks on VOA making this point undoubtedly have nourished this false impression. In fact, VOA's charter instructs it to broadcast news reports and analysis irrespective of US administration policy; news items are usually based on news service tickers and must be verified by at least two sources. The station does, however, broadcast editorials that are required to be "not inconsistent with" US Government policy.

Effect on Attitudes


In addition to providing specific information, listening to the radios gives many Soviets the feeling that they are accepted as part of the international community; that the capitalist world is not hostile, despite what Soviet leaders say; and that it is more interesting than the one in which they live. Anecdotal evidence and results from surveys of Soviet citizens indicate a strong correlation between radio listening and the holding of unorthodox views on a wide range of subjects (see insets). While this relationship is easily established, one cannot prove that listening to Western radio causes individuals to form unorthodox views. In many cases, unorthodox views may cause individuals to listen to foreign radios. Thus, listening probably shapes and reinforces the skeptical attitudes many listeners already have.

According to a typology of attitudes developed by RFE/RL, those who were classified as liberals or moderates have a much higher rate of listening to the major radio stations than those in the indifferent, conservative, or hardliner categories (see figure 2).

Survey results show that liberals have the highest rates of listening to all four major stations. The attitudes of RL listeners can be classified as most liberal of all; RFE/RL audience evaluation data show that fully half of this station's audience can be classified as liberal, compared to 25 percent of the audiences of VOA, BBC, and DW. To the extent people in the indifferent, conservative, and hardline categories listen to Western radios, they tend to prefer these three stations and shun RL (see table 3). Persons in the hardline category often cite such reasons as "knowing what the enemy is saying" to justify their listening.

Western radiobroadcasting's influence on popular attitudes is illustrated by the tendency of listeners to publicly challenge the regime's official line. According to a USIA official, party lecturers from the Znaniye (Knowledge) Society who present political lectures to groups of people have noted the much tougher questioning they face from audiences in the countryside—where Western radio signals are less affected by jamming.

Figure 2
Western Radio Listening, by
Attitudinal Type



This figure shows the percentage of each attitudinal type that uses Western radio as a source of information on either international or national topics. These attitudinal categories are based on a scale constructed by RFE/RL from responses to surveys of urban residents on a range of questions broadly related to civil liberties.

[REDACTED]

Listening to the radios, however, does not necessarily erode the regime's credibility in the eyes of Soviet citizens. To the degree Gorbachev now is trying to tap popular desires to address problems that emerged in prior years, the formation or reinforcement of skeptical attitudes may actually be in the regime's interests.

[REDACTED]

The stations inform ordinary citizens about the USSR's backwardness and the much better conditions in the West, thus encouraging them to support programs that will bring about some improvements.

Regime Concerns About the Radios

Reasons for Concern

The regime's monopoly of mass communications inside the USSR has traditionally served as a major prop to the Soviet system. Control of the media has enabled the regime to determine how much and what

Table 3
Audience Composition of Each
Major Western Station

Percent

	BBC	DW	RL	VOA
Total	100	100	101	100
Liberal	25	25	30	25
Moderate	35	36	30	37
Indifferent	15	10	8	17
Conservative	18	25	8	16
Hardline	4	4	5	5

Source: Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research data.

[REDACTED]

sort of information reaches the Soviet population, to propagate official values and ideology, and to censor opposing points of view. The regime's control of the information flow has thus been a powerful instrument for shaping popular perceptions, attitudes, and behavior.

In recent years, a number of factors have combined to weaken the regime's ability to insulate citizens from external sources of information. As the Soviet economy developed, for example, interaction with the world economy became more desirable from the regime's point of view. Detente policies in the 1970s led to greater Western tourism in the USSR, cultural and scientific exchanges, and increases in trade with Western Europe—exposing more Soviet citizens to things Western and increasing human contacts. Emigration of Jews, Armenians, and ethnic Germans opened another narrow channel of external contact—through letters emigres sent back to the USSR.

But radiobroadcasting has been the main conduit of Western influence. During the 1970s the Soviet people remained more isolated from the outside world than citizens of any industrialized country, but Western broadcasting made a dent in the regime's protective armor. To a great extent, Western broadcasting has come to compete with Soviet media for the

[REDACTED]

The Impact of Western Radiobroadcasts on Defections

For some defectors, listening to Western radiobroadcasts was a conditioning factor in the decision to leave the USSR. Public access to Western sources of information devalues Soviet propaganda about Western militarism, unemployment, and exploitation of workers, thus attenuating a potential defector's fear that economic insecurity would be his lot; and removing psychological barriers to considering a life outside the USSR.

events, often using a wire service's account. The stations thus inform interested segments of the public about some defections, few of which are reported by the domestic media. The radios also conduct interviews with some defectors—though not specifically on the topic of their defections or the methods they used to defect. By referring to or quoting those who have defected, Western radio may inspire confidence for others who are considering defecting.

Western radios may also publicize Soviet foreign machinations or acts of aggression about which the potential defector had been unaware.

most defectors who had not traveled outside the USSR before their defections had not heard detailed accounts of other defections.

Since the charters of both RFE/RL and VOA restrict them from inciting defections, the stations limit their coverage to factual reports of defections as news.

The posting of thousands of Soviet troops in East European countries less insulated than the USSR from Western influences increases their possible exposure to VOA, RFE, and other Western stations. In particular, the majority of Soviet troops assigned to

Warsaw Pact countries are in East Germany where West German radio and TV can be easily received and Western radio stations are not jammed.

Soviet authorities have made known their concern about the radios' influence on potential defectors among youth. In January 1985, an article in an Estonian youth paper fretted that Western broadcasts aimed at youth transmit music and features about the young interspersed with explanations on how to flee the USSR and seek political asylum [sic]. It admitted that "such broadcasts . . . incline some morally unstable people not to return to the Motherland from a trip abroad."

A major factor influencing the regime's decision about publicly acknowledging a particular defection has been the extent of Western radio coverage of the case. Defectors with information of intelligence value to the West almost never are acknowledged by the domestic media unless the case has been so widely publicized on foreign radio that the regime sees a need to counter Western accounts reaching Soviet citizens. After Viktor Belenko flew his MIG aircraft to Japan, TASS released a statement providing Moscow's version of the defection, presumably because many people already knew about it from foreign broadcasts. Similarly, after nearly a week of heavy Western publicity, all major Soviet newspapers released a two-sentence statement portraying Arkady Shevchenko's defection in 1978 as the result of a Western provocation. When Soviet officials have to respond to Western reports of a defection, they try to reap some advantage from it by attacking the stations for using false and rosy portrayals of the West to lure unsophisticated citizens.

domestic audience. As Soviet media became less and less lively and informative during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the population reacted by tuning it out and turning increasingly to Western radio.

There is abundant evidence that this development increased concern within the Soviet establishment about the USSR's vulnerability to Western pressures and influences. Many Soviet officials before Gorbachev's accession expressed a belief that expanded contacts with the West during detente in the 1970s had a negative effect on popular attitudes and aspirations.


Virtually all Soviet leaders who have been influential in the area of ideological controls expressed concern about the threat from the West. In a December 1985 speech, "Second" Secretary Yegor Ligachev criticized Soviet propagandists for failing to counter Western influences effectively. Andropov stated in a 1983 article that "our society is developing not in hothouse conditions, not in isolation from hostile surroundings," but in conditions of "psychological war unleashed by imperialism." A June 1985 *Kommunist* article by KGB chief Chebrikov charged the

* Aside from detente, several other factors that came to a head in the early 1980s exacerbated this sense of concern. The most important ones were: the leadership's fear of excessive dependence on Western imports (highlighted by the US grain embargo imposed after the invasion of Afghanistan); a perceived vulnerability to cutoffs of Western science and technology (highlighted by the US gas pipeline embargo); several defections by high-ranking Soviet officials; the crisis in Poland in the early 1980s; and the war in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan has increased elite apprehensions that the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East would make the USSR's Muslim population more restive.

~~Secret~~

US administration with attempting to "exert a corrosive influence on the awareness of working people" and to "shake the ideological foundations of society" with the aim of "bringing about internal erosion."

The leadership believes that Western radios are partly to blame for helping to spread these "malevolent" Western influences:



- In December 1986, a naval captain [redacted] said that counterpropaganda work had assumed great significance as a result of increased Western propaganda, chiefly that "reaching us by radio." He fretted that a large share of the Soviet population listens to Western broadcasts. He also noted that the Central Committee had recently analyzed the audience—apparently the second such survey since the one mentioned in 1978—and had found that many military personnel were influenced to one degree or another by the stations.



The regime also sees the radios as partly responsible for fueling seemingly insatiable aspirations for more and better consumer goods. In 1985, an Armenian party official warned against the impact of Western broadcasting in that republic by saying:

Some influence from foreign propaganda on some inhabitants of the republic is there for all to see: their desire to imitate the way of life in the West, their apolitical attitude and social passivity, and the manifestation of private-ownership proclivities and consumerist attitudes.

Transmitting Western Radio Signals to Remote Areas of the USSR

Radio coverage of non-Russian nationality regions and remote parts of the RSFSR such as Siberia and the Far East depends, of course, on the location of broadcasting transmitters and the strength of their signals. Shortwave signals can be picked up directly up to a short distance from the actual point of emission—perhaps 100 miles or so, depending on the signal power and time of day. Since virtually all listeners live well beyond the transmitters' direct range, they pick up signals after they bounce off the ionosphere to Earth. Although the strongest are so-called one-hop signals, high-frequency signals can still be audible after they bounce two or more times between the Earth and the ionosphere.

Radio Liberty sends a powerful one-hop signal to the European part of the USSR, but only two- or three-hop signals to Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East. VOA, on the other hand, can send one-hop signals to the Asian republics of the Soviet Union because it operates from transmitters in the Philippines. The US Government is conducting talks with South Korea and has signed an agreement with Israel for additional transmitting stations, which would boost coverage of Soviet Asia. Both VOA and RFE/RL would have use of the Israeli station. The United States is actively exploring with friendly governments in Asia the prospects for obtaining additional sites.

Degree of Concern

Although concern about the threat from Western radiobroadcasting has been apparent in official pronouncements for at least three decades, high-level leaders since about 1980 have focused more attention on the problem than ever before. During all of the last three Communist Party congresses—in 1976, 1981, and 1986—speakers addressed the issue of Western radiobroadcasts, but the tone of concern became progressively sharper in each successive congress.

~~Secret~~



The increased level of concern is undoubtedly due in part to actions undertaken by the major Western stations in reaction to Moscow's resumption of jamming in 1980: the building of new transmitting facilities, the improvement of old ones, and increases in the number of transmitting hours and frequencies. Since 1980, Washington has devoted considerable resources to building new transmitters and upgrading old ones to allow VOA and RFE/RL to reach more listeners in Central Asia and other remote areas of the USSR (see inset).

The atmosphere within the Soviet leadership during the transition period in the 1980s—when the Politburo has been grappling with domestic problems that mounted during Brezhnev's last years—has also been conducive to concern that the Reagan administration is trying to use Western broadcasting to undermine the USSR internally. In May 1986, a first deputy chairman of the KGB wrote:

The US Government and its allies are taking massive measures to further expand ideological sabotage and anticommunist propaganda. In 1985 about \$3 billion was spent on the activities of the US Governmental propaganda apparatus, and in 1986 \$887.9 million was allocated for USIA alone. . . . The US Congress has earmarked \$250 million for the Liberty-Free Europe radio corporation for 1986-87, a significant proportion of which is set aside for updating equipment. . . . [RFE/RL] is the main center for subversive propaganda against the USSR and European socialist countries. . . . [It] is an important center for political intelligence against the USSR.

Earlier that year, a *Znaniye* lecturer trying to explain why propaganda lectures needed to be improved stated that the "ideological struggle is sharpening" and the West is "moving it into a channel of psychological war." In January 1986, another *Znaniye* lecturer claimed in a talk on the East-West ideological struggle that the electronic media are one of the main tools the capitalists use to achieve their goal of destabilizing the internal situation in socialist countries. He decried the fact that approximately 60 percent of the population listened to one or more stations in the 1970s.

In the spring of 1986, Viktor Chebrikov, the head of the KGB, strongly denounced foreign broadcasting as an instrument of subversion:

Lies, slander, and appeals to struggle against the system chosen by our people are brought into play. Various kinds of "radio voices" maintained by the Western special services play an important role in this. Thus we are dealing with covert interference in our internal affairs and with brazen violations of the norms of international law and Soviet legislation. Quite understandably, the measures provided for in our legislation are applied and will be applied resolutely in the struggle against such hostile actions. But the interests of this struggle also require increased vigilance by Communists and all Soviet citizens.

Similarly, Chernenko, during the June 1983 party plenum on ideology, warned:

The class enemy is practicing veritable banditry on the air. We face attempts to organize against us a full-scale information and propaganda invasion and to turn radio and TV networks into tools of subversion.

Wariness about the stations extends to the very top of the current leadership. "Second" Secretary Ligachev has made frequent comments about the pernicious impact of foreign broadcasts. For example, in February 1987 he told employees of the central television center: "It is necessary to unmask the machinations of mendacious bourgeois propaganda, which has devoted considerable resources to undermining the Soviet people's faith in the correctness of the Communist Party's course and restructuring." Gorbachev has made similar statements (see inset).

Sensitivity About Particularly Vulnerable Audiences
The regime is especially concerned about the impact of listening by elites and intellectuals, young people, minority nationalities, religious believers, and members of the armed forces.

~~Secret~~

Gorbachev on the Threat From Western Radiobroadcasts:

In December 1984, Gorbachev told a conference of ideological workers meeting in Moscow:

Imperialism has adopted a policy of undermining detente, intensifying confrontation with socialism, stepping up the arms race, and rousing 'psychological warfare.' The ideological active-ness of the monopolistic bourgeoisie has risen sharply in recent years. The enemy has created a huge propaganda machine for ideological conflict, and employs sophisticated technical equipment and diversionary and psychological techniques. In its intensity, substance, and methods, the psychological warfare unleashed by imperialism represents a special type of aggression, which flouts the sovereignty of other countries. . . . Considering the acuteness and complexity of the current ideological struggle, the June [1983] plenum put forth the task of improving counter-propaganda, both within the country and among the foreign audience. The party committees and mass media must extend still further the content of this work.

In the summer of 1986, Gorbachev told residents of Komsomolsk-na-Amure in the Soviet Far East:

Gorbachev: Did you hear my speech in Vladivostok yesterday?

Voices: We heard!

Gorbachev: Let them justify their policy. No one will bring us to our knees. We are not the people to do this. Nor is saber-rattling our policy. But we will strengthen our defense and—the main point—build up the economy so that the people feel good and confident. You know, all kinds of radio voices, and not just they, are trying to discredit our plans and our policy and to create a clash between the people and the leadership. They would like to split our country. . . .

In an address to party workers in Khabarovsk in July 1986, Gorbachev said:

Certain people in the West . . . lie in wait for something that would mean a deviation from socialism, that we would go cap in hand to capitalism and would borrow its methods. We are receiving much so-called advice from abroad as to how and where we are to go further. There are provocative programs of various kinds being broadcast, and articles are being published aiming at casting a shadow over the changes taking place in our country. Such unseemly attempts are doomed to failure.

Unclassified

Officials and Intellectuals. Members of the Soviet professional classes and employees of bureaucratic institutions listen to the radios in large numbers. A 1984 study by the United States Information Agency (USIA), based on interviews with a group of 166 "surrogates" (selected Americans and West Europeans who had extensive contacts with Soviet elites), found that elites in the arts and other academic fields

are more apt to listen to the radios than officials dealing with trade and foreign affairs. But sizable majorities (from 64 to 77 percent) of all four elite groups were believed to regard foreign broadcasts as a "valuable source of information."

~~Secret~~

Top Soviet Leaders Tune In to Foreign Radios

According to several reports, every leader from Stalin to Andropov has listened to stations such as VOA and BBC. While they may have been largely motivated to obtain dependable information from credible Western sources, they were also no doubt trying to keep abreast of what the Soviet population was picking up from the radios:

- According to a Western press story based on reports from two Soviet emigres, former General Secretary Andropov listened to BBC because of its reputation for objectivity. The US Embassy in Geneva also reported that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze told the British Foreign Secretary that he personally tuned in to BBC from time to time.
- These two emigres claim that the wooded area near Moscow where Politburo members often spend their weekends is kept free of jamming in order to ensure clear reception for the top leaders.
- An emigre who worked as an editor in Leningrad reports that Grigori Romanov, then head of that city's party organization, admonished her for not listening and warned that "all of you [editors] must listen to the Voice of America and the BBC and the Deutsche Welle so as to become familiar with the enemy's poisoned weapon."

Most elite listeners have political interests. They want to know what the Soviet media has not told them about developments at home and abroad and they are quite interested in comparisons between what happens in the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Among elites, entertainment itself is not a major reason for listening. Music that cannot be heard in the USSR, however—such as that of Shostakovich—is of interest, especially when listeners receive an explanation of why the music was banned. Elite listeners are also said to be keenly interested in programs about Soviet history.

The urban intelligentsia, as well as many officials, listen to Western radio stations for broadcasts of literary and political writings by Soviet and emigre authors, and interviews with them. Each day, RL broadcasts 20 minutes of *samizdat* and 30 minutes of *tamizdat* writings (works by emigre or Soviet writers published outside the USSR). In effect, the stations represent an alternative Russian cultural center that many better educated Soviets—until recently, at least—found more vigorous and appealing than official Soviet culture.

Youth. All the major stations draw their highest ratings in the 30-to-49-year-old age group, but the percentage of Soviet youth (defined as 16-to-29-year-olds) that listens is only slightly lower. For most of 1985, an RFE/RL survey found that about 18 percent of Soviet youth listened to VOA (see table 4). Counting casual as well as habitual listeners, an estimated 59 percent of youth has been exposed to Western radio stations, though not necessarily the major ones, during the course of an average year.

A *Znaniye* lecturer in January 1986 expressed particular concern that Soviet citizens under 30 are two or three times more likely to listen than members of the

Western Radio Stations and Political Dissidents

Western radio stations have played a significant role in encouraging political activists. The primary impact has been to help dissident writers of samizdat reach a larger audience. This function became particularly important in the early 1980s when the regime had considerable success in stemming the circulation inside the USSR of unauthorized dissident literature, which was more widely disseminated during the Brezhnev years.

As the regime moved to repress dissent more harshly in the early 1980s, human rights activists became less willing to take the enormous risks involved in photocopying and distributing samizdat. Consequently, activists began to send such material to Western radios, which then relayed it back into the USSR. For example, as of January 1987, RFE/RL had received and broadcast 10 issues of the Chronicle of the [Ukrainian] Catholic Church, a serial publication that is virtually unobtainable inside the USSR.

Western radios are also helpful to dissidents in facilitating communication and building morale in other ways:

- Radio publicity of dates and places of dissident trials enables sympathizers to make a public show of solidarity.
- Imprisoned dissidents or their relatives have sent personal appeals to Western stations detailing official injustices in the hope that publicizing such appeals will pressure the Soviet regime to release them or at least improve their prison conditions.
- Many former political prisoners have said they believe their treatment would have been worse in the absence of VOA and RL broadcasts about their cases.

- Prisoners at labor camps often hear of broadcasts about them from prison personnel who regularly listen to Western radio stations. This often heartens prisoners and encourages some of them to make political statements.

- While living in exile in Gor'kiy, Andrey Sakharov took daily walks carrying a shortwave radio because he could not hear Western stations in his own apartment, which was subjected to jamming.

Paradoxically, however, RL's coverage of the regime's repressive acts may sometimes discourage the very dissidents it seeks to protect. A scientist who emigrated in 1986 states that RL's pervasive pessimism about events in the Soviet Union, especially stories about arrests, tends to subdue rather than rally those who oppose the government. He believes that RL listeners are seen as "masochistic."

Erroneous reports broadcast by Western stations can also hurt the morale of dissidents. In March 1987

political prisoner Rafael Payayan was discouraged when he heard a false report on Western radio that he had been released.

There are also circumstances where dissidents believe that foreign radio publicity of regime action against them can be counterproductive.

relatives and close friends of Feliks Svetov, a Russian Orthodox priest sentenced to internal exile in January 1936, cautioned RL not to publicize the sentence because they feared this would ruin his chances of being sent to the same Siberian town where his wife had been exiled.

~~Secret~~

Table 4
Weekly Audience Ratings* for the Four Major
Western Broadcasters, October 1984-September 1985

	RL/RFE ^b	VOA	BBC	D'W
Overall rating	11.0	16.5	10.5	4.0
Age				
16 to 29	11.0	17.5	11.5	4.0
30 to 49	14.0	19.0	12.0	4.0
50+	6.5	16.5	7.0	3.0
Education				
Less than secondary	8.5	10.5	7.0	2.5
Secondary +	17.0	30.0	18.5	6.5
Sex				
Men	17.0	25.0	16.5	6.5
Women	5.5	10.0	5.5	1.5
Residence				
Rural	9.0	8.5	5.0	1.5
Urban	12.5	22.0	14.0	5.0
Geographic region				
European RSFSR ^c	7.0	13.0	10.0	4.0
Moscow and oblast	10.0	23.0	19.0	8.0
Leningrad and oblast	9.0	21.0	17.0	8.0
Siberian RSFSR	6.0	16.0	4.0	2.0
Baltic states	20.0	21.0	13.0	5.0
Belorussian SSR	15.0	13.0	11.0	6.0
Transcaucasian SSRs	15.0	20.0	13.0	2.0
Central Asian SSRs	12.0	15.0	7.0	2.0
Moldavian SSR	16.0	17.0	9.0	2.0
Ukrainian SSR	18.0	20.0	11.0	4.0

* Ratings are the percentage of the population age 16 or over in each category that bears a given station in the course of a week. The overall rating is the percentage of the total adult population to bear the station during an average week. During the period considered in this table, the adult population totaled about 200 million. For all demographic categories except geographic region, this table presents the midpoint of a range rather than the range that was provided in the original source. For geographic region, the original source provided a single data point.

^b RL plus RFE's three Baltic (but not East European) language services.

^c Excluding the cities and oblasts of Moscow and Leningrad.

Source: RFE-RL Research Memorandum RM J-88, "Demographic Ratings of Four Major Broadcasters to the USSR, October 1984-September 1985," June 1986.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

*Official Views on How Foreign Radio
Subverts Soviet Youth*

Surveys of Soviet citizens indicate some significant generational differences in listening preferences. Older listeners in the USSR are mainly interested in collecting, comparing, and verifying items of "hard" news. Youth listen to newscasts more frequently than any other type of programming, but show greater interest in information on Western life than their parents. At the same time, young people are more interested in music and entertainment than older citizens. Among listeners to Radio Sweden and the more widely heard BBC and VOA, two-thirds of the 16-to-29-year-olds gave entertainment as a reason for listening to the station. Several sources report that young Soviets regularly tape rock music from the Western stations to distribute to others and to play at private parties.

Soviet authorities cite four ways that foreign radio exerts an inimical influence on the nation's youth.

(1) They claim foreign stations directly alienate Soviet youth from the official ideology. To this end, the Western stations allegedly use the insidious tactic of playing contemporary music to lower youths' guard and lull them into accepting "antlsocialist commentaries" that are cleverly interspersed in the program. In January 1985 *Partiynaya Zhizn' Kazakhstana*, quoting a Western magazine, declared that "Operation Barbarossa Rock-'n'-Roll has begun." According to the Kazakh paper, Western ideologists seek to use Soviet rock groups to "shake the foundations" with their music and to "prepare the soil for taking in the

values of the bourgeois world." Another commentator analyzes the mix of news and music on Western radio as follows: "You may say that the news goes in one ear and out the other. But psychologists have shown that when the attention is not concentrated, well-designed phrases and information of a political or ideological nature stay in the memory without the listener being aware of it or wanting it to."

(2) The authorities are anxious that foreign radios help to (in their phrase) "deideologize" Soviet youth. According to several media commentaries, Western radios allegedly have moved away from direct appeals toward attempts to influence young people's consciousness more subtly—primarily by stoking admiration for Western science and technology or the "cult of entertainment." In July 1985 TASS complained:

By shamelessly exploiting the interest of young boys and girls in knowledge and scientific-technical achievements, the Voice of America, as well as other mouthpieces of the imperialist propaganda are in every possible way enabling and romanticizing the "miraculous-saving mission" of the Reagan "Star Wars" program.

In March 1986, a Zaaniye lecturer told his audience: "Bourgeois ideologists, using legal and illegal channels and methods—radiobroadcasts, tourism, cultural and technical exchanges—are trying to poison the consciousness of our youth, sow among it seeds of

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

political indifference and nonideology." This allegedly leads some youths to think that the Western version of events is just as valid as the domestic version. In April 1984, the publication Agitator seemed to blame "deideologization" for foreign radio's popularity:

Some young people, when tuning in on a foreign broadcast think: I've watched [Soviet] television, and now I'll listen to what "they" are saying. I'll compare the two, and that way I'll get an objective picture. . . . But that "approach" is precisely a manifestation of political naivete and immaturity.

(3) They argue that Western ideologists are trying to convince young people in the USSR and Eastern Europe that they and Western youth constitute a special social group distinct from any class. For party propagandists, these are relatively safe ways to explain Soviet youth's political indifference because they shift the blame from internal causes to a foreign source.

(4) Authorities also are concerned that the radios lure Soviet youth into consumerist attitudes and behavior, supposedly with a carefully selected mix of contemporary music and slanted newscasts. "Appropriately selected music" is alleged to have the aim of "planting into [youth's] consciousness . . . a lack of moral fiber, a selfish consumer mentality, and crass materialism."

older age groups. Soviet newspapers and journals have pointed to a widespread tendency for young people—even youngsters in the Pioneers—to use foreign sources of information, and at a recent Komsomol congress the first secretary complained of the uncritical acceptance "by a certain section of young people" of broadcasts by hostile radio stations. In March 1986, a *Znanije* lecturer indicated the seriousness with which the regime took the threat of Western broadcasting aimed at youth. He claimed that more than 70 percent of VOA's broadcasts to the USSR are addressed, directly or indirectly, to Soviet youth.


Realizing that young people are less likely than their parents to measure the system's achievements by comparing them to the bleak circumstances of the prerevolutionary or prewar periods, Soviet authorities have a great incentive to insulate young citizens from information enabling them to compare the Soviet standard of living with that of the West. In December 1984, Gorbachev alluded to this problem:

Today, new generations of Soviet people, born under socialist conditions, are entering active life. These are people for whom the historic gains of our system are as natural . . . as the air that we breathe. Soviet young people are growing up and being educated under constantly improving material conditions, in an environment of four decades of peace. They have become accustomed to comparing our reality not with the past, but with the highest criteria of socialism. And this is one of the most important aspects of the present ideological situation.

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

Figure 3
Listening to Foreign Radio, by
National Grouping



Source: RFE/RL audience research data.

Minority Nationalities. As table 4 and figure 3 suggest, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Transcaucasian republics are all areas with high rates of listening, with Russian and Central Asian interest lagging somewhat behind. The urban areas of Moscow and Leningrad also show high listening rates, except in the case of RL, which obtains its highest ratings in the Baltic states, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. RL suffers from low ratings in Moscow and Leningrad because it is subject to heavy jamming, which is particularly effective in large urban areas.

POOR QUALITY PAGE

~~Secret~~

Table 5
US Government Broadcasts to
Soviet Nationality Groups

Approximate
hours per day

	RFE/RL	VOA
Total	71	29%*
Slavic		
Russian	24	16
Ukrainian	12	4
Belorussian	3	
Caucasian		
Armenian	3	1%
Azeri	4	1
Georgian	3	1%
Tatar-Bashkir	3	
Turkic		
Kazak	3	
Kirghiz	1	
Tajik	1%	
Turkmen	1	
Uzbek	3%	2
Baltic		
Estonian	3	1%
Latvian	3	1%
Lithuanian	3	1%

* Excluding 14 hours of VOA English-language programming each day.

Note: In addition to the languages listed above, there are less frequent broadcasts in others. For example, twice-weekly Russian broadcasts addressed to Soviet Jews sometimes include brief excerpts in Yiddish or Hebrew.

Source: VOA and RFE/RL.

RL's extensive programming in non-Russian languages, however, boosts its ratings in the national republics. (See table 5.)

The xenophobic tendencies of many Russians may account in part for relatively low listening rates among them. A survey conducted by sociologist Vladimir Shlapentokh before he emigrated to the United States found that Slavs tended to have more negative views about the West than non-Slavs. Such attitudes make some Russians, especially among the lower classes, receptive to regime propaganda about the subversive motives of Western broadcast-

The Impact of Foreign Television

Although the penetration by foreign television of Soviet borders is more localized and affects much smaller parts of the country than Western radio, the impact of television on the population is in some ways greater. This is because television is a graphic medium that allows viewers to directly verify the subject material. While radio announcers may be dismissed as biased, television viewers cannot easily deny visible evidence of higher standards of living in the West or evidence the regime would prefer to cover up or distort information about Soviet activities in the Third World.

Foreign television signals reach several parts of the USSR, but the main impact is in Estonia. Thanks to the proximity of the southern coast of Finland, Finnish television can be received in much of Estonia; Tallinn is only 60 miles from the Finnish capital of Helsinki. According to an interview Estonian party chief Karl Vayno gave to Finnish radio in June 1987, about a quarter of the republic's population—mainly people living in Tallinn and northern Estonia—watch Finnish TV. The fact that Estonians can easily understand Finnish, a sister language, increases the impact of Finnish broadcasts of Western account of events.

Broadcasting managers in Helsinki often avoid transmitting programs whose political content would be particularly objectionable to Moscow, but Finnish TV has provided extensive coverage of such sensitive

events as Solidarity activities in Poland and the 1983 downing of the South Korean jetliner. Moreover, Finnish TV—unlike the Swedish and Norwegian systems—includes some commercial advertising. In addition to obtaining Western points of view through news and commentary, the Estonian public receives subtle messages about Western lifestyles from commercials as well as from popular American TV shows like "Dallas," "Dynasty," "The Cosby Show," and "Miami Vice." According to officials from the US Consulate in Leningrad, these particular shows were quite popular in Tallinn as of early 1987. Two Estonians in 1984 described the impact of Finnish TV as follows:

You see on Finnish television how shops are full of products, meat and other things. If you switch the channel, you can hear on our own channel how we have enough of everything. But when you go to the shops there is nothing. Therefore, there have been recent official comments to the effect that the Finnish television is, in fact, only a tool of the CIA.

Soviet officials have expressed considerable concern about the impact of Finnish and Swedish television, which can also be received in some parts of the Baltic republics. In June 1987 Estonian party boss Vayno said that films broadcast on Finnish television are disturbing the Estonian way of life. He particularly criticized "US or other foreign shows which propagate murder and violence and portray rich people as glamorous—shows like 'Dallas'" (although Vayno's Finnish interviewers stated that the Estonian leader had assured that no measures would be taken to restrict viewing).

a Znanivc official said in

The Impact of Foreign Television (continued)

early 1987 that problems in the Baltics are exacerbated by the good reception of Finnish and Swedish television. He also said that residents of Murmansk and the western border region of the Karelian republic, in addition to Estonians, can receive Finnish television. Substantial numbers of Soviets living in Karelia speak Finnish. [REDACTED]

Other parts of the country along the Western borderland can receive East European television. While the standardization of television wavelengths throughout all of Eastern Europe (except for East Germany) and the USSR at first may seem to be a triumph for Moscow, it is simultaneously a cause for Soviet concern. For example, during the Chernobyl accident Polish television made some Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian viewers living just across the border aware of the measures the Warsaw regime took to protect the public from radiation. According to press reporting, when Polish television gave extensive coverage to the Pope's visit in 1979, programmers in eastern Poland were required to cut back this coverage to avoid exposing the Soviet audience to too large a dose of Polish nationalism and religious fervor. The time allotted on Polish TV to debates about Solidarity caused even more alarm, as illustrated by a March 1984 article by the party first secretary of the Brest oblast in Belorussia:

As the situation in [Poland] changed, a new task arose—that of analyzing and explaining to people the . . . causes of the situation and exposing the slanderous fabrications of Western radio centers aimed at Poland and our country. Many inhabitants of Brest Oblast have blood relations among the citizens of [Poland]. The fact that a considerable part of the oblast's inhabitants can

watch Polish television programs cannot be ignored. Before martial law was introduced in that country, programs of an anticommunist nature were sometimes broadcast. These programs paralyzed the will of the Poles to struggle for the ideals of the working class . . . and directed unfriendly attacks at our country.

[REDACTED] the ethnic Ukrainian majority in the Western Ukraine is taking advantage of Gorbachev's glasnost policy and [REDACTED] "almost everyone" listens to Polish TV as well as Western radio. [REDACTED]

Reception of Romanian national television is good in Moldavia because of the republic's location adjacent to the Romanian border. Although the message of Romanian TV is not irredentist or anti-Soviet, its highly nationalistic content probably fortifies ethnic feelings among Moldavians, the majority of whom are ethnic Romanian. The political impact of Romanian TV is quite limited, however, by the harshness of the Romanian regime, the unpalatability of its message, and the fact that it is on the air only two hours per night. [REDACTED]

Soviet residents along the USSR's southern border can receive television from Turkey and Iran. In January 1986, a Znanie lecturer acknowledged that many people in the republics along the southern border watch Turkish or Iranian TV. Residents of Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, told US Embassy visitors that Turkish TV was easy to pick up and that many residents watched them. [REDACTED]

Soviet authorities seem to be quite aware of the factors that make border areas especially vulnerable to Western radios. Officials have commented on the relatively good reception for Western radio in areas directly adjacent to the Western border and the ability of many citizens in these areas to pick up East European television as well (see inset). The regime is also aware of the great interest people living in the Western borderlands have in hearing news from the West. Many people there have extensive historical ties and cultural affinities to Europe that encourage them to listen to Western broadcasting and make them interested in programs about life in Western countries as well as in the USSR. Party leaders also express concern that emigre groups use foreign broadcasts in an effort to promote cultural and political autonomy for their former homelands and to establish contact with their conationals in the USSR.

The regime is especially concerned about the situation in the Baltic states, particularly because of the threat from Finnish television. In recent years, the party first secretary in Estonia has devoted unusual attention in his speeches to warning the Estonian population about the seductive power of Western radiobroadcasting. In a typical November 1986 broadside, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* published an article that specifically attacked VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Baltic republics, accusing the station of broadcasting "malicious legends," misrepresenting American opinion, supporting Nazi war criminals, and citing Soviet repression while keeping silent about cases of emigres returning to the USSR. The Soviets also issued numerous press attacks against VOA and RFE/RL's alleged role in organizing the August 1987 demonstrations in the three Baltic states on the anniversary of the 1939 pact between the USSR and Nazi Germany.

The regime is anxious that the modernization program of VOA and RFE/RL is increasing the vulnerability of the population in Soviet Central Asia to foreign influences at a time when the regime is

bogged down in a war in neighboring Afghanistan and attempting to stem the growth of religious activism among Soviet Muslims. Thus, the first deputy chairman of the KGB complained in August 1986:

[T]he network of subversive radiobroadcasting is being expanded, and the duration of broadcasts in languages of the various peoples of the USSR is significantly increasing. [RFE/RL] is strengthening the existing national editorial offices and creating new ones designed for specific regions of the country. . . . [These offices are] oriented toward conducting subversive activities in various regions of the Soviet Union.

Authorities have devoted special attention to combating the "unprecedented magnitude" of Western efforts to subvert Soviet Muslims. For example:

- In December 1986 *Izvestiya* attacked Western coverage of the riots in Alma Ata, claiming that the *New York Post* had embroidered the story with untrue details it had obtained from RL.
- In May 1987 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* claimed that 90 percent of VOA's Uzbek-language service is devoted to Islam, and attacked the station's "distortions" in presenting this topic. The article alleged that in 1979 Washington hatched a plan to hem in the USSR from the south with states expounding a hostile ideology and to spark a "Muslim bomb," using RL broadcasts in Uzbek and other Central Asian languages. The journal also alleged that VOA tries to prepare young Soviet listeners to reject the ideas of Communism by assuring them that Islam is compatible with modern progress.

* Since Radio Free Afghanistan was established in October 1985 as a service of RL, its initial Dari-language broadcasts totaling one hour per week have been expanded to five hours per week. Monitoring reports indicate that a strong signal is being received in Kabul. The station plans to expand its Dari service and in September 1987 it began to broadcast six hours per week in the Pashto language. Although the station is geared primarily to citizens of Afghanistan, Soviet soldiers from Tajikistan probably are able to understand its Dari-language programming.


- In addition to the standard charge that CIA funds RFE/RL, highly specific attacks have appeared against individual staff members of RL's Central Asian services. In mid-1985, a scathing "open letter" to a member of RL's Turkmen service appeared in an Ashkhabad paper.
- In April 1985 another Turkmen paper ridiculed three specific RL stories. One alleged that the construction of a canal in the republic would lead to unemployment; another cited damage to kolkhoz irrigation systems caused by the pumping of seawater into a bay located near the Caspian Sea; and the third discussed the impact on Turkmenistan of the lack of Turkmen chemists with higher education degrees.
- In late 1984, a Tashkent newspaper attacked RL for calling the Basmachis "freedom fighters" and for "spreading the nonsense that Communists drive Muslims from the mosques."

Religious Believers. In recent years religious believers evidently have begun to listen to Western broadcasting in larger numbers. This increase in interest may be due primarily to major programing changes. In 1985 the Western stations began to devote considerably more air time to Russian-language religious programing.

Among religious believers, members of the Russian Orthodox faith appear to listen to Western religious programing less than members of other faiths. Two studies—one conducted in the West and one in the USSR—reached this conclusion. The first study, a 1985 RFE/RL survey of a group of 600 Soviet citizens traveling abroad, found that Soviet nationalities not associated with Russian Orthodoxy—Lithuanians, Jews, Azeris, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs—listened to religious programing at a higher rate than nationalities containing larger proportions of Orthodox believers—including Russians and Ukrainians.* The second survey, conducted by a Soviet sociologist in 1984,

* Table 6 shows a great deal of interest in religious broadcasting in Armenia, Georgia, the predominantly Muslim republics of Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Lithuania where there are large numbers of Catholics. We do not have comparative data for people living in the RSFSR, however.

investigated the views of a cross section of attendees of local churches in Karaganda oblast in northern Kazakhstan. The survey found that Evangelical Baptists, Lutherans, and Mennonites were more likely to listen to foreign religious radiobroadcasts than were Russian Orthodox Christians.



Some Russian Orthodox believe that foreign radio-broadcasting is directed primarily at other religious groups and that many broadcasts treat Russian Orthodoxy pejoratively. A more important reason for relatively low listening rates among Orthodox believers may be the significance they assign to the physical presence of the church, the visual immediacy of the rituals, and the impact on the senses of incense and music. By contrast, the faith of Protestant believers is nourished by hearing services, via foreign radio or otherwise.

At the same time, some Russian Orthodox clergy and laity do listen to Western radiobroadcasting.



The Kremlin's strident propaganda attacks attest to its strong concern about the impact of religious broadcasting. In October 1984, a *Znanie* lecturer claimed that the United States alone spends \$3 billion a year on religious propaganda directed toward the USSR. In March 1985, the paper *Kommunist Belorussii* noted the variety of stations that allegedly stoke religious fanaticism and anti-Soviet sentiment. In addition to stations solely devoted to religious programing—Radio Vatican, Radio Monte Carlo (Monaco), and Voice of the Andes (Ecuador)—the




Table 6
Programs Heard by Listeners to
Selected Language Services of RFE/RL

Percent

Type of Program	Central Asian Services*	Est.	Latv	Lith.	Armen.	Azer.	Georg	Beloruss.	Ukr.
Size of sample	40	49	37	35	28	8	37	39	166
Newscast	98	90	89	86	96	100	97	95	92
Info. about USSR	83	94	78	83	86	77	70	69	76
Polit. Analysis	80	69	51	69	71	75	78	31	66
Life in the West	68	63	54	71	57	88	73	59	54
Human rights	45	67	41	31	39		57	28	40
Samizdat	38	22	24	31	39	13	24	10	34
Science and Technology	33	24	24	17	14	13	32	21	15
Religion	33	18	19	23	39		24	5	22
Music	25	27	16	29	7		19	15	12
Readings from books	20	31	27	20	25	38	22	31	34
Agriculture	18	8	3	6	14		22	5	11
Culture	13	12	24	17	36	13	24	15	12
Economics	10	14	22	23	14	13	19	10	22
Sports	10		3	14	18			10	15

* Includes listeners to the Tatar-Bashkir-language service.

Notes: Multiple responses possible. For Belorussian and Ukrainian services, data are for 1986. For other services, data are for 1985.

Source: Various RFE/RL nationality listener reports; based on interviews of Soviet citizens temporarily traveling outside the USSR.

[REDACTED]
article mentioned religious segments broadcast by VOA, BBC, Radio Canada, DW, and RL [REDACTED]

Judging from the content of these attacks, officials are primarily concerned about the airing of Russian Orthodox services, Western allegations that Moscow curtails Soviet citizens' religious freedoms, and Western suggestions of a religious revival in the USSR. A typical article addressing all three of these concerns appeared in *Leningradskaya Pravda* in late 1985. The paper attacked a "Father Vasily," who it said makes daily sermons and religious comments on BBC, as an inveterate anti-Soviet; it tried to refute "fabrications about the mythical persecution suffered by most religious servants and believers in our country"; and it

argued that—contrary to reports from "all kinds of 'voices'"—the country was not experiencing an upsurge in religious feeling. The article denied that the young and middle aged fill churches to capacity, and claimed that the crowds that appear during major religious holidays are merely curious people who want to "gawk at an archaic ceremony that is unusual in our day." [REDACTED]

Religious programming enjoys considerable popularity among the large numbers of Catholics in Lithuania and the Ukraine. John Paul II's intense interest in the

~~Secret~~

plight of Ukrainian Catholicism—outlawed by the Soviet regime in 1946—has undoubtedly heightened interest in Radio Vatican broadcasts. [REDACTED]

As in the past, the regime has taken particular care to rebut charges of Western radios, especially Radio Vatican, of regime repression of Catholic believers and clergy in areas where religion is intertwined with anti-Russian nationalism. Thus, a Soviet Lithuanian paper in March 1987 denounced some foreign stations for criticizing the imprisonment of certain Lithuanian religious figures, claiming they had been prosecuted not for religious activity but for "reactionary political activity and for making fabrications against our society." [REDACTED]

Some evidence indicates a growing audience for foreign broadcasting among the Muslim population of Central Asia and Azerbaijan (see inset). In 1979 the head of the Turkmen party Department of Propaganda and Agitation asserted that most of the Turkmen population listened to religious broadcasts from Radio Gorgan in Iran and that tape recordings of these broadcasts had been made by mullahs and replayed before groups of Muslims throughout the republic. *Samizdat* audiocassettes are made from Pakistani religious broadcasts as well, according to a Western newsman. Muslim religious leaders have told visiting [REDACTED] officials that the faithful listen to readings of the Koran transmitted by Tehran and Cairo radios; one mullah rejoiced that "you can hardly turn on the radio without hearing the Koran read." [REDACTED]

Such broadcasts have considerable impact on the Central Asian public. According to information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in October 1986, a sociologist from Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, concluded that Iranian radio-broadcasts in indigenous Turkic languages play a major role in stimulating religious activity in Central Asia. Interest in foreign broadcasts evidently acts to reinforce the feelings of solidarity Soviet Muslims feel for their coreligionists in other countries. When asked whether they use the radios to follow events in Iran and Afghanistan, Muslim leaders in Dagestan responded, "Of course, they are our Muslim brothers." [REDACTED]

Soviet Attacks Against Iranian Broadcasts

Central Asian papers seem to devote as much time denouncing Tehran's religious broadcasting—which has become incendiary under Khomeini—as attacking the Western stations:

- In December 1985, two Turkmen newspapers attacked Radio Gorgan, an Iranian station close to the Soviet border, for broadcasting sermons that called for the export of the "Islamic revolution" and promoted "Islamic brotherhood." According to Soviet commentary, these programs were meant to divert Muslims in the USSR from the path of socialism and fan "hostility among the population of Soviet Central Asia toward other nationalities"—presumably the Russians.
- Various articles accuse Iranian mullahs of spreading religion among nonbelievers in Central Asia, acknowledging that such "inflammatory broadcasts" could sow doubt and confusion among young Central Asians and lead "gullible" or half-educated people astray.
- In June 1986 the first deputy chairman of the KGB, Filip Bobkov, charged that Iranian radio spreads "pan-Islamic propaganda" in Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
- Regime propaganda indicates particular concern about the impact of Iranian broadcasting on "unofficial mullahs"—Muslim clergy in Soviet Central Asia who have no official permission for their activities from the state. Authorities have denounced these mullahs for taking instructions from foreign radio stations and for being in the service of Moscow's ideological enemies. Thus, in February 1987, a Turkmen paper attacked "so-called itinerant mullahs" said to be under the influence of "inflammatory pan-Islamic foreign broadcasts." [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

Official concern about the link between radiobroadcasting and Soviet Jews centers around the emigration issue. Regime propaganda indicates considerable apprehension that foreign broadcasts providing information about positive aspects of life in the West will encourage emigration. Soviet newspapers carry frequent articles describing in harrowing detail problems Jewish emigres face in finding employment, obtaining affordable housing, and adjusting to life in capitalist countries.

The Armed Forces. There are indications the Kremlin worries that Western radiobroadcasting could weaken military morale and combat readiness. In December 1986, a naval captain lecturing at the Central Officers Club in Leningrad told a group of military propagandists that many soldiers listen to Western broadcasts and that a recent Central Committee analysis had found that the stations influence many military personnel to some degree. In 1986 a Soviet expert on military indoctrination wrote:

The CIA and the USIA attach particular significance to psychological warfare against the army personnel in the socialist countries. . . . Much of [RFE/RL's] broadcasting time is devoted to those who wear the army uniform. . . . The radio saboteurs in Munich seek to plant a seed of doubt in the minds of Soviet soldiers, to shake their views and political conviction.

One of the main focuses of counterpropaganda within the military is on the threat of Western broadcasting. In 1984, *Krasnaya zvezda* said that special councils at the battalion level and below are supposed to ensure a timely flow of information about foreign and domestic developments that can help *agitprop* workers rebut the foreign stations by informing them "what current lies Western radio stations are cooking up." A former senior lieutenant in the Soviet Ground Forces during the mid-1970s reported that counterpropaganda departments in the Soviet armed forces analyzed Western military press and media that could have an effect on the morale of Soviet troops, paying particular attention to VOA.

How Soviet Jamming Works


Jamming is carried out by broadcasting intentionally irritating noise or another signal—such as another program—on the same frequency as the incoming transmission. In the early days, Soviet jamming was carried out by mechanically produced noise such as chirps, squeals, and gull cries. "White noise" is now used extensively because it covers a wide range of the audio spectrum and can be produced electronically. The Soviet station Mayak (beacon) falls in the category of a competing program (see Inset, page 42).

There are two basic methods of jamming:

- "Groundwave" or local jamming is the primary method. It is accomplished by a network of transmitters set up in the target zone, usually a large metropolitan area. Groundwave jamming is very effective but limited in range to 15 to 20 miles.
- "Skywave" jammers are powerful transmitters located hundreds or thousands of miles from the target area. Their signals bounce off the ionosphere at an angle calculated to return the jamming signal to Earth in the same area as the incoming broadcast. Skywave jamming usually covers a much larger area than groundwave jamming—typically, outer suburban areas or rural areas containing many small villages—but less effectively.

~~Secret~~

Figure 4
Listening Trends for the Four Major Stations, 1974-85



This figure shows the "ratings" over time for each major Western station, as measured by Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (SAAOR), RFE/RL's audience research unit. Ratings are based on SAAOR's interviews of Soviet citizens traveling temporarily outside the USSR. They include that portion of the adult Soviet population that regularly listens at least once a week plus the small number of citizens who tune in on a random basis on an average of at least once a week.

Note: The designated dates are the midpoints of each sampling period, which vary in length from 6 to 24 months. For each of these periods, the sample size ranged from 2,100 to 3,600 respondents.

Extensive Soviet criticism of Western broadcasts into Afghanistan is probably motivated by concern about the impact they have on Soviet troops as well as on the Afghan population. Another target group that receives major attention in Soviet counterpropaganda includes sailors and merchant marine seamen, who are exposed to Western broadcasting and foreign influences generally more frequently and directly than most other elements of Soviet society.

Recent Regime Policy

The Soviet regime has resorted to various measures to counter the impact of Western broadcasting on Soviet society. These reactions fall into three categories:

- "Tough" measures—jamming, legal sanctions over listeners, counterpropaganda.
- "Soft" measures—changes in information and propaganda policies intended to persuade listeners to switch from Western to Soviet media.

~~Secret~~

POOR QUALITY PAGE

Table 7
The Impact of Jamming on Audibility

Reported Average

Soviet Jamming Capabilities and Practices

	BBC	DW	RFE/RL	VOA
1981	1.8	2.2	1.4	2.3
1984	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
1985	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.5

Scale: 4 = good; 3 = fair; 2 = poor; 1 = im.possible

Note: This table was obtained from interviews with former Soviet citizens (1,002 in 1981 and 1,150 for 1984-85) who listened to Western radio and lived in several large metropolitan areas before they emigrated from the USSR. Because the figures are derived from an unweighted data sample, they should not be projected to the Soviet population as a whole.

Sources: For 1981: RFE/RL Research Memorandum RM 9-85, "Average Audibility of Major Western Broadcasters in Selected Urban Areas," October 1983; for 1984-85: "Summary of Audibility and Jamming Data for Major Western Broadcasters to USSR, 1985," October 1986.

The USSR has an enormous capability to jam incoming high-frequency radio programs.

At any given time, anywhere from one to 12 skywave jammers may be called to block a specific program on a single frequency.

According to some reports, the Soviets usually jam only those programs they find offensive, particularly newscasts, allowing music and other noncontroversial programs to be heard.

- Diplomacy—steps to intimidate or persuade foreign countries on whose territory the broadcasts originate, intended to stop the problem at its source.

Efforts To Restrict Radio Listening

Jamming. Until recently, jamming was the principal countermeasure the Soviets employed against Western broadcasting.


Soviet jamming against

RFE/RL has been unremitting since it went on the air in the early 1950s. From 1980 through the end of 1986, 80 percent of the Russian-language broadcasts of all major Western radios into the Soviet Union have been jammed. In August 1980 the Kremlin resumed full jamming against the major Western stations—VOA, BBC, and DW—following the invasion of Afghanistan and coinciding with preparations for the declaration in December of martial law in Poland. In addition, in September 1982 the Soviets began jamming Dari-language broadcasts of VOA, and in January 1983 jamming of VOA's Pashto

programming began—to block reception of these broadcasts by national minorities near the Afghan border and by the combatants inside Afghanistan.

The jamming campaign begun in August 1980 had a significant short-term impact. A Radio Liberty report issued in late 1981 shows that the resumption of

Figure 5. Local versus skywave jamming.



Prosecuting Citizens for Offenses Related to Radio Listening

Since at least the early 1980s, the regime has used Soviet law to intimidate listeners in three ways.

(1) Soviet citizens have been penalized for disseminating information broadcast over the radios that is judged to be anti-Soviet. Such dissemination can take a number of forms. Listening to foreign radio in a public place is one possibility. In 1980, Ukrainian dissident Dmitrii Mazur was accused of switching on a radio at a bus stop and listening for two minutes to a broadcast by an unidentified station that stated Soviet troops were responsible for atrocities in Afghanistan. He received six years in strict-regime camps and five years in exile for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." Another dissident, Vladimir Rozhdestvov, was put on trial in 1977 for listening to VOA, DW, BBC, and RL broadcasts and talking to friends about them. He was committed to a psychiatric hospital for "disseminating knowingly false fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and social system."

The possession of recordings of Western broadcasts has been enough to put a person in the dock, presumably because it indicates an intention to pass the recorded material to others. In April 1982, two residents of Sverdlovsk received five years in strict-regime camps for building up a tape library of DW and VOA programs (750 broadcasts on 66 cassettes). In another case, authorities reportedly confiscated 14 tape recorders and 700 tapes with religious recordings from Russian Orthodox activist Genadiy Lapkin, who was arrested in January 1986. In September 1986, a Crimean Tatar dissident was sentenced to a term of three years for

various crimes, one of which was the possession of cassettes of Western radiobroadcasts. Dissident poetess Irina Ratusninskaya told [redacted] in late 1986 of an Estonian woman in jail for possessing tapes of RL broadcasts.

(2) To break the will of those willing to pass Western radio stations information describing the persecution of dissidents, Soviet legal authorities have taken legal action against those who pass the information. For example, Mikhail Kukobaka, a Belorussian writer tried in 1979, was indicted for writing and transmitting to the West two samizdat articles "used by hostile radio stations in their subversive activities against the Soviet Union." (Kukobaka also was accused of recording the texts of the Western broadcasts and listening to them in the presence of others.) An Estonian dissident, Lagle Parek, was sentenced in 1983 to six years in labor camp and three years internal exile for passing to the West materials that "discredited" the USSR; these letters were used by VOA, RFE, and publications produced by Estonian emigre organizations in the United States, Canada, West Germany, and Sweden. Mykola Horbal', a Ukrainian dissident already serving a prison term, received an additional 10 years in labor camp plus five years in internal exile in April 1985 for orally expressing anti-Soviet propaganda to fellow labor-camp inmates and for having his verses sent to foreign radio stations. Leonid Volvokskiy, a former Hebrew teacher, reportedly also received three years in a labor camp in 1985 for transmitting "slandorous fabrications" about the

~~Secret~~

persecution of Soviet Jews. The court took note of the fact that RL and the Voice of Israel both broadcast information he had written. Some dissidents have been punished merely for being the subject of a broadcast. In 1981 a Kharkov court judged Anatolii Koryagin, one of the founders of a group that monitors Soviet psychiatric abuses, responsible for broadcasts about him that the Russian services of BBC, VOA, and RL aired.

(3) Prosecutors frequently use the fact that a defendant listens to foreign radio, or even that a friend of his works at a foreign station, to paint a negative picture of his general character. The fact that a defendant listens to Western radio can be mentioned in witnesses' testimony, court pleadings, official legal documents, and court judgments. For example, the charge of listening to VOA, BBC, DW, and RL, as well as abstracting political commentaries put out by the first three stations, was included in the descriptive part of a judgment against Nikolai Pavlov, convicted in 1981 for writing a pamphlet discrediting Politburo member Andrey Kirilenko. The inclusion of such details in a character appraisal can result in a harsher sentence since Soviet law obliges judges to take into account "the personality of the guilty person" when determining the punishment. Quite often, listening is used to explain how the accused came to "embark on a criminal path." In other cases, the fact that an emigre friend of a defendant works for RL can be used against him. This was the case with a scientist from Tomsk charged with circulating samizdat and a Leningrad resident who belonged to the free trade-union movement "SMOT."

jamming decreased the audibility of the stations, caused a major decline in regularity of listening, and reduced the amount of time spent listening. These trends gradually began to reverse themselves, however. RFE/RL surveys indicate that by 1985 listenership had again reached or surpassed prejamming levels for VOA, RL, and the BBC (see figure 4 and table 7).

The increase in audience size from 1981-85 can be explained in part by the modernization of the stations' transmitters that improved range and audibility. In addition, as noted earlier, the public continued taking several measures to try to listen to Western broadcasting despite the jamming.

In late 1986 the Soviets began to let up on jamming to a considerable degree. In October, Moscow stopped jamming radio programming from Beijing, Albania, and South Korea. In January 1987 the Soviets stopped jamming BBC's Russian service following a request made by a British official visiting Moscow. In May 1987 jamming of all VOA's language services ceased.


Legal Sanctions. As previously mentioned, the act of listening to foreign broadcasts is not, strictly speaking, illegal. In response to a foreign listener's question in late 1979 on whether Soviet people were free to listen to these broadcasts, Radio Moscow's World Service answered:

Yes, they are. In fact, most Soviet-made radio sets have shortwave bands and the only thing to do is to push the button and tune in to a station you like. . . . People usually take their transistor radios (along with them when they go out of town on a weekend) and, of course, everyone listens to what he wants. . . . I for one listen to the BBC and the Voice of America. . . . It's not that I always agree with the views that are aired by those stations, but I am absolutely free to listen to foreign radio stations.

At the same time, at least until recently, the regime has punished some listeners for either listening or passing on what they have heard in too blatant a

~~Secret~~

manner. The application of penalties has been highly arbitrary (see inset). This strategy apparently has been intended to intimidate dissidents and other "trouble-makers" by putting them off-balance. It also has been aimed at trying to minimize the extent to which otherwise "law-abiding citizens" listen to the radios or disseminate what they have heard too openly. By such an approach, the regime has attempted to persuade some citizens that anything more than quietly listening to the stations will not be tolerated. Thus, the regime has used legal ambiguity as a means of coping with the public's desire to listen to the radios.




Despite a diminished fear of listening to foreign radios—mainly because of the abandonment of Stalinist repression—this strategy has probably worked for a fair number of citizens, since it appears that many of them do not know about the fine distinction between listening to the radios and violating statutes against "slandering the Soviet state and social system."



The USSR has several interrelated objectives in running intelligence operations against RFE/RL. Perhaps the primary one is to undermine West German willingness to host the station. Moscow attempts in various ways to increase pressure on the Bonn government to kick RFE/RL off West German territory.


Sanctions against listeners have been selectively applied since Gorbachev's accession, but the regime may now be moving away from such tactics. At the same time that authorities have stopped jamming, there are signs that Gorbachev is prepared to acknowledge more openly the public's legal right to listen to incoming broadcasts. Thus, during a TV show aired in May 1987, one roundtable discussant said: "Sometimes people [in the recent past] took the liberty of listening to Western radio stations. By all means please do, it's not banned in our country, after all. It's a matter for you and your conscience, so to speak."



Soviet Intelligence Operations Against the Stations. The Kremlin mounts extensive intelligence operations against RFE/RL. There is little if any evidence of any similar campaign against VOA, BBC, DW, or the other Western stations—a reflection of the more serious subversive threat that RFE/RL represents in Moscow's eyes.

The theme of West German complicity with US "subversion" was stressed by Oleg Tumanov—a Soviet defector who worked at RFE/RL for about 20 years as a KGB agent—in an April 1986 press conference he gave in Moscow after his defection.








Oleg Tumanov

Sovtola ©



A long-running and successful KGB operation against RFE/RL that recently came to light is the recruitment of Oleg Tumanov, who for about 20 years worked undetected as a KGB agent in RL's Russian Language Service. Before he redefected to the USSR in February 1986, Tumanov was that service's Acting Chief Director, responsible for reading and editing scripts in Russian. Two months later, he surfaced in Moscow and gave a press conference (replayed on Soviet television) accusing RFE/RL of being run by the CIA. He alleged that most top RL staffers are CIA officers—some with the ranks of "major" and "colonel," claimed that the US Embassy in Moscow is deeply involved in RL's activities, and said that most samizdat used by RL was fabricated in the West.





The Kremlin hopes to decrease RFE/RL's effectiveness by fanning existing ethnic hostilities among the broadcasters and editors, sometimes by activating *agents provocateurs*. RFE/RL's foreign staff includes three waves of emigres: those who came West at the end of World War II in 1945 (mainly Russians and Belorussians), so-called third-wave emigres (predominantly Jewish) allowed to emigrate in the 1970s, and a more recent group of non-Jewish emigres. Differences in political orientation and ethnic identity of the staff members create an ideal setting for KGB provocations designed to foment and exaggerate existing differences among the station's staff.

Although in the late 1950s Soviet operatives made several assassination attempts against RFE/RL's employees, there is no evidence that Moscow has resorted to assassination since then.



A noteworthy case occurred in 1978 when Bulgarian intelligence operatives killed broadcaster Georgi Markov by injecting him with poison using the tip of an umbrella. In February 1981, a bomb exploded at the Munich headquarters of RFE/RL, injuring four employees and causing over \$1 million in damage. The culprit was never found.




Counterpropaganda and Propaganda
The Emergence of a New Type of Counterpropaganda.
In the last decade, the Soviet leadership has made a concerted effort to improve official propaganda to arrest an erosion of regime credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Soviet population. Because one of the key factors contributing to the regime's credibility problems has been the expansion of foreign views entering the country, much of the effort to upgrade propaganda is directed against the foreign radios and the information they purvey. Increasingly, the regime has seen its primary task in the field of propaganda the refutation of foreign views rather than the promotion of Soviet views.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the Soviet regime took the first steps toward rebutting the increase in the level of foreign information entering the country. An April 1979 Central Committee resolution accused imperialist propaganda, in conjunction with "Beijing chauvinists," of "waging a fierce offensive against Soviet people's minds, seeking with the aid of the most subtle methods and modern technical means to poison their awareness by slander against Soviet reality." The resolution called for a restructuring of the party's ideological work and required party workers to help the public appreciate the falseness of slanderous propaganda. Specifically, it called for a better political education system; more effective *agitprop* in residential areas and workplaces (including improving the quality of propagandists involved in this work); and changes in the mass media. Thus, 1979 marked the beginning of a serious effort to build an effective domestic counterpropaganda system and to develop the concept of counterpropaganda as a weapon against foreign penetration.

From 1979 to 1982 came a veritable flood of plenums, resolutions, and meetings on the subject. This included two conferences for ideological workers and a November 1981 Central Committee resolution that announced "supplementary measures" to create more effective counterpropaganda against the "ideological diversions of imperialism."

The June 1983 Central Committee plenum, which focused on ideology, was a watershed event that pushed the counterpropaganda campaign to the fore.

The plenum was punctuated with tough talk about the need to repulse Western ideology, with Konstantin Chernenko calling for a large-scale assault against "those persons who, consciously or unconsciously, echo foreign voices, so to speak, and spread . . . lies and rumors."




East European ideologists are labeling Moscow's new human rights offensive the "Yakovlev line," after the party secretary in charge of the ideology and propaganda sectors. At the January 1987 meeting in Warsaw of Bloc ideological secretaries, Yakovlev argued that Western precepts of democracy had significantly affected the outlook of Soviet and East European citizens, and that the Bloc had to counter this trend. The conference issued a communique that stressed the need to present more convincingly the socialist countries' policies in the field of human rights and freedoms.

Revamping Organizations and Personnel. Since the late 1970s, the regime has experimented with organizational changes to upgrade the propaganda apparatus:

- In 1978, after a speech by Brezhnev criticizing Soviet propaganda's poor credibility among foreign audiences, an International Information Department was established in the Central Committee to



coordinate and refurbish Moscow's foreign propaganda. At this time, the Politburo also set up a special commission to study ways to improve "ideological, mass political work"



- In early 1986, after Gorbachev's accession, the International Information Department was merged with the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. By giving the new Propaganda Department responsibility over both foreign and domestic propaganda, the regime apparently is trying to promote a more consistent public treatment of Soviet foreign policy at home and abroad.

Gorbachev has carried out a major shakeup of the Soviet media and propaganda bureaucracies, replacing most key Brezhnev holdovers. As previously mentioned, Yakovlev, a close Gorbachev associate, has been put in charge of the propaganda sector. On becoming head of the Propaganda Department in July 1985, he focused on giving new dynamism and sophistication to the domestic media and to Moscow's public diplomacy. Yakovlev has since become a party secretary and full Politburo member, and one of his

underlings now heads the Propaganda Department, although he retains overall responsibility for overseeing its work. A new head of the Central Committee Cultural Department has also been named and the news agency Novosti, the State Committee for Television and Radiobroadcasting, and the government publishing committee have all been given new chiefs. Gorbachev has executed a broad purge of leading newspapers, replacing chief editors of 13 important central newspapers and journals

Upgrading Technical Capabilities and Programing.

The regime in recent years has continued to build up the physical infrastructure of the domestic media. By making television and radio more available, Soviet authorities hope to lessen the appeal of Western broadcasting. The regime has modernized the extensive wired radio system that remains an important source of information for millions of citizens. According to a July 1985 Soviet publication, there are 95.2 million wired radio outlets, of which 58.2 million are three-channel. (A three-channel system allows listeners to receive the two Moscow channels and a third with programs of regional interest.) In May 1985, a joint Central Committee/Council of Ministers resolution had the stated goal of completing within the next 10 years "the setting up of three-channel cable radiobroadcasting in all towns, rayon centers and settlements and the active introduction of this system in rural areas." One Western expert predicts that improvements to the wired system will allow some 42 million families to receive the three radio channels.

As in the West, television has become the dominant information medium, by most accounts displacing newspapers and magazines. With the rapid growth of television ownership, local and all-Union programs have become formidable competitors to Western radiobroadcasting. Moscow TV now reaches nine out of 10 Soviet citizens, enhancing the regime's ability to get its message to the population rapidly. Soviet officials clearly are committed to expanding the reach of television to all parts of the country, and satellite

~~Secret~~

technology makes possible such an expansion, especially for people in Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East. If the USSR fulfills its next five-year plan for communications satellites, by 1990 the whole country will be in the range of both programs beamed from Moscow. [REDACTED]

Increasing the number of channels available is another key element in Moscow's strategy. Large cities in the USSR have four TV channels, and almost all Soviets have access to television and radio receivers that pick up several simultaneously broadcast channels. By allowing citizens a choice—offering light entertainment in addition to more serious fare like cultural and public affairs programs—the regime hopes to create more of an incentive to listen to the domestic media and to dampen public demand for Western radiobroadcasting.¹¹ Similarly, Radio Mayak—a domestic radio station that went on the air in 1964—offers Soviet listeners more variety in programming and a faster paced news coverage (see inset). [REDACTED]

In 1978 some innovative current affairs programming began to appear on Soviet television. Two programs with a novel format ("The World Today" and "International Panorama") featured roundtable discussions by experts; in the past, set speeches by high-ranking officials had been the norm. The new, relatively lively, give-and-take format helps transmit the regime's message more effectively by creating a greater sense of candor and spontaneity. Live reports from commentators in world capitals also began appearing to enliven the presentation. One of the commentators from "The World Today" admitted that an important factor behind these changes was the need to compete with Western stations like VOA and BBC. [REDACTED]

Since Gorbachev has come to power, there has been an increased emphasis on timely television newscasts, with the introduction of new breakfast and late evening news shows. "Vremya" has improved the timeliness of its news reporting and now includes

¹¹ The September 1986 edition of *Argumenty i Fakty*, a publication intended for party propagandists, claimed that "there are many unsolved problems in the development of a television network. Not all regions of the country are provided with television broadcasting. Often foreign propaganda centers take advantage of this." [REDACTED]

Radio Mayak

Radio Mayak (beacon) is a domestic station intended as a first line of defense against foreign radio. It is designed to compete with the Western radios [REDACTED] it tries to provide a content attractive enough to draw Soviet listeners away from Western radio stations. [REDACTED] Radio Mayak was rushed onto the air just five weeks after a June 1964 resolution of the Central Committee on the USSR's radio system. The resolution required that Mayak "contain prompt information (not less than twice per hour)" on both internal and external affairs. [REDACTED]

The results of an audience poll published in an April 1985 issue of *Govorit i pokazyvayet Moskva*, the Moscow radio and television guide, revealed that almost 60 percent of the sample tuned in to Radio Mayak at some time during the day, mainly to listen to the news. According to the publication, the station's main audience is young people, said to be especially attracted by newscasts—which can be heard around the clock and more frequently than in other Soviet media. The station also tries to lure younger listeners by providing entertainment and mimicking the programming format of Western stations. It intersperses frequent newscasts with short items of music, interviews, and humorous anecdotes. [REDACTED]

In the early years of its existence, Radio Mayak purposely transmitted its signal on the same frequency as some of the Western stations. Mayak used to broadcast on frequencies above the 25-meter band—precisely those used by RL—where Soviet internal broadcasts normally are not transmitted. [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

Propaganda at the Working Level Against the Radios: Publications of the Znaniye Society

The Soviet Znaniye (Knowledge) Society—a mass organization subordinate to the Central Committee's Propaganda Department—has primary responsibility for disseminating official views through lecture programs. It also issues publications that are meant to parry questions and dispel doubts arising in the minds of listeners to Western radiobroadcasts. The most important publication—a weekly called Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts)—first appeared in 1980. This eight-page tabloid, published in an edition of 600,000-700,000 copies, is directed at lecturers, propagandists, and teachers; it is not for sale to the general public. The newspaper claims that its average reader is a member of "that detachment which is actively carrying on the struggle against all possible Western 'voices' which daily flood the airwaves." According to its editor, it carries articles that generalize on questions Soviet citizens ask at Znaniye sessions and in other meetings. A wide range of international and domestic topics are covered. Representative subjects include Soviet disarmament proposals, human rights violations, Western propaganda attacks on socialist societies, the portrayal of the

USSR in Western countries, and scientific and technical progress in the USSR. Although these topics are discussed elsewhere in the Soviet press, their handling in Argumenty i Fakty includes a great deal of detail and a minimum of ideological hype because they are designed to help party ideology workers respond to what Soviet citizens have heard from the Western radios.

Other publications using an objective, factual approach have been issued. For example, the almanac Argumenty was established in 1980 and comes out annually in an edition of 200,000 copies. These 160-page volumes focus on religion and religious-nationality linkages and have explicitly responded to programs carried on foreign radio. A series of pamphlets have been published at both the republic and All-Union levels with names such as "On That Side" and "Imperialism Without Masks." A typical pamphlet in one of these series critiqued the argument, made in one of RL's Russian-language broadcasts, that Stoly-pin's reforms, if carried through, could have made the 1917 Revolution unnecessary if not impossible.

more live reports. A systematic effort also is being made to attract more viewers, particularly young adults, to time slots before and after this news program. For instance, recent films, major sporting events, and pop concerts fill these evening slots, as well as a controversial new show called "Twelfth Floor" where frequently uncomfortable government officials are grilled by a youthful audience. In fact, Soviet programmers are trying to build a solid block of attractive shows that will run from about 2100 until 0030 hours, the late night hours when the Western radios traditionally capture a large portion of the Soviet audience. In March 1987, Moscow Television began to expand its programming to meet the demands of factory shift workers. The morning news program came on the air at 0700 instead of 0800, and evening news and entertainment ran until about midnight.

Under Gorbachev, TV programmers also have refined the visual presentation of news programming.

in September 1986, the national newscast Vremya introduced a new format featuring an opening logo generated by computer graphics.

Recent Counterpropaganda Themes. Counterpropaganda is intended to provide a broad array of arguments to rebut negative information about the Soviet

~~Secret~~

system from various Western sources, of which radio-broadcasting is the most important. The counterpropaganda effort is carried out in the media and by oral propagandists, the latter work under the *Znaniye* (Knowledge) Society (see inset)

The Kremlin pitches its counterpropaganda at different audiences with different degrees of sophistication and levels of education, since people from all classes listen to Western radio. Thus, while refined techniques and argumentation are used in materials prepared for specialized professional audiences, counterpropaganda appearing in large-circulation mass-media publications seems to be directed at a rather unsophisticated audience. Such offerings often are aggressive and crude, in the main following a traditional formula—bombastic blasts against the many social and political sins “endemic” to the West and counterattacks that do not grant Western points any shred of validity. Recent Soviet counterpropaganda apparently directly toward the less educated parts of the population has revolved around certain set themes:

- The domestic media often portray Westerners, particularly Americans, in the USSR as engaging in subversive activities. During the jailing of Nicholas Daniloff on spy charges, the Soviet media carried several articles on the CIA’s alleged use of Western journalists for purposes of cover and dissemination of information.
- To warn Soviet citizens not to associate with Westerners in the country, the media make a point of moralizing about those cases where Soviet citizens let themselves be led astray. In addition to publicizing on a selective basis actual defections or recruitments of Soviet citizens by Western intelligence services, regime propaganda highlights instances when Soviet citizens innocent of any intent to betray their country became instruments of foreign anti-Soviet forces—by reading and passing to friends

— In July 1987, however, a Soviet paper presented a much more sympathetic picture of US journalists—obviously intended for a better educated audience. The paper reprinted the text of a phone-in between Soviet citizens and two US correspondents based in Moscow; the account focused on how journalists go about collecting news in the USSR

literature entering the country by way of foreign tourists, for example.

- The regime tries to explain the social pathologies that have become increasingly evident in Soviet society— such as drugs, prostitution, violent crime, and pornography—by connecting them to perverse social and sexual influences from the West. For example, Moscow has portrayed AIDS in the USSR as the result of Western contamination, alleging that virtually the only AIDS victims in the USSR are foreigners.
- The regime constantly attacks the moral degeneracy of the West and the pernicious influence of rampant Western consumerism. At its most extreme, Soviet counterpropaganda portrays the United States as a corrupt society torn by racial tension, controlled by ruthless capitalists, and governed by subordination of the public interest to private greed. For example, a scathing documentary called “The Man From Fifth Avenue,” shown on Soviet television in late 1986, looked at the underside of New York City— evictions of tenants, homeless people surrounded by piles of garbage, cocaine addicts, prostitutes looking for customers in midtown Manhattan, scenes of 42nd Street, replete with peep shows, and the contrast between abandoned city blocks in Harlem and the affluence along Fifth Avenue.
- As a complement to these attacks, the media and official spokesmen describe in glowing terms the social, cultural, economic, and spiritual superiority of the socialist system and the Soviet motherland. For example, the carefully arranged return of over 150 emigres in the early months of 1987, mostly from the United States, was widely hailed as a sign of the USSR’s superior social welfare system— which is said to free Soviet people from daily financial worries—as well as a reflection of the West’s materialism and spiritual vacuity.
- Soviet propagandists, believing that the best defense is a good offense, try to turn the tables on Western

~~Secret~~

Themes in Soviet Counterpropaganda Against the Western Stations Under Gorbachev

In recent years, the Soviets have continued to push several themes in their attacks against the Western stations, often embellishing each one with imaginative variations.

Sponsorship of the Radios

An important element of the campaign against the radios is the allegation that RFE/RL and VOA are "CIA stations." Assertions that these stations receive their funding and tasking directly from "Langley" are standard fare. The Kremlin uses to its propaganda advantage the revelations made during the early 1970s that CIA funded RFE/RL. It has not acknowledged to its public that this relationship changed in 1973 when the two stations were put under the supervision of the newly created Board for International Broadcasting.

The Kremlin labels VOA as Washington's official mouthpiece, misrepresenting its status as an independent news station that also broadcasts editorials reflecting US Government policy. The station's supposed support for President Reagan's "crusade against Communism" and its editorials in favor of the defense modernization program and SDI are targeted for special condemnation.

Other Western stations also are portrayed as tools of their governments. A September 1986 *Literaturnaya gazeta* attack on BBC, for example, claimed that its programs are "approved by the British Foreign Office."

Purposes They Serve

Moscow alleges that the West, realizing that the Soviet regime cannot be brought down by military means, tries to spark a popular revolt by alienating the Soviet public from its leadership. According to the Soviets, the radios "justify spies who have been uncovered and popularize turncoats and criminals who have been deservedly sentenced by Soviet justice."

Moscow also links the radios' defense of human rights activists with their goal of subversion. Soviet media denounce the lies the radios supposedly maintain with anti-Soviet religious groups and organizations of "reactionary" emigres and nationalists, especially in the Baltic and Ukrainian diaspora. The publicity that VOA and RFE/RL extend to "Captive Nations" declarations—annual US Government proclamations of solidarity with the Baltic states and several East European countries—provokes special indignation.

RFE/RL's alleged role in passing operational information to opponents of socialist regimes outside the USSR is part of the same pattern of "subversion." The Soviets charge that the stations gave tactical advice to Czechoslovak activists in 1968 and stage-managed Solidarity activities in Poland during 1980-82 (including sending coded messages to the strikers). Similarly, according to the Kremlin, the "dozens" of Western stations that broadcast to Afghanistan "give direct instructions to the bandits for carrying out subversive and terrorist operations."

Radio Personnel

Soviet propaganda frequently defames with strong personal attacks those who work for the stations, particularly RFE/RL. They are accused of being "turncoats and traitors," "emigrant rabble," former Nazi collaborators, Western spies, and individuals of weak character generally. In January 1986, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* portrayed a specific RL staff member as an inveterate alcoholic who quit his job as a journalist in Moscow, left for Israel, and began drinking so much that he needed to find any job—"even advertising US militarism"—just for the money.

Techniques Employed

Soviet propaganda geared to ordinary citizens includes frequent assertions that the radios engage in outright lying. Moscow accuses Western radio stations of using the same "Big Lie" technique that Goebbels perfected for the Nazis—trying to convince

~~Secret~~

Themes in Soviet Counterpropaganda Against the Western Stations Under Gorbachev (continued)

people to believe in monstrous lies by constantly repeating them. Soviet media have gone to great lengths to persuade the public that the human rights abuses aired by the radios are pure invention. Reflecting a particular sore point, the regime accuses the radios of grossly falsifying events in Afghanistan. Western reports that the regime forced Estonian laborers to work on the Chernobyl cleanup also were dismissed as "incitement" and a "vile lie."

A more refined theme is that the radios use psychological ploys to insinuate their message and entrap Soviet citizens. This argument appears in specialized literature rather than in media intended for ordinary citizens. According to Moscow, the radios' psychological tricks include the following:

- They hold out the attraction of Western material abundance to appeal to the public's philistine instincts. A related argument is that they play down ideological appeals and seem to talk objectively about the West's prosperity and technological advances to attract those who may not oppose the West on political or ideological grounds.
- They acknowledge what appear to be major problems in Western societies or criticize secondary aspects of Washington's policies to create an illusion of impartiality before launching into attacks of the socialist system.
- They carefully mix short news segments with popular music to persuade unsuspecting listeners to accept Western points of view. (Alternatively, VOA has been accused of "cramming" its audience with news to push its anti-Communist line.)
- They broadcast the views of numerous "Sovietologists" and "Kremlinologists" whose authoritative manner helps to hypnotize listeners into accepting disinformation about the Soviet system.
- They openly appeal to the public's prejudices through the use of popular stereotypes.



This cartoon, which ran in *Sovetskaya kultura* on 7 October 1986, reads: "Alongside RL and RFE, which generate slander and disinformation, yet another radio saboteur—'Radio Free Afghanistan'—works under the aegis of the CIA. Fruits of the same field." The ground is labeled "CIA" and the venom-spouting plants represent the radio stations.

accusations by leveling at these countries the same charges made against the USSR. In the field of human rights, for example, Moscow argues that it is the West—not the USSR—that egregiously violates human rights.

Attacks on the Western radios specifically are a staple in this counterpropaganda. A vocally hostile campaign against the stations has appeared in all media, including popular films. Several such stories often appear in the course of a week (see inset). While the USSR generally has lumped VOA, RFE, RL, and DW together as instigatory and subversive transmitters, it has directed most of its venom at RFE/RL. The intensity of these attacks rose sharply in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

In connection with these attacks, Soviet media have strongly denounced the United States Information Agency (USIA) and made personal attacks against Charles Wick, its director. Characterizing USIA as a worldwide "propaganda machine," Moscow portrays

~~Secret~~

Recent Examples of Glasnost in the Media

Gorbachev has promoted the implementation of glasnost in the media in a far more systematic and far-reaching fashion than any of his predecessors. For example:

- Official statistics for 1985 released by the Central Statistical Administration included figures on the grain harvest for the first time in 12 years.
- There are many news stories about corrupt officials containing extensive details of their malfeasance and the punishments meted out to them.
- The media are providing more discussion of Soviet troop activity in Afghanistan.
- Since the Chernobyl disaster, the media have become more informative with respect to internal disasters and industrial accidents. For example, they reported on the sinking of a Soviet submarine in the Atlantic, a coal-mining accident with casualties in the Donbass region, the attempted hijacking of an Aeroflot plane near a remote city in the Urals, a fatal bridge collapse in Latvia, a serious fire with casualties at the Russian Orthodox seminary at Zagorsk, and deadly snowslides in Georgia.
- The regime has promoted a press and television blitz on the horrors of drug abuse inside the USSR.
- In December 1986 the Soviet regime quickly publicized the outbreak of rioting in Almaty sparked by the replacement of an ethnic Kazakh with an ethnic Russian as the republic's first secretary.
- Historical personalities and periods have been discussed in a much more straightforward manner. Favorable references to Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) have appeared prominently in the press, the evils of Stalinism have been denounced more openly, and nonpersons such as Khrushchev have received matter-of-fact treatment.
- A more sophisticated approach has been evident on the Jewish emigration question. For example, in late 1986 Moscow television aired an uncut American documentary film concerning Jewish immigrants from the USSR in Brooklyn, *The Russians Are Here*, which depicted positive as well as negative features of life in the United States.

the expansion and modernization of the US-based radios (not only to the USSR but also to Latin America, Western Europe, and Afghanistan) and USIA's Worldnet program (the beaming of USIA-produced televised public affairs programs to other countries) as a product of American cultural imperialism.

Increasing the Credibility of the Official Media

The Move Toward Openness. Even before Gorbachev's dramatic initiatives to relax censorship, a consensus was building within the leadership about the desirability of injecting more candor into Soviet media:

- Brezhnev, toward the end of his life, began to pay lipservice to the concept of openness. In 1981, for

example, he told the 26th Party Congress that propaganda should not avoid prickly or difficult subjects. But few changes in the media actually took place.

- Under Andropov, the leadership began the practice of publicizing Politburo meetings and provided the population with a greater level of detail about the war in Afghanistan.
- Chernenko urged greater efforts to increase the credibility of Soviet media, but failed to take much concrete action.

Official efforts to open up the domestic media accelerated quickly in 1985. In that year, Gorbachev initiated a major campaign for *glasnost* (openness), and the media began to deal more frankly with problems and shortcomings in Soviet society and the economy. Significantly more candid coverage of crime, elite corruption, alcoholism, drug abuse, inefficiencies in the economy, natural disasters, and the war in Afghanistan has appeared (see inset) [redacted] although journalists today are still expected to respect the tenets of Marxist/Leninist ideology, they can now express opinions that do not reflect official views, and editors are themselves completely responsible for what they print without prior approval from external censoring organizations (except for such sensitive subjects as the Soviet military and space program) [redacted]


Gorbachev's openness policy also has heralded the appearance in the media of more subtle counterpropaganda. More and more, Soviet television programs and the printed media are acknowledging points made by foreign critics (in fact, sometimes letting them speak directly to the domestic audience) before launching into a counterattack (see inset). Aleksandr Yakovlev, the party secretary in charge of ideology, propaganda, and culture, appears to have taken the lead in arguing that the regime gains in credibility by allowing Western foreign policy officials a platform in the Soviet media, accompanied by point-by-point rebuttals. Rather than issuing Cassandra-like statements about the ideological threat from the West—like those of Chebrikov and Chernenko—Yakovlev has concentrated on directing a series of improvements in the Soviet media to help the regime deal with the challenge from Western radiobroadcasts [redacted]

The Purposes of Glasnost. *Glasnost* serves a variety of political purposes for the regime, many of which have nothing to do with concern about Western radios. For example, Gorbachev and his supporters hope that more candor in the media and in cultural policy will highlight social ills (such as public drunkenness and drug abuse) in order to rally public support for remedial action, put the spotlight on abuses of officials who are not behind Gorbachev's program and

pressure them to get on board, and legitimize the discussion of economic reforms." [redacted]

A significant impetus to *glasnost*, however, has been the fear among Soviet leaders that the domestic media were beginning to lose the competition with foreign radio stations, at least among an important and influential part of the population. The growing audience for the stations apparently convinced the regime that its own information and entertainment were becoming unappealing and even irrelevant. Official supporters of greater openness argue that the regime can only gain in the public's eyes if it preempts foreign radios by being the first to provide news and interpretations of important events, bracing Soviet citizens with arguments to counter "one-sided" accounts they hear over foreign radio. Thus, *glasnost* is seen as a way of reengaging critical elements of the population back to the regime's information and value systems:

- During the June 1983 Central Committee plenum on ideology, Chernenko said, "If we explain one event or another superficially, or report it belatedly, we will later on have to reassure people, which is far more difficult than assuring them in the first place."
- In December 1984, Gorbachev told participants of an ideological conference that "we must provide timely and substantive answers to questions. . . . It is inadmissible for the enemy to preempt us on the acute questions of contemporary world development, including our development, and give his interpretation and assessment, palming off recipes for their 'solution.'"
- Boris Yel'tsin, the chief of the Moscow party organization, after a discussion at a meeting of the city's gorkom in July 1986 of such traditionally taboo



~~Secret~~

Western Foreign Policy Views Appearing in the Soviet Media From 1986 to 1987

Beginning in late 1986, the official media have exposed the Soviet public to a large number of Western foreign policy officials and experts, many in the controversial arms control area, albeit accompanying the presentation of Western viewpoints with point-by-point Soviet rebuttals.

- In October 1986, Soviet television carried footage of US officials putting forth their views on controversial issues at a "town meeting" outside Riga, Latvia.*
- That same month, the TV program "International Panorama" ran a special edition featuring highlights of a Soviet-West German roundtable on arms control and the Reykjavik meeting between Gorbachev and President Reagan. The program included a West German Ministry of Defense official's argument that SDI research is justified under the ABM Treaty, defense of SDI as a means of maintaining strategic stability, and statement that NATO's strategy is to prevent war and preserve stability.*
- Also in October, a former US Ambassador to Afghanistan participated in a discussion of the Afghan problem on "Studio 9," Soviet TV's major world affairs program. He called the situation an "impasse" and dwelt on the difficulties of achieving a settlement that would permit the return of the refugees—numbering "a third of the population"—currently living "a life of misery abroad." The Soviet-backed regime, he said, had been installed in Kabul by a "sudden seizure of power during a military coup that did not have the extensive support of the people" and no one will succeed in imposing a system on them because the Afghans are "a nation of proud people."*
- In December 1986, Izvestiya published a letter from the UK's Ambassador in Moscow giving the British case for charging Syria with supporting terrorism.*
- In January 1987, British Minister of State Timothy Renton, in an appearance on "Studio 9," defended NATO policies on nuclear deterrence, criticized the Soviets for making "utopian . . . declarative gestures" to achieve a nuclear-free world, advocated gradual arms reductions through serious negotiations, criticized Moscow's refusal to observe US nuclear tests at the Nevada site, advocated freedom of travel across borders, and praised President Reagan for returning confidence to Americans.*
- In February 1987, Pravda initiated a new feature column, "From Different Perspectives," with articles by Senator Robert Dole and a Pravda commentator on the question of observing SALT II limits. Senator Dole argued that SALT II is dead and should be left to rest in peace.*
- Also that month, Pravda published an article by Kenneth Adelman, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, accusing Moscow of using chemical weapons in Afghanistan and supplying them to Vietnam and claiming that US stockpiles of chemical weapons were small and outdated.*
- In March 1987, British Prime Minister Thatcher, in a sharp and combative interview on Soviet television, strongly defended the Western doctrine of nuclear deterrence; attacked Moscow's superiority over the West in ICBMs and warheads; defended NATO as a defensive alliance; criticized the Soviets for stockpiling chemical weapons; and contrasted the success of the market system with the inefficiencies of a "totally centralized system."*
- In April 1987, Soviet TV aired a lengthy interview with Secretary of State Georg. Shultz who articulated US views on arms control, deplored the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan, and accused the Soviets of bugging the US Embassy in Moscow.*

~~Secret~~

~~Secret~~

topics as the city's mortality rate and the incidence of serious crime, explained, "People must be aware of all our problems and shortcomings, the measures taken to overcome them, and our intentions—not through rumors and gossip, not from BBC broadcasts, but from the party propagandists themselves."

- In January 1986, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published a letter stating: "This fall two Latin American states suffered terrible natural disasters . . . On every *Vremya* program, central television transmitted reports from the scene. But on 13 October there was a large earthquake in . . . the Tajik SSR. Apart from the words 'there have been casualties,' no details were reported. There was not a single shot on central television. Is Tajikistan farther from Moscow than Latin America? . . . Our media must summon the courage to instruct citizens even on unexpected or negative events, so that we do not have to learn of them from foreign voices having an anti-Soviet accent. The ideological losses from information that is incomplete or not reported in good time are too great."

Some proponents of *glasnost* actually see a virtue in publicizing Western arguments. Along these lines, an article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* argued in March 1987:

Readers want the fullest possible knowledge about the facts connected with . . . our opponent's viewpoint so as to be well armed with information in the debate with him. . . . [They do not want a] primitive picture of life in the West . . . a picture of the world where one half is as black as night but in the other "all is well, all is well."

Aleksandr Bovin, political observer for *Izvestiya*, stated the same month that "convincing criticism sets out the adversary's arguments as well It is essential

to invite Western politicians and commentators to Soviet television more often and debate with them."

Some evidence suggests that the airing of Western views, both in the Soviet media and via shortwave broadcasts, alienates some of the more conservative elements of the population and strengthens their confidence in the official media. In December 1986, a member of the Central Committee urged a group of party propagandists to encourage more open debate of foreign policy issues, claiming that Central Committee polls showed a high degree of unity and patriotism among Soviets. He said that propagandists would have more credibility now that the media were providing more information on Western positions and views. In most cases, he said, Western positions on the USSR were so extreme as to be self-defeating. As an example, he noted that at first Soviet officials had been nervous about airing the September 1986 Riga "town meeting" of US and Soviet officials on Soviet television, but, when US speakers took what he called a confrontational and heavyhanded approach, the citizenry reacted with shock to US attacks on Soviet national pride. A Western correspondent claimed in May 1987 that there was a rising public backlash against Westerners appearing on the Soviet airwaves, as well as disgruntlement over Western broadcasts. He reported that a Soviet TV official recently told a journalists' congress that letters demanding increased jamming have been pouring in at the rate of 500 a week.

The Risks of Glasnost. Many of the perceived risks of *glasnost*, like the advantages, do not relate to Western broadcasting. Many conservative elites fear that ex-

"In the spirit of Bovin's injunction, the Soviet media began in 1986 to issue a great number of detailed rejoinders to specific stories broadcast by YOA, RFE/RL, and DW. For example, in August 1987, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* argued against the claim made by "various radio voices" that Stalin's collectivization of agriculture had brought production in the countryside to a standstill while Lenin's "New Economic Policy" produced a sharp increase in food production. Three months before, *Pravda* in May 1987 quoted extensively from a YOA critique of Soviet trade unionism before rebutting it.

~~Secret~~

panding the limits of permissible discussion of regime shortcomings and societal ills could undermine popular respect for the system rather than enhance public support, produce a progressive unraveling of the party's authority, and lead to runaway criticism. The January 1987 party plenum was the occasion of hot debate over how far the press should be allowed to go in exposing domestic problems. Andrei Gromyko reportedly objected to carrying *glasnost* too far on the grounds that uncontrolled vilification of "honest Communists" was damaging the public's confidence in the party.

Another important argument, however, relates directly to Western broadcasting. Since Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy has gained momentum, officials and ordinary citizens have expressed the fear that showing the regime's dirty linen only provides grist for the country's external enemies because foreign radio picks up criticisms from the domestic media, distorts them, and replays them back into the USSR. This fear—and the liberal response to it—were expressed during a televised roundtable discussion in March 1986 between Georgi Arbatov, head of the USA and Canada Institute, and TV commentator Valentin Zorin:

Zorin: Strong self-criticism of our defects has been and is being voiced, and this self-criticism is used by enemy propoganda to cause harm to our country, for open slander against socialism. . . .

Arbatov: Yes, that is a fact. . . . But when shortcomings exist, they are evident whether or not you criticize them. . . . [It is worse] when nothing is said about defects, when there is unrestrained self-praise. . . . I think this is what filled our enemies with serious hopes about things going downhill, so to speak.

The degree of danger of "infecting" the Soviet public with bad news depends on what subjects are opened up for discussion. Information suggesting that ordinary people in the West live better than the average Soviet apparently carries a far greater risk of influencing Soviet public attitudes than Western criticisms

of Moscow's foreign policy. For most citizens, international relations are remote and theoretical, while issues of food or housing availability or the country's deteriorating health care system have a critical immediacy. In March 1987, the head of *Izvestiya's* letter department told

that the paper receives letters from people in central Russia living on rationed food, with little or no milk or meat, complaining that their lives are worse than some of the Western indigents depicted by the Soviet media—such as those who appeared in "The Man From Fifth Avenue." The lower level of risk in exposing Soviet audiences to criticisms of Moscow's foreign policy probably explains why so many West European and American arms control experts have appeared in Soviet media—rather than foreigners who discuss quality-of-life and consumer welfare issues.

The Impact of Glasnost. The Soviets claim the new openness is increasing the audience for Soviet media and decreasing the appeal of foreign radios. In September 1986 a participant on the program "The World Today" stated that *glasnost* was hampering the effectiveness of RL's propaganda.

According to a Western news report, the circulation for domestic newspapers has jumped by more than 14 million in the 22 months (through March 1987) that Gorbachev has been in office. The editor of *Pravda* claims that his paper alone gained 1.5 million new readers between September 1985 and April 1987 "because now we really tell the truth." In June 1987 reported that all the traditionally disaffected Russian intellectuals with whom it had contact over the past year expressed strong support for *glasnost*, applauding it as making the papers worth reading for the first time in 30 years. One expressed pleasure at being able to get some actual news from "Vremya"—before one had to listen to Western radio for such information.

~~Secret~~

At the same time, RFE/RL's audience evaluation data for the first few months of 1987 show no significant drop in the audience for the major Western radio stations. In fact, *glasnost* may represent a vulnerability to the regime because a more open press legitimizes the posing of questions on previously forbidden topics that the regime is not prepared to answer fully. The Soviet media are raising many more questions than before, but even the most liberal of journals are hesitant to address head-on such fundamental political premises as the rationale for the one-party state or the infallibility of Lenin's utterances. For many Soviet listeners, the very attraction of foreign radio is that it operates under no ideologically imposed constraints in pursuing such topics. One Soviet citizen interviewed by RFE/RL researchers in late 1986 stated:

Although Soviet media have become more outspoken of late, they don't tell the whole truth about our internal affairs and shortcomings. The name Radio Liberty speaks for itself. . . . Whether it is talking about Western or Eastern countries, RL always discusses both the positive and negative aspects.

There is probably another reason *glasnost* fails to lower the demand for foreign broadcasting. The domestic media's more open treatment of political issues makes the public more interested in politics generally than was the case in the Brezhnev period, when apathy about political subjects was widespread. Greater interest in political topics may increase attention to foreign broadcasting as well as domestic media. In sum, *glasnost* heightens consciousness of controversial subjects that only the foreign radios can discuss to their logical (often anti-Soviet) conclusion.

Recent Diplomatic Initiatives

The Kremlin has launched a broad array of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic measures to accomplish several objectives:

- To persuade Western countries to reduce "hostile" radiobroadcasts or at least moderate their content.
- To fend off foreign charges against Soviet jamming.
- To create an international consensus, based on existing Third World resentment against Western communications policy, that would legitimize Moscow's blocking of those stations that are still jammed.
- To pressure West Germany and other countries into no longer hosting RFE/RL or the other Western stations.

In broad terms, the Kremlin's diplomacy is based on a claim that the stations, particularly RFE/RL, violate the basic norms of international law. Jamming is therefore justified as a legitimate form of self-defense. The USSR's specific legal arguments have included the following:

- All governments have the right to control the influx of information from abroad; broadcasts in native languages are a particularly inadmissible type of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign nations.
- Western radios are subversive instruments of psychological warfare designed to incite rebellion against the Soviet and East European regimes.
- Western radios engage in war propaganda in violation of international conventions.
- The radios transmit information that is contrary to the purpose of the Helsinki Final Act, which is to promote mutual understanding among people.

~~Secret~~

Soviet Multilateral Diplomacy. The Soviets, in conjunction with their East European allies, have sought to exert pressure on Western broadcasters by working through various international forums. At the CSCE Review Conferences, for example, the Soviets have vigorously asserted the right of societies to defend themselves against "onslaughts" by foreign information services. Similarly, at a 1982 conference of the International Telecommunications Union held in Nairobi, the Czechoslovak delegation introduced a proposal (subsequently withdrawn) that would have legalized jamming by giving states the right to cut off any communications "which may appear dangerous to the security of the state or contrary to their laws, to public order or to decency."


In 1982 the USSR unexpectedly ratified a 1936 League of Nations convention entitled "Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace."¹ This treaty outlaws the broadcasting of materials inciting war or other acts incompatible with a nation's internal order or security, or factually incorrect information concerning international relations. Although the treaty prohibits signatories from allowing offending broadcasts (as defined in the convention) to emanate from their territories, it does not confer the right for "victims" of such broadcasts to take corrective action such as jamming.

Despite the fact that the treaty does not sanction jamming, the sudden Soviet ratification was designed to justify jamming of "militaristic" propaganda entering the USSR via Western shortwave broadcasts. *Izvestiya* argued that Moscow's action was "timely" because "imperialist" propaganda, notably that of the United States, used radiobroadcasting "as the main instrument of psychological warfare and subversive interference in the internal affairs of other nations." A Soviet journal noted in 1983 that Nazi Germany and Italy used radiobroadcasts to prepare their populations for war and to demoralize people in the countries they planned to invade; the journal added that this "forced Austria to jam Germany's subversive broadcasts."

¹ Moscow signed the treaty in 1936 but failed to ratify it because of certain reservations concerning its enforceability.

In an effort to overcome the strong Western consensus that jamming is illegal (see inset), the Soviets have attempted to mobilize the support of various less developed countries (LDCs) against the supposed "imperialist" monopoly of information by Western news services. Moscow has especially promoted a campaign for a "New World Information Order" (NWIO), arguing that Western radiobroadcasting represents a form of "war propaganda" and consequently violates international law. Thus, Moscow's Third World diplomacy on communications issues has taken advantage of the desire of authoritarian governments in many LDCs to maintain control over information media as instruments for indoctrinating their populations and preventing the spread of "subversive" Western cultural and political influences. In addition to furthering Moscow's own interests in securing LDC support for jamming, exploiting the NWIO issue enables Moscow to stress the mutuality of interests between the Soviet Bloc and the Third World and provides a convenient platform for pillorying Washington.

Moscow promotes the NWIO at every possible forum, except on a few issues where NWIO positions adversely affect the USSR.² For example, at the 1980 UNESCO General Conference, the USSR and several LDCs proposed an assortment of NWIO initiatives and advocated the right of all states to rebut "inaccurate" or "malicious" reporting. In December 1982 the



~~Secret~~

The International Community's Condemnation of Jamming

The General Assembly explicitly condemned jamming in December 1950, the first international condemnation of the practice. Jamming violates several internationally accepted agreements: the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), the Helsinki Final Act (1975), and the International Telecommunications Convention (which went into force in 1984). The first agreement, signed and ratified by the USSR, states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek to receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." The International Telecommunications Convention states that "all stations . . . must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services . . . of other members or of recognized private operating agencies, which carry on radio service and which operate in accordance with the provisions of the regulations."

Soviet jamming was an important issue at the 1984 session of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the Planning of High-Frequency Bands (HF-WARC), a meeting of 115 nations that was charged with planning the worldwide use of shortwave radio.⁴ HF-WARC had to address jamming because it congests the already crowded high-frequency spectrum and makes it harder to allocate the radio band to users. In addition to blocking out reception of the target program, jamming harms distant broadcasts transmitted on the same frequency by third countries as well as broadcasts on adjacent frequencies. In 1982, the European Broadcasting Union estimated that, although the amount of deliberate interference during peak listening hours is of the order of 20 to 40 percent of the available spectrum, the total amount of spectrum affected at these times is of the order of 60 to 80 percent.

At the 1984 HF-WARC, the United States tried to demonstrate to other countries that the problem in allocating the high-frequency band was inextricably linked to jamming. Washington, however, found little support for condemning jamming or forcing Moscow to cease the practice. West European nations also extensively employ high-frequency broadcasting, but they

preferred to treat jamming as a technical, not political, problem. Support for the US position against jamming was even thinner among LDCs, many of whom perceive themselves as unaffected by the practice.

The United States did obtain a resolution calling for governments, working through the IFRB, to monitor shortwave broadcasts "with a view to identifying stations causing harmful interference." The IFRB conducted four monitoring campaigns, the results of which were reported to the second session of the HF-WARC, held from February to March 1987. The monitors detected jamming in the USSR and several East European countries, but these countries made no response when presented with the evidence.


Meanwhile, the United States and nine friendly nations organized another monitoring program paralleling the ITU's. This effort involved the use of sophisticated direction-finding equipment to identify specific sky-wave jamming transmitters. The data collected by these countries was sent to the US Commerce Department's Institute for Telecommunications Sciences for analysis, and more than 200 distinct sky-wave jammers in use at more than 80 locations in the Soviet Bloc were confirmed.

In September 1986, the IFRB, acting upon a US complaint filed in 1984-85, took the unprecedented action of confirming that emissions by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland are causing "harmful interference" with US high-frequency broadcasts. This was the first instance of the ITU formally recognizing and registering the extent of the USSR's jamming. The Board then officially notified the offending governments involved, and requested that remedial measures be taken.

⁴ The various WARC conferences are sponsored by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized UN agency. ITU is responsible for allocating and coordinating radiofrequencies to various services to ensure the harmonious operations of radio communications such as telephone, television, radar, telex, and navigation. An arm of the ITU known as the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB) allocates the radiofrequency spectrum and registers these assignments to avoid interference between radio stations of different countries.

~~Secret~~

USSR supported a UN General Assembly resolution appealing for the establishment of an NWIO.




Pressure on Particular Countries. By the fall of 1986, when Soviet leaders apparently had decided in principle to stop jamming VOA, they probably thought they might as well try to get something in return. Gorbachev originally broached the idea of a quid pro quo during the October 1986 summit with President Reagan in Reykjavik. The Soviet leader proposed a deal whereby the USSR would stop jamming VOA in exchange for US permission for a transmitting station on or near US territory that would allow Soviet mediumwave broadcasts to be heard in the United States. Gorbachev argued that the present situation discriminates against the USSR because many Soviets have access to shortwave receivers and listen to shortwave broadcasts (including those of US stations), while most Americans tune in to mediumwave rather than shortwave. Thus, he claimed, the United States uses mediumwaves to "fence itself off from the information carried by our radios." In the end, Washington rebuffed Gorbachev's proposal because trading US broadcast rights for ending VOA jamming would undercut the principle that jamming is indefensible under international law.


The actual cessation of jamming came days before a trip to the USSR in May 1987 by USIA Director Charles Wick. By timing the end of jamming to this visit, the Kremlin apparently was trying to maximize its chances of obtaining concessions from the United States. Director Wick explored ways to accommodate Soviet interest in gaining greater access to US audiences, including seeing if any US radio station would be willing to run Soviet material on the air and exchanging Soviet and US radio programs. He did not work out any arrangement along these lines because no US station had a commercial incentive to agree, but Soviet officials portrayed the impasse as a reflection of US ill will rather than the commercial nature of the US broadcasting industry.

When Moscow stopped jamming VOA, it began to use Cuban mediumwave transmitters to broadcast Soviet English-language programming to US territory. Soviet officials quietly contended that Washington had already agreed to such a quid pro quo. In a letter to Director Wick, Aleksandr Yakovlev stated his view of a direct linkage between the "unblocking" of Soviet and US radiobroadcasts beamed to each other's country:

The USSR Gosteleradio has had talks with Cuban radio authorities, with reference to the fact that a possibility of our broadcasting from a territory adjacent to your country was raised during my conversation with you [at the Reykjavik summit], with no objections on your part. Soon, perhaps, it will be possible to arrange Soviet mediumwave broadcasts to the US from the Cuban territory. Simultaneously, the jamming of the VOA broadcasts to the USSR will be stopped. We hope that you will duly appreciate this step of ours...

US officials emphatically and publicly denied that any deal had been made, and in July 1987 Washington made a protest to Moscow complaining that the Cuban-based broadcasts were interfering with US commercial broadcasts.





The fact that West Germany hosts RFE/RL, the stations Moscow is most concerned to block, accounts for Soviet demarches to Bonn. The USSR, however, also has made noises condemning DW and RIAS ("Radio in the American Sector," a station run by USIA). The Kremlin has alleged that Bonn, by letting RFE/RL broadcast from West German territory, is violating the 1970 *Ostpolitik* treaties and promoting "revanchism."



A West German specialist in East-West relations has written that the USSR and other East European countries threatened to boycott the 1972 Munich Olympic Games unless the Bonn government agreed to close down RFE and RL. The Soviets complement diplomatic approaches with media attacks making the same point (see inset, pages 45-46).

There is also evidence that Moscow has (or may have) applied pressure on Turkey and Israel. A Turkish newspaper reported in January 1987 that Prime Minister Ozal planned to refuse US requests for a VOA transmitter in Turkey if President Reagan brought up the issue during a 5 February 1987 conversation on the grounds that it would harm Ankara's relations with Moscow. Washington must "understand the strategic realities," the paper added. Moscow may also have applied pressure to Israel into refusing a US Government request to build a VOA/RFE/RL transmitting station on Israeli territory (see inset).

Moscow also has applied pressure against individual LDCs in an effort to prevent the building of Western radio transmitters. For example,

the Soviets made a protest to the

Israel Approves US Radio Transmitter Despite Fears of Alienating Moscow

Throughout most of 1985 and 1986, Washington tried to gain approval from the Israeli Government for a radio transmitter on Israeli territory in order to improve VOA and RFE/RL reception in those parts of the USSR where listening is difficult—particularly east of the Urals. Despite the arguments made by some Israeli officials that emphasized the political risks of such a transmitter, Tel Aviv agreed because of the great importance it attached to being responsive to US interests.

In 1985, some Israeli leaders reportedly balked at agreeing for fear of offending the Kremlin. According to the Jerusalem Post, Abba Eban, the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, was opposed to the station because it conflicted with Israel's aims of helping Soviet Jews to emigrate and encouraging Moscow to renew diplomatic relations with Jerusalem. Some officials, including the minister in charge of the integration of Soviet Jews in Israeli society, expressed disagreement with Peres's decision to build the transmitter. Recognizing that the relationship with Washington is the cornerstone of Israel's foreign policy, however, Tel Aviv concurred, and the agreement was formalized in August 1986.

According to a Jerusalem radiobroadcast aired in April 1987, Warsaw submitted an unofficial protest to Israel about the expansion of the transmitter. We have no evidence that Moscow exerted any direct pressure to persuade Israel to refuse the transmitter, but a staffer at the USSR Oriental Institute told the [redacted] in September 1985 that Moscow is convinced that Tel Aviv is not serious about improving relations for two reasons: Israel's efforts to exclude the USSR from the peace process and the "anti-Sovietism" evident in its approval of the radio site.

Government of Sri Lanka in the summer of 1987, making the outlandish claim that a VOA transmitter planned for construction represents a subversive and strategic threat to the countries in the area and that it could help Washington control all underwater military operations in the Indian Ocean and intercept other countries' communications. The Soviets on several occasions have threatened that the VOA transmitter in Sri Lanka would be destroyed in the event of a Soviet confrontation with China or the United States, and they have organized a disinformation campaign in the media along these lines, charging that the new station would hurt Sri Lanka's relations with neighboring states. In May 1987, during a period of ethnic disorders, a leftist newspaper in Sri Lanka reprinted a Soviet statement that attacked Washington for "escalating psychological warfare" by building the VOA relay station. The paper repeated the claim that the transmitter is really meant to help the US Navy monitor ships passing through the Indian Ocean.



Looking Ahead: Factors Influencing Future Policy Toward the Radios

The decision to begin, end, or resume jamming of Western radio—or to use other countermeasures like intelligence operations or legal sanctions—reflects several factors. Among them are the regime's evaluation of the public's mood and of the stations' content, foreign policy considerations, and technical (including cost and energy) constraints. These closely interrelated considerations probably will continue to be the operative elements influencing future Soviet policy toward Western stations.



Assessment of the Public's Mood

The regime's evaluation of the public's mood is basically the reason for Soviet jamming: if the regime had no concern about the impact of the radios there would, of course, be no jamming. Changes in the international atmosphere often are instrumental in changing the leadership's perception of how much

Western information the public can be trusted to hear. In the past, the leadership has judged that, when Western radios help the Soviet public independently verify and analyze international crises involving the extension of Soviet military force, a potentially inflammatory or at least troublesome situation is created inside the USSR. Moscow therefore tends to jam Western stations when it is about to undertake large-scale external actions likely to arouse worldwide controversy.

At the time of the Afghanistan invasion, the regime's fear of an adverse domestic reaction probably was an important conditioning factor that led to the resumption of jamming. The regime apparently calculated that "protecting" Soviet citizens from the international reaction of outrage was necessary to prevent them from raising embarrassing questions. Moscow resumed intensive jamming in August 1980, eight months after the invasion, and domestic radio and television acknowledged only that Soviet troops had been "invited" to help fight the "counterrevolution," not that they had engaged in combat. Much of the population learned about Soviet combat activity from Western broadcasts that were left unjammed, and, after August, by listening through the jamming. The jamming of VOA's Dari and Pashto-language broadcasts in late 1982 and early 1983 probably was an attempt to close this gap among the vulnerable Central Asian audience.

At about the same time as the decision to invade Afghanistan, authorities also were quite concerned about a potential spillover effect from the independent trade union Solidarity in the Baltic republics and other border areas. Concern was especially great about preventing news from spreading to Lithuania, which has long historical links to Poland. In fact, the resumption of jamming in August 1980 appears primarily to have been a reaction to events in Poland and only secondarily to the invasion of Afghanistan.



Similarly, during the "Prague Spring" in 1968, the primary goal was to prevent the public from becoming "infected" with reform ideas generated within the framework of a Marxist ideology and to make it easier to push Moscow's own line about Czechoslovakia to the Soviet population.

In addition to concern about exposing Soviet citizens to information from abroad that puts the USSR in a bad light, the regime must weigh the negative impact on Soviet public opinion of acknowledging in effect that the regime has something to hide from the population and is fearful of competing with the West in the world of ideas. The cessation of jamming of some stations suggests that Gorbachev believes that jamming has been one factor widening the gulf between state and society in recent years and contributing to political alienation among important segments of the population.

Evaluation of the Station's Content

Moscow's evaluation of each station's content and tone and its likely impact on vulnerable parts of the population is an important consideration. Given this criterion, the Soviets have much greater cause to jam RFE/RL than any other Western station because, as a "surrogate home station," it represents a stronger domestic challenge to Soviet authorities. Thus, the Soviets have consistently jammed RFE/RL since the station went on the air in 1953, although policy toward the other radios has fluctuated.

Foreign Policy Considerations

There is a strong correlation between the level of international tension (particularly East-West) and the decision to initiate or end jamming:

- Jamming was stopped in late 1959 during Khrushchev's talks with President Eisenhower in the United States, and it continued at a low level until the U-2 incident of May 1960.
- In June 1963, Moscow stopped jamming in reaction to the signing of the US-USSR "hotline" and test ban agreements, but resumed it in August 1968 upon the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

- Jamming for the major Western stations stopped in September 1973 after the SALT I agreement was signed—a period when detente was in full bloom and preparations for the CSCE Conference were under way.

- Jamming resumed in August 1980 after the invasion of Afghanistan and the onset of labor unrest in Poland. (See inset.)

Another foreign policy factor is the USSR's bilateral relationship with a broadcasting country; this often explains the different treatment some of them receive:

- The Kremlin spares Radio Sweden probably out of appreciation for Stockholm's neutrality as well as the politically mild content of this radio's broadcasting.
- The USSR began jamming Radio Israel at about the same time it ruptured relations with Tel Aviv (1973).
- Even though Moscow stopped jamming the radio-broadcasts of Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States in 1973, it continued to jam those of Israel and China, probably because of sour bilateral relations with both countries.

The Soviet leadership tries to mesh jamming policy with the pursuit of diplomatic objectives vis-a-vis individual countries. For example, the Politburo traditionally suspends jamming just before or during the visit of a high-level foreign dignitary, apparently as a sign of goodwill or to help Moscow obtain concessions:

- When Khrushchev visited the United States for talks with President Eisenhower in 1959, he reduced jamming for VOA and BBC as a goodwill gesture. This probably was meant to induce Washington to agree to Khrushchev's proposal that the United States "restrain" VOA's content in exchange for a permanent end to jamming.

Chronology of Soviet Jamming

- February 1948 Jamming of VOA begins.*
- April 1949 Jamming of BBC's Russian Service begins.*
- 1951 USSR extends jamming to VOA and RFE's East European broadcasts.*
- 1953 Jamming of RL begins.*
- September 1959 Jamming stopped briefly, then resumed on a selective basis.*
- June 1963 Jamming stopped for BBC and for VOA's Armenian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian, and Ukrainian services. Jamming continues for RL and some other stations.*
- Mid-1960s Jamming begins for Albanian and Chinese broadcasts.*
- August 1968 Jamming resumes for VOA's Russian, Armenian, Georgian, and Ukrainian services and for BBC, DW, Peking, Kol Israel, and other stations. Russian broadcasts from France, Sweden, and Canada are left free.*
- 1972 VOA's Uzbek Service jammed minutes after first broadcast begins.*
- September 1973 Jamming ceases for VOA, BBC, and DW. Continues for RL, Kol Israel, Albania, and China.*
- January 1974 DW jammed to stop reading from Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago.*
- August 1980 Full jamming of VOA, BBC, and DW begins.*
- December 1981 Jammers in USSR, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia jam Polish broadcasts of VOA and BBC.*
- September 1982 Jamming of VOA Dari begins.*
- January 1983 Jamming of VOA Pashto begins.*
- October 1986 Jamming ceases for Radio Beijing, Albania, and South Korea.*
- January 1987 Jamming ceases for BBC's Russian Service.*
- May 1987 Jamming ceases for all VOA broadcasts but continues for RFE/RL.*
-

~~Secret~~

- Moscow's decision to end its 19-year-long practice of jamming China's Russian-language broadcasts in October 1986 may have been timed to coincide with a meeting of the deputy foreign ministers that took place in Beijing that month.
- The end of jamming for BBC in January 1987 may have been timed to a forthcoming visit to the USSR by Prime Minister Thatcher.
- Gorbachev's offer to end jamming for VOA during the October 1986 high-level meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik may have reflected a hope that the outpouring of worldwide hopes for better US-USSR relations would pressure the United States to agree to his precondition for ending the jamming.
- The end of VOA jamming in May 1987 may have been timed to coincide with a visit to the USSR by the director of USIA.

Other foreign policy considerations have also influenced other Soviet jamming decisions:

- Part of the reason Moscow resumed jamming Western stations in 1968 (after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) and in 1980 (in reaction to the Afghan and Polish crises) may have been to register displeasure over the strong Western reaction—in the case of 1980, against Western trade sanctions—as well as to keep the Soviet populace from bearing the Western side of the story.
- In October 1986, Moscow probably stopped jamming Radio Beijing to cement the better bilateral relationship. (The Kremlin may also have stopped jamming the South Korean and Albanian stations that same month as a token of good faith.)

Cost and Energy Constraints

Jamming is an extremely costly operation. Actual costs are not known and are hard to estimate, in part because of difficulties estimating the relevant ruble-dollar exchange rate and the wage levels of jamming technicians. Most calculations range from \$100-300 million per year, to which must be added \$250 million investment in equipment. A senior BBC engineer has put the annual cost to the Soviet economy at no less

than \$750 million, and perhaps as high as \$1.2 billion. According to some experts, if the United States were to maintain a comparable system, the cost would exceed \$1 billion—well over twice the combined annual cost of producing and transmitting RFE/RL, VOA, BBC, and DW broadcasts to the Warsaw Pact countries. From 5,000 to 15,000 technicians operating up to 2,000 jammers are thought to be employed on Soviet territory alone.

The impact jamming has on the USSR's energy balance, although even more difficult to measure, may also be a relevant factor. At most, we estimate that the total jamming operation consumes only 1 to 2 percent of electricity production, but, in times of shortfalls (especially in critical times of the year, like winter), this could make a considerable difference. According to a series of reports appearing in the second half of 1986, the loss of electrical power due to the Chernobyl' explosion affected Soviet jamming decisions. For example, in October a professor of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences told [redacted] that electricity shortfalls due to the accident were likely to lead to a Soviet decision to save electricity by stopping jamming of VOA.

We have no confirmation that electricity shortfalls were responsible for the decision to stop jamming BBC or VOA in January and May 1987, respectively. However, jamming of BBC ended during a particularly harsh winter that worsened the USSR's seasonal electricity shortages and delayed oil and coal deliveries—over and above the shortfalls due to Chernobyl'. It also came during a slowdown for the nuclear construction program when the introduction of new safety procedures (designed to prevent another Chernobyl'-type accident) temporarily shut down a number of existing nuclear power plants.

Options Available to Gorbachev

Ending All Jamming

In the spirit of openness and to achieve foreign policy benefits, the Soviet regime could decide to stop jamming all Western stations, not just BBC and

~~Secret~~

VOA. The main foreign policy goals would be to buttress the more favorable image of the USSR overseas and to encourage Western governments to grant concessions to the USSR. Ending jamming would further burnish Moscow's image in the eyes of the US and West European publics who would take it to be another symbol of the regime's more liberal direction. This, along with other actions, could improve the climate for arms control or other negotiations.

Domestic considerations, however, probably would be paramount in any decision to free broadcasting for the radios that are still jammed—DW, RFE/RL, and Radio Israel. If Gorbachev is sincere in his effort to redefine the relationship between state and society on a positive basis of support rather than on a negative basis of control, he could ultimately conclude that ceasing all jamming would do more to bolster regime legitimacy than continuing to block the more offensive stations. Indeed, Soviet journalist Vladimir Posner said in June 1986 that he favored an end to jamming and called the practice "counterproductive." He pointed out that jamming gives the stations more attention than they deserve, and he implied that people are tempted to listen precisely because the regime does not want them to. There have been indications that other Soviet officials have concluded that jamming has become counterproductive and that it is preferable to rely on *glasnost* to counter Western propaganda.


If Moscow decides to stop jamming other stations as well as BBC and VOA, we would expect a sharp increase in the amount of domestic counterpropaganda against the stations and the West generally—meant to brace the population and urge increased vigilance against "seductive" Western broadcasts. In fact, the Soviets did appear to jack up their denunciations of VOA late in the fall of 1986 (about the time of Gorbachev's proposal to President Reagan), with several media attacks introduced by a mention of the exact day and time of the VOA broadcast. This could have been a sign that leading propaganda officials in the party were preparing for an end to VOA jamming but were subsequently overruled. Beginning in June 1987—immediately after jamming of VOA ended—

there was another noticeable increase in attacks against stories broadcast by the stations, particularly VOA.

The Conservative Option

As has happened following past selective cessations of jamming, the Soviets could revert to a more repressive approach in dealing with foreign radios. The conservative option could consist of three elements that could be used, either singly or in combination: an increase in jamming, legal prohibitions against listening backed up by audio surveillance, or a cutback in the availability of shortwave receivers available to Soviet citizens.

Reporting from about the time Gorbachev came to power suggests the Soviets actively considered beefing up jamming rather than decreasing it:



• According to [redacted] Komsomol officials [redacted] in 1984 three large jamming transmitters were being built in Estonia to prevent the public from watching Finnish television. This apparently was being done pursuant to instructions from Moscow to the Estonian Communist Party to increase ideological restrictions. (The director of the Estonian state television system publicly denied this allegation.)

These reports may indicate a willingness to resume jamming in the future if current policies come to be viewed by Soviet leaders as counterproductive. Gorbachev's *glasnost* policies represent a bold political gamble that could backfire. If openness stimulates public criticism that gets out of hand and leads to

~~Secret~~

widespread protest activity, skeptics of *glasnost* within the leadership would press more vigorously for reimposing controls, at least with regard to the radios. They could argue that *glasnost* was never intended to leave the country defenseless against ill-intended foreign propaganda. Gorbachev himself clearly has no intention of allowing *glasnost* to go so far that it becomes destabilizing.

In fact, some officials undoubtedly believe that allowing Western broadcasting is especially dangerous now that the party line is *glasnost*.

[REDACTED]

Aside from the damage to the regime's image at home and abroad of renewing jamming, however, purely technical considerations could prevent the regime from increasing jamming much beyond the levels of recent years. Total jamming coverage is not a feasible option. Given the physical nature of radiowave transmission, the Soviets cannot make the country totally impermeable to foreign broadcasting. This is primarily because the "twilight immunity" phenomenon (caused by changes in the ionosphere after the sun has set in the East but is still up in the West) makes skywave jamming ineffective late at night and before the sun rises. Furthermore, since "groundwave" jammers are located only in urban centers, jamming is also much less effective in the countryside than in cities.

In theory, the regime could intimidate listeners through legal measures. Total prohibition of the act of listening would have to be backed by draconian legal penalties and by technical means of detection—audio surveillance.

There is apparently a perception among a very small part of the Soviet public that the regime already can

detect those who listen to Western radio and that authorities have done so in recent years:

- A [REDACTED] claims that officers of the secret police patrol Moscow in vans that are equipped with sensitive equipment able to detect radio wave vibrations off window glass up to about 200 meters. According to hearsay picked up by the source, the apparatus can analyze the vibrations from the glass and detect if a Western radio program is being aired.

- Before he emigrated [REDACTED] claimed that special vehicles were used to monitor individual apartments to see if the occupants were listening. He also claimed that an acquaintance who altered his radio so he could listen to foreign broadcasts through the jamming was arrested and jailed.


- A Turkish-speaking Westerner who is an amateur radio operator makes a similar claim. During a visit to Soviet Central Asia where he closely observed shortwave equipment for sale in electronics stores, he concluded that many people owned "tube-type" radios rather than transistor-type. He states that tube-type radios, in addition to being harder to transport than transistor radios, are easier to locate by using radiated energy radio location techniques. This could mean that internal security forces could verify listening from a distance without entering residences physically.

Whether or not massive surveillance of this sort is within the realm of technical possibility, it would seem to be out of the question even on practical grounds because it would require enormous police resources.

A variety of information suggests that the regime has at least considered cutting back the supply of short-wave receivers:

[REDACTED]

~~Secret~~



- There were indications as early as 1984 that Soviet security officials were toying with the idea of stopping shortwave radio sales to the Soviet population.

We have seen no firm evidence that the Soviets have already stopped the production of shortwave receivers for the domestic market. At present, the Soviets probably would be loath to reduce the supply of shortwave receivers sharply because the population in some areas still needs these receivers to pick up Soviet domestic broadcasts. [REDACTED]

It is possible, however, that within a decade or so the regime will be able to eliminate reliance on shortwave for Soviet broadcasts by hard-wiring the entire USSR so that signals travel by cable rather than through the atmosphere. As previously mentioned, by 1995 the regime intends to make three-channel radiobroadcasting available to virtually all citizens, even those living in remote, rural parts of the country. By making its message immune to "contamination" from outside broadcasters, the Kremlin may eventually do away with the need for shortwave receivers in transcontinental communication and could then safely cut off all production of them. [REDACTED]

Making Refinements in the Current Course

In the absence of an international crisis or an unraveling of social stability in the USSR, it seems most likely that the Soviets will continue a differentiated approach to the radios. Thus, Moscow may continue to allow relatively mild stations like BBC to broadcast unimpeded, while strengthening jamming against more "offensive" stations like RFE/RL (and perhaps DW). In fact, Moscow has already reallocated

skywave jamming resources that were freed up so it can more effectively block out other stations. According to a Western press report, DW's Russian-language signals aimed at Central Asia and its Pashto and Dari broadcasts to Afghanistan were subjected to stronger jamming in October 1986, when Moscow stopped jamming broadcasts from China and Albania, presumably because some jamming transmitters had been freed. The following February, Gene Pell, the president of RL, announced that Moscow had increased jamming for that station as well after ending its blocking of BBC's Russian service. RL engineers detected that at least eight transmitters that previously blocked BBC's signal were now used against RL. In June 1987 the Board for International Broadcasting announced that the Kremlin had redirected toward RFE/RL at least two jamming transmitters that were previously used against VOA. [REDACTED]

Diplomatic considerations may be an impetus to this type of relatively subtle policy. For example, in the future Moscow may decide to treat Western stations differently, according to the country from which they broadcast. If US-Soviet relations take a downturn, for example, the Soviets might renew jamming of VOA while leaving BBC untouched and perhaps ending jamming of DW. The vehemence of Soviet press attacks against DW, however, suggests that Moscow regards the German station with almost as much suspicion as RFE/RL. [REDACTED]

In a move analogous to selectively jamming stations by country of origin, the Soviets could decide to beef up only the system of local "groundwave" jammers while leaving the more porous "skywave" jamming system alone (see inset on page 31). Indeed, Moscow already has embarked along this path. Local groundwave jammers first appeared in Soviet cities with over a million population. By the 1970s they were reported in cities of more than 500,000 people, and now they have appeared in towns with fewer than 250,000 people. We expect this trend to continue, with groundwave jammers appearing in smaller and smaller towns. [REDACTED]

~~Secret~~

Conclusions and Outlook

For the foreseeable future, a substantial minority of the Soviet public will probably be able to receive Western news and analysis via shortwave radio:

- The hard-wiring of the country for cable radio could make possible a drastic cut in domestic production of shortwave receivers—but, in addition to the existing stock of radios, resourceful citizens would still have access to black-market radio sets, to foreign imports, and to receivers modified for short-wave by Soviet "moonlighters."
- If jamming continues on a selective basis, or resumes on a comprehensive basis, Soviet citizens will use time-honored ways to overcome it partially."
- Propaganda attacks against all the stations and intelligence operations against RFE/RL are unlikely to deter members of the public who are determined to listen.
- Some listeners will probably continue to be harassed, especially for disseminating "anti-Soviet propaganda" obtained from the radios, but the regime almost certainly will flinch from erecting legal penalties such as those used to prevent listening during World War II; such laws would simply be unenforceable under present conditions.

There is an upward limit to the growth in audience size for Western broadcasting. Listening is already widespread among the urban, educated classes. Those people who do not listen much—the less educated, and rural dwellers, for example—are least likely to desire independent sources of information.

* According to a Western news report from March 1987, USIA engineers may soon be able to produce a simple device that will thwart the regime's ability to jam foreign broadcasts. Citizens would be able to make the anti-jammer out of ordinary household goods, such as aluminum foil. USIA officials believe the device will eliminate or substantially reduce the effect of jamming for VOA. Presumably it would help listeners pick up other stations as well.

The cessation of jamming of most Western stations will result in a gradual growth in the Soviet audience for foreign broadcasts. The ease with which programs can be picked up will more than offset the loss of the thrill of tasting "forbidden fruit" by listening to the stations the authorities were trying to jam.

Glasnost is not likely to diminish the appetite for news from Western stations. Greater candor in Soviet domestic media cannot completely close the credibility gap between official propaganda and the population's desire to hear another point of view. Since Gorbachev is not likely to remove all constraints on public discussion of sensitive political issues—such as the legitimacy of the Communist Party's rule—there will continue to be an interest in Western reporting and analysis. In fact, by increasing public attention to political issues, *glasnost* is likely to stimulate greater interest in both domestic and foreign media. In Eastern Europe, where the media generally have been more open than in the USSR, the audiences for Western broadcasting remain large.

Western broadcasting has had and will continue to have a profound long-range impact on the attitudes of the Soviet population. The penetration of the USSR by Western broadcasting is part of a broad process of modernization—including technological improvements in communications, urbanization, education, and growing global economic interdependence—that is breaking down the isolation of the Soviet population, enlarging the size of the critically thinking public, diminishing suspicion of the outside world, and placing pressure on the regime to take into account the desires of its people in making policy.

~~Secret~~