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Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War [REDACTED]

An Intelligence Assessment

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March 1991
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Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War [REDACTED]

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [REDACTED]
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March 1991

Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War [REDACTED]

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 13 March 1991
was used in this report.*

Civil war remains a distinct possibility in Yugoslavia. Although tensions have ebbed and flowed in recent weeks, deep ethnic divisions, economic weakness, political paralysis, and senior army leaders' skepticism about democratization continue as firm features of the political landscape. Full-scale civil war, if it comes, will probably be disorganized and protracted, with a stalemate the most likely outcome. With neither side able to impose its will by force of arms, a political solution—perhaps brokered internationally—would be required, possibly offering the first real test of CSCE institutions. [REDACTED]

Militarily, conflict would pit the strengths of armored and air forces under national control against republic infantry forces trained in guerrilla warfare. The contending forces are already in place, the unintended consequence of long-held Yugoslav military doctrine that emphasizes an initial short conventional defense by the national forces followed by an extended guerrilla war led by republic-based forces. Both sides have boosted their defense preparedness and are ready to act quickly if necessary, but neither side could win a rapid military victory:

- The better-armed national forces would enjoy pronounced military advantages against republic forces in Slovenia and Croatia, but in a broader war their advantages would be sharply undermined by manpower, logistic, and transportation shortfalls.
- Republic forces, equipped and trained to conduct guerrilla warfare, could take advantage of rugged terrain in such a campaign and would be a credible military force. [REDACTED]

Foreign arms have been entering the Yugoslav republics for months, the product of smuggling, gray arms market transactions, and at least one confirmed government-to-republic sale. The acquisition of foreign weapons is extremely sensitive in Yugoslavia's supercharged political atmosphere, and Belgrade reacted sharply to Hungary's government authorized sale of assault rifles to the Croatian government. Political sensitivity may limit future official sales, but republics threatened by the prospect of Army intervention probably will continue to acquire the arms they need commercially. [REDACTED]

The course and outcome of a civil war would be heavily colored by ethnic tensions, evident even within the Army. In the face of heavy fighting, military discipline and cohesion would evaporate, leading to fragmentation

of the Army along ethnic lines. The Army's transformation into a rump Serbian force would result in a marked decrease in military effectiveness. Recent political tensions and antigovernment demonstrations in Serbia suggest that not even all Serbs would be united behind such an army. Moreover, given the fissures within Yugoslav society, organized violence between military units would probably trigger smaller scale, but widespread communal violence. Refugee flows probably would be substantial.


With the danger of a spillover of the violence into neighboring countries, a Yugoslav civil war would rapidly become a "European" problem. But the major Pan-European institution, CSCE, is currently not structured to grapple effectively with internal conflicts. Major violence in Yugoslavia would lead CSCE members to consider creating new mechanisms to resolve conflict. In any conflict, the US and European nations will come under pressure to provide political and military support to the different combatants.

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Scope Note



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Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of a Potential Civil War [REDACTED]

Introduction

Yugoslavia's political fabric is badly frayed and may unravel in 1991. There is a strong chance this process will be accompanied by some level of violence, particularly if, as we expect, federal leaders insist on maintaining central authority and final say on key policy questions. In public and private statements, some senior military officers have already advocated force to reverse the republics' steady usurpation of federal powers, particularly over defense matters. [REDACTED]

Political flexibility has not wholly disappeared, however, and civil war is not inescapable. [REDACTED] the fear of a widespread, brutal conflict may brake political passions. Nevertheless, full-scale civil war is a distinct possibility and several recent developments—including armed violence in Serb-dominated regions of Croatia, the growing possibility of renewed Albanian unrest in Kosovo, the near clash of Croatian and federal forces in January, and Slovene and Croat moves toward secession—highlight the strong centrifugal forces at work in Yugoslavia. [REDACTED]

Yugoslav Military Forces

We believe the dual nature of Yugoslavia's military structure, with a federally based army, navy, and air force and regionally organized militia forces, provides the groundwork for civil war in the current crisis. For more than 20 years Belgrade has based its military policy on the doctrine of "All People's Defense"—a short conventional defense against an invading force followed by a protracted guerrilla war. The regular Army, a federal force under the command of a Serb-dominated officer corps, traditionally has had the mission of conducting initial armored and air operations against an invader. The more numerous but lightly armed Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), under republic command, have been organized, equipped, and trained for guerrilla warfare. As a

result, the keys to Belgrade's strategy—universal military training, mass mobilization, redundant command and control structures, and widely distributed weaponry—have equipped the entire society for war and created two potential contenders. [REDACTED]

Historically, both the national forces and the TDF have been subordinate to national authority as components of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA). In reality, [REDACTED] Belgrade's political and military control over the territorial forces now ranges from little to none, depending on the region of the country:

- Forces in Montenegro, closely allied to Serbia, might follow orders from JNA officers assigned to the republic defense ministry staff.
- Both Slovenia and Croatia have severed command links between their forces and the JNA. In both, territorial forces respond solely to republic authorities. [REDACTED]

National Forces

The JNA consists of separate Ground, Naval, Air, and Air Defense Forces. The Ground Force component, with 110,000 men, is a conventional armored force organized into a full range of combat arms and support services. Its arms inventory comes from a variety of sources and the Army generally lacks modern weapons and support equipment. The Ground Forces have limited logistic and communications capabilities, and little, if any, offensive capability against neighboring countries. They are, nonetheless, more heavily armed, more mobile, and better equipped and trained than the territorial forces. [REDACTED]

The national Air and Air Defense Forces have some 34,000 personnel and are equipped with over 600 Soviet and domestically produced fighter, ground attack, and reconnaissance aircraft. The bulk of Yugoslavia's attack helicopters are also under Air Force control. Although almost certainly no match for the

NATO or Soviet air forces, the Air Force has ground attack capabilities that could be effective in a civil war. [REDACTED]

Territorial Defense Forces

Despite repeated efforts by Belgrade in recent months to disarm and degrade territorial forces, particularly in Slovenia and Croatia, we believe the republics continue to possess viable military forces equipped with small arms and light antiarmor and air defense weapons. Republic-based TDF forces primarily are small infantry units organized by municipalities, although a handful of brigade-size TDF units exist. Command and control arrangements for territorial forces have been only loosely defined. In theory, TDF units would operate under the control of republic-level headquarters until these command centers were destroyed. Thereafter, TDF units would operate as independent combat units. Trained in hit-and-run warfare, TDF units would be a capable guerrilla force in urban areas or in Yugoslavia's rugged countryside. Although these units lack armor and air assets and have only limited mobility, the existence of the TDF sharply shankles JNA officers. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who have come to regard them as rudimentary republic armies, especially in independence-minded Slovenia and Croatia. JNA leaders moved last spring to disarm the TDF, seizing weapons stocks at the republic level. These seizures seriously depleted TDF arms stocks, although the degree varies in each republic. Since then, Slovenia and Croatia have engaged in vigorous arms acquisition. [REDACTED]

As political tensions have increased over the past two years, Army officers have grown increasingly concerned by their loss of control over the republics' military forces, and command over those forces has become a key issue in the crisis. With the republics gaining power at the federal government's expense, the Army has come to view the TDF as a threat to unity. In mid-1989, [REDACTED] reporting first noted federal Army plans to transform TDF units into "area forces" and disband their command structures. [REDACTED] in October 1990 the JNA considered implementing a plan whereby the TDF would lose its military role and become a civil defense force—a clear attempt to eliminate the republics' fighting capability. More recently, with the complete breakdown of federal control over Slovene and

Croatian forces, the Army has labeled them "illegal armed groups" and repeatedly called for their abolition, a move rebuffed by both republics. [REDACTED]

Dynamics Within the Military

We believe the regular Army has the military capability to act against the republics, but political developments in recent months have undermined its effectiveness as an armed force. Yugoslavia's longstanding system of parallel command structures at the federal and republic level, with both the regular Army and TDF forces ultimately answering to the Federal civilian presidency, has collapsed. Rising ethnic friction, nationalism, and declining federal authority [REDACTED] have affected the responsiveness and discipline of the troops and raised serious questions about how long the Army would remain intact in the event of a civil war. [REDACTED]

The Army, in our view, is neither unified nor are its troops unquestionably reliable. The senior officer corps is nominally balanced along ethnic lines, and these officers retain a Pan-Yugoslav orientation. Serbs, however, have long dominated the middle and lower officer ranks, making line officers, at least, broadly sympathetic to the Communist government in Serbia. Although Serbs make up only 36 percent of the population, they and their close Montenegrin cousins make up 60 percent of the total officer corps. [REDACTED] ethnic rivalries exist within middle and junior officer ranks between Serbs and other nationalities. At lower ranks, the bulk of the Army consists of some 80,000 conscripts whose ethnic makeup more closely reflects the composition of Yugoslav society. Their principal loyalties are likely to remain with their own ethnic group and native republic (see graphic). [REDACTED]

We believe the discipline of enlisted men would be gravely tested by orders to fire on civilians or even on TDF units. In a limited military action, we believe the troops would inflict and receive at least some casualties without breaking. For example, if the Army were used to seize Slovene draft records or as a show of force to

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Foreign Military Assistance

Arms have been flowing into the Yugoslav republics for months. Lax customs procedures at border posts have long enabled individuals to drive into Yugoslavia with small caches of arms and ammunition, [redacted] in addition to overland road and rail routes, Yugoslavia's extensive coastline also offers numerous opportunities to move weapons into the country [redacted]

It is difficult to assess precisely the dimensions of the arms trade and the sources of supply, because [redacted] the issue is highly charged politically. Senior Army officers have repeatedly complained of outside plotting to destabilize Yugoslavia and cited the republics' acquisition of weapons as proof. In addition, Serbian media have made frequent, unsubstantiated charges of foreign military and financial support for the breakaway republics. Under the circumstances, it is hard to separate fact from propaganda, but it is quite likely that arms dealers from Israel, Europe, and the Middle East have approached republic officials in Yugoslavia and concluded agreements with some of them. [redacted]

[redacted] the flow of foreign arms stepped up late last year as Slovenia and Croatia began to see a more immediate threat of Army intervention. Private Slovene groups covertly

acquired weapons last fall [redacted] and we believe the republic government has been buying arms commercially on the gray arms market. Croatian representatives directly solicited US and European military support late last year, and senior republic officials have publicly acknowledged their efforts to acquire weapons in international arms markets. The Croats were rebuffed by Western governments, but the Hungarian Government responded by authorizing a controversial sale of several thousand assault rifles. Hungarian officials and Yugoslav press reports claim they may also have received Czech weapons. At least one report indicates some Croatian paramilitary forces have been seen with weapons from Singapore and Germany [redacted]

The Yugoslav Government has tightened its arms import regulations in response to the Hungarian arms sale, but its efforts to restrict the flow of arms are likely to have only a limited effect. Belgrade's stinging rebuke of Budapest may undercut further official sales to the republics. Weapons the republics may require, however, are readily available on the gray arms market where customs regulations carry limited force. Moreover, if conflict erupts, emigre groups elsewhere in Europe will almost certainly step up efforts to provide military support to their compatriots in Yugoslavia. [redacted]

end ethnic fighting and restore order in Bosnia and Hercegovina or Kosovo, the units most likely would respond to authority and enforce the government's policy as they have done in the past to quell outbreaks of nationalist unrest, or, more recently, as they did to contain anti-Serbian protests in Belgrade. Sustained or large-scale violence, as would probably occur in fighting against Slovene or Croatian forces, would, in our view, shatter the troops' discipline. [redacted]

With the breakdown of unit cohesion and discipline that would most likely accompany organized violence, the Army would probably fracture along ethnic lines, leading to wholesale desertions and intra-unit violence. Some troops probably would take their personal

weapons and join the TDF or paramilitary forces in their home republics. What would be left would be essentially a rump Serbian army. We believe officers and troops sympathetic to Serbia—some 40 to 50 percent of the Army—would remain.¹ Serbian TDF

¹ The Army, which could lose 50 to 60 percent of its active duty and ready reserve strength following factionalization of the force, might total some 150,000 in a civil war. We estimate the Serbian TDF to be some 300,000. If popular sentiment against the Serbian government deepens, however, it is unlikely the Serbian TDF would reach its full authorized strength. Effective forces in Slovenia and Croatia might, we estimate, be in the 150,000 to 200,000 range, although Croatia's ability to call up 200,000 reservists could eventually expand this number [redacted]

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Disposition and Composition of Federal and Republic Forces

National Forces. The regular Army's striking power—tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery—is dispersed among 57 brigades and independent regiments deployed throughout the country. As political tensions increased in late 1990, these units were ordered to maintain a high state of combat readiness. They assumed a war footing in late January, when a clash in Croatia appeared imminent, and they were prepared for immediate action in the face of early March demonstrations in Belgrade. We believe commanders have made particular efforts to maintain their preparedness in the Fifth Military Region encompassing Slovenia and most of Croatia (see map). The JNA, in our view, could quickly assume a posture threatening either republic.


Two regular Army corps, comprising 19 armored, mechanized, and infantry brigades and four infantry regiments and support units are currently stationed in the Fifth Military Region. Croats and Slovenes account for about one-third of the conscript force in the region. Political leaders in both republics, however, have recently charged the military with transferring many members of those ethnic groups out of the region, a charge the military claims is exaggerated. [redacted] forces in the Fifth Military Region are among the Army's most capable units and probably could seize key republic facilities, such as government buildings and communications facilities, within hours. Remaining Army units are dispersed throughout the republics, but [redacted] federal authorities would prefer to rely on heavily armed police units under Interior Ministry control to maintain order in trouble spots like Kosovo province, or, as they did recently in Belgrade, to contain antigovernment unrest. Interior Ministry units in Kosovo are bogged down, their capabilities undercut by Slovenia and Croatia's decision last year to withdraw their nationals from the force. Macedonia, moreover, has announced plans to withdraw its personnel in the near future.

Territorial Forces. According to multiple sources, authorities in Slovenia and Croatia began bolstering their defenses late last year, organizing new units and acquiring substantial numbers of weapons on the international arms market. Slovenia's 60,000-strong TDF units, according to republic defense officials, lost only half their weapons during arms seizures by the JNA early in the year. We believe the force subsequently has been reequipped with automatic weapons and light antiaircraft and antitank arms. Slovene authorities boosted the readiness of their forces in the face of JNA hostility last year, and we believe Slovene forces remain on guard against the possibility of Army intervention. Special republic police and Interior Ministry units, armed with automatic weapons, are guarding government facilities, and the republic's defense minister has publicly claimed the ability to quickly mobilize tens of thousands of armed men.

Croatia's 200,000-member TDF was effectively disarmed by the May 1990 arms roundup. In response, according to various sources, Croatian authorities organized a new paramilitary force of at least 40,000 built on local police and republic Interior Ministry units. Multiple reports indicate they have acquired thousands of automatic weapons, and possibly light antiarmor and antiaircraft weapons as well, over the past several months. Senior JNA officers are so concerned by the development of what they term "illegal armed bands" in Croatia that the two sides nearly came to blows in January. In a last-minute compromise [redacted] the Croatian force partially demobilized at least some 20,000 reservists it had just called to active service. We believe that Croatian authorities retained the weapons and that the force could quickly be mobilized again. [redacted]

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Figure 1
Military Regions and Corps Headquarters



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might combine with the remnants of the regular Army, in effect giving Serbia a sizable military force.

Factionalization of the regular Army would markedly decrease its military effectiveness. It probably would retain control over most, but not all, of its heavy equipment. With ranks thinned by desertion, however, combat units—as well as combat support and service support—would all be ineffective until they were reformed. Logistic support and maintenance capabilities would probably decline, which would most likely undercut air operations by either the regular Army or the Air Force.

Military Stalemate Likely

Whether localized in one or two republics or nationwide, civil war in Yugoslavia, in our view, would be bloody, disjointed, and protracted, with neither side able to impose its will by force of arms. Republic forces could not prevail in fixed, large-scale battles against much more mobile and better equipped regular Army units, but the Army also could not completely pacify the republics in a guerrilla war. Whatever the dimensions of the conflict, the regular Army is likely to hold sway over those areas of the country in which its military strengths can be employed effectively. Control over the northern plains, containing the nation's principal cities, much of its industry, and the bulk of its rail lines, highways, and lines of communication, would almost certainly be one of the Army's key objectives and would probably be within its grasp. We would expect the Army to make forays against, or be in uneasy control of, major cities and to be hunting for republic units. Republic forces, drawing on popular support and active in the hills, mountains, and lowlands beyond the reach of the regular Army, would attack its units wherever possible.

Conflict in Slovenia and Croatia

Although the national Army would enjoy decided military advantages in a conflict limited to Slovenia and Croatia, we believe the two republics have sufficient military and nonmilitary means to resist armed intervention and force a political solution. Both Slovenia and Croatia have rudimentary republic


armies, based on their police and Territorial Defense Forces, although the quality of Croat forces almost certainly suffers from limited training and shortages of experienced commanders. Moreover,

the two republics agreed in late January on a series of political steps to be taken if either is attacked, including immediate secession and calls on their troops to desert the JNA. In addition, work stoppages, economic sabotage, and interruptions of power and communications would be likely.

Even after its transformation into a rump Serbian army, the regular Army still would be stronger and better equipped than TDF forces functioning as republican armies. Moreover, geography largely favors the regular Army in a conflict against republican armies in Slovenia and Croatia. The northern plains—spreading across portions of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia, encompassing Belgrade and Zagreb, and reaching almost to Ljubljana—are suitable for mobile warfare and armored operations (see map). The extensive road network would restrict guerrilla operations of the sort for which the TDF is trained, and the Army's air power could be more effectively employed in the open terrain.


The republic forces, on the other hand, would have the advantage of being a dedicated irregular force fighting a defensive battle on home terrain, and we believe republic units would fare reasonably well, especially in areas unsuited to armored operations such as the western regions of Slovenia and Croatia. The regular Army is clearly more capable militarily, but it would find itself fighting guerrilla bands, an opponent entirely different from the massed armor formations against which it has been trained to mount defensive operations. The Army also is heavily dependent on stringing phone lines for command, control, and communications, and these facilities would be especially vulnerable. Moreover, taking and holding

Figure 2
Yugoslavia's Ethnic Composition



0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles

In Percent



^a Yugoslavs are those persons who listed themselves as such in the 1981 census, but who, in fact, belong to one or another of the ethnic groups. They are dispersed across Yugoslavia.

entire cities in hostile republics could be accomplished, but only at the risk of heavy losses. Urban areas strongly favor the defense; in built-up areas even armor is vulnerable to guerrilla attack.

A Wider War

With tensions running high within and between republics, even a localized conflict between federal forces and the republic armies will take on the character of an ethnic quarrel and could spread rapidly to other areas. Organized conflict anywhere and on almost any scale is likely to trigger bloody, widespread communal violence.

We believe the Army would lack the capability to assert simultaneous military control across the length and breadth of Yugoslavia. In a full-scale civil war, involving JNA operations against Croatia and Slovenia, intervention in the face of communal violence in Bosnia and Hercegovina, fighting an Albanian uprising



in Kosovo, and moving to control Macedonia, the military equation between the national and the republican armies would be more nearly equal. Transportation difficulties, logistic shortfalls, and the presumed impact of desertions and casualties would all tend to limit operations. Manpower limitations alone would tend to force the Army to choose its military objectives carefully. Moreover, Yugoslavia is predominantly a country of hills and mountains—unsuitable conditions that restrict mobile armored operations in 80 percent of the country.

Implications for Europe and the United States

If conditions in Yugoslavia degenerate into civil war, we believe the combatants would pressure the United States and European nations to take sides and provide

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Figure 3
Military Terrain of Yugoslavia



SOURCE: DMA ONC

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military and political support. Croatian and Slovene authorities would probably repeat their requests for military assistance, portraying their struggle as one of newly democratized, independent states against an aggressive, Communist Serbia. A civil war in Yugoslavia also is likely to reopen similar issues of nationalism and ethnicity in other Balkan states. [REDACTED]

A Yugoslav civil war, in our view, would quickly become a "European" problem requiring a political settlement—perhaps negotiated under international auspices. A major conflict almost certainly would lead to substantial refugee flows and raise international human rights concerns. Emigre groups might become involved in an attempt to provide cross-border military support for their compatriots, and there is an additional danger of a spillover of violence into neighboring states, especially Greece and Albania. [REDACTED]

CSCE members undoubtedly would try to use the forum to help Yugoslavia through arbitration or perhaps a peacekeeping force. CSCE, however, is not currently structured to address internal problems and

because of its consensus rule, the government in Belgrade would be able to veto any of the forum's decisions regarding the crisis. Nevertheless, a major conflict in Yugoslavia probably would lead CSCE members to consider creating new conflict resolution mechanisms that could be directed toward internal matters and which would weaken the consensus rule by permitting CSCE emergency meetings to be held without the consent of all members. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Appendix

Yugoslav Military Doctrine, Ground, and Air Forces

Yugoslav Military Doctrine

The presence in Yugoslavia of mutually hostile federal and republic armed forces is an unintended outgrowth of the military doctrine that for years has underpinned Belgrade's defense policy. Officially neutral, surrounded by potential foes, and with limited money and manpower, Belgrade has focused historically on maintaining credible defenses at acceptable cost. "All People's Defense," a territorial defense doctrine predicated on the participation of every citizen in armed or civil resistance, has been the basis of Yugoslav defense policy for more than two decades.

Military planners have presupposed Yugoslavia would be outmanned and outgunned in any attack, and they developed the concept of "All People's Defense" to take advantage of the defensive strengths afforded by Yugoslavia's rugged terrain. This doctrine envisions a classic guerrilla war of attrition: wear down enemy forces through long-term, hit-and-run actions; seize the strategic initiative by striking whenever and wherever possible; and fight until the enemy's political will is broken. Regular forces—conventional armored formations and air power—would blunt the initial attack and inflict maximum casualties in order to buy time for mass mobilization. Planners assume these forces would largely be destroyed and the brunt of the war would shift to reserve forces mobilized from the civilian population—the Territorial Defense Force.

Yugoslavia's armed forces have been consciously structured to provide the military capabilities required to make "All People's Defense" workable. The national Army has been equipped with the heavy weapons, air power, mobility, and combat support services needed to oppose a modern armored opponent. Territorial Defense Forces necessarily have been organized to arm and integrate into combat formations the citizen-soldiers on whom Yugoslav doctrine ultimately relies to provide a credible national defense.

The Army

The Army has been restructured and reorganized in recent years to boost its operational flexibility, but also, in large part, to reduce defense outlays. In early 1989 Belgrade redrew and reduced from six to four the number of military regions and shifted from a division-based organization to one employing brigades as the largest independent combat formations. The national Army now consists of 17 corps subordinated to four regional headquarters controlling 43 tank, mechanized infantry, and infantry brigades; two mountain brigades; and independent infantry, artillery, and antitank regiments.

This reorganization simultaneously has achieved several important objectives. Militarily, the shift to a brigade structure has enhanced the combat power available to corps commanders, better enabling them to tailor forces to specific missions. The move further ensures the Army would be a significant military force against a domestic opponent. Politically, by divorcing military regions from republic boundaries, the Army has further insulated republic authorities from control over the troops. Economically, the reorganization has generated manpower savings, potentially freeing resources for badly needed equipment.

The Army has been hit severely by a long-term decline in defense spending fueled by the government's inability to cope with hyperinflation, declining production, and rising unemployment and foreign debt. In 15 years' time, spending declined from 6.5 percent to 4.5 percent of GNP in 1989. As a consequence, the armed forces generally lag 15 to 20 years in the introduction of new arms equipment. The corrosive effects of financial shortfalls are widely

¹ Yugoslav corps, unlike their US and NATO counterparts, are not mobile command and control structures intended to conduct conventional armored operations. They are static area defense commands and are assigned armored and infantry brigades consonant with their mission only after mobilization.

evident. Although the Army has substantial heavy arms and equipment, its inventory is aging and extremely heterogeneous. Training, [redacted] is rudimentary for conscripts and at best infrequent above battalion level. [redacted]

Arms production, logistic support, and maintenance present a mixed picture. Hundreds of depots around the country maintain major supply items (for example, arms, ammunition, equipment, fuels, and lubricants) in storage for active duty and reserve forces. We believe the logistics and maintenance systems are adequate for a short conflict but would almost certainly be substantially degraded in a protracted fight. Weapons production facilities (see graphic) are extensive, but Yugoslavia has only limited capabilities to produce the latest defense technologies and must rely on foreign licensing or imports. [redacted]

Territorial Defense Forces

The TDF is a part-time military organization whose capabilities lag those of the Army. Its 300,000 peacetime strength consists of various categories of reservists who have recently completed regular service. While the federal Army is organized and deployed in standard military formations, the TDF has the cast of a local defense force. Some 20,000 Territorial Defense units, scattered across Yugoslavia, are organized on the basis of regional political structures (republics, districts, cities, and towns) and economic entities (large enterprises and individual factories). Larger TDF units—at the republic level—are in brigade strength, have some limited mobility, and have a minimal maneuver capability. The overwhelming majority of TDF units, however, are small infantry units—platoons, companies, and battalions—with little mobility. They are designed to provide point defense for specific installations and areas, back up local Army forces, and conduct independent operations behind enemy lines. The TDF also has a number of units trained and equipped to perform specialized tasks—river crossing, sabotage, and the like. [redacted]

Arms and equipment vary from unit to unit but are widely available, and TDF units generally would be well-equipped guerrilla forces. World War II-era German weapons or Soviet arms phased out of Army service have traditionally comprised the bulk of the

Major Items in Army Inventory

Main Battle Tanks

M-84	160
T-72	70
T-54/T-55	1,520
T-34	250

Armored Vehicles

BRDM	80
BTR 50/60	300
M-60	520
M-80	340
M-980	20
TAB-72	155

Artillery

155-mm gun (M-2)	20
152-mm gun (D-20, ML-20, M-1943)	200
130-mm gun (M-46)	130
128-mm multiple rocket launcher	40
122-mm howitzer (D-30, M-1938, 2S1)	830
105-mm howitzer (M-7, M-56)	510

Antitank Weapons


AT-3 antitank guided missile	130
100-mm antitank gun (SU-100, T-12)	530
44-mm rocket-propelled grenade (M-57)	16,000

Air Defense Missiles

SA-9 launcher	30
SA-7 launcher	150
SA-6 launcher	140

TDF's arms inventory, and we believe many of these weapons are still in the hundreds of TDF arms depots and caches around the country. Numerous reports indicate republic forces in Slovenia and Croatia, and perhaps other republics, have smuggled in modern automatic weapons and it is quite likely they have at least some light antiarmor and antiaircraft capabilities as well. [redacted]

Figure 4
Major Weapons Production Facilities



Yugoslavia produces a wide assortment of modern weapons, ranging from small arms and ammunition to modern combat aircraft. Most defense plants have been able to continue production during the country's internal crisis and have stockpiles of finished weapons on hand. If war erupts, these plants probably would be forced to close.

Defense industry plants are scattered throughout Yugoslavia and will provide an attractive target for destruction or seizure if war erupts. Small arms, ammunition, and explosives plants are clustered in Serbia, but the greatest variety of weapons is produced in Bosnia and Hercegovina, where the mix of ethnic groups threatens the greatest potential for violence, some of which probably would lead to the seizure of these plants.

**Estimated Territorial Defense
Wartime Strength**

Republic	Manpower
Slovenia	60,000
Croatia	200,000
Serbia	300,000
Bosnia Hercegovina	200,000
Macedonia	100,000
Montenegro	30,000

TDF training and readiness are, we believe, generally weak. The only full-time TDF forces consist of small (several-hundred-man) staffs in each republic. TDF personnel, drawn from the ranks of recently discharged Army troops, would all have received basic military training, but sharply limited defense budgets mean refresher training is sporadic at best. We nevertheless believe locally recruited, relatively ethnically homogeneous TDF forces would perform credibly in conflict, given their morale-stiffening assignment of defending their own communities.

Yugoslav Air Force

Yugoslavia's Air and Air Defense Forces are the best organized and trained of the armed services. Administratively separate, the Air Force and Air Defense Force are controlled by a single headquarters exercising command over three regional air corps: Zagreb in the north, Banjica in central Yugoslavia, and Nis in the south. Regional commanders have operational control over tactical and air defense resources within their area.

Each air corps consists of two wings and supporting units. Air wings comprise two or three regiments of three squadrons each. In addition, the Air Force administratively controls naval aviation, to which it assigns transport, antisubmarine warfare helicopters, and one regiment of combat aircraft. The Air and Air Defense Forces combined include:

- Twelve fighter/bomber squadrons.
- Nine interceptor squadrons.

Yugoslav Aircraft by Role

Fighter *	
Fishbed (D,F,J,L,N)	135
Fulcrum (A,B)	17
Galeb-Jastreb	73
Galeb-4	55
Jurom 200 Orao	51
Mongol	18
Soko G-2A Galeb	89
Ground Attack	
Galeb-Jastreb	113
Jurom 200 Orao	54
Soko P-2 Kraguj	30
UTVA-75	18
Attack Helicopter	
Hip-C	75
Gazelle	200

* Includes trainer and reconnaissance variants.

- Four reconnaissance squadrons.
- Four attack helicopter squadrons.
- Two transport squadrons.
- Fourteen surface-to-air missile regiments.

Yugoslavia operates domestically-built as well as Soviet and Western-origin aircraft. MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft are its most advanced fighters. Yugoslav-built Orao, Jastreb, and Galeb aircraft provide the primary ground attack capability, along with Gazelle helicopters built under French license and older Soviet Hip-C helicopters.

The Air and Air Defense Forces are very well maintained, with an in-commission rate of over 80 percent. They should be able to fulfill the initial defensive and support missions called for in Yugoslav doctrine. Combat, however, probably would quickly reveal shortcomings in

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ground-based air defense, low-altitude radar coverage, electronic countermeasures capabilities, and night flying expertise [REDACTED]

In the past, the Air Force has been used as a show of force to quell nationalist discontent. In February 1990 troop transports and fighters were deployed to Kosovo to intimidate rioting Albanian separatists. As part of a limited military operation, senior defense officials might again call on Air Force assets. In the context of a civil war, we believe ethnic turmoil within the Air Force would undercut personnel strength, logistic support, and maintenance operations, leading to a quick reduction in its capabilities. [REDACTED]

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