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
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

RUSSIAN BALTIC SHIPYARD NO. 890
IN TALLINN ESTONIAN SSR

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

RUSSIAN BALTIC SHIPYARD NO. 890
IN TALLINN, ESTONIAN SSR

CIA/RR PR-114

(ORR Project 35.507)

NOTICE

The data and conclusions contained in this report do not necessarily represent the final position of ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and subject to revision. Comments and additional data which may be available to the user are solicited.

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FOREWORD

This report on the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 is one of a series of Soviet shipyard studies made in an effort better to assess the capabilities of the Soviet shipbuilding and ship-repair industry.

- iii -

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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary and Conclusions	1
I. Name and Location	2
II. History	2
III. Organization	3
IV. Importance	3
V. Building and Facilities	3
VI. Production	4
VII. Labor	5
VIII. Sources of Power and Materials	5
IX. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities	5
A. Capabilities	5
B. Vulnerabilities	6

Appendixes

Appendix A. Methodology	7
Appendix B. Gaps in Intelligence	9
Appendix C. Source References	11

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Chart

Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890, Tallinn, Inside
Estonian SSR Back Cover

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RUSSIAN BALTIC SHIPYARD NO. 890, IN TALLINN, ESTONIAN SSR*

Summary and Conclusions

The Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890, in Tallinn, Estonian SSR, is an important ship-repair and modernization yard in the Baltic Sea area of the Soviet Bloc. The shipyard was reconstructed by the Russians after World War II, but no building ways were added. The major function of the shipyard is the repair and modernization of naval vessels of fleet destroyer size and smaller, including submarines in the Soviet Baltic Naval Fleet. The shipyard also serves the fleet as a refueling station. The vulnerable location of the shipyard at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and the development of shipyards elsewhere in the USSR and the European Satellites for the construction of naval and merchant vessels make the shipyard an unlikely site for the construction of new vessels.

The shipyard has about 3,650 feet of quay and pier berthing space, of which 1,250 feet are allocated for refueling activities. The remaining 2,400 feet of quay and pier frontage, together with the floating drydock, permit the simultaneous repair of 9 fleet destroyers or 17 W-class submarines. Machine shops, foundry and forges, and hull fabrication shops have been developed to support adequately all repair and modernization activities. Current employment is estimated at 3,500 persons.

The proximity of the shipyard to the Leningrad-Moscow industrial area adds considerably to the efficiency of the yard through the availability and the relatively short rail haul of components.

* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the best judgment of ORR as of 1 April 1955.

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I. Name and Location.

The Soviet Shipyard No. 890, commonly known as the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 and also known as Kopli No. 2, Kopli No. 890, or Vene-Baltic, is situated on the tip of the Teliskopli Neem Peninsula, approximately 4.9 nautical miles southeast of Naissaar Island and 1.5 nautical miles southwest of the northwest tip of Paljassaar Island. It is roughly 3.5 miles west-northwest of the center of Tallinn (formerly Reval), Estonian SSR, in Economic Region IIa.* The shipyard is approximately 170 nautical miles by water and 230 miles by rail west of Leningrad. 1/** The plane coordinates are latitude 59°27'48" N - longitude 24°39'28" E. 2/

The approach to the shipyard from the Gulf of Finland is through open waters. Tides do not affect navigation, and variations up to 4 feet in the water level are due almost entirely to winds. Ice interferes with navigation from the middle of January to the end of February. Icebreakers, however, usually are able to maintain open channels during the winter. 3/

The mean annual temperature is 40° F. Extreme recorded temperatures are 89° F in July and minus 19° F in February. 4/

The shipyard is about 3,000 feet long by 1,200 feet wide and covers an area of 4.19 million square feet, or approximately 96 acres.

Tallinn is an important railroad terminal for railroads which connect the city with Leningrad, the Latvian SSR, and other parts of the USSR. A Soviet standard-gauge rail line connects the shipyard with the city of Tallinn. 5/

II. History.

The Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn had its origin during the days of the czars when Estonia was a province of the Russian Empire. The shipyard had eight shipbuilding ways and was an important shipyard for the construction of new vessels. The shipyard suffered much damage during World War I and was not reconstructed during the period of

* The term region in this report refers to the economic regions defined and numbered on CIA Map 12048.1, 9-51 (First Revision, 7-52), USSR: Economic Regions.

** For serially numbered source references, see Appendix C.

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Estonian independence. During the latter period, several unrelated private enterprises occupied a few buildings, but there were no shipbuilding or ship-repair activities. 6/

Further damage was done to the shipyard during World War II. Following the war, reconstruction was started under the supervision of Soviet engineers with prisoner-of-war labor. Description of the reconstruction by many of these prisoners of war indicated that the shipyard was being developed to repair naval vessels, including submarines, and to serve as a refueling station for naval vessels. At the time when the prisoners of war left the shipyard in late 1949, no reconstruction work had been started on the shipbuilding ways. No confirmed reports of ship construction have since been received, and it is believed that the principal activity has been naval ship repair. 7/

III. Organization.

As the shipyard is engaged principally in the servicing of naval vessels, it probably comes under the cognizance of the Ministry of Shipbuilding (Ministerstvo Sudostroitel'noy Promyshlennosti -- MSP).

IV. Importance.

The city of Tallinn is the capital, the largest city, and the most important economic center and port in the Estonian SSR. Since World War II this port has become the main advanced base of the Baltic Fleet. The city of Tallinn, lying within the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, is well placed to defend the sea approaches to Leningrad. 8/ The operations of this naval base are supported in part by the repair facilities of the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890.

V. Building and Facilities.

Information on development of the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn since late 1949 is sparse. Much work remained to be done when the prisoners of war were repatriated in late 1949, and it is doubtful that the shipyard was fully activated until about 1952. 9/ Buildings and facilities have been reconstructed in a permanent manner, indicating that the shipyard will be integrated into Soviet long-range planning.

- 3 -

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Intrayard transportation is chiefly by railroad of Soviet standard gauge. 10/

The shipyard is protected on the land side by a fence about 6 feet high. All entrances are guarded by armed guards, and entrance is by pass only. 11/

The chart of the shipyard,* developed from aerial photography but revised to agree with various intelligence reports, is believed to present a reasonably accurate picture. 12/ Shops in addition to those shown on the chart probably have been added, and mobile heavy lift facilities have been installed along the quays and piers: There are no reports that the original shipbuilding ways have been reconstructed. However, it is significant that during the reconstruction the old ways were not demolished and no new buildings were erected close by which might interfere with the future development in this area.

Following the war, buildings 29 and 31 were occupied by industry not related to shipbuilding. Building 29, formerly known as the ETKVL plant, was engaged in the production of farm machinery. Building 31 was engaged in the manufacture of bricks. During the reconversion period it was reported that these activities would be transferred to other locations in the Tallinn area and that the buildings would be converted into shops for the shipyard. 13/ It is probable that this conversion took place by 1952.

The shipyard has a floating drydock capable of docking vessels of fleet destroyer size. 14/

VI. Production.

The Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn probably was not equipped for full production until about 1952. A few destroyers and other small naval vessels were overhauled during 1948-49. Because the heavy lift facilities had not been installed on the repair quays, work on these vessels was accomplished with a 20-ton floating crane. 15/

There are no reports of production since late 1949. It is estimated, however, that the yard has been in full operation since 1952, engaging principally in major overhaul and possibly modernization of destroyers and smaller naval vessels.

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Shop production is believed to be confined largely to rebuilding worn or damaged parts of vessels and assembling of new components for replacement. It is doubtful whether any major production of components is accomplished.

VII. Labor.

Assuming that the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn is engaged in repair and modernization work only, it is estimated that the current total employment is 3,500 persons. The shipyard probably follows the practice of other shipyards in the USSR and operates on one principal 8-hour shift, with certain shops and possibly some vessel repair of high priority working additional shifts.

VIII. Sources of Power and Materials.

Electric power is supplied by the 50,000-kw Tallinn Thermal Power Plant. 16/

Because of the proximity to the Leningrad-Moscow-Ukraine industrial and steel-producing region, adequate sources of supply for machinery, electrical and electronic equipment, and iron and steel are available to the shipyard through relatively short rail hauls.

IX. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.

A. Capabilities.

The Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn has adequate piers, quays, floating drydocks, and shops to effect repair and modernization of hull and machinery and possibly of electronic equipment on naval vessels of fleet destroyer size and smaller.

Assuming that one quay, No. 7 on the shipyard chart,* will be used exclusively for refueling, the remaining quay and pier facilities, including the floating drydock, provide berthing space for the simultaneous repair of 9 fleet destroyers or 17 W-class submarines.

Although the shipbuilding facilities were not reconstructed, the shipyard is a potential shipbuilding yard. It is estimated that within a period of 9 to 12 months the old building ways could be rebuilt, new platens for the assembly of hull subsections could be

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constructed, and other facilities related to new construction could be brought into production. The undeveloped area adjacent to the old shipbuilding ways could easily be developed into platen areas for the assembly of hull subsections, and the shipbuilding ways could be reconstructed to provide building facilities for the simultaneous construction of 2 cruisers and 6 coastal destroyers or 6 Z-class submarines. The supporting shops in the shipyard are believed to be adequate to produce new vessels, assuming that all hull steel would be fabricated and assembled within the shipyard from rolled plates and shapes, that light castings and forgings would be produced within the shipyard, that all machinery would be assembled and installed, and that probably all naval ordnance would be installed. Machinery, ordnance, heavy castings, and forgings, including propellers and propeller shafts, would be procured from the industrial area of Leningrad, probably from one of the larger shipyards in Leningrad. The development of the shipyard to construct new vessels would practically preclude repair work.

It is believed, however, because of the following reasons, that any future expansion of the shipyard will be in the direction of additional repair facilities such as graving docks and marine railways, constructed in the area of the old building ways, rather than development as a shipbuilding yard: (1) the proximity of the shipyard to the Baltic area of the Naval Fleet operations as well as to the fleet's base in Tallinn makes it ideally situated for fleet maintenance support; (2) the apparent trend of the USSR to develop naval shipbuilding facilities within the interior or at least in less vulnerable locations such as Molotovsk, Nikolayev, and Komsomol'sk indicates a trend toward sites that can be protected for a longer period of time in case of war; and (3) the use of the yard to build merchant vessels is believed to be very remote in view of the merchant shipbuilding capabilities in the Baltic region of the Soviet Bloc.

B. Vulnerabilities.

The Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890 in Tallinn probably has developed into a well-coordinated plant. As the shipyard is located about 230 miles, by rail, west of Leningrad and has good railroad connections with the Leningrad industrial area, it can safely be assumed that sources of supply available to the shipbuilding industry in Leningrad will be available to the shipyard. Probably the most critical item in the operation of the shipyard is an adequate supply of skilled labor. The shipyard, operating as an adjunct to the Soviet Naval Forces, undoubtedly enjoys a higher priority for the procurement of labor and materials than do repair yards of the merchant or river fleets.

- 6 -

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APPENDIX A

METHODOLOGY

This report was compiled chiefly from post-World War II intelligence. The determination of the use to which the shipyard would be put was derived principally from an analysis of reports by repatriated prisoners of war and to a lesser degree was confirmed by other intelligence reports and digests.

The chart of the shipyard was compiled by using 1944 aerial photography as a base and revising this base to agree with reported development since 1944.

The labor force was estimated by using a factor of 200 square feet per employee and calculating the total area of all buildings, including the area of multiple floors and a space of 30 feet along each pier and quay. This method evolved from data obtained from a number of US shipyards and has been found to agree in general with data obtained from shipyards in East Germany (see CIA/RR 42, The Shipbuilding Industry in East Germany, 1 Oct 54, S/) and in Czechoslovakia (see CIA/RR 31, The Shipbuilding Industry of Czechoslovakia, 19 Mar 54, S/

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APPENDIX B

GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE

Information is required on the current status of development of facilities and the availability and competence of labor in the Russian Baltic Shipyard No. 890. Data on the type and amount of work performed; on the technology; on the source and availability of raw, semifinished, and finished material; and on capital investment, budgets, and administrative control are also needed.

- 9 -

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APPENDIX C

SOURCE REFERENCES

The compilation of data and the preparation of estimates and conclusions were derived from research in the files of the Industrial Register, the CIA Library, and the Graphics Register.

The documents from the Industrial Register were mainly raw intelligence consisting chiefly of prisoner-of-war reports. The reliability of single reports could be evaluated only on the basis of their contribution to this report as a whole. The composite of selected reports may be given a rating of RR 3 (possibly true).

Publications of IAC agencies and a few intelligence reports and digests prepared by foreign governments have been given a high evaluation, as they represent the considered opinion of experienced observers and analysts.

Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance:

<u>Source of Information</u>	<u>Information</u>
Doc. - Documentary	1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable	2 - Probably true
B - Usually reliable	3 - Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable	4 - Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable	5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable	6 - Cannot be judged
F - Cannot be judged	

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"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."

Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited document.

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 11. Navy. 408-S-50, 20 Nov 50, info Apr 49, S. Eval. RR 2.
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