

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5. May. 1960

PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Khrushchev climaxed his pre-summit maneuvers with a speech to the Supreme Soviet on 5 May in which he resorted to a time-honored Soviet device --used frequently on the eve of important negotiations-- which is designed to place the Western powers on the defensive and to demonstrate that the USSR's peaceful coexistence policy does not result from any weakness the West could exploit at the negotiating table.

The Soviet premier gave a pessimistic assessment of prospects for agreement at the summit, citing recent Western policy statements and actions as providing little ground for hope that the Western leaders "are really looking for concrete solutions." He charged that "aggressive forces" in the United States recently have intensified their efforts to "wreck the summit conference, or at least prevent it from reaching agreements."

Although Khrushchev's references to President Eisenhower were couched in moderate terms, he went further in criticizing the President than at any time since his visit to the United States. He remarked that recent speeches by American spokesmen were an "ill omen" for a "favorable outcome" at the summit and said this situation has been "aggravated" by the "unfortunate fact that even the American President approved these speeches." He expressed regret that President Eisenhower intended to limit his presence at the summit to only

seven days and observed that this shows that questions to be discussed in Paris "do not enjoy due attention on the part of the United States Government."

Khrushchev apparently intends to build up his charges of recent violations of Soviet air space by US aircraft into a major international issue. He denounced these flights as a "direct provocation" and announced that the USSR would bring these incidents before the UN Security Council. He charged that the incidents were timed to coincide with the summit meeting and that the United States is seeking to weaken the USSR's "determination to fight for a relaxation of international tension and an end to the cold war and arms race."

In an effort to portray American policy as irresponsible and provocative and to generate widespread public alarm over its possible consequences, Khrushchev warned that the USSR reserves the right to reply to "such aggressive actions" in the future "with measures which we shall find necessary to ensure the safety of our country." Without committing the USSR to such a course, he attempted to convey the notion that it would employ missile retaliation.

Khrushchev's threat to bring the issue before the Security Council closely parallels a Soviet move calling an emergency session of the council in April 1958 to condemn flights of US Strategic Air Command nuclear-

Approved for Release
Date _____

~~SECRET~~

MAY 2000

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

armed bombers over the Arctic "in the direction of the frontiers of the USSR." This move coincided with the beginning of the abortive preparatory talks in Moscow to arrange a pre-summit foreign ministers' conference. The 1958 maneuver culminated in a veto by the Soviet Union of an American resolution calling for an Arctic inspection system to reduce the danger of surprise attack.

In addition to the primary effort to discredit the United States on the eve of the summit meeting, Khrushchev's speech probably was calculated to warn against any exaggerated expectations in the Communist world regarding the outcome of the Paris talks, which he has been careful to portray as only the first of a series of such negotiations. Khrushchev's harsh criticism of the United States may also be intended to prepare a case for blaming American "insincerity" should the talks break down.

Having invoked the threat of a new and dangerous crisis, Khrushchev concluded his speech by reaffirming his commitment to the "Leninist policy" of peaceful coexistence and by pledging himself to "spare no effort at Paris to achieve a mutually acceptable agreement." This pledge was intended to reassure Western leaders and forestall speculation that he has lost interest in summit talks.

Prior to Khrushchev's speech, Soviet and bloc officials

portrayed the Paris summit meeting as a general discussion to narrow differences rather than to negotiate specific settlements.

[REDACTED] b1, b2
[REDACTED] A Soviet official said that the one thing the West could be assured of was that Khrushchev would come to Paris "with a smile" and a willingness to discuss issues seriously.

[REDACTED] b3
[REDACTED] a Soviet Embassy official expressed the view that some progress could be achieved on disarmament and nuclear testing. [REDACTED] press reports quote a "top Communist diplomat" to the effect that Khrushchev will mark time until the US elections and will seek only broad general agreements in Paris, leaving the details to be worked out later.

Bloc spokesmen, [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] sought privately last week to de-emphasize any suggestion of a crisis on Berlin at the summit. The Soviet [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] apparently acting on instructions, went out of his way to stress [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Khrushchev's 25 April speech in Baku was not intended as a threat to use force on the Berlin issue. The [REDACTED] b3

[REDACTED] attachés also took the same approach in private conversations, and the Soviet ambassador [REDACTED] publicly denied that Khrushchev's remarks could be interpreted as a threat.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT

Khrushchev probably views the summit meeting, which opens in Paris on 16 May, not as a decisive confrontation with the West but as a new and important stage in a protracted period of high-level negotiations. This outlook probably precludes any move to force a showdown at the summit itself or immediately after, prior to President Eisenhower's visit to the USSR in June. The Soviet leader summed up this approach during his trip to France by expressing "hope that the meeting will usher in a series of important negotiations between the leaders of the great powers, with the object of putting an end to the cold-war policy."

Moscow's general policy line during the pre-summit period has reflected the more conciliatory posture adopted by Khrushchev during his visit to the United States. Moscow has endeavored to appear responsive to Western views on the timing of a summit meeting with no fixed agenda. Except for adjustments in its position on a nuclear test ban treaty, however, the Soviet Government's efforts to create a favorable pre-summit atmosphere have not gone so far as to presage Soviet concessions on major East-West issues.

Germany and Berlin

Despite Khrushchev's frequent statements assigning top priority to disarmament and his intention to negotiate outstanding issues of a nuclear test ban treaty, he probably regards the German and Berlin questions as the focal point of the summit. Over the past few months, Moscow has increasingly invoked the threat of a separate East German peace treaty to soften

Western resistance to a peace treaty with both German states converting West Berlin into a free city. Moscow probably realizes that, on these issues, a change in the status quo would be of little advantage to the West, and believes that negotiations are unlikely to be fruitful for the USSR unless conducted under the threat of unilateral Soviet action.

At the same time, Moscow does not wish to detract from the general policy of detente or appear to be repudiating the Camp David agreement not to impose a time limit on negotiations. Thus, the threat to sign a separate treaty has been ambiguously formulated and calculated to create uncertainty as to the timing and circumstances of such action.

Against this background, Khrushchev's initial move at the summit on these issues probably will be to reintroduce his maximum demands for a peace treaty signed by both German governments and the establishment of a free city in West Berlin. Modifications of this position, as indicated by authoritative East German statements reportedly issued at Moscow's direction, would probably include an offer to draft two separate documents containing the same basic provisions, one of which would be signed by the Western powers with Bonn and the other by the bloc with East Germany.

As a part of his peace treaty proposal, Khrushchev will probably urge that the heads of government agree on the underlying principles. He will press for the establishment of a four-power commission to develop the details and of an all-German commission to present a joint

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

proposal to the four powers. The Soviet leader may accompany such a proposal with an offer to hold the Berlin question in abeyance during peace treaty talks, but within a strictly defined time limit. As a further variant, Khrushchev may propose declarations ending the state of war, which would be signed by the bloc and Bonn and the Western powers and East Germany, citing as a precedent the 19 October 1956 Soviet-Japanese joint declaration.

However, Khrushchev probably does not expect at this stage to win Western agreement to a four-power commission to draft a peace treaty or to an all-German committee to discuss an expansion of contacts and reunification. Western agreement to these proposals would imply acceptance of the long-standing Soviet position that conclusion of a peace treaty is the only task remaining for the four powers and that reunification is the exclusive responsibility of the two German states.

Largely for the record, Khrushchev will advance as a separate issue the 1 June 1959 proposal to make West Berlin a free city, garrisoned either by token contingents of all four powers or by neutral troops. As an ostensible concession, Moscow may drop its suggestion that a Soviet component join the "symbolic" Western units in West Berlin, and instead build up the UN and neutral role in guaranteeing the free city.

Finally, Khrushchev may indicate that the free-city status can be reached in stages, provided the final goal is explicitly spelled out. The first stage might not go beyond the severance of all ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, with troop reductions at a later date. Agreement to a limited first stage, however,

would probably be contingent on a clear commitment to discuss further stages at an early date.

Interim Berlin Agreement

After the maximum Soviet demands have been put forward for the record, Khrushchev probably will try to move on promptly to the question of an interim Berlin solution along the lines discussed at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference in 1959. Gromyko recently hinted this

████████████████████ and Moscow's sharp propaganda criticism of alleged Western attempts to cancel out the "positive results" of the foreign ministers' negotiations suggests that the USSR considers the Western proposal for an interim solution still open to negotiation.

Khrushchev may introduce certain modifications to make the Soviet interim-solution proposal more palatable to the West. He may drop Soviet insistence on formal East German participation in such an agreement and suggest that East Germany could be associated by means of separate commitments. He may offer to extend the time limit on an interim agreement from 18 months to two or three years, and he may refrain from insisting on linking an interim agreement to the creation of an all-German committee. He can be expected to stress that an interim solution would not involve any change in existing Western access arrangements.

Khrushchev would probably insist, in return, on a Western commitment to reduce troops in West Berlin, possibly in phases. On the basic question of the status of Western rights at the expiration of such an agreement, there is no evidence that the USSR would abandon its opposition to explicit confirmation of these rights.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

Minimum Aims

It is unlikely that Khrushchev expects to reach agreement even on the main elements of an interim Berlin solution in the few days available to the heads of government. He probably will concentrate his main efforts on obtaining a general statement which Moscow could then represent as marking Western acceptance of the principle that the Berlin situation is "abnormal" and should therefore be modified in the direction of ending the "occupation regime" in West Berlin.

Khrushchev may even be satisfied with an agreement to resume high-level negotiations on Berlin with terms of reference which the USSR could interpret as a step toward an eventual change in West Berlin's status. He will be particularly vigilant to maintain intact the provision of his Camp David agreement with President Eisenhower that new negotiations on Berlin should not be protracted indefinitely. Therefore, he may press for setting a specific date for a subsequent summit meeting, or at least for another foreign ministers' conference.

Disarmament

Often in the past, when the Soviet leaders have wanted to impress world opinion with their peaceful and constructive purposes, they have turned to the disarmament problem. Since Khrushchev's speech to the UN, Moscow's main effort has been to focus on disarmament as the central theme of its peaceful coexistence campaign and to present a convincing case that the USSR is prepared to move toward total disarmament.

In six weeks of actual negotiations at the Geneva disarmament conference, however, the bloc delegations have resisted Western efforts to discuss the

vital question of effective international controls. The Soviet delegation declined to spell out its position, beyond the vague and general proposition enunciated by Khrushchev that the extent of control should be commensurate with the various stages of the disarmament process.

Soviet tactics in the negotiations have been aimed primarily at obtaining a definition, in Soviet terms, of complete and general disarmament as the final goal of the conference, and winning Western agreement to a set of disarmament principles lifted directly from the Soviet plan. Khrushchev's position at the summit will probably be a continuation of this effort, with the objective of gaining a joint statement instructing representatives in the ten-power committee to take into account Soviet and other plans in working out the framework of a treaty.

The Soviet leaders would probably seek to represent such a statement as being tantamount to acceptance of the main features of the Soviet plan and press the West to agree to proceed with a discussion of the first stage, which calls for reduction of conventional forces. Such tactics would also allow Moscow to place the onus for rejecting general disarmament on the West, before permitting the talks to shift to specific first measures or partial plans. As a secondary position, Khrushchev may follow the lines of his communiqués with Presidents Eisenhower and De Gaulle and agree on a statement reaffirming general disarmament as the most important international problem.

Nuclear Test Ban

In contrast to its approach to disarmament, Moscow has moved to narrow the differences on the main issues of a nuclear test

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

ban treaty in preparation for submitting these problems to the summit for decision. Since Khrushchev's visit to the United States, the USSR has proposed compromise solutions on a number of key points, while maintaining its long-standing position that all tests must be banned at the outset of an agreement. After resisting the American position on the difficulty of detecting small underground tests, Moscow in effect acknowledged this position by countering a Western proposal for a limited treaty with a proposal for a moratorium on small underground explosions.

Following the Eisenhower-Macmillan communiqué on 29 March proposing that a moratorium be achieved through unilateral and voluntary declarations, Soviet officials served notice that the main issues still outstanding, including the nature and duration of the moratorium, were beyond the competence of the Geneva conference and could be resolved only at the summit. They listed as possible summit topics, besides the moratorium itself, a quota for on-site inspections, the composition and voting procedures of the control council, and the staffing of control organs.

Khrushchev has indicated that the paramount issue is the duration of the moratorium. He implied in a speech at Baku on 25 April that the Soviet suggestion for one of four to five years could be adjusted downward. The Soviet premier has dropped his insistence for formal incorporation of the moratorium into the treaty, either as an annex or protocol, and accepted a voluntary declaration providing agreement is reached on the duration...

Since advancing the proposal based on Prime Minister Macmillan's suggestion in early 1959 for an annual quota of on-site inspections of suspected

nuclear explosions, Moscow has made this a major element of its position on controls but has carefully avoided committing itself to a precise figure. The USSR has made it clear that such a determination should be based on a high-level political decision, rather than a scientific estimate of the annual number of probably natural disturbances which could be mistaken for nuclear explosions.

Recently a Soviet official [redacted] expressed doubt that Moscow could agree to as many as 20 such inspections in the USSR. Khrushchev is likely to take a similar stand, while pressing for American acceptance "in principle" of the concept of a quota based on an arbitrary political determination.

Other Issues

Under the general category of East-West relations, Khrushchev may attempt to secure an agreed definition of principles on which these relations should be based and set forth his concept of "peaceful coexistence." He may also be prepared to conclude a more generalized agreement along the lines of the Camp David communiqué, reaffirming the four governments' intention to settle disputes by negotiation rather than by force.

Khrushchev also plans to raise the question of outer space, probably in connection with UN plans to convene an international scientific conference to exchange information on peaceful uses. Soviet representatives in the UN have privately urged that the United Nation's Outer Space Committee meet before the summit and begin working out plans for the conference. The USSR, however, is insisting on a preponderance in the key conference posts. Khrushchev will probably make some gesture to demonstrate that the summit has yielded

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

5 May 1960

results and to create the impression that the USSR is taking the lead in the field of peaceful uses of outer space.

Conclusions

Although Khrushchev has deeply engaged his prestige in the campaign for a summit conference and has frequently represented such a meeting as the most "effective manner" of resolving international problems, he has been extremely cautious in setting forth any specific objective for the initial meeting. In his recent remarks in France, he limited his expectations to a hope to find a "common language," and more recently in Baku he resorted to the standard expression that the meeting should produce a further relaxation of tensions and "advance the settlement of the urgent questions."

Khrushchev has been equally vague in defining the spe-

cific goals to be achieved on the main issues under discussion and has taken an equivocal position in acknowledging publicly in France that a solution of the Berlin problem "evidently demands some time."

Khrushchev's deliberate restraint in spelling out his objectives for the Paris meeting probably reflects his expectation that a series of meetings will be held. At Paris he may attempt to gain a specific commitment on the next meeting. Such an approach is suggested by his speech in January to the Supreme Soviet when he asserted that "this conference will be followed by a number of summit meetings" and added that it would be "improvident to try to guess beforehand the possible results of the forthcoming conference."

[REDACTED]

* * *

~~SECRET~~