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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

12 May 1960

## PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

## EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Khrushchev's aggressive exploitation of the aircraft incident of 1 May reflects his confidence that he can use this issue to good advantage in strengthening his negotiating position. At the same time, however, he has indicated that he does not wish to slam any doors in or upset at the last minute his long campaign to bring the Western leaders to a meeting under what he considers highly favorable conditions. Soviet propaganda, Khrushchev's remarks, and the formal Soviet protest note show that Moscow is preparing the ground for further measures to capitalize on the incident, including a complaint to the United Nations and a trial of the American pilot.

Soviet propaganda media are giving the plane incident relatively moderate publicity. Several previous Khrushchev speeches have been given greater coverage by Moscow than his 7 May speech, and routine radio comment has not been voluminous. Domestic propaganda has not stressed the danger of accidental war as a result of such flights. A Pravda editorial of 9 May made it clear that the incident should not be considered a "crisis" situation. There have been no demonstrations before the US Embassy in Moscow, although the embassy has received a number of protest telegrams. Mass meetings of workers reportedly have been held in several cities, but

there has been no concerned effort to arouse anti-American feeling.

Khrushchev gave the lead in this approach by stressing in his 7 May speech that his exposure of details of the incident should not be interpreted as a "call to strain nerves in our country," but as an "appeal for calmness," vigilance, and reason. He followed this up in his remarks at the Czech Embassy reception on 9 May by calling for an end to further aggravation of US-Soviet relations.

Khrushchev's remarks regarding President Eisenhower at an impromptu press conference during the display of the downed aircraft would seem to undermine to some extent the position he took in his Supreme Soviet speeches on 5 and 7 May in which he carefully avoided attributing direct responsibility for the aircraft incident to the President. According to Western press reports, the Soviet Western press reports, the Soviet premier stated that his estimate of the President had been revised, but Moscow imposed censorship on subsequent accounts until the official TASS version was released.

TASS omitted some of Khrushchev's remarks and altered other statements. TASS quotes Khrushchev as saying that Secretary Herter's statement "has made us

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
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doubt the correctness of our earlier conclusion that the President, the American Government, did not know about the flights." The Soviet version of Khrushchev's remarks also avoids the question of the President's visit to the USSR. TASS quotes Khrushchev's references to the politeness of the Soviet people, although it

with the sanction of the American Government.

Khrushchev has seized on the incident to renew pressure against countries which grant bases to the United States. In an effort to generate distrust and alarm over US utilization of these bases, Khrushchev



Lockheed U-2 high-altitude research plane.

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would be difficult for them to welcome him as a guest.

Khrushchev also moved to forestall speculation that exploitation of the incident was an effort to disrupt the summit by sending notes on 9 May to the Western heads of government confirming proposed procedural details and expressing hope for a successful summit. In Moscow's official protest note of 10 May, however, the Soviet Government challenged the US statement that the flight was not authorized by Washington. In building its case against the US, the note charged that this version "does not correspond to reality" and concluded that "espionage activities" were carried on

charged that the Soviet Government considered Norway, Turkey, and Pakistan "accomplices" in the matter. He warned on 7 May that the involvement of these governments was a "hostile act against the Soviet Union" and emphasized that they "must now see" the consequences of lending their territories for "aggressive purposes."

More explicitly, in his 9 May speech he called on those countries which have foreign bases to "note carefully" that flights from these bases would draw direct retaliation. At the Czech reception he made a point of publicly upbraiding the Norwegian ambassador and the Pakistani chargé.

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In developing his threats of retaliation against the US, Khrushchev has been careful to avoid any direct commitment. In his 7 May address, he recalled that an "adventurist, prone to dizziness" could drop a hydrogen bomb on foreign soil, which would lead to the dropping of a more destructive bomb on the country where the adventurist was born. The official protest to the US, however, was limited to stating that if "similar provocations are repeated, the USSR will be obliged to take retaliatory measures."

Moscow apparently plans a further series of moves to extract the maximum propaganda value from the incident. Khrushchev reaffirmed on 11 May his intention to take the matter to the UN Security Council, but gave no indication of the timing of such a move. He added that if the Security Council does not "take the right decision," the USSR will raise the matter in the General Assembly. As a prelude to a trial of the pilot, formal charges together with an alleged confession were placed on display at the exhibition of the aircraft of the aircraft wreckage on 11 May.

Chinese Reaction

Peiping's propaganda treatment of the incident, while remarkably low in volume, is centered on "proving" lack of American sincerity in the forthcoming summit meeting. A People's Daily editorial on 9 May states that the incident "is by no means accidental" and that the US Government "is devoid of any sincerity regarding the summit conference." In

an effort to justify Peiping's basic disagreement with Khrushchev's detente tactics, the editorial asserts that "American military provocations and the threat of war against China continue." The editorial implies that Peiping had been right all along, and Khrushchev wrong, and that his "patient, conciliatory, and accommodating attitude" is regarded by the United States "as a sign of Soviet weakness."

This Chinese view, expressed in part by Premier Chou En-lai's remark in Hanoi that the West is taking advantage of the relaxation of tension and continuing to wield "the butcher's knife," stems from Peiping's fear that the summit could perpetuate the existing status quo in the Far East. The Chinese leaders, calculating that at some future period they will find the opportune moment to again probe US - Chinese Nationalist determination to defend the offshore islands in the face of international opinion reluctant to see a major war flare up over these islands, are trying to place the onus for any increased hostilities on the United States.

Current Chinese Communist propaganda on US intentions is a direct continuation of the line stressed by Chou En-lai in September 1958, when he claimed that the United States "often uses peaceful negotiation" as a cover for its action of "continuously expanding aggression...and interfering in China's internal affairs."

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