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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

26 May 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

The main purpose of Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin on 20 May probably was to provide assurances that, despite the breakdown of the Paris talks and the Soviet premier's intention to continue harsh attacks on the United States, the USSR does not plan to abandon its peaceful coexistence line and revert to a hard, "Stalinist" posture toward the West.

Apparently hoping to salvage as much of his detente policy as possible, Khrushchev stated he assumed that another heads-of-government conference would take place in six to eight months. He repeated publicly the pledge Gromyko gave

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[redacted] that the USSR would do nothing in the interim that might "aggravate the international situation and take us back to the dark time of the cold war."

On the key issue of Berlin, Khrushchev emphasized he had reached agreement with East German leaders that no unilateral moves would be taken until a further effort could be made to reach agreement at the summit on a peace treaty with the two German states. Although he claimed that the failure of the Paris meeting gave the USSR a "moral right" to proceed with a separate treaty with East Germany, he offered a qualified guarantee of the status quo on condition that the Western powers would be willing to avoid "any unilateral steps" which would prevent a meeting in six to eight months.

The general line of Khrushchev's speech suggests that he feels the necessity of demonstrating that his detente policy in recent months was justified and remains valid. He recalled that after returning from his visit to the United States he had warned that President Eisenhower was in a "difficult position" as a result of a "hidden struggle" there between the "forces of the cold war" and the "advocates of peaceful coexistence." Khrushchev observed that he had recognized speeches by US officials as "alarm signals"; he implied that the U-2 incident resulted from the victory of the "cold-war forces."

Moscow's handling of the US C-47 aircraft incident suggests that the Soviet leaders used it as an opportunity to demonstrate the more moderate position taken by Khrushchev in Berlin. In contrast to previous incidents in East Germany, in which the East Germans became involved, the Soviet authorities retained control of the aircraft and personnel and, after a pro forma exchange of communications with American officials, released the plane on 24 May. Soviet propaganda noted the incident only briefly and without comment.

[redacted] the evidence thus far supports the view that there will be no fundamental reorientation of Soviet policy but that the Soviet leadership was caught off balance by the American announcement

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that overflights were part of US policy. The Soviet minister counselor [redacted] apparently acting under instructions, expressed his belief to American officials that US-Soviet relations would improve soon, that negotiations could be renewed "at any time," and that Khrushchev has only the "highest regard" for President Eisenhower.

The first secretary [redacted]

b3 [redacted] assured a [redacted] reporter that the events in Paris indicated no "basic change" in Soviet policy. He also claimed that the U-2 incident would have developed differently if the US had taken advantage of the "open door" in Khrushchev's 5 May speech which offered the President an opportunity to dissociate himself from the incident.

Geneva Nuclear Test Talks

b3 [redacted] attempted to create the impression that the USSR was prepared to continue serious negotiations on the main issues of a test ban treaty. He indicated, however, that Moscow had doubts regarding American intentions.

b1 b3 [redacted] intimated willingness to continue in either formal or informal meetings beginning on 27 May.

b3 On specific issues, [redacted] a quota of 20 on-site inspections would be too high and that a moratorium

on small underground tests for two years would be too short. He stressed that parity on the control commission was more important than the precise composition and indicated that a compromise might be possible on the composition of the on-site inspection teams.

Security Council Debate

In his opening speech at the UN Security Council meeting on 23 May, Gromyko showed that Moscow intends to press vigorously its campaign to discredit the United States and divide world opinion on the U-2 affair. Gromyko touched on the points made previously by Khrushchev and the official memorandum of complaint to the Security Council before introducing a resolution calling for condemnation of the US incursions as aggressive acts and for the adoption of measures to halt such actions and prohibit them in the future.

Soviet tactics apparently are designed to maintain intact the position taken by Khrushchev in insisting on a direct condemnation of the overflights

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rather than seeking an eventual compromise resolution which could be represented as ruling out future overflights. Gromyko's reported determination to move to the General Assembly if the US does not apologize for the U-2 incident also suggests that Moscow's primary aim is to focus attention on the incident over the next few months.

b3 In an unsuccessful attempt to forestall the tabling of a resolution sponsored by four of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council urging moderation and a new summit meeting, [redacted] claimed privately that Gromyko "heatedly" rejected it on the grounds it would increase tensions. The [redacted] hint that such a resolution might have "some value" in two or three months' time was also probably designed to discourage introduction of the resolution.

b3 [redacted] Gromyko would attempt to amend this resolution to include a condemnation of overflights.

Khrushchev's Position

Khrushchev's activities since returning to Moscow provide no additional evidence on the future course of his foreign policy. Khrushchev did not make a public statement at the airport and passed up the usual major speech at Luzhniki Stadium. He reportedly will give his speech at a workers' conference on 28 May.

Bloc Reaction

Khrushchev's relatively moderate tone in outlining his future course of action in his Berlin speech will displease

critics in the Communist world who opposed his peaceful coexistence diplomacy and interpreted his performance in Paris as foreshadowing a complete abandonment of this line. His postponement of a separate peace treaty caused visible disappointment to some 8,000 East German party officials who, shortly before, had loudly cheered his remark that he would not wait much longer to sign a treaty.

American officials who viewed the performance on TV noted that even party boss Walter Ulbricht was somewhat reluctant, both in manner and words, to accept the postponement. Later Ulbricht presented an extensive list of demands for eliminating Western troops and activities in Berlin. The release of the C-47 aircraft may intensify the feeling of regime leaders that East German claims to sovereignty are being sacrificed to the expedencies of Khrushchev's policies.

The Poles are reportedly delighted by the Khrushchev speech in Berlin, which they see as a direct rebuff to Ulbricht. Peiping has not yet commented on Khrushchev's Berlin speech; the Chinese leaders may well view it as confirming their suspicions that he will not maintain an uncompromising attitude toward the West.

Peiping's largest and most acrimonious anti-American demonstrations since the Lebanon crisis in 1958 apparently ended on 24 May. The Chinese denounced the United States and personally castigated President Eisenhower in language even more intemperate than Khrushchev's at Paris. The demonstrations

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scarcely concealed Peiping's delight over the breakdown of the Paris meetings and became increasingly more anti-American than pro-Soviet. In contrast to other bloc commentary, Peiping has made no specific reference to a possible future summit conference.

Western European Views

Following its initial shock at the breakdown of the summit meeting, Western European opinion is turning toward a more searching assessment of the causes of the conference failure and the outlook for future East-West relations. Most observers continue to blame Khrushchev for wrecking the conference. Even [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a caustic critic of the U-2 flight, charged Khrushchev with "spitting in the face of peace." There remains, however, a persistent undercurrent of criticism of American handling of the U-2 episode in relation to subsequent events at the summit.

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Some feeling is expressed that the United States disregarded the interests of its smaller allies. The Norwegian Air Force, in granting landing clearance on 22 May for a routine US training flight from

Iceland, stated that clearance would require acceptance of the limitation that the plane would not go east of 24 degrees east longitude, either over Norway or international waters. Previously Oslo had stated that NATO flights would "not normally be cleared" east of the same line but made no reference to international waters.

The Danish defense minister, in a possible move to ward off future Soviet charges, told a parliamentary committee on 17 May that Denmark would not permit American bases in Greenland to be used for reconnaissance flights over the USSR. [REDACTED] the Danish Government pointedly complained about the lack of caution in the flight from Copenhagen on 20 May of the US transport plane forced down in East Germany.

A period of higher tension is generally expected to follow the summit collapse, although most West Europeans believe that a major European crisis is not imminent. Chancellor Adenauer has asserted that recent events have vindicated his stand against negotiating a Berlin settlement. His call for strengthening Western unity has been widely voiced in opposition as well as government circles throughout Western Europe.

Middle East - Africa

Reactions among the Arab states vary widely in the proportion of blame attributed to the US or USSR, but all show deep disappointment over the summit breakdown and fear of extreme international tension to come. Nasir is reported to believe that, while the US blundered seriously in its

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handling of the U-2 incident, Khrushchev badly overplayed his hand in Paris and Eisenhower's restraint helped salvage American prestige.

Jordan's foreign minister, expressing admiration for Eisenhower's candor on the U-2 incident, said he had been sure--but wrong--that Khrushchev would have accepted the President's "transparent honesty" and closed the matter. The prime minister of Lebanon declared that, in view of the atmosphere then prevailing, the summit conference should have been postponed before it convened. Following several days of quarreling between the pro-Communist and nationalist press in Iraq as to who was responsible for the summit failure, the emphasis has shifted to the need for "redoubled efforts by the peace-loving nations" to check the dangers of increasing world tensions.

Officials in Libya and Saudi Arabia have expressed particular nervousness over the summit breakdown and Khrushchev's threats against American bases abroad. Turkish comment has been favorable to the United States, although Turkish reaction has been limited by the fact that political leaders and the press are preoccupied with domestic problems. Iranian reaction has been generally favorable to the US, but there has been little official comment or editorializing. The newspaper Etelaat, which usually reflects the viewpoint of the Iranian Government, blames the breakup of the summit on the USSR.

The government party press in Tunisia has taken the posi-

tion that the US could not comply with the Soviet demand for an apology, but that the plane incident cast doubt on American desires to preserve the peace. Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah, claiming to be speaking on behalf of the small nations of the world, questioned the right of the "big four" to settle the world's problems. Ethiopia's controlled press blamed the USSR for giving undue importance to the plane incident and acting irresponsibly in breaking up the summit. Liberian President Tubman blamed the US for a violation of international law, but his tone indicated he believed the US was justified.

South and Southeast Asia

Reaction in South Asia generally has been more realistic than on similar occasions in the past. Nehru's comment has been cautious. He carefully refrained from pinning the blame for the summit "fiasco" on either side, and similarly refused to condemn the U-2 incident until the facts are known. In communiqués issued after visiting Nasir and Menderes, Nehru "deplored" the failure at Paris, and hoped the big powers would try again. The communiqués also suggested that some move to "help" was under consideration, although in Ankara on 21 May Nehru specifically ruled out personal mediation.

In Pakistan, Ayub has made it clear where his sympathies lie, noting that "today the free world must live under an umbrella of American nuclear deterrent." The government-monitored press, however, is beginning to put more blame for the world crisis on the US. Afghanistan's government-controlled press has

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flailed the "aggressive" attitudes and actions of the US and Pakistan.

Official reaction in Southeast Asia has been moderate. The earliest theme in widespread press commentary--distress over the setback to hopes of world peace--gave way to almost universal condemnation of Khrushchev's tactics at Paris. Most recently, however, both editorial and official comment has tended to pass over the whole summit debacle and concentrate on hopes for future conferences and new efforts for a detente.

Latin America

In the limited reaction from Latin America, the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Venezuela highlight Khrushchev's responsibility for the conference failure, while commentators in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico have been critical of the United States in varying degrees. From Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and

Peru came suggestions that the smaller powers can help to calm tensions between the great powers--as Ecuador and Argentina are trying to do as members of the UN Security Council. Cuban comment tends to follow the Communist line.

An attitude of a "plague on both your houses" is evident in much of the area. A Costa Rican radio commentary likened the "highly touted" summit conference to a gathering of "any four street urchins." Mexican writers have stated that Mexico and Latin America in general were fortunate to be out of the "insanity of Paris." A Brazilian Foreign Ministry official has privately expressed concern lest the United States lose its moral authority as leader of the Western alliance. In Chile, criticisms of US leadership were the sharpest in recent years, and even President Alessandri reportedly expressed disappointment at Western strategy.

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