

2

~~SECRET~~ - WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT
LEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS -
S NATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: HANOI'S POSITION ON, AND ACTIVITIES REGARDING, THE ISSUE
OF U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION IN INDOCHINA.

SUMMARY: AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM (SRV) GOVERNMENT NOR THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST
PARTY HAD ORDERED A NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH IN INDOCHINA
FOR U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) IN THE
INDOCHINA WAR ENDING IN 1975. WITHIN THE SRV MINISTRY
OF INTERIOR (BNV) NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN SRV
OFFICE TO HANDLE MIA MATTERS. FOR NORTH VIETNAM THE SRV
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS RECORDS OF U.S.
AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN IN THE PERIOD 1964-1972. ALTHOUGH
HANOI GAINED CONTROL OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS IN 1975
AND KAMPUCHEA IN 1979, ITS CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR
PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) AND MIA'S HAS NOT BEEN
SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE
COMMENTED ON HANOI'S MANIPULATION OF THE MIA ISSUE AS A
BARGAINING CHIP TO SEEK CONCESSIONS FROM THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT. IF THE SRV STILL HOLDS U.S. PERSONNEL,
THEY COULD POSSIBLY BE LOCATED AT FOUR SITES IN NORTH
VIETNAM. END SUMMARY.

1. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, NEITHER THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM (SRV) NOR ITS RULING VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VNCP)
POLITBURO HAD ORDERED ANY NATIONAL-LEVEL SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF
U.S. MISSING-IN-ACTION (MIA) PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS OR IN
KAMPUCHEA. POLITBURO POLICY ON THE U.S. PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MIA
ISSUE WAS CLASSIFIED AS A STATE SECRET AND WAS NOT PUBLICIZED IN
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STATE AND VNCP AGENCIES OR TO THE
VIETNAMESE POPULACE. HANOI APPEARED PROUD OF THE FACT THAT SOME
(NUMBER UNKNOWN) U.S. POW'S AND U.S. MIA REMAINS HAD NOT BEEN
RETURNED TO THE U.S. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE U.S. POW/MIA ISSUE WAS (b)(3)
BEING KEPT ALIVE AS "BARGAINING CHIPS" TO PRESSURE THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT PROVISIONS OF THE 1973 PARIS AGREEMENT.)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~--WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT
LEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS -
SSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

2. AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981, THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED PUBLIC SEARCH FOR THE REMAINS OF U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE SRV, LAOS OR KAMPUCHEA. NO INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED BY THE SRV GOVERNMENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THE MINISTR. OF INTERIOR (BO NOI VU-BNV), TO SUBORDINATE ECHELONS TO LOOK FOR U.S. REMAINS. WITHIN BNV CIRCLES, NO MENTION WAS EVER MADE OF AN OFFICE CREATED BY THE SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IF SUCH AN OFFICE (b)(3) EXISTED, PERSONNEL WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THE BNV, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE OFFICE WOULD HAVE NO FUNCTION TO PERFORM OTHER THAN ACTING AS A "GHOST" FRONT TO PLEASE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES DURING DISCUSSIONS OF THE U.S. MIA ISSUE.)

3. FOR THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SRV, THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (MND) HAS COMPLETE RECORDS OF ALL U.S. AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN BY TIME, DATE AND PLACE, AS WELL AS DATA ON CAPTURED AND DEAD AIR CREW MEMBERS BETWEEN 1964 AND 1972. THE BNV KEPT COMPLETE RECORDS ON ALL U.S. POW'S WHO HAD BEEN TRANSFERRED TO PRISON FACILITIES WHICH WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV AND WHERE INTERROGATIONS WERE CONDUCTED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI WAS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6). THE HOA LO PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN PRISON FACILITY WHICH WAS PHYSICALLY GUARDED BY THE BNV. AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF PRISON FACILITIES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL WERE GUARDED BY MND GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT MILITARY JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (CUC QUAN PHAP/CQP) PERSONNEL IN JOINT ACTION WITH THE BNV. THE SON TAY PRISON WAS THE ONLY KNOWN FACILITY GUARDED BY THE CQP. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: [REDACTED] WAS UNABLE TO COMMENT (b)(3) FACTUALLY ON THE LOCATION AND DESIGNATIONS OF OTHER PRISON FACILITIES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL IN THE NORTHERN SRV DURING THE PERIOD 1964-1972.)

4. AS FAR AS THE SOUTHERN SRV AND LAOS SINCE 1975 AND KAMPUCHEA SINCE 1979 ARE CONCERNED, HANOI'S CAPABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR U.S. POW'S AND MIA REMAINS WAS NOT AS SYSTEMATICALLY ORGANIZED AS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. NEVERTHELESS, HANOI THROUGH ITS BNV AND THE MND COULD TASK ITS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS IN THE SOUTHERN SRV TO SEARCH FOR U.S. REMAINS IF IT DESIRED. NO ORDER TO DO SO WAS ISSUED THROUGH BNV CHANNELS AS OF EARLY JUNE

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

1981. ALTHOUGH THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) HAD SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FROM THE SRV, HANOI HAD THE POWER TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION ON U.S. PERSONNEL WHO WERE EITHER CAPTURED ALIVE OR DIED DURING THE INDOCHINA WAR YEARS IN AREAS UNDER PATHET LAO CONTROL. IF THE PATHET LAO HAD CAPTURED U.S. PERSONNEL, HANOI WOULD KNOW OF IT. IN THE CASE OF KAMPUCHEA, SINCE 1979 HANOI COMPLETELY CONTROLS ALL FACETS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK) GOVERNMENT AND, IF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) RECORDS ON AMERICAN PERSONNEL HAD FALLEN INTACT INTO SRV HANDS, HANOI WOULD HAVE THEM.

5. AFTER HANOI'S TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN APRIL 1975, SEVERAL FOREIGNERS WERE CAPTURED AND/OR ARRESTED IN THE SOUTHERN SRV. KG-3 AUDIO OPERATIONS OFFICE 1 HAD INSTALLED A NUMBER OF AUDIO IMPLANT DEVICES INSIDE THE CHI HOA PRISON IN HO CHI MINH CITY (HCMC) AND IN THE BIEN HOA PRISON. THESE TWO PRISONS WERE ADMINISTERED BY THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6). THE BNV FOREIGN COUNTERESPIONAGE DEPARTMENT (KD-3) WAS ALSO INVOLVED IN UNSPECIFIED ACTIVITIES AT BOTH PRISONS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SOURCE WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EITHER THE IDENTITIES OR THE NATIONALITIES OF ANY FOREIGNER ARRESTED/CAPTURED BY THE BNV AFTER APRIL 1975; HOWEVER, HE OPINED THAT FOREIGNERS ARRESTED IN THE 14 SOUTHERN SRV PROVINCES AND HCMC WOULD HAVE PROBABLY BEEN DETAINED FOR UNDETERMINED PERIODS AT ONE OF THESE PRISONS.)

6. SOME SRV PERSONNEL HAVE MADE COMMENTS ON HANOI'S POSITION ON THE MIA ISSUE SINCE THE COMMUNIST VICTORY IN 1975. IN MID-1976, SENIOR COLONEL VO VAN ((MANG)), DIRECTOR OF THE SRV BNV TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT (CUC TRINH SAT KY THUAT/KG-3), CONDUCTED A POLITICAL STUDY SESSION AT THE KG-3B DEPARTMENT OF THE BNV REPRESENTATION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (RSVN) IN HCMC. DURING THE POLITICAL STUDY SESSION, MANG COMMENTED ON THE STRATEGIC TACTICS (DUONG LOI CHIEN LUOC) OF THE SRV TOWARD THE U.S., WHICH SUPPORTED THE OBJECTIVE OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WOULD BREAK THE U.S. "ENCIRCLEMENT" EFFORTS OF THE SRV. THE SRV STRATEGY WAS TO USE THE U.S. MIA ISSUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC AID FOR THE SRV. THE SRV MEANS WERE TO CONDUCT DIALOGUES ON THE U.S. MIA ISSUE WITH PRIVATE U.S. RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND OTHER GROUPS. HANOI HOPED

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)

THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD GENERATE PRESSURE ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND THAT THESE GROUPS WOULD IN TURN PROVIDE SOME ECONOMIC OR MEDICAL AID TO THE SRV. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS WAS TO CULTIVATE SYMPATHY FOR THE SRV AND TO DEMONSTRATE THE HUMANENESS OF THE SRV TOWARD THE AMERICAN POPULACE, WHICH WOULD HELP HANOI ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

7. OTHER COMMENTS TO THIS EFFECT WERE MADE DURING ANOTHER POLITICAL STUDY SESSION IN MARCH 1979 BY BNV MAJOR NGUYEN HUU ((KHAC)) TO KG-3B PERSONNEL IN HCMC; MAJOR KHAC STATED IN VAGUE BUT UNDERSTANDABLE TERMS THAT "WE HAVE BARGAINING CHIPS IN ORDER TO ASK THEM CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN PARIS."
(HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT [REDACTED] OTHER ATTENDEES WERE AWARE WITHOUT IT BEING SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT KHAC'S REFERENCE TO BARGAINING CHIPS MEANT U.S. PERSONNEL.)

(b)(3)

8. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS LARGELY SPECULATION [REDACTED]) IF U.S. PERSONNEL WERE AND ARE BEING DETAINED IN THE SRV AFTER 1973, HANOI MIGHT BE KEEPING THEM IN ONE OF FOUR PROBABLE AREAS IN THE NORTHERN SRV: THE DA PHUC AIR BASE AREA, THE CENTRAL HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI, HA SON BINH PROVINCE AND HA NAM NINH PROVINCE. THE DA PHUC AIRBASE AREA, WHICH SERVED AS ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE MILITARY BASES IN THE SRV, WAS BUILT WITH SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND WAS FREQUENTED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL. IT WAS LARGELY MADE UP OF CAVES TO CONCEAL VARIOUS TYPES OF MIG AIRCRAFT AND COULD CONCEIVABLY BE USED TO KEEP PRISONERS. THE HOA LO PRISON IN HANOI COULD STILL BE USED TO HOUSE U.S. PRISONERS, BASED ON THE FACT THAT HANOI'S PROPAGANDA MACHINERY HAD MADE A FILM RECORD OF PRISON CONDITIONS THERE AFTER 1973, ACCORDING TO WHAT WAS HEARD FROM OTHER BNV PERSONNEL. THE PROVINCES OF HA SON BINH AND HA NAM NINH (PARTICULARLY THE AREA OF FORMER NINH BINH PROVINCE) WERE OTHER LIKELY AREAS WHERE U.S. PRISONERS MIGHT BE HELD, BECAUSE COLLECTIVIZED AREAS THERE COULD BE CAMOUFLAGED TO LOOK LIKE REGULAR VILLAGES. OTHER FACTORS WHICH MIGHT FAVOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE TWO PROVINCES HAVING U.S. POW'S WERE THAT THEY WERE LOCATED FAR FROM THE CHINA-SRV BORDER; WERE SPARSELY POPULATED, MOUNTAINOUS AND HEAVILY FORESTED; AND PRISONER FACILITIES COULD BE EASILY CONCEALED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL INHABITANTS. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] MENTIONED THESE AREAS AS POTENTIAL DETENTION AREAS, HIS COMMENTS

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

ARE PERSONAL OPINION WHICH ARE NOT FURTHER SUPPORTED BY HARD
FACTS, SINCE HE DID NOT HAVE SPECIFIC ACCESS TO EITHER PLACE
MENTIONED AND HAD NO ██████████ TO SUPPORT HIS REASONING FURTHER. (b)(3)
██████████ SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST WAY OF DETERMINING AND/OR
CONFIRMING WHETHER U.S. PERSONNEL WERE EITHER BEING HELD AGAINST
THEIR WILL OR HAD VOLUNTARILY REMAINED IN INDOCHINA AFTER 1973 WAS (b)(3)
TO CHECK OUT SYSTEMATICALLY KNOWN AND SUSPECTED DETENTION
FACILITIES WITH EMPHASIS PLACED ON OBTAINING INFORMATION FROM
CADRE WHO HAD WORKED OR HAD DEALT DIRECTLY WITH THE MANAGEMENT AND
EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PRISONERS.)

9. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ██████████ HAD NOT SEEN (b)(3)
ANY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONERS OR OTHER FOREIGN CAPTIVES
AND WAS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE OF SPECIFIC U.S. AIRCRAFT CRASH SITES
AND BURIAL SITES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL, HE PROVIDED OTHER COMMENTS
BASED ON HIS PERSONAL OPINION ON REQUIREMENT AREAS OF INTEREST ON
THE U.S. POW/MIA ISSUE. IF HANOI HAS KEPT U.S. PRISONERS, EITHER
AGAINST THEIR WILL OR VOLUNTARILY, AFTER MARCH 1973, HANOI WOULD
HAVE ASSIGNED THE TASK OF ADMINISTRATING FACILITIES FOR THEM TO A
SPECIAL HIGHLY COMPARTMENTED GROUP UNDER JOINT BNV/MND CONTROL.
██████████ OPINED THAT THE BNV PRISONS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (KH-6)
WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH KEY KH-6 LEADERSHIP (b)(3)
PERSONNEL MIGHT HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SPECIFIC ORGAN INVOLVED.
██████████ FELT THAT THE BNV LEADERSHIP SECURITY DEPARTMENT (K-10)
MIGHT BE INVOLVED, SINCE K-10 HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR GUARDING (b)(3)
HIGHLY SENSITIVE FACILITIES AND TOP LEADERSHIP PERSONALITIES IN
THE SRV. KEY LEADERSHIP CADRE OF THE BNV FOREIGN COUNTERESPIONAGE
DEPARTMENT (KD-3), THE BNV TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT
(KG-3), THE BNV MILITARY SECURITY DEPARTMENT (K-32) AND POSSIBLY
THE BNV ENEMY/MILITARY PROSELYTIZING DEPARTMENT (K-30) WOULD HAVE
SOME OR FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND LOCATION OF PRISON
FACILITIES AND THE NUMBER OF U.S. PRISONERS BEING HELD IN THEM
AFTER MARCH 1973 IN THE SRV AND POSSIBLY LAOS, BUT NOT IN
KAMPUCHEA. ██████████ LISTED A NUMBER OF SENIOR AND INTERMEDIATE- (b)(3)
LEVEL KG-3 OFFICERS WHO HE FELT MIGHT POSSESS THIS KNOWLEDGE:
DIRECTOR/SENIOR COLONEL VO VAN ((MANG)); DEPUTY DIRECTOR/COLONEL
LE SONG ((TOAN)); DEPUTY DIRECTORS/LIEUTENANT COLONELS NGUYEN KHAC
((HAM)), TRAN QUANG ((HONG)) AND MAI ((KHIEM)); SENIOR CAPTAIN
NGUYEN NGOC KHUE, HEAD OF THE MAIL CENSORSHIP OFFICE 2; MAJOR VU
VAN SAM, A DEPUTY OFFICE 2 CHIEF; SENIOR CAPTAIN DOAN CONG HONG OF

██████████ (b)(3)

~~SECRET~~ - WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS -
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR

GENERAL RESEARCH-STAFF OFFICE 6; AND AUDIO OPERATIONS OFFICE 1
PERSONNEL, INCLUDING SENIOR CAPTAIN NGUYEN VAN ((LONG)) AND SENIOR
LIEUTENANT NGUYEN QUANG ((HUNG)). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SENIOR CAP-
TAIN NGUYEN VAN LONG, WHO WAS ASSIGNED AS OF EARLY JUNE 1981 TO
HCMC BNV TECHNICAL RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT (KG-3) AUDIO
OPERATIONS UNIT, ALL OF THE ABOVE INDIVIDUALS WERE ASSIGNED TO THE
KG-3 HEADQUARTERS IN HANOI. AUDIO OPERATIONS OFFICE 1 PERSONNEL
WERE ASSIGNED THE TASK OF IMPLANTING AUDIO DEVICES IN DETENTION
FACILITIES THROUGHOUT THE SRV AND WOULD BE LOGICALLY INVOLVED IN
SUCH PROJECTS.)

10.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ - WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS - NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS - DISSEMINATION AND
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

RVW 23JUL02 [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~--WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS -
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR