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# WEEKLY SUMMARY

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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
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PEKING TALKS ON TWO FRONTS

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


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
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## PEKING TALKS ON TWO FRONTS


Already in the midst of difficult negotiations with the USSR, the Chinese Communists last week began to set the stage for talks with Peking's other major antagonist, the US. This unprecedented development does not appear to signal any loss of nerve on the part of the Chinese, who in fact have stepped up the pace in their war of words with Moscow. But the leadership in Peking undoubtedly sees an interrelation between the two sets of discussions and is clearly prepared to play off one opponent against the other should the opportunity arise.

The negotiations with the Soviets unquestionably have top billing in Peking. The second round of discussions now under way following the return of chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov to China were resumed, however, in a grim atmosphere. Neither side is putting forward the optimistic private comments that accompanied the opening phases of the first round of the talks. The Chinese, moreover, last week surfaced a highly negative view of the accomplishments of the first round in a Hong Kong Communist newspaper. This article laid full responsibility on Moscow for the lack of progress thus far in the talks, charging the Soviets with failure to restrain its forces along the Chinese border and reiterating the established Chinese position that a mutual disengagement of forces from the border must precede negotiations

on other substantive border issues. The Chinese also made public an official protest to Moscow, excoriating Soviet references to the "country" of Taiwan.

The USSR has responded in kind, denouncing the war preparations campaign still under way in China and accusing Peking of whipping up a "war psychosis" and "rabid anti-Sovietism." These polemics were somewhat less strident than those of the Chinese, but they represent a significant departure from Moscow's propaganda standdown of last September. Both sides in fact appear to have accepted for the moment a public war of nerves as an accompaniment to the private discussions in Peking. Moscow apparently came to believe that last year's public exchanges were working against its interests, and it is possible that Soviet patience may wear thin at some point if the polemics continue.

The Chinese probably view the forthcoming talks with the US in Warsaw primarily as another aspect of the war of nerves with the Soviets, although Peking is also interested in sounding out Washington on a number of important Asian problems. 



[REDACTED]

At the same time, Peking is clearly interested in assessing at closer range future US intentions in Asia. [REDACTED] officials duri

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peking is probably even more eager, however, to see signs of such "reasonableness" surface in the press in order to give the Soviets additional food for thought.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peking almost certainly does not actually expect much movement on this issue, and the fact that the Chinese will allow their chargé in Warsaw to represent them at the "ambassadorial-level" talks suggests that they do not believe there will be much progress on important matters at this time. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In short, the Chinese do not expect a major breakthrough of any kind, but they see prospects of harassing Moscow and improving China's understanding of US moves in Asia as sufficiently advantageous to reopen the Warsaw contact. Their views of the talks with the Soviets is probably similar. At this juncture they apparently do not expect much real progress toward the resolution of the border problem, but they probably believe that it is better to keep talking than to allow the situation to deteriorate sharply, thereby risking a military confrontation with the Soviets on a scale larger than that of last spring and summer. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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