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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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(Information as of noon EDT, 9 July 1970)


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Sino-Soviet Relations

The sudden departure from Peking on 30 June of the chief Soviet negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, has raised some question about the future status of the deadlocked Sino-Soviet border negotiations. To avoid the appearance of a deliberate attempt to disrupt the negotiations, the Soviets say Kuznetsov departed because of illness and that Chinese doctors were consulted before he left. Nevertheless, there has been no specific indication that Moscow plans to send Kuznetsov back to Peking. One Soviet official would say only that the negotiator's illness was relatively minor and that he would be "back to work soon."

At the time of Kuznetsov's departure from Peking, Soviet sources also began insinuating that the Chinese had finally granted agreement to ambassador-designate Vladimir Stepakov. A Soviet official subsequently has said that there has been only "some development" regarding the nomination. There has, moreover, been no confirmation of Stepakov's alleged accreditation from the Chinese. They have heretofore refused to accept him primarily because they fear Moscow would use his appointment to downgrade the negotiations to the ambassadorial level.

Although the top Soviet leaders have publicly admitted that "no appreciable progress" has

been made in the negotiations, they have good reason for wanting the diplomatic dialogue to continue at some level. They must find some satisfaction in the absence of major border clashes since the talks got under way and they may retain some hope that protracted negotiations may lead to a limited accord on the border. In addition, the Soviets want to maintain the appearance of stability in their relations with China that the negotiating process itself tends to foster. Moscow's apprehensiveness that the appearance of preoccupation with its "China problem" will weaken its position elsewhere was recently underscored by Politburo member Polyansky, who told a Western visitor that attempts by "others" to take advantage of strained Sino-Soviet relations would be "severely rebuffed."

For its part, Peking also values continuing the discussions, both as a means to obtain a close reading of Moscow's intentions toward China and as a possible deterrent against Soviet military pressure along the border. Nevertheless, the Chinese have been unwilling to pursue the discussions during Kuznetsov's past absences, and may be reluctant to reconvene the sessions unless he returns or is replaced by an equally prominent envoy. [REDACTED]

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