

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]
SUBJECT	WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962	DATE DISTR.	1 AUGUST 1962
DATE OF INFO.	1 AUGUST 1962	PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)	REFERENCES	SMITH BUNDY DUNGAN KAYSEN KILDUFF PETERSEN SCHLESINGER TAYLOR BELK
APPRaisal	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	[REDACTED]

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS **CONFIDENTIAL**

SOURCE [REDACTED]

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1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE [REDACTED] APPRAISAL IN PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. [REDACTED] COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	OSIR	OCI	ONE	DDI	DDP	DDO	DIA	CIB
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WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. [REDACTED] COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT.

[REDACTED] REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

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6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

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WEEK. [REDACTED] COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

7. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

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8. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

9. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

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10. [REDACTED] COMMENT. [REDACTED] WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

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IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

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11. [REDACTED] COMMENT.

[REDACTED] THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

[REDACTED] COMMENT.

12. /AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.

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13. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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