




Soviet Statements on SALT - VII
(Feb - June 72)



REFERENCE AID

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Soviet Statements on SALT - VII

16 February 1972 - 30 June 1972

Part I

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Weiler, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

Ambassador Parsons, referring to Ambassador Smith's plenary statement, asked Grinevskiy when he thought the Special Working Group (SWG) should resume its meetings. Grinevskiy said the Soviet Delegation appeared to have a somewhat different view of how we might best proceed. He said the Soviets believed we should make more use of small groups, such as Heads of Delegations and groups of two or three from each side, to seek solutions to the remaining issues. He noted that at one point in his statement, Ambassador Smith seemed to agree with this approach. As for the SWG, Grinevskiy said it should meet after more substantive agreement had been achieved on the remaining issues, not before. He expressed some concern about the reference in the US plenary statement to possible changes in the JDT's, and said certain agreed Articles were "delicate" and should not be reopened.

Parsons told Grinevskiy he had apparently not noted the use of the word "minor" in the US statement on JDT changes and said they were more for purposes of clarification that had resulted from Washington's review of the texts. He said this should be welcomed by the Soviet Delegation. Grinevskiy seemed much relieved by this explanation.

Weiler asked if the Soviet view was that the SWG should in general be limited in its work at this stage to recording agreements reached in other meetings and perhaps drafting textual expressions for these agreements. Grinevskiy said it was. Parsons argued that the SWG had other functions that it could usefully perform. Weiler commented that the SWG could be usefully used at the present time by taking up the minor changes the US had in mind, even if outstanding substantive issues were left to other forums, and Grinevskiy indicated agreement with this approach..

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*Formal statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov,
28 March 1972, Helsinki:*

"In Vienna we succeeded in achieving significant positive results. Progress was made in working out a number of specific provisions relating to limitation of ABM systems: Some articles of the Joint Draft Text of the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems were agreed upon.

"It has already been noted that one of the key questions requiring agreement in the preparation of the draft treaty on limiting ABM systems is the question of the number and type of facilities to be protected by ABM systems. We are deeply convinced that the compromise proposal submitted by the USSR Delegation on December 15 and 22, 1971, constitutes a good foundation for finding a mutually acceptable solution on the basis of ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages. This Soviet proposal has not yet been substantively discussed."

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov emphasized that the Soviet side would still like further US views on the Soviet ABM proposal of 15 and 22 December, saying that this proposal had not been fully addressed during the Vienna SALT VI negotiations.

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*Formal statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov,
28 March 1972, Helsinki:*

"In resuming the negotiations in Helsinki, the USSR Delegation would like to reemphasize the seriousness of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the negotiations with the US on limiting strategic armaments.

"Speaking on March 20, 1972 at the 15th Trade Union Congress, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev stated:

'We attach serious importance to the Soviet-American negotiations on limiting strategic armaments. The key to their success is recognition by both participants of the principle of equal security for the sides and readiness to adhere to this principle in practice. We are in favor of achieving mutually acceptable agreement. This would serve the interests of both the Soviet and the American peoples and the interests of international security.'

"The Soviet Delegation intends to adhere to this course firmly and consistently.

"We are under instructions from the Soviet Government to discuss in a business like and constructive spirit the entire range of questions defined in the Understanding of May 20, 1971 between the Governments of the USSR and the US, to seek mutually acceptable solutions, carrying through to completion the process of agreeing the draft documents under preparation. It has been stated repeatedly here that both sides are equally interested in finding mutually acceptable specific solutions. If the Delegations act accordingly, then it seems to us, the success of our work can be ensured.

"The last Vienna phase created definite prerequisites for such a productive development. The Joint Communique adopted in Vienna not only noted the progress achieved on a number of issues, but also emphasized the determination of the Delegations to exert efforts to achieve necessary agreement.

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"In Vienna we succeeded in achieving significant positive results. Progress was made in working out a number of specific provisions relating to limitation of ABM systems and to certain interim measures with respect to 'freezing' strategic offensive weapons. Some articles of the Joint Draft Text of the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems were agreed upon. Useful work was also accomplished in working out a Joint Draft Text of the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

"For the purpose of moving the positions closer the Soviet side in Vienna submitted a number of compromise proposals which took into account the considerations expressed by the US Delegation. We are looking forward to a businesslike discussion in a positive spirit of the constructive proposals we submitted in Vienna.

"I think that the progress achieved enables us to concentrate on agreeing to the most important main questions awaiting solution. This refers to both problems, to the limitation of ABM systems and to the adoption of certain measures with respect to limiting strategic offensive armaments. Finding mutually acceptable solutions to precisely these central issues would lead to achievement of the goal set by the Understanding of May 20, 1971 between the Governments of the USSR and the US and this would open up good prospects for further active negotiations between our countries on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

"It is precisely the achievement of intensive progress on the remaining and, above all, the main issues that the USSR Delegation regards as the principal mission of the Helsinki phase. Of course, these questions are not simple! However, this has to do with precisely the main issues, and their resolution would signify achievement of positive results. In other words, we have already climbed the major part of the pyramid and now we have to reach its summit. This requires that both Delegations give careful and unprejudiced consideration to the proposals of the sides,

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searching for ways that could open up new possibilities in the interests of strengthening peace and improving the relations between our countries.

"As heretofore, we proceed from our agreed view that the solutions which must be found in the course of the negotiations will be based on the main principle-- equal security for the sides and precluding unilateral advantages for either. By observing this principle it is possible to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on both issues we are discussing. And this, of course, not at the expense of any third countries or peoples, not to the detriment of their legitimate rights and interests. On the contrary, achievement of agreement between the USSR and the US on limiting strategic armaments would serve the interests of strengthening security throughout the world.

"It has already been noted that one of the key questions requiring agreement in the preparation of the draft treaty on limiting ABM systems is the question of the number and type of facilities to be protected by ABM systems. We are deeply convinced that the compromise proposal submitted by the USSR Delegation on December 15 and 22, 1971, constitutes a good foundation for finding a mutually acceptable solution on the basis of ensuring equal security and precluding unilateral advantages. This Soviet proposal has not yet been substantively discussed.

"In resuming our work today we confidently proceed from the premise that the present Helsinki phase must play a most important role in moving the ongoing negotiations forward. Of course, we also cannot lose sight of those developments in the relations between our countries against the background of which this phase will be conducted. On May 22, 1972 there will be a meeting between the highest leaders of our states. The one-year period designated in the well-known Understanding of last May 20 between the USSR and the US on the objectives and course of our negotiations during this current year will also have expired by that time.

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"Consequently the time factor also acquires a serious significance for us in Helsinki. I agree with you that the special nature of the phase which is beginning today will, possibly, require greater flexibility in selecting the forms of work in order to create the best conditions for effective progress in the negotiations.

"In the present circumstances progress in our discussions would be facilitated by the Delegations unfolding their respective positions as actively as possible. As for the Soviet side, it intends, just as before, to work energetically in search of ways to solve the remaining unagreed issues. As we know, progress in the negotiations depends upon the efforts of both partners."

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT advisors Shaw and Weiler, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

Weiler commented that the Soviet statement seemed like the usual hearts-and-flowers opening. Grinevskiy said it was a positive statement and he should compare it with some previous ones as to tone and emphasis. Shaw asked if Grinevskiy would agree that it should be characterized as "routine but positive." Grinevskiy objected to "routine" but agreed that "general and positive" would be an accurate description.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze and advisor FitzGerald, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

I asked Pleshakov his views on how the Delegations could best proceed during this phase of SALT. He said that he had understood Ambassador Smith's proposal and was in agreement that the best way to proceed was to meet in frequent mini-plenaries and to have the Special Working Group begin work on the JDT's as soon as possible.

Pleshakov said the mini-plenaries should concentrate on the "central" questions and let the SWG discuss the "small" or peripheral questions. He was of the opinion that the Delegates should not use the mini-plenaries as a forum for repeating statements on differences of views on peripheral questions. They should discuss such questions only once and then turn them over to the SWG for discussion. The Delegates should concentrate on the key questions--such as the number and types of targets to be defended by ABMs--and make specific proposals on these key issues. Pleshakov said that the key issues should be resolved as soon as possible; then agreement on the "small" questions could be reached rapidly.

Pleshakov stated that the Soviet Delegation has clear and firm instructions from the USSR Government to discuss both offensive and defensive systems simultaneously during SALT VII.

Pleshakov said that the time available is short and the sides should use it by presenting their positions as quickly as possible. For this reason, he had been pleased by his understanding of the thrust of Ambassador Smith's statement today to the effect that the US Delegation is prepared to work in a businesslike, serious manner.

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Pleshakov said that the opening US statement would be studied carefully by the Soviet Delegation and he trusted that we would study their statement carefully and understand its main point (equal security, particularly as it applies to the number and types of targets defended by ABMs). I assured him that we would study it carefully. I had already understood Minister Semenov's statement to mean that the sides should work hard to reach agreement during this phase. Pleshakov then asked whether I believed we could reach agreement at this session on the complete texts of both an ABM Treaty and an offensive agreement. I replied yes, if we can reach agreement on the inclusion of SLBMs in the freeze. Given this, agreement on the question of ABM levels and other key questions should be attainable. Minister Pleshakov concluded that he was encouraged by the fact that both Delegations have come to Helsinki with a constructive approach and in an eager frame of mind.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

I noted some of the most important passages in Ambassador Smith's Plenary statement of that morning, and emphasized that inclusion of SLBMs was the key to moving ahead most expeditiously, in particular on ABM levels. Kishilov did not demur or object. He indirectly hinted on Soviet readiness to make some move concerning SLBMs by saying that the Soviet Delegation would have new positions to advance, probably next week. (While Kishilov did not say so explicitly, I got the impression that Semenov considered it prudent not to appear to be advancing a concession or compromises too precipitously.)

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

After an initial exchange of pleasantries following the adjournment of the first plenary meeting of SALT VII, I told General Trusov that I was sure he had noted in Ambassador Smith's statement the serious intent of the US side to give priority attention to the major issues--that early resolution of the main questions before us is the basic business of this phase of SALT. Trusov expressed his agreement and repeated several comments from Minister Semenov's plenary statement concerning the good work done at Vienna SALT VI and the necessity to continue business-like mutual efforts to deal with the important issues. He acknowledged Ambassador Smith's touching on a number of questions in today's plenary meeting, and said that we would be getting responses and Soviet considerations on those issues very soon. Trusov, referring to Minister Semenov's comment on the same subject, emphasized that the Soviet side would still like further US views on the Soviet ABM proposal of 15 and 22 December, saying that this proposal had not been fully addressed during the Vienna SALT VI negotiations.

Trusov said that the Soviet side had announced at the first meeting of SALT VI its readiness to discuss both the offensive and defensive limitations, and had in fact done so. He recalled Minister Semenov's statement of today that the Soviet Delegation was instructed to work at achieving agreement on both ABM and offensive limitations. He then expressed some negative reaction to what he said was US insistence on dealing exclusively with offensive measures first--he said it was not a proper approach to make success in our ABM negotiations dependent on the results of negotiations on the interim offensive agreement. I told him that he had misunderstood Ambassador Smith's statement--it had said that in interest of progress on both documents we should focus initially on the interim freeze agreement. We were seeking to aid progress in our negotiations by reminding the Soviet side of the importance with which we view measures

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limiting strategic offensive weapons, and by pointing out that the development of our position on ABMs would, of course, be influenced by the degree of success our two sides had in eliminating our differences concerning the scope of the offensive freeze agreement.

Trusov indicated that this explanation had helped him and that he would study the US plenary statement carefully. He said it appeared as though our two sides were in agreement concerning intentions for this phase of our negotiations.

I then re-emphasized the importance with which the US side views the scope of the offensive agreement-- inclusion of SLBMs. I said that we had made a significant change to our position today; that we had indicated this change promptly in the interest of progress; and hoped that the Soviet side would respond in a positive manner. Trusov acknowledged that he had noted several changes while listening to Ambassador Smith today, but that it was difficult to give even any preliminary consideration before carefully studying the statement. He said that the Soviet ABM proposal of December 1971 had been on the table much longer, and was in the process of repeating his request for more reaction to it when we had to cut off our conversation for today.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Chulitskiy during a post-plenary conversation with US SALT advisors Rhinelande and Stoertz, 28 March 1972, Helsinki:

When asked whether the Soviet side would seek to move now to discussion of offensive or defensive limitations, Chulitskiy replied that they favored "balanced" treatment of both.