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*Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 3, 7 April 1972, Helsinki*

Minister Semenov said that today he intended to discuss Article III of the Draft Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems which the Delegations are working out. As is known, this Article contains the key questions of the ABM document as a whole. It was hardly necessary at that time to reproduce the history of the sides' discussions in connection with Article III since their history is well-known. He would merely recall that the Soviet side has had the opportunity to state repeatedly and convincingly the unacceptability of the proposal submitted by the US Delegation on August 20, 1971. The USSR Delegation proceeds from the premise that the provisions contained in it do not correspond to the objectives of the negotiations and to the principle of equality of conditions for limiting ABM systems. It is the conviction of the USSR Delegation that constructive progress on agreeing Article III is possible only on the basis of the principle of true equality, which flows from the May 20, 1971. Understanding between the US and USSR Governments.

Minister Semenov then said that, in the interest of achieving rapid mutual agreement on the given question within the limits of the above-mentioned principle, the USSR Government has instructed the Soviet Delegation to introduce a new Article III for the Draft Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems. Minister Semenov wanted initially to make a few introductory remarks regarding certain features of the new proposal.

Minister Semenov said that the Soviet side proposed that, within a framework of ABM systems limited to low levels, the US and USSR could provide ABM defense of both national capitals against accidental and unauthorized missile launches. This would permit both sides to realize the general intention of undertaking measures aimed at reducing the risk of accidentally unleashing a nuclear war. At the same time, given this approach, it is a simpler task to insure equal conditions for limiting ABM systems. In particular, in the context of the USSR Delegation's proposals of January 18 and 25, 1971, it would

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be possible to solve on a mutually acceptable basis the question of limitations on ABM radars by proceeding on the basis of the MARC concept proposed by the US side and to meet US considerations related to equal conditions for limiting accordingly the individual types of interceptors subject to limitations.

Minister Semenov also wanted to explain that, proceeding from the afore-mentioned conditions, the Soviet side considers it appropriate that the text of the Draft Treaty should not spell out the national capitals of the US and USSR, and limitations on ABM systems would not be mentioned in this way but would be determined in a general way, for example, as circular areas with a radius of 150-kilometers centered on the defended location.

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Minister Semenov said that, as regards ABM system components deployed for defense of ICBM launchers, the Soviet side proposes that the Draft should provide that the US could deploy an ABM defense for the ICBM silo launchers within one ICBM base. At the same time, from the standpoint of strategic stability, the determining factor is the number of ICBM silos protected by ABMs. The sides have discussed this repeatedly. The Soviet side takes into consideration the US point of view on the question of the number of areas of deployment of ICBM silo launchers to be defended by ABM systems and is prepared to agree to limit the number of such areas in the USSR to two.

Minister Semenov then said that the Soviet side, guided by the task of restraining a build-up in strategic weapons, proposes that the right of the US to deploy ABM system components around its national capital and the right of the USSR to deploy ABM system components for defense of the remaining 50 percent of the ICBM launchers of the number of ICBM launchers within the base defended in the US not be realized during an agreed period of time, for example, 3-5 years.

Minister Semenov then read and handed to Ambassador Smith the text of the new Soviet Draft Article III of the Treaty for Limiting ABM Systems (see Section U).

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Minister Semenov concluded that the Soviet Delegation was convinced that this new proposal by the USSR is constructive and contains all the prerequisites for working out a mutually acceptable solution on the central question of limiting ABM systems. The Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that it would be reported to the US Government and that the US side would consider it with all due attention.

*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Brown, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Shchukin said that the sides were spending too much time on minor things. In a way ABM details did not much matter, because as we had both observed many times, ABMs are unable to defend either country against a large-scale attack. To him, the SLBM issue seems the central one.

I asked him why Washington and Moscow as place names suddenly had disappeared from their formulation. He said that they wanted to avoid in formal terms the question that might arise as to why one part of the country was being defended instead of another. He did not allege that they had dropped the place names in order to accommodate us. I pointed out to him that our past observations on why NCA might be hard to sell in the United States had included popular objections to "protecting" the capital, but added that this was not a concern that could be solved by leaving out the names in a treaty.

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Pleshakov then asked if Nitze had had the opportunity to become familiar with the new Soviet ABM proposal which Minister Semenov had outlined at the Heads of Delegation meeting and what his own personal reaction was to it. Nitze said that a major problem with the new proposal was that it initially gave the USSR two areas to be defended versus one for the US and eventually three versus two. He thought that politically we could find a mutually acceptable agreement only on the basis of equality in the number of areas defended. If they raised the point of equal number of silos covered, he would regret this. To do so would regrettably, lead to a reopening of the discussions the Delegations had had on the ICBMs covered by the Moscow ABM system. Pleshakov replied that it is not the number of ABM sites that determines strategic stability; it is the number of ICBM silos defended that is the decisive factor.

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Nitze disagreed and pointed out that with the interceptors and launchers for ICBM defense limited to low levels, e.g., 100-150 under the Soviet proposal, or 100 per site under the US proposal, strategically significant defense of large numbers of ICBMs is not possible. He could, for example, foresee that, in the case of the US defending Grand Forks with 100 to 150 interceptors, only a limited number, perhaps less than 75 silos, would be defended. Given ABM defenses of three different areas, as they proposed for the Soviet side, greater concern could arise as to the creation of a potential base for a defense of the territory of the country.

Pleshakov disagreed although admitting that he could understand the political aspects to some extent. As regards the number of ABM sites for ICBM defense, he said that geological and geographical differences, and differences in weapons systems, and other factors had led to different methods of ICBM deployment in the two countries. The US had deployed ICBMs at bases having 150-200 silos. In the



USSR, different numbers of silos are deployed at various deployment areas. National means of verification are able to determine precisely how many silos would be defended in each country. As for Nitze's apprehensions that three sites would constitute more of a territorial base than two sites, this was not so. The components deployed for ICBM defense would be different. ICBM silos are hardened and built in a different way from buildings in cities or for industrial purposes. Therefore, the components for defending the former are different and would only be able to defend the ICBM silos in the area. Thus, the area of coverage would be small and there would be no possibility of developing a territorial ABM system. The number of ABM sites is therefore not the controlling factor strategically.

Pleshakov added that Nitze had been correct in saying that the numbers of ABM launchers and interceptors would be 150/225 on each side. These numbers could, however, be discussed and different numbers agreed to. Minister Semenov's departure interrupted the conversation at this point.

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Following the mini-plenary meeting, General Trusov said that he wanted to keep his promise and answer the question I had asked at the end of our last conversation concerning the equality, or lack of it, in the Soviet ABM proposal of 15 December 1971. He said that the Soviet proposal tabled at this morning's meeting rendered unnecessary any other response to my question -- it clearly provides for complete equality for both sides in terms of an NCA defense and defense of equal numbers of ICBM launchers. He added that any inequality in the proposal is to the advantage of the US and referred to provisions permitting the US to keep the Spartan missile, Missile Site Radars and Perimeter Acquisition Radars ready deployed by the time of treaty conclusion. Trusov concluded by pointing out -- in what seemed to be a what "tongue-in-cheek" way -- that this clearly indicated that the Soviet side would go to almost any lengths to reach agreement.

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I told him that my view of the new Soviet proposal was quite different; it seemed to me that three ABM sites for the USSR and two for the US could not be called equal. The essence of the new Soviet proposal was that it called for a 3:2 inequality of 2:1 which was contained in the 15 December proposal. Also, the provision to defer the permitted deployments for three to five years had the effect of preventing US construction of a second ABM site while the USSR, with its NCA defense already operational, could go ahead with construction of an ICBM defense.

Trusov said he thought it incorrect to concentrate attention on the number of sites in a discussion of the conditions for limiting ABM deployment, and asked why I did not consider important the number of launcher sites protected. I replied that when ICBM launchers to be protected are deployed in a large area and the ABM deployment area and number of interceptors are limited, the number of silos cannot take on primary importance. We both understood that the defense of ICBM launchers is dependent on factors such as interceptor range, radar range, the need to

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radars, and the concept of preferential defense. Therefore, we understand that a number -- 150 for example -- of ICBM launchers deployed in a large area cannot be the criterion for determining equality of conditions if the ABM defense is limited to 100 ABM launchers deployed within a 70 kilometer circle. Trusov said he understood that it is not possible to protect 150 ICBMs with 100 ABMs, but only the defense planners would know which of the 150 were being protected and both sides should have an equal opportunity to make the preferential defense choice.

As we rose to leave, we agreed that this discussion needed to be continued.

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

I said that the new Soviet ABM proposal was clearly unequal and could not serve as the basis for a solution. Kishilov of course demurred, and asked why I considered it unequal. I said that it was unequal on its face and in its effects. In particular, surely the Soviet side must realize that the US could never accept a number of ABM defense areas smaller than the number allowed the Soviet Union. Kishilov claimed that the Soviet proposal was not inequitable, and said that equality should be measured in terms of what was protected rather than number of locations. In particular, what counted was the number of ICBMs defended, rather than the number of places for such defense.

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I asked Kishilov what the Soviet side had in mind in referring, in connection with national capital defense, to meeting the US view on "equality of conditions of ABM limitations with respect to types of ABM interceptors". At first Kishilov said that "there was something to that point", and that we should ask about it. He said it related to hard site defense. I said I did not understand, and asked if he meant that his side was offering assurance that the Soviets would not deploy ABM defenses at Moscow to defend ICBMs in that region. Kishilov was then perplexed, and said that he was not talking about ABM interceptors with respect to defense of Moscow and Washington at all, but to interceptors for ICBM defense. I said that the sentence I was referring to, which had been used by Semenov both in the private meeting the day before and again this morning, occurred in a paragraph devoted to ABM limitations for defense of capitals. Kishilov said that, as both sides had long agreed, there were no restraints on types of interceptors for defense of capitals (except as provided in Articles IV and V). I said that was indeed the standard position of both sides, and therefore I did not understand reference to meeting American preference in this regard.

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Grinevskiy said that he had not fully understood Mr. Nitze's statement in the mini-plenary on testing in an ABM mode. Assuming that he referred to the technical complexities, I told him that I was sure that the interpreters would exchange full notes as it was important, in order to grasp the points, to see the exact wording. Grinevskiy then referred, with some edge in his voice, that what he did not understand was the procedure. This statement was an interpretation of an Article already agreed. Normally in a negotiation, the parties expressed their viewpoints before language was agreed, settled their differences and came to agreement. It was strange to agree first and then place interpretations on the agreement afterwards. I expressed surprise saying that we had made clear many times our concern with "testing in an ABM mode." From numerous discussions, including some in the "Group of Four," various aspects had come up indicating that this was a subject of continuing interest, and, finally, that it is much better to assure that we had similar understandings now rather than find out later that we had a misunderstanding. As Grinevskiy continued to be grumpy, I reminded him that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, but while we were not making a statement in that connection, this principle made it possible to bring up any subject at any time before final commitment.

I told Grinevskiy that since he had mentioned Mr. Nitze, I was confused by a reference he had made after the Special Working Group yesterday to a statement he attributed to Mr. Nitze on Article V/I. He had not explained the reference yesterday and I had meant to come back to it. Article V/I had to do with mobile ABM systems and I could not recall the Nitze statement. Grinevskiy said that last May 5th, he thought, Mr. Nitze had made a statement relating this Article to components, especially radars that could be moved. At our luncheon on April 5, Mr. Garthoff had given Mr. Kishilov a copy of a statement on this. Mr. Grinevskiy then said that what he had in mind was the desirability of our making a statement on this

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin, during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Brown, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Shchukin went on to say that both sides should move along more rapidly instead of circling the subjects remaining at issue, but he supposed that we were constrained to proceed according to diplomatic custom. He thought it important to resolve as many of the issues as we could by May, because at the Summit Meeting there would be a large number of subjects, of which SALT would be only one. The political leaders could not be expected to look at these matters in the detail with which our Delegations could examine them.

*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a working luncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 8 April 1972, Helsinki:*

Garthoff asked why the Soviet side had proposed the peculiar arrangement of not specifying national capitals, but suggesting that there be a separate side understanding to the effect that Moscow and Washington were meant. It had been said that this change was introduced to meet wishes of the American side; he hoped the Soviet Delegation now understood that this did not meet the wishes of the American side--on the contrary, we found the proposal unsatisfactory. Grinevskiy said that there had been difficulties in the United States when the Sentinel ABM program had been proposed because some cities would be defended while others would not be. Garthoff suggested that it should be left to the American side to decide whether it had such problems and how it proposed to deal with them. We did not agree with the suggestion made by the Soviet side. Grinevskiy then said that his Delegation had instructions from the Soviet Government on this subject, and asked if we had instructions from the US Government on this point. Garthoff replied that we did not, and that comments so far from the American side (including