

[REDACTED]

to this formulation. I said that if I understood him correctly, he was saying they could probably agree to a formulation undertaking not to deploy ABM systems or their components except as the Article would provide. Grinevskiy said that they could, as this would ban "other systems" but, as usual, their agreement to this lead-in language could not be final until we had agreed the rest of Article III. (I took this to mean not a reservation of bargaining credit but rather a precaution lest such language might appear differently if the Article itself came out differently.)

*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a dinner conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 2 May 1971, Helsinki:*

Grinevskiy remarked that his Delegation had now definitely decided that it wished to keep the multiple warhead subject in an agreed interpretive minute, rather than introducing it into the text of the Treaty. I expressed regret, but said that as we had indicated earlier that would be acceptable. Grinevskiy further indicated that his Delegation did have in mind commenting on the subject of testing in an ABM mode, and wished to do so in a mini-plenary since the subject had been addressed in that forum by the American side.

*Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a meeting, 3 May 1972, Helsinki:*

Smith described and handed over new US proposals for Article III of the Interim Agreement, concerning SLBMs, and Article III of the ABM Treaty (see Section U), but Soviet reaction was limited to Semenov's statement that these proposals would be carefully studied and later addressed.

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