

[REDACTED]

In conclusion, Semenov noted that the Soviet proposals transmitted today were in line with the principles at the basis of our negotiations and therefore could be regarded by the sides as being mutually acceptable.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons following a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

I told Grinevskiy that listening to Minister Semenov I thought I heard indications of progress but even now questions occurred to me. Also, as no text of Article III had been read, and I did not yet have a copy of a text, I was curious as to its substance. Did the Soviet side propose the same structure and substance with MARCs for ABM and ICBM defense? Grinevskiy replied that they had indeed taken our structure and accompanied MARCs for each, six in each case, but there were differences of substance we needed to discuss. I then remarked that I had heard nothing about OLPARs. Grinevskiy confirmed that his side was deferring this. I noted that this was an important subject and wondered if they were leaving it to the last. Grinevskiy thought that was what might happen. I demurred.

In passing, Grinevskiy referred to our last Group of Four meeting in which Garthoff had proposed a change from the words "the sides" to "the Parties," in the interpretive statement to Article IX. Their side was agreeable to use of "the Parties," in both languages.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze following a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin said that their proposed language for Article III and particularly the provisions concerning ICBM defense were subject to discussion. He said he thought we could deduce from their previous statements what kind of a solution it might eventually be possible for their side to accept.

b(3)

RELEASED AUG 2000

- M1-63 -

[REDACTED]

7

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, following a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

I said that I was not sure that I understood fully the Soviet proposal for limits on ABM radars in defense of ICBMs. I was, however, quite sure that the US did continue to find unacceptable the idea of an unlimited number of ABM radars. Kishilov remarked that they would be small ones. I said that the precise qualitative level was one of the points that was not clear in the Soviet text, but that in any event there was no need for unlimited numbers. Also, I did not understand the idea of having six MARCs with no qualitative limit, in addition to other smaller radars. Kishilov said there had to be equality between the two sides, that the US side had proposed six MARCs, and that we needed to take account of the fact that the US has the large PAR and MSR radars, and there must be quality for the Soviet side. Kishilov suggested that if the Soviet proposal for unlimited numbers of smaller radars was not acceptable to the US, we should say so. Also, if some elements such as the qualitative level were unclear, we should ask about them in the meeting the next day. (Comment: It seemed to me that Kishilov was hinting at a possible compromise under which both sides would have the right to either two MARCs or simply two large radars, plus some finite number of less powerful radars.)

I noted that the Soviet proposal was also deficient in specifying, even if indirectly, that the US ICBM defense location would be Grand Forks, while indicating nothing about the location of the Soviet ICBM defense area. The US side had made clear its position that the Soviet ICBM defense area must be located east of the Urals. Kishilov again suggested that the US side draw attention to this problem at the meeting the next day. He suggested that there should be some way to satisfy the Soviet interest in specifying Grand Forks, and the US interest in having the Soviet ICBM defense area located in the non-European part of the USSR.

[REDACTED]

Kishilov asked when the US side would "take care of the Article XV problem (ABM withdrawal)". He noted that the Soviet Delegation had several times recently indicated that it could not accept the proposed additional paragraph in Article XV, and had pointed out that it was not necessary even from the standpoint of the expressed American position. I replied that I thought my Delegation would address that question fairly soon.

[REDACTED]

*Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
during a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:*

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process of modernization and replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers: In this connection, he was authorized to submit a draft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement.

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that in the process of modernization the sides might find it necessary to effect certain insignificant alterations of the external size of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

The Soviet side had closely examined the views expressed by the US side on the subject of land-based heavy ICBM launchers. In this respect the Soviet Delegation was now tabling new language for Article II of the draft Interim Agreement.

The Parties undertake not to convert launchers for light land-based ICBMs and launchers for older types of land-based ICBMs constructed before 1964 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs.

The Soviet side was convinced that the new language in this Article completely precluded the possibility of circumventing the agreement by conversion of older types of ballistic missiles into heavy land-based ICBMs. Semenov did not think that, in view of the considerations stated by the US side on this subject earlier, there was any need for additional comment on the importance of this proposal. The undertakings provided in this Article II and in the interpretive statement attached to it took full account of the considerations expressed by the US side on the subject of heavy missiles and their limitation.

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process of modernization and replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers. In this connection, he was authorized to submit a draft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement.

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the

[REDACTED]

aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that in the process of modernization the sides might find it necessary to effect certain insignificant alterations of the external size of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

[REDACTED]

of a definition of ICBM, but it was harder for his people to see any useful purpose served by the second sentence, and since there was a common understanding on the substance there did not seem to be need for such a statement.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said he wished to discuss questions concerning SLBM submarines and SLBM launchers in a separate meeting Sunday. He did say that the Soviet side was prepared to consider including "modern submarines with ballistic missiles" in the Interim Agreement and intended to present its views in this regard with a view to preparing appropriate Articles "and statements". Smith asked whether Semenov's mention of "statements" referred to what we had called "interpretive statements"; Semenov confirmed that he had the same thing in mind.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the proposals of the US side which had been handed over on May 3 had been seriously and carefully studied in Moscow. In view of this the Soviet Delegation had been instructed to continue discussion of the draft Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Offensive Arms and the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. In so doing, it was borne in mind that both documents could be signed at the Soviet-American summit meeting. Today, in accordance with instructions, the Soviet side wanted to table proposals on certain aspects of the Interim Agreement and also a new Soviet draft of Article III of the ABM Treaty. All of these drafts had been designed to accommodate the proposals the US side had tabled on May 3.

The Soviet Union considered it possible to include in an agreement on temporarily freezing strategic offensive weapons, along with ICBM silo launchers, also fixed soft land-based ICBM launchers. In this connection, the Soviet Delegation was authorized to submit a new text for Article I of the draft Interim Agreement, reading as follows:

The Parties undertake not to start new construction of silo and fixed soft launchers for land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as of July 1, 1972.

Semenov wanted to add to this that the Interim Agreement would enter into force on July 1, 1972, but not earlier than entry into force of the ABM Treaty. In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the US side, the Soviet Delegation was prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides would in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.

In an effort to solve problems in a constructive spirit, the Soviet side expressed its consent to the Delegations' making an agreed statement on Article I

[REDACTED]

of the Interim Agreement in the following wording:

The Parties understand that the ICBM launchers referred to in Article I of this Agreement are launchers for ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the distance between the midpoint of the northern border of the European part of the continental USSR and the midpoint of the northern border of the continental USA. The Parties further understand that land-based ICBM silo launchers under active construction may be completed.

In the view of the Soviet side, such a statement fully took into account the considerations expressed by the US side and was completely in line with the objectives of the Interim Agreement. It was based on the existing real situation, because it dealt with the specific distance from the nearest area of ICBM launcher deployment in the US to the continental USSR.

The Soviet side had closely examined the views expressed by the US side on the subject of land-based heavy ICBM launchers. In this respect the Soviet Delegation was now tabling new language for Article II of the draft Interim Agreement.

The Parties undertake not to convert launchers for light land-based ICBMs and launchers for older types of land-based ICBMs constructed before 1964 into launchers for heavy land-based ICBMs.

The Soviet side was convinced that the new language in this Article completely precluded the possibility of circumventing the agreement by conversion of older types of ballistic missiles into heavy land-based ICBMs. Semenov did not think that, in view of the considerations stated by the US side on this subject earlier, there was any need for additional comment on the importance of this proposal. The undertakings provided in this Article II and in the interpretive statement attached to it took full account of the considerations expressed by the US side on the subject of heavy missiles and

[REDACTED]

their limitation.

The Soviet side agreed that the two sides undertake an obligation not to increase in the process of modernization and replacement the external dimensions, observable by national technical means of verification, of silo launchers. In this connection, he was authorized to submit a draft agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement.

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties.

The Soviet side proceeded from the premise that in the process of modernization the sides might find it necessary to effect certain insignificant alterations of the external size of the ICBM silo launchers at their disposal, alterations that would be observable by national technical means of verification. It was quite obvious that such changes could not create the possibility of converting these launchers into launchers for heavy missiles.

Taking into account the wishes of the US side, the Soviet Delegation was now also tabling new language for paragraph 2 of Article VII/VIII of the Interim Agreement.

This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless earlier replaced by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is an objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as feasible.

The Soviet Delegation was convinced that the new language for paragraph 2, Article VII/VIII, took full account of the proposal tabled by the US side on May 3.

[REDACTED]

In conclusion, Semenov noted that the Soviet proposals transmitted today were in line with the principles at the basis of our negotiations and therefore could be regarded by the sides as being mutually acceptable.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, following a Delegates' meeting, 6 May 1972, Helsinki:

I noted the inclusion of soft ICBM launchers, but failure to include mobile ICBM launchers. Kishilov said that the American Delegation had suggested a tradeoff including soft launchers but not mobile ones. I replied that Kishilov knew full well that this was not the position of the US Delegation. I reminded him that when he had earlier told me that there had been some such suggestion from the American Delegation, Ambassador Parsons and I had authoritatively assured him and Grinevskiy that this was not the case. Kishilov smiled, and said that he recalled that very well, but that "the damage had been done" and it had not been possible to persuade others that the American side considered inclusion of mobile launchers essential. Now, continued Kishilov, the matter had gone much further. I replied that the American side continued to believe that it would be inconsistent with a freeze of all other ICBM launchers to allow deployment of mobile ICBMs. Kishilov said we would have an opportunity to discuss this subject further; I replied that indeed we would.