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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a Delegates' meeting, 7 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin said that after yesterday's tabling of the Soviet draft of Article III of the ABM Treaty, the US and USSR positions on this Article had come closer to each other. Therefore it was necessary for us to exert every effort to overcome the differences remaining. As far as the limitation on deployment of ABM systems for defense of national capitals was concerned, the provisions in the two drafts were practically identical. At the same time, the Soviet side believed it superfluous to include the reservation envisaged in the US draft of Article III concerning dish-type mechanical-scan ABM radars. Considering the agreed principle of establishing modern ABM radar complexes, there was no need to include such a reservation. There were no other differences between the two drafts on the subject of limiting the deployment of ABM systems and their components for the defense of national capitals. He believed that given an additional effort this question could be completely agreed upon promptly.

Regarding MARCs, Shchukin said that the concept of the Soviet side coincided with that of the US side in that for the purpose of defending national capitals the MARC concept would be used and that there would be six such complexes. Of course, the definition of the MARC concept required some additional editorial drafting work, either in the Special Working Group or elsewhere. He meant that we should have more precise language than had been tabled so far, since the respective formulas of the sides were somewhat different at present. The consideration he had expressed earlier was not intended to imply that for defense of national capitals any radars would be deployed other than those which were covered by the MARC concept. For his part, he would like to ask the following question: what was the reason in the view of the US side for including a separate reservation on

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 7 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the foreign policy course of the USSR, as guided by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, was aimed at strengthening peace and international security and at ensuring an easing of tensions in compliance with the legitimate interests of states and nations.. The Soviet Union believed that the cessation of the arms race and the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would constitute an important contribution to ensuring peace and detente. This was precisely what constituted the basis for the approach of the Soviet side to the present most responsible moment in the negotiations on limiting strategic armaments. It was obvious that we could point out that in the course of these negotiations the two sides had succeeded in overcoming a number of substantive differences between their respective positions and in working out a number of mutually acceptable provisions for the joint drafts of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. There was a common understanding between us that for the purpose of completing work on these two documents it would be necessary in the nearest future to find mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining unagreed issues.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 7 May 1972, Helsinki:

In an effort to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US side and with a view to working out mutually acceptable provisions, the Soviet Delegation yesterday had tabled a draft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties." Such a provision would indeed not impede the work of modernizing land-based ICBM silo launchers which were referred to in the US statement of April 13, 1972. It was quite obvious that in the course of such modernization the necessity might arise for insignificant changes in the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by national technical means of verification.

Trusov said that, in regard to Article II of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the main purpose of statements made by the US side was to preclude the possibility of converting other ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. Accordingly, the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged an undertaking by the sides not to convert launchers built before 1964 into modern heavy ICBM launchers; (b) it proposed to include an undertaking not to increase substantially the dimensions of ICBM launchers, observable by national technical means of verification; and (c) it took into account the understanding of the sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by the Agreement and the capability of identifying them with certainty by national technical means of verification. In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet side believed it to be completely superfluous to include any kind of definitions of light and heavy missiles.

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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov
during a Delegates' meeting, 7 May 1972, Helsinki:*

Trusov said that the US side had expressed the view that the Interim Freeze Agreement had to include provisions that would preclude the possibility of an increase in the number of heavy ICBMs by conversion of launchers of other types of missiles into heavy ICBM launchers. The Soviet side believed that the obligations to be assumed by the sides not to convert light land-based ICBM launchers and land-based ICBM launchers of older types built before 1964 into launchers for land-based heavy missiles, together with the information which could be obtained by national technical means of verification, would provide full assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. At the same time, in an effort to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US side and with a view to working out mutually acceptable provisions, the Soviet Delegation yesterday had tabled a draft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties." Such a provision would indeed not impede the work of modernizing land-based ICBM silo launchers which were referred to in the US statement of April 13, 1972. It was quite obvious that in the course of such modernization the necessity might arise for insignificant changes in the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by national technical means of verification. However, this would not in any way create the possibility of converting light and older land-based ballistic missile launchers into modern heavy ICBM launchers. It was the view of the Soviet side that the obligation provided for in this proposed agreed statement would fully meet the considerations that had been presented by the US side on the subject of heavy missiles and their limitation.

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Trusov said that, in regard to Article II of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the main purpose of statements made by the US side was to preclude the possibility of converting other ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. Accordingly, the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged an undertaking by the sides not to convert launchers built before 1964 into modern heavy ICBM launchers; (b) it proposed to include an undertaking not to increase substantially the dimensions of ICBM launchers, observable by national technical means of verification; and (c) it took into account the understanding of the sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by the Agreement and the capability of identifying them with certainty by national technical means of verification. In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet side believed it to be completely superfluous to include any kind of definitions of light and heavy missiles.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and Soviet SALT delegates Shchukin and Trusov during a Delegates' meeting, 7 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov stated that among the remaining unagreed issues was the important question of modern submarines with ballistic missiles. With respect to this issue we had to face the difficulty that we had not yet been working on formulation of agreed provisions to deal with it. On the other hand, this question had long been within the purview of the negotiations between our two Delegations, specifically during the working out of a joint draft text for the Interim Freeze Agreement. The US side had repeatedly emphasized its interest in including submarines with ballistic missiles in the strategic offensive arms to be covered by the Interim Freeze Agreement. The Soviet Delegation had presented its positions on this question both in Vienna and in Helsinki. In so doing, the Soviet side had pointed out that in view of the special place occupied by submarines with ballistic missiles in the overall complex of strategic armaments, a different approach would be required for their consideration than the approach to other strategic offensive armaments to be included among the weapons systems to be frozen under the Interim Agreement. This was an objective fact which one could not fail to take into account when working out mutually acceptable limitations. With a view to ensuring the success of our negotiations, the Soviet Delegation had already pointed out that for the purpose of ensuring international detente, normalizing relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and curbing the arms race the Soviet side agrees to consider the question of including modern submarines with ballistic missiles in the Interim Freeze Agreement. This constituted a breakthrough in the negotiations, ensuring completion of drafting such an agreement.

The Soviet side took into account the fact that now there was agreement in principle between the sides regarding the approach to the question of including submarines with ballistic missiles and ballistic missile launchers on these submarines in the Interim Agreement. The objective situation demanded that this question be solved in an agreement in such a way as to take into

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account the special position of submarines with ballistic missiles in the complex of strategic offensive arms. In considering this question, of course, the following factors also had to be taken into consideration: the fact that the geographic situation of our two countries differed, the existence of submarines with ballistic missiles in the possession of US Allies in NATO, as well as the existence of forward bases used by US SLBM submarines. All these factors had to be taken into account, for only then would inclusion of submarines in the Interim Agreement be consistent with the principle of ensuring equal security and not providing unilateral advantages for either side.

Proceeding from all the above and taking into account the considerations on that score expressed by the US side, the Soviet side agreed to the establishment for the sides of appropriate limits on the numbers of modern submarines and SLBM launchers to be limited for the period of effectiveness of the Interim Freeze Agreement. It was obvious that in view of what had been said above, and in order to preclude providing a serious strategic advantage for the United States, these levels could not be equal for the two sides. In working out appropriate provisions for the draft Interim Agreement, this circumstance had to be duly considered. It was intended that during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement the sides would reduce the numbers of their land-based ICBM launchers by removing old missile launchers. An appropriate provision on that score could be handled in the form of statements by the sides to be attached to the Interim Agreement. The Delegation of the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss with the Delegation of the United States the practical questions involved in final working out of relevant provisions for the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Semenov concluded by saying that today he had presented some considerations of the Soviet side on the question of including SLBMs in the Interim Freeze Agreement. At a meeting the next day he intended to continue his presentation.

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Smith said that, as he understood it, in the exchanges which had taken place between our authorities on this question of inclusion of SLBMs in the Interim Agreement, there seemed to be common ground between us on the concept that SLBMs would be included in the freeze and that replacement would be effected in connection with any increased production of SLBMs. That was his understanding of the limit of the common ground between us on this question. The considerations which Semenov had raised today involving geographic disadvantages, forward-based advantages, and the fact that certain third countries had submarines, were not acceptable considerations from our point of view. He wanted to state this at the very beginning of our discussion of this issue [and believed that this fact had already been communicated to Semenov's authorities]. Until he heard further specifics of the Soviet position, he would not be in a position to provide any additional reaction from our side.

Semenov said he assumed that Smith would recall that at past meetings in Helsinki the Soviet side had already expressed its considerations on these three factors Smith had mentioned. The Soviet side believed that these were objective and realistic existing factors and that they should be taken into account in working out an agreement. He had not intended to imply that Smith would share his views on this question, but he had wanted to state that this was the substance of the Soviet position which in their view should be appropriately taken into account in finding a mutually acceptable solution.

Smith said he understood that Semenov had made arguments of this sort in the past, and that Semenov had repeated them here today. Semenov knew they were not acceptable to the US side. He did not believe it would be fruitful at this stage of our negotiations if he were to restate why these considerations were not acceptable to us. We needed to deal with specifics and not resume debate on reasons already stated in the past.

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Semenov agreed that it would be desirable to concentrate on specifics; in this respect he shared Smith's point of view. For his part, he also did not believe it useful to continue presenting reasons in support of the considerations which he had already presented in the past, because these facts did objectively exist in reality, outside and independent of our discussions.

Trusov said that the US side had expressed the view that the Interim Freeze Agreement had to include provisions that would preclude the possibility of an increase in the number of heavy ICBMs by conversion of launchers of other types of missiles into heavy ICBM launchers. The Soviet side believed that the obligations to be assumed by the sides not to convert light land-based ICBM launchers and land-based heavy missiles, together with the information which could be obtained by national technical means of verification, would provide full assurance of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. At the same time, in an effort to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US side and with a view to working out mutually acceptable provisions, the Soviet Delegation yesterday had tabled a draft for an agreed statement on Article II of the Interim Agreement which stated: "The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no substantial increase in the external dimensions, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in the possession of the Parties." Such a provision would indeed not impede the work of modernizing land-based ICBM silo launchers which were referred to in the US statement of April 13, 1972. It was quite obvious that in the course of such modernization the necessity might arise for insignificant changes in the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, observable by national technical means of verification. However, this would not in any way create the possibility of converting light and older land-based ballistic missile launchers into modern heavy ICBM launchers. It was the view of the Soviet side

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that the obligation provided for in this proposed agreed statement would fully meet the considerations that had been presented by the US side on the subject of heavy missiles and their limitation.

Nitze had one question. He noted a difference between the two drafts in the description of missiles. We had spoken of missile launchers of older types initially deployed before 1964, while the Soviet statement spoke of missile launchers constructed before 1964. His question was: is there any difference between these two formulas, is there any significance in this distinction?

Trusov replied that he did not think so.

Semenov said he believed that in working out the joint drafts the text of this provision could easily be conformed to each other, because in fact the understanding of the two sides was identical.

Trusov said that, in regard to Article II of the Interim Agreement, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the main purpose of statements made by the US side was to preclude the possibility of converting other ballistic missile launchers covered by the Agreement into modern heavy ICBM launchers. Accordingly, the Soviet side approached this objective as follows: (a) it envisaged an undertaking by the sides not to convert launchers built before 1964 into modern heavy ICBM launchers; (b) it proposed to include an undertaking not to increase substantially the dimensions of ICBM launchers, observable by national technical means of verification; and (c) it took into account the understanding of the sides of precisely which types of missiles would be covered by the Agreement and the capability of identifying them with certainty by national technical means of verification. In the light of these circumstances, the Soviet side believed it to be completely superfluous to include any kind of definitions of light and heavy missiles.

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Trusov wanted to say a few words on the subject of ICBM definition. The Soviet side believed that the sides had a sufficiently precise understanding on this score. At the same time, taking a constructive approach to our negotiations, the Soviet side had tabled a draft statement on Article I which defined ICBM launchers referred to in that Article as being launchers for ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the distance between the midpoint of the northern border of the European part of the continental USSR and the midpoint of the northern border of the continental US. In the Soviet view such language had the following advantages: (1) it best suited the subject matter of the Interim Agreement which envisioned freezing ICBM launchers, and (2) the definition was of a concrete nature in that it took for a criterion the distance between the border of the European part of the USSR and the nearest area of deployment of ICBM launchers in the United States.

Nitze pointed out that our preliminary information was that this definition would result in a range of approximately 6,700 kilometers. Such a definition would imply that land-based ballistic missiles capable of hitting most of the contiguous portion of the continental US would by definition not be covered by the agreement.

Shchukin asked for clarification of the words "most of the contiguous portion of the continental US."

Nitze said that this phrase was meant to describe more than 50% of the contiguous continental United States, i.e., the 48 States, excluding Alaska and Hawaii.

Trusov said that frankly, he did not understand what bearing this had on the definition of an ICBM. Since we were talking about intercontinental ballistic missiles, obviously it was a matter of missiles that could reach the territory of the other country. Furthermore, he did not understand what considerations Nitze was guided by when he spoke of the Interim Agree-

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ment as being intended to freeze new construction of launchers for ICBMs of older types and for land-based fixed soft ICBMs.

Nitze wanted to put his point again. If one defined an ICBM as being a missile with a range of more than 6,700 kilometers, that would mean that any missile with a range less than 6,700 kilometers would not be considered an ICBM by definition, and that new starts for such launchers could be undertaken. Such missiles, depending upon where their launchers were located, could cover more than 50% of the 48-State territory of the United States.

Semenov said that this consideration was clear.

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the Soviet side had expressed its agreement to consider the question of including modern SLBM submarines and their SLBM launchers into the Interim Agreement with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Soviet side was convinced that agreement in principle between the sides on the approach to the solution of this question would contribute to a productive solution and would be of great significance for working out a draft Interim Agreement in the short time remaining to us. Today he would like to continue presentation of some aspects related to the question of modern submarines and the SLBM launchers on these submarines, and he would also complete presentation of the Soviet proposals. In the course of all previous phases of SALT both sides had proceeded from the premise that modernization and replacement of the armaments being limited would not be prohibited. In this connection, in addition to the proposals he had presented the day before, he would state that the Soviet side would consider it necessary to register in the Interim Agreement the right of both sides to modernization and replacement of older submarines by new submarines but without exceeding the number of modern submarines

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and of the SLBM launchers on these submarines, established at appropriate levels for each side. Semenov would also like to note that the solution of the question of including SLBM submarines and their SLBM launchers in the Interim Agreement, which he had proposed yesterday, would represent only partial compensation for the imbalance in SLBMs between the sides. Therefore, the Soviet side proceeded from the premise that this entire question, and above all the question of liquidating US submarine bases beyond US territory, must receive an appropriate solution in the follow-on negotiations, and in this connection he proposed that the appropriate form of recording the mutual understanding on that score be discussed with the US side. The Soviet side had repeatedly stated that the possession of SLBM submarines by US Allies in NATO was a factor that could not fail to be taken into account by the Soviet side. This was an objective reality and, of course, we could not abstract ourselves from this fact. If during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement US Allies in NATO were to increase the number of SLBM submarines in their possession over and above those operational or under construction at the present time, then the Soviet Union reserved the right to appropriately increase the numbers of its SLBM submarines. In stating this, he did not intend to insist that this provision be recorded as part of the text of the Interim Agreement, and the Soviet side was prepared to discuss mutually acceptable ways of solving the question of how such an understanding could be formalized. To accommodate the wishes of the US side the Soviet Union was prepared to agree that the interim freeze agreement remain in effect for a period of five years, unless replaced before the expiration of that period of time by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. There was no doubt that the Soviet proposal to include modern SLBM submarines in the Interim Agreement was constructive. The Soviet side believed that now it was necessary for us to focus our efforts on the search for concrete mutually acceptable language on this question, so as to complete work on drafting the Interim Agreement, bearing in mind that this document, together with the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, could be signed during the Soviet-American summit meeting.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a meeting with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Garthoff noted that the Soviet side had dropped the statement from the US proposed agreed interpretive statement associated with Article I which explained that "new construction" of ICBM launchers meant construction of additional such launchers. The US side could agree to drop that sentence, but only if the Article itself could be slightly reworded to make clear that the undertaking was not to start construction of additional launchers. Alternatively, if the Soviet side wished to retain the agreed draft language about new construction in the Article itself, we considered the additional sentence in the interpretive statement necessary. After some discussion, Grinevskiy agreed that it was clearer in English to speak about not starting construction of additional launchers, but he was uncertain about the effect in Russian, where it was awkward to use the word "additional". Garthoff agreed, but suggested perhaps using in Russian the word "new" modifying launchers. Kishilov and Grinevskiy thought that might be considered, but it might also be ambiguous with respect to not starting more launchers of an old type. The matter was not conclusively resolved, but it was agreed that there was no difference except in terms of determining the best drafting with a view to translatability.

Grinevskiy asked about the second sentence in the Soviet-proposed interpretive statement concerning completion of ICBM launchers under active construction. Garthoff said that the US side was prepared to agree to such a sentence, and he had one with slightly revised wording which he would propose after some other elements involved in the formulation of Article I had been discussed. Grinevskiy indicated satisfaction. Garthoff noted that the American side assumed on the basis of previous exchanges on that subject that the words "active construction" excluded cases of launchers construction of which had been initiated several years ago but abandoned a long time ago. The Soviet participants agreed that "active construction" related to launchers on which in fact construction remained underway.

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Garthoff noted that the Soviet formulation continued not to cover mobile land-based ICBMs. In the US view, such mobile launchers should be included. Nonetheless, bearing in mind that Article VII provided that obligations of the Interim Agreement would not prejudice the terms of limitations to be worked out in subsequent negotiation, and to find a mutually acceptable solution to the matter, the US side was prepared to refer in the Article itself simply to "fixed" ICBM launchers. However, in such a case, there should be an agreed interpretive statement to the effect that: "The Parties agree that they will not deploy land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of operation of the Interim Agreement." Grinevskiy said that the Soviet position with respect to mobile ICBM launchers had been clearly stated, but he would take note of and report the US proposal. He did not comment directly upon the use of the word "fixed" in place of "silo and fixed soft" as stated in the Soviet language, but he seemed to accept the abbreviated form.

Garthoff noted that two problems remained in connection with the definition contained in an interpretive statement. First, the US side believed that the definition should state clearly that ICBM launchers are land-based. Incidentally, the US side agreed with the Soviet suggestion to couch the definition in terms of ICBM launchers, rather than ICBMs. Grinevskiy said there was no difference in substance with respect to the term "land-based". Garthoff suggested that it was much simpler to use the term in the definition, and to omit it in the many other cases where reference was made to ICBMs or ICBM launchers. Grinevskiy suggested that it would still be clearer, at least in some cases, to use the term "land-based" in the actual Articles. Moreover, the interpretive statement would not necessarily appear together with the Articles. Turning to the second issue involved in the definition, Garthoff noted that the Soviet definition was not satisfactory, for reasons which had been indicated in the Delegates' meeting the day before. For this reason, the US side continued to believe that the definition it had proposed was appropriate. Grinevskiy did not accept, nor argue against, the American-proposed definition. He indicated that the matter was under study in his

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Delegation. He did not propose the definition included in the Soviet proposal of May 6.

After having run through the considerations summarized above, Garthoff gave the Soviet participants a text reflecting the points which had been discussed. (See Section U.)

Turning to Article II, Garthoff asked why the Soviet side continued to limit application of the Article to ICBMs, rather than to non-conversion into launchers for modern heavy strategic ballistic missiles in general. Grinevskiy said that his Delegation had always looked at this problem in terms of ICBMs, since there were heavy land-based ICBMs, and there were no other heavy strategic ballistic missiles. He said that since the recent discussion where Garthoff had referred for the first time to SLBMs in this connection, his Delegation had again considered this matter and did not believe it appropriate or necessary to refer to anything but heavy land-based ICBMs. He asked whether the US side had or expected to have heavy SLBMs. Garthoff replied that neither side presently had heavy SLBMs, and it was unlikely that any would be deployed during the period of the freeze. Nonetheless, because of the significance of very large strategic missiles, the US side had thought it appropriate to use the broader formulation. However, since the matter was not one of current concern, and since the interim freeze related only to certain offensive weapons limitations, the US side was prepared without prejudice to future more complete limitations to agree in the interim freeze that the language of Article II refer to modern heavy ICBMs. Grinevskiy expressed satisfaction. Garthoff then proposed a simplified Article II, which he wished to present in conjunction with revised interpretive statements associated with the Article. (See Section U.)

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet proposal of May 6 included a formulation to deal with the question of "modern" launchers in the Article II itself. Why was it necessary to have the second sentence of the proposal just advanced? Garthoff agreed that it would be possible to include the substance of the point in the Article,

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although with some drafting changes from the Soviet formulation. Grinevskiy indicated that drafting changes would present no problem. Garthoff repeated that this could be done, but that it might be useful first to consider other aspects of the Article, including the distinction between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs. Grinevskiy said there was no need for definition of light and heavy ICBMs. Each side knew which ICBMs were light and which were heavy. Moreover, the Soviet-proposed article, in conjunction with an interpretive statement relating to not increasing substantially the external dimensions of ICBM silo launchers, would deal with the whole problem. Garthoff disagreed. He said that whether in an interpretive statement or in the Article, it was necessary to have a clear, common understanding of the difference between light and heavy ICBMs. He agreed that we both understood the categorization of contemporary ICBMs, but a definition was needed in order to deal with possible future missiles. Moreover, while a provision on not increasing the dimensions of silo launchers was important to assist in verifying this provision, it could not serve as a substitute for a clear definition of what it was that was to be verified. Grinevskiy continued to contend that it was unnecessary to define heavy ICBMs. Garthoff noted that the Soviet definition referred to heavy ICBMs only in connection with modern ones, and not in connection with older types. Grinevskiy suggested that there was no need for such reference, nor indeed for any reference to "light" ICBMs; perhaps all that was needed was to agree not to convert launchers for older ICBMs into launchers for current heavy ones. Garthoff disagreed. The question was left unresolved, with both sides agreeing to consider it further.

There followed an extended discussion of the interpretive statement relating to dimensions of silo launchers. Garthoff asked what the Soviet side meant by "external dimensions", and why it was so specified. Garthoff produced a chart which depicted types of missile silos, with and without internal sleeves, and asked the Soviet participants if they would point out what the external dimensions of a silo were. Both Grinevskiy and Kishilov said they did not know, but agreed to look into the matter further for clarification.

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Grinevskiy referred to the fact that the Soviet proposal included the qualifier "observable with the aid of national technical means of verification". Garthoff noted that the US side considered it unnecessary and undesirable to include such a phrase. Grinevskiy argued that both sides agreed that the agreement should be verified by national means. Garthoff agreed, and said that for that reason it was unnecessary, and it could be invidious to make such a reference in an individual case. The US side indeed agreed that this provision, like all others, would be monitored by national technical means. If, however, the Soviet side had in mind in addition using the estimated performance of national technical means as an element in establishing the standard for permissible increase in silo dimensions, the US was not prepared to agree to such an approach. National technical means would be used, but we could not accept a situation where an obligation itself was defined in terms of performance of national technical means. Grinevskiy argued strongly for inclusion of the phrase, but Garthoff was adamant in opposing its inclusion.

Garthoff asked what the Soviet side meant by speaking of no "substantial increase". Grinevskiy argued that it was not possible to quantify precisely what the term meant, but he thought both sides understood what "substantial" meant, and it would always be possible to raise any question in the Standing Consultative Commission. Garthoff agreed that any question could be raised, but that it was surely in the mutual interests of both to reduce uncertainties and inquiries. He said he was not sure if both sides understood what the word "substantial" meant. Incidentally, a different word had been used from the one employed in the interpretive statement on test and training launchers. Grinevskiy and Kishilov both said that it made no particular difference whether the word used was "substantial" or "significant".

It was agreed that further consideration needed to be given to the terms "heavy"; "internal or external dimensions", "substantial increase", and to the best combination of form with respect to what should be included in the Article and what should be left to an interpretive statement.

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Grinevskiy asked whether the American proposal for including in paragraph 3 of Article V the sentence "Each Party shall not use covered facilities for fitting out or berthing submarines" was necessary.

Garthoff replied that it was, in order to contribute to the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. Grinevskiy gave what appeared to be a prepared response, arguing that the provision was unnecessary and inappropriate; unnecessary, because there was no need for such explicit mention since the subject was covered adequately by the agreed language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article (relating to non-interference with national technical means, and non-use of deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technical means); and inappropriate, because it was not proper to single out submarines for particular attention--such reference raised a question about other systems not mentioned.

Garthoff noted with satisfaction the Soviet acceptance of the first two sentences of paragraph 2 of Article VIII by the Soviet side. Grinevskiy interrupted to point out that the Soviet side now agreed officially to the American proposal for a revised wording of paragraph 1 of the Article as well. Garthoff then asked why the Soviet side had not included in its draft the proposed final sentence of paragraph 2 ("If this aim [a more comprehensive agreement] has not been achieved in five years, this Interim Agreement may be extended by mutual agreement.").

Grinevskiy replied that it was quite unnecessary to note that two parties might at a future time decide something by mutual agreement, and, moreover, that it would appear that the parties were not even now confident in their expectation that a more comprehensive agreement would be reached in five years. For that matter, Grinevskiy continued, five years was really too long; it should be two or three.

Grinevskiy then raised the subject of the draft agreed interpretive statement on test and training launchers. He produced a new Soviet proposal, based closely upon the previous ad hoc draft developed at a

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recent meeting of the Group of Four. Garthoff produced a new draft on his part as well, and several areas of overlap were noted. There was some discussion of whether the term "land-based" should or should not be used in modifying "ICBM". Garthoff objected that in the first clause of the Soviet draft it was ambiguous whether the term "land-based" qualified only ICBM launchers or also SLBM test and training launchers. Grinevskiy agreed to delete the word "land-based" in that clause, in exchange for American agreement to include the phrase in the next clause referring to modern heavy ICBMs.

(The text of the Soviet proposal, and the agreed compromise text which emerged from the meeting without any bracketed differences, are included in Section U.)

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Kishilov acknowledged the awkwardness of the problem of reconciling a date of signature, an arbitrary specific date such as July 1, and date of entry into force. He said that in practice there was not any real difference, but they hoped Semenov's suggestion of the day before would provide a solution. As for Article I of the Interim Agreement, they did not think that reference to date of signature for an obligation, in distinction to a descriptive reference such as occurred at several other points, was appropriate. They had not been able to come up with a better solution than to suggest the date of July 1. I asked if July 1 was any better than June 1, and Kishilov replied it made no difference.

I berated Kishilov for Semenov's recital of considerations concerning SLBM forward basing, our allies, etc. Kishilov remarked that what had been said was "not new." I agreed, but said that I had not expected it to be repeated again at this time. Kishilov commented, almost apologetically, that "instructions are instructions."

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

I remarked it was a coincidence that our big remaining problems were in Articles III, one in the ABM Treaty and one in the Interim Treaty. Semenov said he hoped this was not so as regards Article III of the Interim Agreement. This could be very simple and a side agreement could express our more detailed understandings on SLBMs. I said we awaited with interest more concrete indications of their position and if it involved confidential agreements on the side, I did not see how this was possible for us. The Congress, and the public, would expect to know the facts and this could be important for the agreements. Semenov said he expected to make their position clear later today (and so he did).

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT expert Shelepin during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisors Graybeal and Shinn, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

There was an extended discussion of the words "external dimensions" in the Soviet draft agreed statement for Article II of the Interim Agreement. Initially, Shelepin said that this wording was used because only the "external dimensions" were observable by national technical means of verification. However, after Graybeal pressed the point that "external dimensions" were meaningless in determining the size of missile which could be accommodated by a silo launcher, making his point visually by use of a rough diagram, Shelepin wondered whether there might not be a linguistic misunderstanding involved. Specifically, the Soviet words translated as "launcher" ("puskovaya ustanovka") might designate only the internal part of the silo so that the Soviet formulation "external dimensions" might actually mean the same thing as "interior diameter" in our concept. Shelepin confessed that he was not an expert in these matters but said he would bring this possibility to the attention of those who were.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Weiler, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet Delegation would be addressing the SLBM question this afternoon and said that he hoped that the mobile ICBM question would not be a stumbling block to an agreement. I said that with respect to mobiles the idea of a situation under an interim offensive agreement in which the Soviets would or could proceed with the deployment of mobile ICBMs was just not part of the practical world and that I was sure he was fully aware of this. Grinevskiy responded that the Interim Agreement would be only a partial one and did not include various systems. He said that as far as the Soviet Union knew the US might be proceeding with B-1's, ULMS and also had Pershings in Europe that could hit the Soviet Union. I said he was mistaken about Pershings and that the Soviet Union undoubtedly knew enough about US plans with respect to B-1's and ULMS to lead me to believe that he was merely making debating points. I added that the Soviet side would have to face up to a solution of the mobile ICBM question if it expected an agreement to be reached and expected an agreement to be supported in the US. Grinevskiy replied that if the US had serious objections to the fact that the Soviets had not suggested a way to deal with the mobile ICBM question, the US should make this fact clear, adding that silence on the part of the US Delegation would be interpreted as agreement. Grinevskiy then said that, speaking personally, he would tell me that the only instructions the Soviet Delegation had on this question were to continue to oppose inclusion of mobile ICBMs in the Interim Agreement.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Kishilov did not wish to go into the substance of the Soviet SLBM position at that time, but he did say that it would involve a general provision for inclusion as Article III of the Interim Agreement, plus one or more interpretive agreements or understandings "on the side". Such a side understanding with specific numbers might, for example, remain confidential. Kishilov also disclosed that the Soviet proposed article would not include a freeze date, but was couched in terms of levels (differing) of modern submarines and of SLBM launchers for the sides.

Kishilov remarked that the American Delegation had apparently not delivered itself of all the points it had intended to raise in the meeting Sunday afternoon. I said that was correct, and that in particular we had not had time to mention one point of particular importance: inclusion of land-mobile ICBM launchers in the freeze. Kishilov replied that, as I knew, their position was that mobile launchers should not be included. I said that this was a matter of considerable importance to us. Would we be able to reach a mutually acceptable solution more readily if we dealt with this matter in an agreed interpretive statement? Kishilov said, in high confidence, that there was some partial fallback in the Soviet position, and thought that it could be helpful to make an agreed interpretive statement. I said that I would make such a move at the meeting of the Group of Four that afternoon.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a meeting with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy referred to the fact that the Soviet proposal included the qualifier "observable with the aid of national technical means of verification". Garthoff noted that the US side considered it unnecessary and undesirable to include such a phrase. Grinevskiy argued that both sides agreed that the agreement should be verified by national means. Garthoff agreed, and said that for that reason it was unnecessary, and it could be invidious to make such a reference in an individual case. The US side indeed agreed that this provision, like all others, would be monitored by national technical means. If, however, the Soviet side had in mind in addition using the estimated performance of national technical means as an element in establishing the standard for permissible increase in silo dimensions, the US was not prepared to agree to such an approach. National technical means would be used, but we could not accept a situation where an obligation itself was defined in terms of performance of national technical means. Grinevskiy argued strongly for inclusion of the phrase, but Garthoff was adamant in opposing its inclusion.

Grinevskiy asked whether the American proposal for including in paragraph 3 of Article V the sentence "Each Party shall not use covered facilities for fitting out or berthing submarines" was necessary.

Garthoff replied that it was, in order to contribute to the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. Grinevskiy gave what appeared to be a prepared response, arguing that the provision was unnecessary and inappropriate; unnecessary, because there was no need for such explicit mention

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since the subject was covered adequately by the agreed language in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Article (relating to non-interference with national technical means, and non-use of deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technical means); and inappropriate, because it was not proper to single out submarines for particular attention--such reference raised a question about other systems not mentioned.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT expert Shelepin during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisors Graybeal and Shinn, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

There was an extended discussion of the words "external dimensions" in the Soviet draft agreed statement for Article II of the Interim Agreement. Initially, Shelepin said that this wording was used because only the "external dimensions" were observable by national technical means of verification. However, after Graybeal pressed the point that "external dimensions" were meaningless in determining the size of missile which could be accommodated by a silo launcher, making his point visually by use of a rough diagram, Shelepin wondered whether there might not be a linguistic misunderstanding involved. Specifically, the Soviet words translated as "launcher" ("puskovaya ustanovka") might designate only the internal part of the silo so that the Soviet formulation "external dimensions" might actually mean the same thing as "interior diameter" in our concept. Shelepin confessed that he was not an expert in these matters but said he would bring this possibility to the attention of those who were.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Kishilov said the Soviet position was firmly against inclusion of an explicit provision prohibiting covered facilities for fitting-out or berthing submarines, even as an agreed interpretive statement. He said such a provision was not needed, given the general provision not to use deliberate concealment measures impeding verification by national technical means.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov indicated that they now understood clearly the power/antenna product of the MSR radar. He noted that we had referred for the first time to the receiver antenna area, since we were speaking about a standard for other types of large phased-array radars. I confirmed that such was precisely the case. I commented that, as he no doubt knew, for the MSR the receiver antenna area and transmitter antenna area were essentially the same, but that since this was not the case with large bistatic radars, we did indeed wish to specify a clear standard which would apply to them. Pleshakov said that the potential of a radar should really be based on the product of power and transmitter antenna area, but he could understand that from the standpoint of judging by use of national technical means it would be appropriate to use the receiver antenna area. (Comment: This did not correspond to my understanding of the reason for specifying receiver antenna area--namely, that it was the relevant parameter for gauging effective range of a radar, but since Pleshakov seemed to accept the definition we were seeking, and since I am not expert on radar matters, I did not pursue this point further.)

I asked Pleshakov what the Soviet side meant in referring to certain radars for ABM defense of ICBM silos as "substantially smaller" in potential than the smallest currently deployed ABM radar. I noted I assumed the latter referent is the MSR. Pleshakov confirmed the MSR as the referent, and said that by "substantially smaller" they meant "smaller by one order of magnitude." He further commented that, in any event, there was a large "gray area" in judging such things by national technical means. I agreed with the latter comment, but said that there should nonetheless be a clear understanding on the qualitative level to which the two sides would limit a class of radars, and his indication of what his side meant by "substantially smaller" was very helpful in that respect. Pleshakov agreed that there should be an agreed standard.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a Delegates' meeting, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov said that with due account for the two drafts for Article III of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems tabled by the two Delegations, it now appeared necessary to state the following considerations:

(1) Both Delegations had a common understanding on:

(a) the number and nature of areas for deployment of ABM systems, i.e., one area for each side in which an ABM system would be deployed for defense of the national capital and one area for each side in which an ABM system would be deployed for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

(b) equality in the size of areas of deployment of ABM system components--circular areas with a radius of 150 kilometers.

(c) equality in numbers of ABM launchers and interceptors, i.e., no more than 100 of each in each area, both for defense of national capitals and for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

There was also convergence of positions on a number of other questions. In the view of the Soviet side this situation brought the two Delegations closer to the possibility of agreeing on a joint draft for Article III of the draft Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems.

(2) As for differences in views between the two Delegations, they concerned the specific question of radars to be used for ABM defense of ICBM launchers. He would like to note that the Soviet side had agreed to the US proposal to limit the number of modern ABM radar complexes in each area to six. The specific difference consisted in that the US Delegation believed that for protection of ICBM launchers ABM radars within

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these complexes, which were not operational or under construction on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty, should have a smaller potential than the smallest phased-array ABM radar protecting ICBMs which is operational or under construction on the date of signature of the ABM Treaty. In substance, in so doing the US Delegation would provide for itself the unilateral right to have two larger ABM radars, and thereby it was departing from the principle of providing equal terms for the limitation of ABM systems. In working out the draft Treaty on ABMs, the Soviet Delegation proceeded from the premise that one should not try to prescribe for the sides any single technical approach to the deployment of ABM systems in defense of ICBM launchers. A number of different ways of solving this problem were possible, all of which would be fully consistent with the principles and aims underlying the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side had repeatedly stated its considerations on this question. As the US side knew, they were reflected in the Soviet draft for Article III which stated that deployment of ABM radars having a substantially smaller potential than those used in modern ABM radar complexes within the areas of ABM system deployment in defense of ICBM silo launchers would not be limited. In this connection, in the opinion of the Soviet side the doubts raised by the US side the day before were not convincing.

Further, at yesterday's mini-plenary meeting, the US side had raised the question of defining the geographic location of ICBM launchers to be defended by ABM systems. The Soviet side in its proposed text for Article III had included an appropriate provision on this subject in subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, a provision that would solve this problem. The Soviet side believed that the formula in that proposal was sufficient for purposes of the ABM Treaty and, moreover, it assumed that the sides had a clear understanding of how an adequate number of ICBM launchers could be protected by ABM systems.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze following a Delegates' meeting, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin began the conversation by drawing a picture of a capital defense deployment area and illustrating thereby that the Soviet side wish six MARCs in addition to the four locations in which they today have mechanical scan-dish radars. He also made it clear that they do not intend to deploy more than an aggregate of 100 interceptors/launchers at a deployment area. I made the point that, in my view, the word "deployed" meant not only those deployed in the future, but included those which had been deployed in the past. For greater certainty of clarity we had proposed using the word "have." In either case, I believed an exception covering the mechanical scan-dish radars would be necessary in Article III, paragraph 1(a).

We then discussed the question of the location of the ICBM defense deployment areas. I said that we must have language making it clear that their area would be either east of the Urals or at least "outside of the European portion of the Soviet Union"; language which, as I remembered it, he had suggested at Vienna. Shchukin said there was a problem with respect to how such an area would be centered. I said that it was not our intention to center our area in a way which would include launchers outside of Grand Forks field. Shchukin said that was helpful to him.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Garthoff opened by suggesting that the participants turn in the first instance to Article III of the ABM Treaty. He noted that the only difference in the lead-in of paragraph 1 was the US use of the phrase "ABM systems or ABM components" and the Soviet use of "ABM systems or their components". He asked if the Soviet side had any preference. Grinevskiy said that the Soviet side continued to prefer its formulation, since that was the standard formulation used in the other articles, and it seemed quite clear. Garthoff agreed to accept the Soviet formulation. He then noted that there was a difference between terms in referring to the deployment area for defending the national capital. The US draft referred to a "national capital defense deployment area", while the Soviet draft referred to "an ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital." Garthoff said that the Soviet formulation seemed clearer, and agreed to accept it. Garthoff noted that the Soviet draft used the verb "deploy" with respect to launchers and interceptors, while the US draft used the verb "have". Garthoff suggested that, particularly in view of the discussion the day before, the word "have" would be preferable. Grinevskiy noted that there might be some components which were produced in a factory, for example, within the 150 kilometer circle, but he believed that neither side meant to include such components. Garthoff agreed, but said that he thought this point was dealt with by the next change he would like to suggest. The US text referred to interceptor missiles "on or in the vicinity of ABM launcher's"; this phrase was absent in the Soviet version. He would now like to propose inserting at that point the words "at launch sites". The sentence would then speak about having 100 launchers and 100 interceptor missiles at launch sites, clearly avoiding the possible case Grinevskiy had mentioned. Grinevskiy accepted the suggestion to include the words "at launch sites", and agreed to consider further the possible use of the verb "have".

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Grinevskiy suggested that it was unnecessary to include the reference to retaining operational mechanical-scan radars, since they were not included in MARCs, and the article simply limited MARCs. Garthoff rejoined that this was not the case, since the Article involves an undertaking not to deploy ABM components except as specified, and the older ABM radars and ABM components. The US side would have no objection to deleting reference to the mechanical-scan radars if the Soviet side preferred, but he wished to note that this would mean that the four existing mechanical-scan radar complexes would need to be dismantled. Grinevskiy asked, in some agitation, if this was an American proposal. Garthoff replied that it seemed to be a Soviet proposal -- the US draft spoke about retaining currently operational mechanical-scan radars. After the discussion had continued for some time, Grinevskiy said his Delegation had not considered the full implications of the way the article was drafted, and they would reconsider the question of including the clause about mechanical-scan radars.

Garthoff further noted that the Soviet side would be retaining certain existing radars at Moscow in addition to the equal number of six MARCs for each side, and that the US would retain the existing two radars at Grand Forks, in addition to a proposed equal number of six MARCs for each side for ICBM defense. Grinevskiy objected strongly to this attempt to equate the two. Kishilov said that we had long ago agreed that the Soviet side could have the existing mechanical-scan radars in addition to an equal number of MARCs. The Soviets had moved to meet us by agreeing to place their two large existing radars at Moscow in the six MARCs, although their earlier position had been six MARCs plus those two large radars. Under those circumstances, the US could not have two large radars at Grand Forks and the Soviet side not have an equivalent. The definitions in paragraph 2 were readily conformed, except for the US reference to ICBM de-

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fenses west of the Mississippi and east of the Urals, and Soviet proposed language on centering ICBM defenses in the immediate area of ICBM silo deployment. (In addition, the definition of MARCs hinges in part on resolution of the ICBM radar divergence.) Garthoff argued that the Soviet formulation on centering the ICBM defense at the place where such deployment is most advanced could be interpreted as denying the USSR any such ABM deployment. Moreover, since the US deployment at Grand Forks had already substantially occurred, there was no need to attempt to define it in this round-about way. Grinevskiy confirmed that the objective of the Soviet language was to tie the American deployment to its present location in the Grand Forks ICBM field, since otherwise the 150 kilometer circle would permit such deployment being made midway between the Grand Forks ICBM field and the next nearest American ICBM field, thus providing coverage for many more than 150 silos. Garthoff noted that the language of the provisions must apply equally to both sides, and the Soviet language would mean that the USSR could not deploy its ABM components midway between ICBM fields, which we understood was necessary to permit coverage of 150 silos. Grinevskiy agreed. He suggested that we try to find some way to satisfy the concern of some people on his side that the US might take advantage of a provision permitting deployment which could cover the larger number of silos, while preserving opportunity for the Soviet deployment to cover a number of silos comparable to those at Grand Forks. He suggested that perhaps we could refer to Grand Forks for the United States, and east of the Urals for the USSR. Garthoff indicated that he doubted that would be acceptable.

Garthoff presented a slightly revised version of the US proposal for an agreed interpretive statement on OLPARs. He noted that it referred to the smallest phased-array ABM radar "operational or under construction by either side ... on the date of signature", rather than "currently being deployed by either side". Grinevskiy did not seem to find any objection to it. Garthoff noted that the new formulation also

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included the phrase which had just been agreed for Article III, "within an ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silos". Grinevskiy nodded, and expressed no objection. Finally, Garthoff noted the reference to Article VI (b), rather than merely Article VI. Again the Soviet participants registered no disagreement. Grinevskiy said that they were not in a position to discuss the basic substance of the statement at that time. He did, however wish to raise one drafting point from his side. His specialists did not like our use of the phrase "objects in outer space" rather than "space objects", since the American language would include missiles transiting space, and they were covered by the provision concerning Article VI (b). Since Article VI (b) was also listed as an exception, there was no practical difference in this case, but the Soviet side continued to prefer what they regarded as the more precise term "space objects", by which was meant such things as meteorites, and artificial satellites.

Garthoff noted that agreement had been reached to use the Soviet suggested shortened form of Article VI (b). The US side would, however, like to change the English language version of the formulation from "early warning radars for strategic ballistic missiles in the future" to "in the future radars for early warning of strategic missile attack". Garthoff thought that this would not require any change in the Russian language text. Grinevskiy said he had doubts about the word "attack", and wondered whether it was necessary to make any change in something earlier agreed. Garthoff again said that there was no change required in the Russian; the Russian language text used the phrase "warning of rocket attack". Kishilov also noted this latter point. Grinevskiy said he would take the new formulation, and thought there would be no trouble if the Russian text was unchanged.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Following a rehearsal of our respective positions on radars under Article III of the ABM Treaty and mention of OLPARs, Minister Semenov said that their requirements had to take into account modern air defenses. Aircraft equipped with modern missiles required suitable radar deployments for defense.

I asked Semenov if they had thought about arrangements for the Standing Consultative Commission. The Treaty specified some things in Article XIII but others had to be worked out -- location, composition, meeting date, duration, etc. Semenov said that these things could be settled upon ratification of the Treaty. I replied that I had thought we needed to look at them sooner as the Commission was supposed to exist when the Treaty came into force.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov asked my opinion of the latest Soviet proposal for Article III of the ABM Treaty. I said that there appeared to be a good deal of common understanding on much of the language and provisions of their latest proposal and the US proposal. There were, however, two major problems as regards the latest Soviet proposal; namely, limits and constraints on ABM radars for ICBM defense and the location of the ICBM silos to be defended by ABMs in the USSR. Minister Pleshakov ignored the ABM radar problem. In regard to the question of the geographic area of the Soviet ICBMs to be defended by ABMs, he said that a careful reading of the Soviet draft article would make their views perfectly clear.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

We had an inconclusive discussion about the mechanical-scan dish-type radars at Moscow, in terms of whether it was necessary to make specific reference to them in the text of Article III, but we agreed that this was essentially a matter of drafting, and that it was difficult to deal with it without having texts before us.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor FitzGerald, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

During the luncheon for the Soviet Delegation, I talked briefly to Minister Pleshakov. I asked why the latest Soviet proposal for Article III of the ABM Treaty had omitted the words "at sites" when it had been included in all the earlier formulations. Unlike Col. Anyutin, Minister Pleshakov said the words had been deliberately omitted. He went on to say that the reason why the words had been dropped revolved around the fact that the sides have agreed to deploy only 100 interceptors and launchers within each ABM deployment area. He then asked if I knew what the Soviet side means by a "launch site", i.e., what is deployed within an ABM launch site. I said I assumed it included the launcher, interceptor for the launcher, command and control equipment, the necessary handling equipment; plus storage facilities for interceptors. Pleshakov said the latter were not a part of an ABM position; consequently, if the words "at sites" were to be used one could get around the clear intent of both sides to limit the number of interceptors available. For this reason, he thought the words should not be used in Article III. Minister Scmenov's departure prevented further discussion of the question with Minister Pleshakov.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

When Kishilov asked what I saw as the principal remaining problems, I replied: terms of SLEM inclusion in the freeze, and radars for ICBM defense. In the latter connection, I went on, the US side did not agree to unlimited numbers of ABM radars to support 100 ABM interceptors -- even when the potential of such radars was substantially constrained. (Kishilov had observed that I had discussed this latter question with Minister Pleshakov, sitting on the other side during the luncheon, and suggested that the Minister and I had had, he was sure, a useful exchange.) I objected strongly to the Soviet approach of agreeing to six MARCs with no qualitative limitations on radars deployed in them, plus quantitatively unlimited radars of limited potential. I pointed out to Kishilov that the Soviet side was retaining four major non-phased-array ABM radar complexes at Moscow in addition to the six MARCs available to each side. I suggested that we could similarly make an exception for the two large American radars at Grand Forks -- the PAR and the MSR there -- and add to them some equitable equal radar structure suitable for supporting more than 100 interceptors. This could be six MARCs with qualitative restraints on the radars within them, but perhaps we could explore an alternative route that identified a given number of radars, rather than complexes of three kilometers diameter. Specifically, perhaps we could consider twelve radars of less than MSR potential for each side. In this connection, we could consider the Soviet proposal for radars "substantially less" than the MSR. Kishilov immediately objected to the idea that the American PAR and MSR could in any way be regarded as an equivalent to the older non-phased-array radars around Moscow. He said that if we wished, we too could have four older non-phased-array radar complexes at Washington. But it was quite necessary for political as well as (by implication, rather than for) military reasons for the Soviet Union

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to have the right to have two large phased-array radars such as the US has. Apart from that point, Kishilov expressed interest in the proposition that each side might have, say, twelve radars rather than six MARCs. He said that in such an approach he was sure that the Soviet side would not be prepared to limit these radars to a level "substantially smaller" than the MSR; it would have to be the level "smaller than" the MSR. I said that with the right for each side to have two large radars -- to take, for the moment, Kishilov's variant of my suggestion -- I thought it more appropriate to consider twelve radars for each side of which two would be large and the remaining ten smaller than the MSR level. Kishilov said that this proposition would be considered, but he doubted if he would have a response before Wednesday at best, since Monday and Tuesday are VE Day holidays in Moscow.

I remarked that the Soviet side had once again referred explicitly to defense of national capitals, and inquired why they had conducted the strange excursion into obscure and indirect identification of the national capitals. Kishilov noted that this was now a matter of the past, but said that frankly the reason was that there was some indication of objection in certain Republic capitals in the USSR to explicitly giving this different protected status to Moscow.

[REDACTED]

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Anyutin during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor FitzGerald, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

During the luncheon for the Soviet Delegation, I asked why the Soviet side had omitted the words "at sites" in the latest proposal for Article III of the ABM Treaty. I noted that they had consistently used the words "no more than 100 interceptors at sites" in all previous formulations of this article. Anyutin reacted with considerable surprise and said that he had not realized the words had been omitted. He took the view that it would be a simple matter to insert the words "at sites" since it was the intention of both sides to deploy no more than 100 interceptors for 100 launchers. (Comment: Minister Pleshakov's different reaction is reported in a separate Memcon.)

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Surikov and expert Obukhov during a luncheon conversation with US SALT advisor Leard, 8 May 1972, Helsinki:

Leard inquired why the Soviets had not accepted the US language in Article III of the ABM Treaty "east of the Urals and west of the Mississippi" with reference to the location of the ICBM defense deployment area. The current Soviet wording was vague and did not make it clear where the Soviet ICBM defense deployment area would be located.

Surikov responded that the Soviets have a better solution but understand our problem. They will further address the issue soon. Obukhov also confirmed his personal understanding of the problem and the fact that they planned to further address the issue.