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these indications of a serious remaining difficulty on this subject. Garthoff said he shared that regret and both he and Parsons emphasized the high attention given to this subject by the American Delegation.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a Delegates' meeting, 17 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin said that on May 14 of this year the Soviet Delegation had given the US side a draft for a joint statement on Article VI of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems. This draft provided for agreement between the parties not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding ten million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for purposes of tracking space objects or use as national technical means of verification. The obligation provided for in Article VI precluded possibility of using non-ABM radars for ABM defense purposes. Therefore the Soviet side continued to believe that this obligation in combination with the obligation provided for in Article I was quite sufficient. At the same time, in a desire to accommodate the considerations expressed by the US side, the Soviet side had tabled a draft for the above-mentioned statement. He would like to say that the magnitude of the potential referred to in the Soviet draft joint statement on Article VI left no doubt that it did not reflect that which Smith seemed to have had in mind when he had spoken at the limited composition meeting on May 10. The Soviet proposal was dictated by the desire of the Soviet side to find mutually acceptable language for still unagreed questions. In this connection, the Soviet side continues to believe that the draft joint statement of Article VI it had handed the US Delegation was completely in line with the purposes and objectives of this Article.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 17 May 1972, Helsinki:

Regarding the Soviet proposal for maximum permissible power-aperture product for OLPARs, Trusov said the Soviet side had already moved very far in order to achieve compromise on this question and there is no room left for further "retreat" on their part. I stated again--and firmly--that the new Soviet position that 10^7 WM^2 be the criterion for OLPARs is not acceptable.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin recalled that some twenty years ago, one of his associates had come into his office and proposed the construction of a radar appropriate for an antiballistic missile system. His equations had indicated that the radar should be higher than a ten-story building and about as wide as it was high. Shchukin had objected that such a radar would be a monstrosity from an economic standpoint. One would not be able to build it in a factory; one would have to build it on the spot. It would be enormous and take many years to build and vastly expensive. Nevertheless, it had been done. He doubted, however, that there would be a desire on either side to build many more such radars; particularly, when the true effectiveness of such an ABM defense was wholly doubtful.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a Delegates' meeting, 17 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that as a philosopher he would like to cite a comparison, a common type of reasoning. For example, what was the meaning of "up"? It could be said that "up" was not "down," it could be said that "father" was not "son" or "daughter." Here we were dealing with a violation of concepts where what was up could also be seen as down and where a son could also be seen as a father. At the end of such an approach, as Mark Twain had once said, one could end up saying that one's grandson was also one's grandfather. Movement, of course, was understandable, there was movement, but there was also stability. In shaping the Soviet approach to what was a heavy missile we could not say that heavy missiles are light missiles. Semenov pointed out that he was speaking as a philosopher and although this perhaps would not satisfy Mr. Nitze, it would serve to relieve tension.

Semenov said that in the course of more than two years the Soviet side had clearly stated that the definition of heavy missiles as having a volume in excess of 70 cubic meters was not suitable for the Soviet side. Frankly he did not understand the insistence with which this proposal was being raised again, a proposal on which the Soviet side had already expressed its views. At the same time, he proceeded from the premise that the sides would assume the obligation for the duration of the Interim Agreement not to convert launchers for light missiles into launchers for heavy missiles. As a matter of fact, the entire question had been formulated by the Soviet side in an effort to accommodate the proposals advanced by the US side. We should recall who was the father of this child. In this case we could definitely determine the father since the Soviet formulation was submitted in response to what had been proposed by the US side. He would ask that the US side accept it in the form in which it was presented. If the need for greater clarification would arise in the future,



we would, after all, have recourse in the Consultative Commission to be established in accordance with Article XIII in the ABM Treaty. He believed that we could find a mutually acceptable solution, given the desire on both sides to do so.