


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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov said that, the Delegations had already agreed Article I of the Draft Treaty on Limiting ABM Systems. This Article was of fundamental importance to that document as a whole. As is known, according to the provisions of that Article, the Parties undertake not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of the country and not to provide a base for such a defense. The Soviet Delegation proceeds from the premise that Article I is, therefore, a fully reliable guarantee against any attempts by either side to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty being worked out, including use of the permitted ABM components contrary to its spirit and letter.

Pleshakov said that the general undertakings by the sides provided in Article I are complemented by the contents of other articles of the Draft Treaty, including the undertakings by the sides to deploy ABM systems within two areas only. The undertaking not to create the base for deployment of an ABM system for a defense of the territory of the country is also complemented by the clearly defined limitations on ABM deployment areas, namely, that ABM systems would be deployed only for defense of national capitals and ICBM silos within areas, each of which would be circular and have a 150-kilometer radius. It was also necessary to bear in mind the specific quantitative limitations on ABM system components as a whole, which were contained in Article III. In addition, the Draft Article III also provides for constraints on the potential of the ABM radars deployed for defense of ICBMs.

Pleshakov said that these constraints are still one more guarantee that the limitations provided in the Draft ABM Treaty are quite adequate to fully exclude the creation of a base for an ABM defense of the territory of the country. It is perfectly clear that all these undertakings were very consistent with Article I and gave it specific meaning or content. b(3)



Pleshakov concluded that, in view of all the aforesaid, it was clear to the Soviet side that, regardless of the geographic location of ABM deployment areas for ICBM defense, deployment of those systems within the framework of the limitations worked out in the Treaty cannot facilitate creation of a base for deployment of ABM systems for defense of the territory of the country. Raising the question of spelling out the location of ABM deployment areas for defense of ICBMs seems to the Soviet Delegation to be unfounded. The Soviet Delegation was authorized to declare its objection to this US proposal.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Fitzgerald, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov opened our informal Post-Mini-Plenary conversation by repeating most of the statements he had made during the Mini-Plenary as to why there is no need to define the geographic location of the ABM deployment area for ICBM defense. He listed such constraints as the number of launchers and interceptors to be deployed, the limited number of deployment areas and the constraints placed on the 18 ABM radars for ICBM defense. He concluded that all of these constraints make it impossible to deploy a territorial ABM system even if the two ABM deployment areas were to be located immediately adjacent to each other. He placed the greatest emphasis on the constraints to be placed on the 18 ABM radars limiting them to less than 3×10^6 .

I disagreed with him on several accounts. Initially, I said that he had, in my view, overemphasized the 3×10^6 limitation on the 18 ABM radars, if only because the difference in potential might be as small as 1 watt. Pleshakov disagreed, saying that national means could not detect such a minute difference. The difference would be "substantial" (sushchestvenno) and my familiarity with the Russian language should permit me to understand what he meant by "substantial". I asked if he could be more precise--would it be at least one order of magnitude less? Pleshakov said it might possibly be as much as one order of magnitude, but more likely it would be about one half one order of magnitude less than 3×10^6 .

Pleshakov then said that another reason why there should be no cause for concern about any possibility of the two ABM deployment areas being capable of mutual support was the factor of different types of targets being defended. In the case of NCA, the targets are soft targets, while ICBM silos are hardened. Therefore, the ABM components must be different in each case. He declared that, if the two ABM deployment areas were to be of the Sentinel type, then there would indeed be a

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possibility of creating the base for a territorial ABM system. The Article III constraints, however, do not permit a Sentinel-type deployment inasmuch as the ABM components for ICBM defense are greatly constrained. I noted that there would, in fact, be no qualitative constraints on interceptors, consequently, his statement did not correspond to the permitted deployment.

Pleshakov replied that, given the number of interceptors limited to 100, the capabilities of the ABM radars were the determinant of the system capabilities. The level of 100 interceptors permits only a defense of ICBMs against accidental or unauthorized launches. Longer-range interceptors are adequate for this purpose. The US side has originated the proposal of defending ICBMs against accidental launches; the Soviet side would have preferred to defend only its capital against such attacks. The Soviet side would have discussed higher levels of interceptors which would be of the Sprint type.

Pleshakov then said he could personally assure me that the two ABM deployment areas in the USSR would not be in close proximity to each other. His major reason for saying so was that there were no ICBM silos near Moscow. I disagreed, referring to the earlier exchanges between the sides on this subject. Pleshakov said he did not have personal knowledge of Soviet ICBM deployment areas. He doubted, however, that any of the ICBM silos near Moscow were "important ones". Also he doubted that there were large numbers of them, in which event, the USSR would be unable to defend a number of silos equal to those being defended by the US, by deploying the second site adjacent to the NCA defense area.

I asked what he foresaw as the future course of the negotiations on this question. The Soviet side had been authorized to declare its objections to spelling out the geographic location of the ABM deployment area for ICBM defense. Ambassador Smith had received new instructions to reaffirm the US position.

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Pleshakov shrugged his shoulders, and repeated the Soviet position and said "Each side has its God; let the Gods decide this question."

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy then suggested, "on a personal basis", the possibility of a trade-off under which the Soviet side would agree to an OLPAR level of 7 million, if the US side would drop the attempt to get an agreed definition of a "heavy" ICBM. Garthoff did not reject this proposal, but was very reserved toward it, and after some discussion said that he was very doubtful about it, since the American side considered it necessary to have an agreed understanding on what constitutes a "heavy" ICBM, and because we consider 3 million to be the highest level for such an OLPAR ceiling. Grinevskiy pointedly asked Garthoff to pass along this suggestion, although he again labeled it "personal". Garthoff asked what the Soviet side might regard as an appropriate reciprocal step in seeking overall mutual solution of differences in exchange for Soviet agreement to the definition of a heavy ICBM. Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that they did not think the Soviet side could agree on such a definition. Grinevskiy pressed for some kind of trade-off that Garthoff might suggest, but he declined to suggest any. Garthoff then asked what the Soviet side would consider an appropriate reciprocal move to reach Soviet agreement to specify their ICBM defense as east of the Urals. But Grinevskiy declined to make any suggestion or consider the question except in terms of some concrete proposal of a trade, and Garthoff did not suggest any.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

I said that one of the important matters we should talk about was the question of geographic location for ABM system deployment--east of the Urals, west of the Mississippi--a question which has been under discussion for a long time. I said I did not understand the evolution of the current Soviet position. A long time ago it appeared clear that both sides saw a need for precluding any disposition of two ABM sites which might provide a possible base for an expanded ABM system, but now the Soviet side seems to think that such a provision is no longer necessary.

Trusov said the Soviet side saw no contradictions between their present position and the understanding of the earlier position to which I had referred. Earlier Soviet concern was in the context of unconstrained radars. He argued that qualitative constraints which we had agreed to place on ABM components-- radars, in particular--for ICBM defense adequately precluded the creation of a possible base for a territorial ABM system. Radars of less than 3×10^6 potential cannot, when restricted to one ABM deployment area, provide such a base, independent of where the deployment area is located. Under present circumstances, and with the constraints currently agreed upon, there is no possibility for either side of deployment of a territorial ABM system or the base for one. He also repeated the argument that the US had not chosen Grand Forks because it was west of the Mississippi, and the Soviet side feels it would be unequal to tie one side down with a Treaty obligation geographically restricting its choice of an ABM deployment for ICBM defense.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov concluded that the Soviet Delegation was instructed to state formally that the Soviet side cannot accept the US proposals on the definition of heavy land-based ICBMs, neither as missiles with volumes in excess of 70 cubic meters, nor as missiles whose volume exceeds the volume of the "SS-11" in US terminology, nor as missiles with a volume exceeding the volume of the largest light missile the sides have. The Soviet side proceeds from the firm conviction that, for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, it is quite superfluous to have any definitions of heavy land-based ICBMs. The solution which the Soviet Delegation has proposed is fully consistent with the purposes of Article II and the Interim Agreement as a whole. It is precisely on this basis that the Delegations should solve this question which has remained unresolved for too long a time.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the sides have agreed on the provisions of the Interim Agreement which provide an undertaking by the sides not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. In addition, the sides agreed that this obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Proceeding from this basis, the Soviet side confirms that the agreed text of Article V of the Interim Agreement, which speaks about the non-use of special concealment measures which would impede verification by national technical means, is adequate for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, including as it is applied to ballistic missile submarines.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

At the same time, the Soviet side, in order to meet the considerations advanced by the US side, proposed a draft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides' understanding that, during the process of modernization and replacement, there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers which are observable by national technical means of verification. In referring to national technical means of verification, the Soviet Delegation did not have in mind the properties of the verification means but the dimensions observable by them.

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details about such procedures, including notification, and such matters could be decided in the Standing Consultative Commission. He noted that such an approach had been addressed in the case of the parallel provision in the draft ABM Treaty. Grinevskiy argued that there was very little time left, and this did not allow getting into such matters of detail that could be assigned instead to the Commission.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 19 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy noted that the Soviet side had not considered that it was necessary to have any procedural provision on dismantling at this time, so it had already moved a great way by including anything at all, and that in the Nitze-Shchukin conversation to which Minister Semenov had adverted there had been no discussion of notification procedures--and in particular, nothing about "number, type and location" of launchers.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov said that the provisions of Article II of the Interim Agreement provide for undertakings by the sides not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs. This very precise and clear undertaking by the sides, in itself, precludes a possible increase in the number of heavy land-based ICBMs through conversion of missiles of the other types referred to in the text of the Article. At the same time, the Soviet side, in order to meet the considerations advanced by the US side, proposed a draft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides' understanding that, during the process of modernization and replacement, there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers which are observable by national technical means of verification. In referring to national technical means of verification, the Soviet Delegation did not have in mind the properties of the verification means but the dimensions observable by them.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Shchukin during a conversation with US SALT delegate Nitze, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Shchukin raised the question of procedures for SLBM replacement. He proposed that the deactivation of the silo launcher to be replaced by an SLBM should begin concurrently with the commissioning of the SLBM submarine containing the replacement SLBM. He gave as a rationalization for this position the argument that once the dismantling process begins, the silo is no longer operational.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and SALT advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and SALT advisor Garthoff, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy and Kishilov took the initiative in wishing to start working toward an agreed text of a provision on the subject of replacement and dismantling procedures. Garthoff noted that the US side continued to believe it should be a paragraph in Article IV. Kishilov said that was understood, and that he thought there would be no problem once the language was agreed.

Grinevskiy objected strongly to the proposed sentence on notification of launcher replacement, which he said his Delegation considered quite unnecessary and fully covered by a reference in the practically agreed final sentence on agreeing procedures in the Standing Consultative Commission. He also argued strongly for specifying the timing for dismantling launchers to be replaced in the time that a replacement SLBM submarine would become operational. This latter point became the main focus for the rest of the discussion.

The main point which Grinevskiy and Kishilov repeatedly emphasized was that there should be no required gap in the authorized level of SLBM launchers and submarines operational and under construction. Under the American proposal, there would be such a gap between the time of launch of replacement submarines and the time such submarines would become operational. The issue was not resolved, and it was agreed the Four would meet again later that afternoon to work further on this problem.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilov during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

On replacement and dismantling procedures, Garthoff said that on the basis of the short discussion at noon-time, his Delegation had further considered this question, and he was now in a position to propose a new compromise formulation. He then presented the text of such a formulation:

Notification of SLBM or ICBM launchers to be deactivated and replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be given by the time of the launch of a replacement SLBM submarine. Dismantling or destruction of SLBM and older ICBM launchers to be replaced by new SLBM launchers shall be accomplished within six months following the launch of the replacement submarines, or the date at which the replacement submarine becomes operational, whichever is earlier. Such dismantling or destruction, and prior notification thereof, shall be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Grinevskiy said that the sentence on notification was certainly improved, but that his side continued to believe that it was totally unnecessary. Such questions were among those to be decided in the Standing Consultative Commission. Turning to the second sentence, he asked what was meant by the phrase "whichever is earlier." Garthoff explained. Garthoff also noted that the formulation was now in terms of accomplishing or completing dismantling, rather than its initiation. The "initiation" of dismantling could be a quite uncertain matter. The American Delegation believed that this new formulation should meet the interests of both sides.

Grinevskiy said that his Delegation would consider the proposal. He again objected to the first sentence. Garthoff said that the position he had been authorized to present was the one he had presented. However, he

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thought that if the second and third sentences could be agreed upon, it might be possible to consider dispensing with the first sentence. Grinevskiy expressed thanks, and said he would take up the new formulation.

Later in the meeting, Grinevskiy was called from the room for a few minutes, and returned with a piece of paper which contained a new Soviet proposal:

Dismantling or destruction of older ICBM and SLBM launchers being replaced by new SLBM launchers will be initiated at the same time as SLBM launchers on modern nuclear replacement submarines become operational, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Notification, dismantling or destruction will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

Apparently, this proposal was developed by other members of the Soviet Delegation without the benefit of the new US text. The Soviet proposal was changed from their last previous one mainly by the addition of a clause dealing with the completion of dismantling: "and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time." Garthoff noted that the clause in question had been borrowed from the ABM Treaty. However, he noted the earlier discussion, and his remarks on the desirability of agreeing on the completion of dismantling rather than focusing on its initiation. He also noted that notification had now been added to the last sentence. He said he would report it, but urged that the Soviet Delegation consider the text which he had submitted. It was agreed that both Delegations would consider this whole matter further.

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Reported remarks of Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Semenov said that the sides have agreed on the provisions of the Interim Agreement which provide an undertaking by the sides not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement. In addition, the sides agreed that this obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices. Proceeding from this basis, the Soviet side confirms that the agreed text of Article V of the Interim Agreement, which speaks about the non-use of special concealment measures which would impede verification by national technical means, is adequate for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, including as it is applied to ballistic missile submarines.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a mini-plenary meeting, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov said he wanted to dwell again on the question of definition of light and heavy land-based ICBMs raised by the US side in connection with Article II of the Interim Agreement. Analysis of the considerations presented by the US side during the process of working out the agreed text of that Article demonstrates that the foundation of these considerations was the inclusion of such undertakings by the sides as would preclude the possibility of an increase in the number of heavy land-based ICBMs as replacements for other types of land-based ICBMs covered by the Agreement.

Trusov said that the provisions of Article II of the Interim Agreement provide for undertakings by the sides not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs. This very precise and clear undertaking by

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the sides, in itself, precludes a possible increase in the number of heavy land-based ICBMs through conversion of missiles of the other types referred to in the text of the Article. At the same time, the Soviet side, in order to meet the considerations advanced by the US side, proposed a draft agreed statement on this Article concerning the sides' understanding that, during the process of modernization and replacement, there would be no substantial increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers which are observable by national technical means of verification, the Soviet Delegation did not have in mind the properties of the verification means but the dimensions observable by them.

Trusov said that the Soviet Delegation had no doubts whatsoever that the undertaking not to increase such dimensions substantially, taken together with the provisions of Article II itself, fully solves the task of limiting heavy land-based ICBMs during the period of effectiveness of the Interim Agreement. He wanted to emphasize that the Soviet side was speaking about a bilateral understanding providing equal limitations for the two sides and it proceeds from the premise that both sides will comply with the obligations assumed and not seek ways to circumvent them.

Trusov concluded that the Soviet Delegation was instructed to state formally that the Soviet side cannot accept the US proposals on the definition of heavy land-based ICBMs, neither as missiles with volumes in excess of 70 cubic meters, nor as missiles whose volume exceeds the volume of the "SS-11" in US terminology, nor as missiles with a volume exceeding the volume of the largest light missile the sides have. The Soviet side proceeds from the firm conviction that, for the purposes of the Interim Agreement, it is quite superfluous to have any definitions of heavy land-based ICBMs. The solution which the Soviet Delegation has proposed is fully consistent with the purposes of Article II and the Interim Agreement as a whole. It is precisely on this basis that the Delegations should solve this question which has remained unresolved for too long a time.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Grinevskiy and advisor Kishilev during a conversation with US SALT delegate Parsons and advisor Garthoff, 20 May 1972, Helsinki:

Grinevskiy said that the Soviet side had nothing new to propose or additional to say on the subject of the interpretive statement relating to Article II of the Interim Agreement.

Garthoff proposed a solution along the following lines: neither side would replace current light missiles with new ones significantly larger than the largest light missile that either side currently has. In this connection, we could reach a side understanding that "significantly larger" would mean 10% larger. Grinevskiy said that this appeared to be another variation of the same position which the Soviet Delegation had just rejected on instructions. It was not different from the earlier American proposals, and it was also not acceptable. Garthoff said that we should explore further the concept of ICBMs not "significantly larger" than the largest current ones. After further discussion, Garthoff suggested the following formulation for the entire interpretive statement:

"The Parties understand that any ICBM of a volume significantly greater than the volume of the largest light ICBM currently deployed by either Party would be understood to be a heavy ICBM, and that in the process of modernization and replacement there would be no significant increase in the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Grinevskiy said he would report this suggestion, and his Delegation would consider it. However, he was frankly very doubtful if it would be the basis for agreement. Again, it did not seem to change the essence of the long-standing American position which his side had rejected.

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Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that their Delegation was firmly of the view that there was no need whatsoever for a definition of "heavy," and that nothing was needed beyond Article II itself and the undertaking on not substantially increasing observable dimensions of ICBM silo launchers.

Garthoff then raised the question of the American proposed agreed interpretive statement defining submarines "operational and under construction". The Soviet participants acted as though they had hoped that this proposal would simply be forgotten. Grinevskiy reiterated again that the Soviet side simply did not consider it necessary at all. Garthoff said that it now seemed to the American side to be more necessary than ever. Semenov had suggested that there was a difference over understanding of the term "under construction", but did not say what that difference was. This had surprised us, since the leading naval experts on both sides had earlier--in fact, at Vienna in SALT VI--agreed on precisely the terms embodied in the US proposal. We could understand, even if not agree with, a suggestion that such an agreed statement was unnecessary. But now that it appeared there was a difference, it became all the more necessary. Grinevskiy cautiously expressed doubt that Semenov would have suggested that there was a difference of substance. He continued simply to argue that it was not necessary. He also argued that we were concerned only about final levels of SLBM launchers and submarines, so that the question was now irrelevant.

Grinevskiy* then suggested, "on a personal basis", the possibility of a trade-off under which the Soviet side would agree to an OLPAR level of 7 million, if the US side would drop the attempt to get an agreed definition of a "heavy" ICBM. Garthoff did not reject this proposal, but was very reserved toward it, and after some discussion said that he was very doubtful about it, since the American side considered it necessary to have an agreed understanding on what constitutes a "heavy" ICBM, and because we consider 3 million to be the highest level for such an OLPAR ceiling. Grinevskiy pointedly asked Garthoff to pass along this suggestion, although he again labeled it "personal". Garthoff

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asked what the Soviet side might regard as an appropriate reciprocal step in seeking overall mutual solution of differences in exchange for Soviet agreement to the definition of a heavy ICBM. Grinevskiy and Kishilov both indicated that they did not think the Soviet side could agree on such a definition. Grinevskiy pressed for some kind of trade-off that Garthoff might suggest, but he declined to suggest any. Garthoff then asked what the Soviet side would consider an appropriate reciprocal move to reach Soviet agreement to specify their ICBM defense as east of the Urals. But Grinevskiy declined to make any suggestion or consider the question except in terms of some concrete proposal of a trade, and Garthoff did not suggest any.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Smolin at a meeting of the Editorial Working Group, 21 May 1972, Helsinki:

On the Interpretive Statements on Articles I and II

Shaw asked Smolin whether the Soviet side disagreed with the phrase "capable of ranges" in the US text. Smolin said that the Soviet side did not object to it, but its experts were adamant in retaining the present Soviet language. Shaw said that, if this understanding was completely clear, he could agree to retaining the present US text and the Soviets could retain their present text. Smolin said several times that this arrangement was satisfactory, and that the Soviet side understood the meaning of the US text. Shaw said that his agreement to this arrangement was contingent on approval from his Delegation.