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TRANSPORTATION

Extracts from CIA-DIA Appraisals

The cumulative effects of the air strikes have severely reduced the throughput capacity of the rail line south of Hanoi. The turn-around time for equipment has increased and the use of equipment is less efficient.

The road network directly related to the military logistics support effort has been maintained in relatively good condition with truck traffic possible on nearly all routes.

The wide dispersal of vehicles and the inefficient operating condition imposed by the air campaign in the southern part of the country are believed to be taxing present truck transport capability.

The Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-Dong Day lines remained fully operational.

The Hanoi-Vinh line was probably closed for through service . . . however, limited operations were possible between major point of interdiction.

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On-The-Spot Reports

The pont des rapides north of Hanoi is no longer usable and rail traffic has ceased. [REDACTED]

There are only five vehicles in Haiphong and the lack of trucks makes it necessary to haul material by bicycle and foot. The rail line between Hanoi and Communist China has been disassembled by the Chinese following destruction of the tracks by the bombing. Temporary and constantly shifted steel ponton bridges are used for river crossings between Haiphong and Hanoi. Since rails and bridges have been damaged by the bombings, transportation has become practically paralyzed. [REDACTED]

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Transportation (continued)

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Civil transportation seemed to operate on a very restricted supply of gasoline and only military vehicles seemed to have enough fuel.

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There was as a result of the bombing only one undamaged bridge between Hanoi and Thanh Hoa. All the others had been damaged or destroyed, but subsequently repaired by teams on permanent standby. The journey to the place was by convoys under dim lights. On 12 March, the journey took five and one-half hours (90 miles), on 28 March it took seven hours.

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Attacks against main road communications have frequently been at least temporarily successful and accurate, but subsidiary roads were usually taken without excessive delays.

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In Thanh Hoa, because of damage to the roads, bicycles played a larger role in transportation than did lorries; each bicycle being modified to carry a load of 440 pounds; but a large cause of delay is the time taken (two hours) in reassembling the ponton bridges at dusk and then being regularly disassembled at dawn.

ChiCom Charge' admitted bombing bothered communications and transportation between China and DRV.

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