


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Weekly Review

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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Review, [REDACTED]

Portugal

JUNTA CONSOLIDATES POWER

The seven-man junta headed by General Antonio de Spinoia, which assumed leadership in Portugal after the almost bloodless coup last week, has already issued decrees designed to restore domestic liberties and consolidate its power. Political groups, labor unions, and student associations, which had been quiescent under the previous government, have become active. If the junta is willing to include representatives of both the left and right in the provisional government—to be established within two weeks—and is able to persuade them to join, this would augur well for the stability of the country over the near term.

General Spinoia met earlier this week with representatives of various political parties that were illegal under the previous regime. A spokesman for the parties described the meeting as very cordial, but the moderates appeared to be more satisfied than the far leftists. The leftists were disappointed that Spinoia refused to consult with them on the formation of the government and that he refused to make a commitment on immediate decolonization.

Political groups are busily organizing, issuing manifestos, and collecting funds. Socialist leader Mario Soares and Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal are playing prominent roles following their triumphant return from exile. Both parties have participated in the formation of a leftist coalition, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, to serve as a vehicle for participation in the new government. This would comply with Spinoia's announcement that he favors broad coalitions

rather than many parties. The union may be short-lived, however

Soares is working to build his own party's strength, and probably stands a better chance than Communist leader Cunhal of getting a ministerial post in the provisional government.

In an attempt to reform the state-controlled universities, the junta has dismissed their rectors. Student associations previously closed down by the Caetano government are reopening, and campus political activity appears to be on the rise.

The labor organizations that were formed by the ousted regime are also undergoing changes. In Lisbon and Oporto, leaders foisted upon the organizations by the previous government are being fired and workers are electing new leaders.

In an effort to consolidate his power within the military Spinoia has reinstated General Francisco da Costa Gomes, also a member of the junta, in his previous job as chief of staff of the armed forces. Costa Gomes, who had approved the publication of Spinoia's book, was fired from his job in March, ostensibly for refusing to take a ceremonial oath of allegiance to the old regime. Three other junta members have taken over as chiefs of staff of the air force, army, and navy. The junta has retired 24 senior officers, including two former ministers and the ex - chiefs of staff, thereby eliminating a potential threat from senior officers who have remained faithful to the Caetano government.

Generals Gomes and Spinoia, and Captain of the Navy Pinheiro



THE IMPACT IN PORTUGUESE AFRICA

The Spinoia junta is being widely supported by the Portuguese power structures in all three African territories. Civilian and military administrations are being run, on an interim basis, by the deputies to the governors general and the military commanders that were relieved of their responsibilities shortly after the coup. The transition has been largely without incident.

The idea of greater autonomy for the territories is a popular one, particularly in Angola and Mozambique, which have sizable white settler populations that have long wanted less interference from the metropole. Politically, however, Lisbon faces a problem stemming from the former government's refusal to allow local political organizations. The new regime will now have to permit the emergence of such organizations, broadly multi-racial in composition, if its new African policy is to have any meaning. One group in Mozambique that had been accepted by the Caetano government as a cultural organization has since the coup openly avowed political ambitions.

The ouster of Caetano has been welcomed by Portuguese Africa's liberation movements and by the black African governments that have been supporting them through more than a decade of insurgency. The guerrilla groups have rejected Spinoia's federation concept, however, and have reiterated their demands for complete independence. For the time being, they are likely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude.

In deciding future policy, Lisbon will have to take into account the quite different military and political situations that prevail in the three territories. In Angola, three rival insurgent organizations, each with serious factional, recruiting, or logistic problems, have failed to gain even minimal territorial control. It seems unlikely that Lisbon will be ready to negotiate with any of these groups in the near future.

In Mozambique, the insurgents are unified, and their activity has been on a modest upswing

since the first of the year, marked by a slow but steady southward infiltration. Their military effort could be enough to press Lisbon into eventually opening a dialogue.

In Portuguese Guinea the military stalemate that developed convinced Spinoia during his five years as governor general of the futility of seeking a military solution. The African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde consistently has waged the strongest military and political effort of all the African insurgent organizations. Last September, the party proclaimed the "Republic of Guinea-Bissau," which is now recognized by more than 60 Communist, African, and other Third World countries as well as by the Organization of African Unity. The "republic" has been granted observer status in the UN and intends to push for membership at the next UN General Assembly. Although the African party's territorial claims are inflated, it may be the first of the liberation movements to gain political concessions from Lisbon.

Portuguese Africa



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