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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
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(C)

COUNTRY BOLIVIA




DISTR. 10 JUNE 1965



SUBJECT

CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNISTS IN
BOLIVIA
SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 9 JUNE 1965

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2. THE NATIONAL CRISES IN BOLIVIA OF NOVEMBER 1964 AND MAY
1965 HAVE REVEALED A SEVERE LACK OF ANY CAPABILITY OF THE COM-
MUNIST PARTY OF BOLIVIA(PCB) EITHER TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION FOR

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000

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/PURPOSES OR TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE PARTY AS A LEADER OF THE WORKING CLASS.

3. VERY FEW MEMBERS OF THE PCB PARTICIPATED IN THE REVOLUTION OF 4 NOVEMBER AND EVEN THIS LIMITED PARTICIPATION WAS ON A PERSONAL BASIS. AT NO TIME DID THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY GIVE ANY ORDER FOR PARTY MEMBERS OR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST YOUTH OF BOLIVIA (JCB) TO MUSTER IN BEHALF OF A PARTY OBJECTIVE. THE PARTY LEADERSHIP REALIZED THAT THE EVENTS OF EARLY NOVEMBER 1964 HAD CAUGHT THEM BY SURPRISE, AND ALSO PASSED THEM BY AND, THEREFORE, RESOLVED THAT THE FORTHCOMING MONTHS SHOULD BE DEDICATED TO A REORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY AND INCREASED WORK AMONG THE WORKING CLASS AND CAMPESINOS IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP A STRONGER BASE OF ACTION FOR ANY FUTURE CONTINGENCY.

4. INSTEAD OF BEING A TIME OF REORGANIZATION, THE NEXT FIVE MONTHS WERE DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A GRAVE INTERNAL CRISIS. MANY OF THE PROMINENT LEADERS OF THE PARTY WERE ACTIVE DURING THIS TIME IN THE FORMATION OF RIVAL PARTY UNITS. THE PARTY SPLIT WAS FORMALIZED IN MID-APRIL 1965 WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF A RIVAL PCB WHOSE POLITICAL ORIENTATION AS YET IS NOT ENTIRELY DEFINED.

5. THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE PCB DEMONSTRATED ALMOST NO CAPABILITY TO COUNTER THE GROWING SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ~~DISSIDENTS~~ WERE SIMPLY DENOUNCED AS BEING OF ~~TROTSKYIST~~ OR SOME OTHER ORIGIN AND THOSE MEMBERS PARTICIPATING OR

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SUSPECTED OF PARTICIPATING IN ~~FACETIONAL~~ ACTIVITIES WERE (C)
 EXPELLED FROM THE PARTY. A NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PCB WAS
 CONVOKED IN EARLY MAY 1965 WHICH DID LITTLE MORE THAN REAFFIRM
 THE POLITICAL LINE ADOPTED AT THE SECOND NATIONAL CONGRESS OF
 APRIL 1964 AND CONSOLIDATE, TO A GREATER DEGREE, THE CONTROL OF THE
 PARTY IN THE HANDS OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. NO SOLUTIONS WERE
 OFFERED TO THE PROBLEM OF THE RIVAL PCB.

6. THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PCB IN THE LABOR/POLITICAL CRISIS
 OF MID-MAY 1965 WAS LIMITED TO THE PUBLICATION OF A FEW ~~DECLARA-~~
~~TIONS~~ OF PROTEST AGAINST THE ACTIONS OF THE MILITARY JUNTA. ONLY
 TWO MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY WERE ACTIVE
 IN PROMOTING THE STRIKE. THE REMAINDER WERE EITHER OUT OF THE CITY
 OR IN HIDING. AGAIN, NO ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO LOWER PARTY UNITS
 FOR ANY ACTION. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE JCB AT THE SAN ANDRES
 UNIVERSITY ^{IN LA PAZ} WAS NEUTRALIZED BECAUSE OF ITS INABILITY TO DEVELOP
 SUPPORT FROM OTHER UNIVERSITY STUDENT GROUPS.

7. THE ARREST AND PERSECUTION OF THE PCB LEADERS, WHICH BEGAN
 IN LATE MAY, HAS CAUSED THE PARTY TO GO UNDERGROUND. THE MEMBERS
 OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP STILL REMAIN IN HIDING. ~~REORGANIZA-~~
~~TION~~ OF THE PARTY IS BEING CARRIED OUT IN ANTICIPATION OF EVEN
 GREATER REPRESSION. SECRET CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION HAVE BEEN
 ARRANGED BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND THE LOWER PARTY UNITS.
 PARTY UNITS ARE BEING COMPARTMENTED FROM ONE ANOTHER AND
 PSEUDONYMS ARE BEING ASSIGNED TO PARTY MEMBERS. THE JCB HAS

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GREATLY CURTAILED ITS ACTIVITIES AND ALSO IS PREPARING FOR AN ILLEGAL STATUS.

8. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT REFORM DECREES IN THE MINES WILL DEAL THE PARTY A SEVERE BLOW. THE MINES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRINCIPAL BULWARK OF PARTY STRENGTH IN THE LABOR FIELD. NOW, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE PARTY ORGANIZATION AND INFLUENCE IN THAT REGION WILL BE DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THE DISCHARGE OF THE PARTY MEMBERS. THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP PLANS TO RESETTLE A LARGE NUMBER OF THESE MEMBERS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE TO WORK WITH THE CAMPESINOS AND BUILD UP A NEW BASE OF PARTY ~~STRENGTH~~; PARTY EFFORTS SO FAR TO WORK WITH THE CAMPESINOS HAVE PRODUCED NEGLIGIBLE RESULTS, AND MANY YEARS MUST PASS BEFORE ANY EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION CAN BE BUILT UP.

9. THE ONLY OTHER FIELD OF ENDEAVOR OF THE PCB AT PRESENT IS TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN CONTROL OF SOME LABOR UNIONS DURING THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS OF NEW OFFICERS. THE PARTY WILL MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO CONTROL THE FACTORY WORKERS' UNIONS AS IT IS REALIZED THAT THESE UNIONS ARE THE MOST MILITANT AND STRONGEST UNIONS IN LA PAZ. FURTHER, THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE FACTORY WORKERS HAVE EITHER BEEN ARRESTED OR EXILED, THUS LEAVING A VACUUM OF LEADERSHIP WHICH THE PARTY PLANS TO EXPLOIT.

10. NOTWITHSTANDING THE REVERSES WHICH THE PARTY HAS SUFFERED DURING THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN NO SHIFT OF POLICY YET REGARDING THE METHOD THROUGH WHICH TO OBTAIN POWER. THE POLICY OF

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SUPPORT OF A PEACEFUL ROAD TO POWER IS STILL IN EFFECT. ON 29 MAY, MARIO MONJE MOLINA, THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE PCB, ISSUED A DECLARATION SAYING THAT NEW CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN CREATED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MASS FRONT AGAINST THE MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND THE REACTIONARY FORCES. THIS PROPOSED FRONT OF ALL OF THE POPULAR ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES IN THE COUNTRY WILL BE ABLE TO DEMAND THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES, RESPECT FOR WORKERS' RIGHTS, THE HOLDING OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS, AND THE CANCELLATION OF THE REPRESSIVE DECREES ISSUED BY THE JUNTA.

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11. PREVIOUS EFFORTS BY THE PCB TO FORM A FRONT WERE NOTABLY UNSUCCESSFUL. IN EARLY 1965, THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP REALIZED THAT ITS EFFORTS TO FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH THE NATIONAL LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF JUAN LECHIN WERE A FAILURE. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, WHICH THE PARTY ORGANIZED IN ANTICIPATION OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS OF MAY 1964, ALSO HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN ATTRACTING ANY SUPPORT. THE FORMATION OF A FRONT, OR A WORKING AGREEMENT WITH OTHER RADICAL PARTIES OF THE LEFT, IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF ANY OBJECTIVES OF THE PCB. BECAUSE OF ITS SMALL SIZE, THE PCB DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ANY PLAN OF ACTION ON ITS OWN.

12. THE PCB LIKEWISE HAS NO CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT ANY SUBVERSIVE ATTEMPT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE STRONG PARTICIPATION OF OTHER GROUPS. THE PARTY HAS NO STRONG PARAMILITARY GROUPS WITHIN ITS CADRE TO GIVE IT THE CAPABILITY OF

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ACTING INDEPENDENTLY. ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE JCB AND ONLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE PARTY ARE KNOWN TO HAVE RECEIVED ANY PARA-MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA. THE MAJORITY OF PARTY MEMBERS HAVE RECEIVED THEIR TRAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL PARTY SCHOOL IN MOSCOW, WHICH IS ~~DEVOTED~~ PRINCIPALLY TO THEORETICAL STUDIES. UP UNTIL 1964, THE CUBANS, IN PARTICULAR, WERE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE YOUTH OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, THE MNR. ^(NATIONAL REVOLUTION-ARY MOVEMENT)

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A MAXIMUM OF 50 YOUTHS FROM THIS GROUP HAVE RECEIVED EITHER POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION OR PARA-MILITARY TRAINING IN CUBA.

13. THE MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS IN CUBA DURING NOVEMBER 1964 HAS NOT YET AFFECTED THE SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL OF THE PCB. NO PLANS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN MADE AT THIS CONFERENCE TO INCREASE THE TRAINING OF PARTY MEMBERS OR PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA.

14. THE CAPABILITIES OF THE RIVAL PCB FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES ARE ALSO NEGLIGIBLE AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH A PARTY STRUCTURE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, ITS ORGANIZATION IS NOT COMPLETE. ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL INHIBITING FACTORS TO ANY ANTI-PARTY POTENTIAL IS THE LACK OF CAPABLE LEADERSHIP. EVEN COMPARED TO THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE ORTHODOX PCB, THE PRESENT LEADERS OF THE RIVAL PCB DO NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE THEORETICAL PREPARATION. FURTHER, TWO OF THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE RIVAL PCB ARE IN HIDING, AND THE FIRST SECRETARY OF THE PARTY IS IN EXILE.

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15. THERE IS NO CAPABILITY ~~WITHIN~~ THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN BOLIVIA TO OVERTHROW THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME. THE LACK OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PCS WILL REQUIRE A LONG TIME FOR ANY SUCH PREPARATION AND THEN IT WILL NEED: A) THE STRONG PARTICIPATION OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS, AND B) A CLIMATE OF VERY STRONG DISCONTENT AMONG THE WORKING CLASS AND OTHER GROUPS WHICH IT CAN EXPLOIT FOR ITS SUBVERSIVE AIMS.

16.  DISSEM: CINCOS.

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