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TDCS-314/08090-67
REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY: UAR/USSR
DOI: 7 JUNE 1967
SUBJECT: 1. POSSIBLE SOVIET MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE UAR
2. SOVIET CLAIMS OF SIGHTING OF UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT
OVER ISMAILIA.
DATE AND PLACE ACQ: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.

[REDACTED] INQUIRED AS TO WHAT ASSESSMENT WAS OF THE CURRENT ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE SOVIET REACTION TO WHAT APPEARED TO BE A STRING OF ISRAELI VICTORIES. [REDACTED] REPLIED "WE WILL INTERVENE". WHEN [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM THIS MOVE, [REDACTED] REPLIED "WE HAVE NO OTHER CHOICE". AS TO WHAT [REDACTED] MEANT BY INTERVENTION HE STATED THE UAR HAS LOST MANY PLANES BUT THE PILOTS ARE STILL ALIVE AND CAN FLY OTHER PLANES. [REDACTED] COMMENTED IF THE SOVIET UNION PLANNED TO INTERVENE BY PROVIDING ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IT WOULD HAVE TO ACT SOON FOR THERE WERE REPORTS THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE IN POSITION TO THREATEN PORT SAID WITHIN A DAY. [REDACTED] REPLIED, YES, ACTION WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW HOURS.

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2.

IN REPLY TO [REDACTED] QUERY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH THROUGH ENFORCING THE UNITED NATIONS CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE, [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT [REDACTED] MEAN DEFEAT AND HE WOULD BE FINISHED. [REDACTED] NOTED ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORT THAT JORDAN HAD ACCEPTED THE CEASE FIRE AND [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT ALL OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES COULD ACCEPT THE CEASE FIRE BUT UAR WOULD NOT.

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3. [REDACTED] ASKED [REDACTED] IF THE UAR ARMY COULD HOLD AT SUEZ, WHAT COUNTRY COULD HOLD OUT THE LONGEST. [REDACTED] REPLIED BOTH WOULD BE IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY. [REDACTED] THEN CONTINUED BY STATING THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT SUSTAIN A LENGTHY WAR AND IF THE UAR COULD HOLD AT SUEZ, THE UAR WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO COUNTER-ATTACK AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE AFTER SOVIET ASSISTANCE, [REDACTED] REPLIED, YES.

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4. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED WHAT EVIDENCE HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO PROVE UNITED STATES PLANES WERE PROVIDING AIR COVER FOR THE ISRAELIS. [REDACTED] REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN "REPORTS" THAT UNITED STATES PLANES PROVIDED AIR COVER OVER ISRAELI CITIES TO ALLOW ALL ISRAELI PLANES TO BE UTILIZED IN THE FIRST SURPRISE STRIKE AT THE ARABS. IN REPLY TO [REDACTED] ASSURANCES THAT NO UNITED STATES AIRCRAFTS HAD BEEN INVOLVED, [REDACTED] SAID RUSSIANS AT ISMAILIA HAD SEEN UNITED STATES PLANES. [REDACTED] CONTINUED BY STATING IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS MAY HAVE USED UNITED STATES MANUFACTURED AIRCRAFT AND ADDED UNITED STATES MARKINGS.

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[REDACTED] GAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO [REDACTED] SPECIFIC QUESTION IF THE RUSSIANS HAD SEEN UNITED STATES MARKINGS ON THE AIRCRAFT SEEN OVER ISMAILIA.

5. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE UAR, [REDACTED] STATED HE HAD HEARD EGYPTIANS ARE QUITE DISAPPOINTED OVER THE LACK OF SOVIET SUPPORT DURING THE PRESENT CONFLICT. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT THE EGYPTIANS WERE DISAPPOINTED BUT HOPEFULLY NOT FOR LONG.

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6. TO [REDACTED] COMMENT THAT A MORE SENSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM, [REDACTED] ANSWERED BY STATING PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PREMIER KOSTELIN HAD ALREADY TALKED ON THE "RED TELEPHONE" AND COULD NOT COME TO AN AGREEMENT.

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPACAFSA
(ALSO SENT [REDACTED])

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