

SUBJECT: Allan W. DULLES

1. Allan W. DULLES was born fifty-nine years ago. He began his career as a diplomat. Later, with his brother, he became a partner in the legal office of "Sullivan and Cromwell", Wall Street, New York. He is an extremely calm individual, a man of a few words, an efficient speaker, slow and thoughtful. One of his daughters is married to an Austrian editor. His only son was a soldier in Korea, is at present gravely wounded and (has been) recovering in a military hospital in Japan.

2. For the last few years Mr. DULLES has been suffering from a grave form of arthritis, which strikes him periodically but does not prevent him from carrying on his work. He drinks very little, sleeps a lot, is a practically indefatigable worker. Being an excellent organizer is his principal characteristic. He is a good psychologist and capable of properly evaluating his men. He is considered (and rightly so) as being impervious to any form of corruption either direct or indirect.

3. His appointment as Chief of CIA is not the result of a form of nepotism (as one could be brought to believe, since his brother has been named Secretary of State). General Bedell SMITH clearly indicated that regardless of the Administration elected, he would have suggested that Mr. DULLES take over CIA.

4. For the last couple of years, Mr. DULLES was Deputy Chief of CIA and—in spite of diplomatic gossip—he has without any doubt turned that Agency into the most efficient espionage and counter-espionage instrument available to the Western world. (Let the British be patient!) CIA at present has the capacity for collection, selecting, and evaluating information in a degree which is probably even superior to the similar capacity of Soviet services. One can argue over the methods which are being used, but not over the results. Mr. DULLES is the author of "Directive #5", which anticipated by more than two years the political-strategical facts (translator's note: sic).

5. Typical of Mr. DULLES' method is that of using a double cover, i.e., covering the intelligence gathering by exposing to outside observation a network under nominal cover and doubling it with a real network under deep cover. The CIA section "of covert activities" (translator's note: in English, in the original) was organized directly by Mr. DULLES.

6. He has the firm conviction that the spiritual always dominates the material. (In fact, this is a slogan of his). He is convinced that Europe can only save itself by eliminating its inferiority complex. He also believes that the key to Europe's salvation—when the crisis will come—lies in the rebirth of the spirit of European collectivity.

7. During the war, from Berne he headed the OSS office for central and southern Europe. In this capacity, he was concerned primarily with Italy (i.e., the German armies fighting in that country) and with Germany (i.e., the internal liquidation of Naziism).

8. At that time, he, a convinced Calvinist, had the great foresight to recognize immediately that the Catholic Church aimed at a final goal which (almost) coincided with his: preventing the spreading of Communism in Italy. He immediately recognized the uselessness, or better the damage, which the Western allies would have suffered from the indiscriminate bombing of industrial centers which would inevitably have caused unemployment and misery and therefore Communism. Italy owes him a lot in this sense: he always advised in favor of using "diplomatic" means whenever he felt that war methods were not indispensable.

9. His contacts with German representatives (SS General WOLFF and SS Colonel DOLLMAN) go back to the Fall of 1944. The story of these contacts, of the negotiations and of the surrender which resulted from them are very well known. It is not known, instead, that such contacts were known also to Russia, through the PCI, and that Stalin sent violent protests to ROOSEVELT in a personal telegram.

10. The dissension between the Americans and the Russians began with that telegram. Mr. DULLES did not have much luck. His British colleague was feathering his own nest (i.e., he was trying to do nothing), the Apostolic Nuncio in Berne was a mediocre individual (or was trying to be such) and the two German negotiators did not appear to be trustworthy (Mr. DULLES was wrong on this point), at least until Mr. DULLES personally met Colonel DOLLMAN and was thus able to establish the solidity of the offer. Had Mr. DULLES been just a bit luckier, he would have succeeded in carrying out his plan to its extreme consequences which, as far as Trieste is concerned, would have avoided the occupation of Trieste by the TITO bands. One of his main concerns was that through TITO the Soviets could eventually invade the Po Valley.

11. As for Germany, Mr. DULLES should be credited with the support given to the "GOERDELER Bands." Here again, Mr. DULLES was not too lucky because the attempt on Hitler's life (14 July 1944) failed, as is known. It is very interesting to note, however, that Mr. DULLES

never agreed with the theory of unconditional surrender. The facts have proven him right. Were he to have had a free hand, GORDELER and company would have received a promise of quite different conditions. One must not forget that among the best collaborators of Mr. BLANK (Amt - Blank, Bonn) one finds Generals SPIDEL and HEUSINGER known and esteemed by Mr. DULLES. At any rate, the American policy in the postwar period as regards Germany has been directly and deeply influenced by Mr. DULLES. He has a greater trust in the Germans than he has, for instance, in the French and in the Italians.