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~~traveling with TS-103415~~

DRAFT OUTLINE

MAJOR UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS

Naval War College, February 18, 1955

I. INTRODUCTION

Refer to Admiral Robbins and his work as Director of the Net Evaluation study under Admiral Radford and DCI in summer 1954.

Refer to Admiral Conolly as member of Clark Committee -- perhaps adding a remark about thoroughness and value of CC work

Refer to relations with Admiral Radford and Admiral Carney generally.

Also Admirals Espe and Layton (L. recently spoke at NWC).

Refer to Inchon Landings (details in Annex A) as example of cooperation that may be achieved with Navy.*

II. SCOPE AND OUTLINE

Will concentrate on big picture, intelligence as it relates to and supports policy making at the national level, and above all intelligence on the prime target, the Soviet Bloc. Mention that we do a lot in other areas, but it is in relation to Sov Bloc that intelligence is crucial and the greatest contributor to our knowledge, as opposed to operating contacts and working relationships.

Three aspects to the problem:

- a. ~~Acquisition or~~ Collection
- b. Processing and Coordinating Intelligence
- c. Use of Intelligence by the Policy Maker

*You used this last time (November 1953), but no other comparable incident has occurred since.

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III. ACQUISITION OR COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE

A. Methods of acquisition -- overt, covert, scientific and technical.

B. Division of workload among agencies, Role of the IAC as the central coordinating point to work out such joint problems as priorities (IPC), defectors (IDC), atomic energy (JAEIC), economic intelligence (EIC), Scientific intelligence (SEC), and proposed guided missiles committee (GMIC). Basic principles are full exchange of product, avoiding of unnecessary duplication, letting best qualified agency do the legwork (AFOAT and ELINT as examples) -- and not setting up subcommittees unless they have a real job to do. Main point is that we have traveled a tremendous distance from the rivalries and jealousies of World War II, and are aiming to get the maximum advantages of coordination and minimum disadvantages.

Turning specifically to the Soviet Orbit problem:

C. Overt Collection.

1. Easing of social contacts and travel have given us some help in past year. Insight into Malenkov and Khrushchev personalities (tho this proved misleading insofar as it led some to believe M. likely to come out on top. Hearst interview tends to show K. is a lot smoother when sober than in a party mood). General value of travellers impressions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] tho these have produced little specific military information, and Sovs have not let in any expert observers.

2. Attache travel much eased, and Travel Folder program for systematic exploitation, [REDACTED] has yielded some good

results -- [REDACTED] --

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(S)(3)

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[REDACTED] observations of possible* NIKE sites around Moscow. Sovs harass US personnel more than others, as shown by Trans-Siberian and Stiff-Somerlatte incidents. Overall result is that missions pulling their weight far more than, say, two years ago, tho most of info is low-level, and results still insignificant compared to what Sovs can get from the magazine counters here. Strong chance Sovs may now tighten up again.

3. Radio broadcasts, periodicals, and documents continue to be major sources. Careful analysis of these gave us many indications of the developing Malenkov-Khrushchev split. Published Soviet economic statistics we now think to be fairly reliable, and CIA puts a major effort into analysing every scrap of evidence on the economy, both for itself and for military bearing. On military and technical matters, however, Soviet information security is excellent.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

D. Covert Collection.

a. Enormous difficulty of this. Soviet counter-espionage compared to German. Extent of border guards, document checks, surveillance of personnel, etc. Communist China equally tough.

b. Resulting necessity of doing large-share of planning on a long-range basis, to prepare way for future operations, get credentials, etc. Hence cannot load mechanism down with too many immediate requirements. Long-range operations, also, are the only way to get some big dividends -- e.g. Scapa Flow story of German agent in place for more than 20 years.

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c. Tho our own-initiative direct agent operations thus sharply limited in effectiveness, we have been getting very useful results from several covert lines of action:

1. Recruitment of Soviet Bloc personnel serving abroad.

[REDACTED]

2. Double-agent operations. Travel back and forth. One specific highly sensitive military acquisition from these recently.

- 3.

[REDACTED]

4. Defectors. These have been highlight of past year. Most valuable dope on Soviet intelligence personnel and methods, and leads for inducing further defections. Also good general political info, including strongest forecast we had that Malenkov was through. In addition to prominent cases, steady flow of medium and low level men from Army especially. Hope to develop this source more and more (perhaps aided by further friction at top of Sov system). Importance of inter-service cooperation for this.

d. Should be noted that much effort goes on outside Bloc, in seeking

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
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to contact Sov personnel, persons receiving info from Bloc, etc. This brings up problem of evaluation. Sov plants and simple paper mills very common -- [REDACTED] case as prime example in past year when we were able to puncture false stories. Have learned to use great care in evaluation, so you can assume our reports have been very thoroughly screened before dissemination.

E. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



F. Summary and Vital Need for New Techniques.

Sum total of the above is that we are getting a somewhat better picture of the Bloc than, say, two years ago, but we have enormous gaps, particularly in our supply of concrete military information ;both of capabilities and intentions (notable exceptions being A-stockpile and military information on East Germany). Hence we are doing two things in particular:

1. Reviewing priorities, which have just been redefined under new DCID to be sure we are concentrating on crucial rather than merely important.
2. More important, seeking new techniques, particularly in the way of detection devices.

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IV. PROCESSING AND COORDINATION

A. Intelligence useless unless promptly and effectively presented to the policy maker, at the right level and in the right detail.

B. Methods for doing this now better than in the past:

NSC Briefings. Scope and thoroughness of these.

Current Intelligence publications.

National Intelligence Estimates. IAC role in these.

Day-to-day intelligence production of agencies.

Basic Intelligence -- NIS work. Geared to JCS requirements.

C. Special problem of briefing special committees and Congress.

D. At the national policy-making level, two key problems:

1. Warning. On this we have made progress in past year by revising status of IAC's Watch Committee and setting up a special National Indications Center, with a small staff to which each IAC agency contributes one senior man on a full-time basis. This now set up in Pentagon, with tie-in to Air Defense Command and to White House. In this connection President has approved NSC directive that NIC be furnished with all relevant intelligence and with important operational information unless agreed with DCI that this too sensitive even for Watch Committee use. In practice this now applied in case of Navy briefings on 7th Fleet dispositions. In this connection, one peculiar problem with Navy is reporting of submarines sightings; this presents difficulty in that there are many improbables, but we now have it worked out for prompt reporting of any possibles. NIC can be put on 24-hour basis at any time, and this has been done in recent weeks, with rotating duty roster. Shows high degree of cooperation in this field.

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2. National Estimates support of NSC. Almost all our estimates now have a clear NSC relationship, and 2/3 (16 of 24 for last six months of 1954) were geared directly to pending NSC papers in scope and timing: Estimates on consequences of proposed major courses of action now vitally important (e.g. Indochina, Korea in 1953), and almost routine where time permits (whereas first of these less than 3 years ago!). These quite often matters of judgment incapable of proof, and mean intelligence community is taking heavy responsibility. But point is that President is entitled to best judgment in most precise form. Handling of dissents shows everyone's view out in the open.

E. Net Evaluation Problem. Many broad estimates of Soviet Bloc capabilities must take into account our own posture. In most crucial field of Soviet capabilities for surprise attack against US and key installations overseas, we have worked out by NSC direction the Net Evaluation procedure, which worked with great success under Admiral Robbins' (and General Bull's) guidance. Now clear that it is essential to have a tightly held war-gaming exercise on such problems, in which intelligence and operations are called on repeatedly for answers to successive stages of the problem. New exercise just launched on this basis, and process seems here to stay in this field. Next step is to consider whether it cannot be used in other fields of sufficiently major importance. Joint committee of Chairman/JCS and DCI may be good answer and is being considered. This does not mean intelligence community is getting into planning, but does mean much closer tie than in past at top level, where estimates of Soviet action must take into account whole range of political as well as military considerations.

V. USE OF INTELLIGENCE BY THE POLICY MAKER

A. Problem of belief always present. Hitler and North Africa, Yalu River case. On more long-range basis, danger that policy-maker will think intelligence is trying to sell a policy case (e.g. claim that we make Soviets "forty feet

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tall"). Degree of coordination and impartiality we now have should ensure minimum of this, but it will always persist.

B. Related problem of not crying wolf. Costa Rica as a recent example of calling it at just the right time.*

VI. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Lots of progress in coordination, processing, and links to policy maker.
- B. Some progress in analysis and production.
- C. But in last analysis, whole structure rests on collection base, and on this we cannot claim to be in strong position toward Soviet Bloc. Fair on capabilities and on intentions in peripheral areas and for general war if they took substantial preparatory action.** But we come back to the great need for new techniques and for every ounce of coordinated effort to get these.

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ANNEX A

The Inchon Landings: an example of effective cooperation

Problem: to get best intelligence on Seoul-Inchon Area, as to landing sites, defenses, enemy troop dispositions, etc.

Problem given to CIA 24 August 1950 in the field; final HQ approval 27 August

Period of preparation 24-30 August

Arrived off Inchon 0630 1 September

Base established on Yonghung-Do (which had been secured by ROK Navy) which lies 12 miles from Inchon, short distance off coast

Teams of agents worked right up to invasion time 15 September sending back through the operations base info of immense value, meanwhile defending the base against enemy attack

Turned over operations to another intelligence unit and cleared out on 19 September

Radioed commendation from Admiral Joy: Your work in current operations Inchon-Seoul Area has been exemplary. Reports have been timely and information has proven to be most accurate. You have contributed immeasurable to the success of the Inchon landings. Admiral Joy sending.

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