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24 OCT 1958

Honorable Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

In response to your letter of 17 October, I am enclosing two copies of our comments on the validity of the statements made by Hanson Baldwin on 10 October 1958.

Sincerely,

Signed

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Enclosure:
Comments on Baldwin Article

ORIGINATED BY:

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Acting Chief, 


Herbert S. ... Jr.

CONCURRENCES:

Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence

Deputy Director/Intelligence

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COMMENTS ON BALDWIN ARTICLE

In the New York Times of 10 October 1958, Hanson W. Baldwin wrote of the alleged concern among officials in the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission about the accuracy of Soviet announcements dealing with U.S. nuclear tests. He also stated these same officials believe that Soviet knowledge was derived by leaks or espionage.

The Soviet announcement of the detection of 32 U.S. tests was undoubtedly based on monitoring of U.S. communications. A number of the tests were of such low yield as to almost certainly preclude their detection by long range detection methods. Furthermore, two of the announced test dates were false with no nuclear test having occurred. On the second of these dates, a small (112 pounds) High Explosive charge was exploded. On the other date, a nuclear test was scheduled, but cancelled at the last moment. However, the Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting the tests reports that on both of these dates a normal count-down was conducted, such count-downs being carried in the clear by radio communications to all the ships and installations supporting the Task Force. From other information furnished by the JTF, it is clear that the Soviets would have encountered very little difficulty in monitoring the internal communication system at the proving ground. Searches conducted by the JTF to clear the test area were primarily

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for safety reasons and were not directed toward detecting undersea craft. Even if a submarine stayed outside the test restricted zone, it could have been well within the general range of the local communications system. One additional item in support of the likelihood that the USSR information came from communication monitoring is the fact that one U.S. test, conducted on 26 July, was announced in Moscow within twenty-four hours after detonation. It is doubtful that espionage could have provided such rapid transmission of information.

As reported by Mr. Baldwin, officials in the Pentagon and the AEC are undoubtedly concerned about the Soviet announcements dealing with United States tests, although the announcements are partially inaccurate, but the further allegation that these officials believe that the Soviet knowledge was derived by leaks or espionage, is probably not shared by responsible officials of the Pentagon and AEC who have full knowledge of the conditions under which U.S. oversea nuclear tests are conducted.

Our conclusion would be that the Soviet information came from official U.S. announcements about the test series, open broadcasts made for safety reasons announcing closed and restricted areas for surface ships and aircraft at specific times and dates, and finally from monitoring of the JTF count-down communications from a point inside or immediately adjacent to the restricted area surrounding the test site.

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