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SOCIALISM

PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM  
IN LATIN AMERICA

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
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STUDIES ON THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT

PRINCIPAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM  
IN LATIN AMERICA

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The Latin American Secretariat  
of the Socialist International

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Principal Socialist Parties in  
Latin America:

Argentina


Brazil

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Ecuador

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.....	TABLE OF CONTENTS	.....
FOREWORD	.....	v
I. THE LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARIAT OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL	.....	1
II. PRINCIPAL SOCIALIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA	.....	9
A. SOCIALIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (Partido Socialista Argentino, PSA)	.....	9
I. Background	.....	10
II. Political Influence	.....	12
III. Ideology and Objectives	.....	14
IV. Trade Union Work	.....	16
V. Attitude Toward the Free World- Communist Conflict	.....	18
VI. International Socialist Associations	.....	20
B. SOCIALIST PARTY OF BRAZIL (Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB)	.....	21
I. Background	.....	22
II. Political Influence	.....	23
III. Ideology and Objectives	.....	23
IV. Trade Union Work	.....	24
V. Attitude Toward the Free World- Communist Conflict	.....	24
VI. International Socialist Associations	.....	26
C. CHILEAN SOCIALIST PARTY (Partido Socialista, PS)	.....	27
I. Background	.....	29
II. Political Influence	.....	33

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

III. Ideology and Objectives .....	34	
IV. Trade Union Work .....	37	
V. Attitude Toward the Free World- Communist Conflict .....	39	
VI. International Socialist Associations .....	41	(5)(1)
VII. Dissident Socialists .....	42	(5)(3)
VIII. [REDACTED] .....	43	
D. SOCIALIST PARTY OF ECUADOR (Partido Socialista del Ecuador, PSE)	52	
I. Background .....	54	
II. Political Influence .....	56	
III. Ideology and Objectives .....	56	
IV. Trade Union Work .....	62	
V. Attitude Toward the Free World- Communist Conflict .....	65	
VI. International Socialist Associations .....	68	
E. SOCIALIST PARTY OF URUGUAY (Partido Socialista del Uruguay, PSU)	70	
I. Background .....	72	
II. Political Influence .....	74	
III. Ideology and Objectives .....	75	
IV. Trade Union Work .....	76	
V. Attitude Toward the Free World- Communist Conflict .....	81	
VI. International Socialist Associations .....	84	
ATTACHMENT A		
Resolutions of the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International and Delegates Indorsing these Resolutions (Santiago, 18 to 19 April 1958)	86	
INDEX	92	

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

## SOCIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

### FOREWORD

Out of the varied and universally complex situations in the underdeveloped areas of the Free World, two main forces are developing, the growth of which are leading to profound political and economic changes. The first and more important of these forces is nationalism, the intensity of development and political manifestations of which depend upon the conditions prevailing in a given area. The second force is socialism which embodies the aspirations of the people for industrialization and a higher standard of living, and which connotes certain economic measures, principally economic planning and nationalization, to effect this goal. Socialism additionally has political overtones, and, as now developing in Asia and the Middle East, not only complements nationalism but is developing concurrently with it. This complementary nature is evident in the political sphere where the nationalistic desire for freedom from foreign political and economic influence coincides with socialism's broad goal of man's emancipation. It is also evident in the economic views held by nationalists in many of the underdeveloped countries. The main thread running through these nationalist economic views is that socialism offers the means whereby the resources of a country can be mobilized for rapid industrialization without jeopardizing the country's independence through acceptance of foreign economic aid.

The growth of nationalism and socialism is greatest in certain underdeveloped countries of Asia and the Middle East, notably India, Burma, Ceylon, and Egypt, where nationalistic and largely socialistic regimes have been established. In these former colonial countries, anti-colonialism and the desire

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to industrialize have been the dominating factors in the growth of nationalism and socialism. Hatred for colonialism, which is often identified with Western capitalism, has produced the view that many Western investments are efforts to undermine the newly-won independence of these countries. Socialism is viewed as the only alternative which can effect rapid industrialization without Western aid and bring a measure of equality in the distribution of available goods.

Not the least of the factors contributing to the growth of nationalism and socialism in the underdeveloped countries are the activities of indigenous Communist parties, various international Communist front organizations, and the foreign and economic policies of the USSR and the Soviet Bloc. Through these activities the USSR seeks to transform the strong sentiment against Western colonialism into anti-U.S. sentiment. Incessantly, Communist propaganda media equate colonialism with capitalism and imperialism and then identify the United States as an imperialist power practicing insidious new-style colonialism through economic coercion. The countries are urged by these media to undertake nationalization and other socialistic measures and to accept Soviet loans "with no political strings attached". Concurrently, the indigenous Communist parties, on the basis of the common goals of socialism and independence, seek to form an alliance with the Socialists (United Front) and then to expand it into a "Democratic Front for National Liberation" with the inclusion of the petit and national bourgeoisie. Emphasis is placed in the broader front on independence which, in a non-colonial area, is interpreted by the Communists as independence from domestic regimes supported by "U.S. imperialism" or from "new-style U.S. colonialism".

The development of nationalism and socialism in Latin America to date has not been concurrent, as in Asia and the Middle East. The politically dominant conservative elements

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exploit Latin America's particular type of nationalism to perpetuate their rule, and have frequently established dictatorial regimes on a nationalistic basis.\* Socialism in turn has not had much appeal, regardless of whether the Socialist parties were established at the turn of the century, as were those of Argentina and Uruguay, or were established after 1920, like the Socialist Parties of Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador. Yet it is noted that many of the elements which are contributing to the concurrent development of nationalism and socialism in Asia and the Middle East are also present in Latin America. The area is in general underdeveloped; the great majority of the people live in ignorance and poverty. The strong anti-U.S. sentiment is akin to anti-colonialism in Asia and the Middle East, in which the U.S. is blamed for Latin America's general backwardness and lack of industrial development in major areas. Dictatorial and even feudal regimes exist in some countries in which the elements of democracy are lacking. Many Latin Americans attribute responsibility for these regimes to the United States, which allegedly supports such regimes as a matter of expediency, often under the guise of anti-Communism. The indigenous Communist parties are fanning this anti-U.S. sentiment and calling for a "Democratic Front for National Liberation" to effect liberation from governments supported by "U.S. imperialism" or regimes responsive to "new-style U.S. colonialism". The USSR is intensifying its

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\* Nationalism in Latin America is a demagogic, highly emotional pressure which is now being exploited by all political elements, including both extremes. Its character is shaped by such factors as the presence of racially and ethnically mixed groups in many countries (i.e., negroes, Indians, and different groups of white immigrants in various combinations); the relatively brief history of independence in many countries; and the feeling that the Latin American countries are dominated economically and politically by the United States.

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economic programs in Latin America in efforts to detach these countries from the United States. The specter thus appears of nationalistic and socialistic regimes eventually arising in Latin America which would, as in Asia and the Middle East, advocate a Third Force if not a pro-Soviet neutralist position in the Communist-Free World conflict.

Within the above framework, the Socialist parties of Latin America could in the future increase in size and become of increasing usefulness to the United States, or to the Communist conspiracy. On the one hand they compete with the Communists for the allegiance of labor and the generally underprivileged elements. On the other hand, because of varying degrees of ideological affinity with the Communists, the coincidence of immediate objectives, and some Communist penetration, the Socialist parties of Latin America can, and in many instances do, facilitate Communist tactics.

The potential of the Latin American Socialists has been recognized by both the Free World and the International Communist Movement. In late 1955 the Socialist International established a Latin American Secretariat to win existing Socialist parties for Democratic Socialism and to establish new Democratic Socialist parties. In February 1956 the CPSU at its Twentieth Party Congress issued a call for Communist-Socialist collaboration in all areas.

In studying Socialism in Latin America, it should be understood that it is not a unified movement bound by a coherent ideology and a monolithic discipline as the International Communist Movement. The Socialist parties in Latin America are national political parties with varying ideological concepts. Although generally either the theories of Democratic Socialism or Marxism are espoused, ideological concepts are often fluid and are adjusted to accord with the existing national

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political situation. Whether the Latin American Socialist parties espousing Marx's principles would follow the path of Asian Socialist parties, such as that of Burma, and depart from theory to pursue pragmatic policies upon achieving power, is, however, a matter for conjecture. In this study, considerable weight has had to be given to ideology in judging each Socialist party, because none of them are in power to provide a basis for comparing theory with practice.

Of the Socialist parties in Latin America only those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay have any current political significance, and of these only the Socialist Party of Chile has any reasonable hopes of entering the government in the near future.\* The Argentine and Uruguayan Parties are members of the Socialist International and with the Socialist Party of Chile form the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International. The Socialist Parties of Brazil and Ecuador, as well as those of Colombia and Panama, have been invited to join this committee.

This study undertakes first to describe the organization and activities of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International which is tending to become an anti-American body. Secondly, it seeks to set forth the current status and orientation of the five most significant Socialist parties in Latin America. In assessing the five major Socialist parties the method used is to discuss each party separately, but in terms of common factors. One advantage of this method is the obvious one of providing a brief with topical breakdowns for an individual concerned with Socialism in any one of the countries discussed. But more important, these factors were selected because, in addition to providing a necessary introduction, a discussion of these factors gives an indication of a Socialist party's Cold War orientation. The discussion of each topic is as comprehensive as permitted by available information in view of the absence of any study on this subject.

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\* It is of interest to note that the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay are the primary targets of Soviet economic penetration in Latin America.

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For each party the first and second sections are devoted respectively to origin and development and to present political influence. The next three sections treat respectively with the key factors of ideology and objectives, trade union activity, and attitude to the Free World-Communist conflict. Communist-Socialist relations are highlighted in the discussion of these factors as well as Socialist Left Wing factions or groups which cooperate or advocate cooperation with the Communists and oppose the Socialist party's Right Wing. The attitude of each party on such questions as trade with the Soviet Bloc and U.S. policies in Latin America is set forth in the section concerning the Free World-Communist conflict.

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[REDACTED] (A separate section on this aspect was prepared in the case of the Socialist Party of Chile, the only Socialist party which has any reasonable hope of entering the government in the near future.). Lastly, each party's international Socialist associations are described.

It will be noted that no mention is made in the above resume of Socialist party intelligence organizations. Such organizations are known to exist in several European Democratic Socialist parties, and could logically be expected to exist in some Latin American Socialist parties, given Latin America's revolutionary tradition. However, no information is available on this subject.

It should also be noted that a distinction is made throughout the study between Democratic Socialism, as manifested in theory and practice in Western Europe, and Marxist Socialism. The Democratic Socialist parties in Western Europe emphasize democracy rather than socialism. They advocate a gradual approach to socialism through parliamentary reform and espouse pragmatic as opposed to

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doctrinaire methods. For example, nationalization and economic planning are limited, and implementation is so undertaken as to minimize any restriction of freedom. Mass parties rather than class parties, they have relegated most of Marx's concepts to history. They reject collaboration with the Communists and are pro-U.S. Of the Latin American Socialist parties, the Argentine Party and to a lesser extent that of Uruguay largely conform to the pattern of Democratic Socialism.

Marxist Socialist parties and groups, on the other hand, maintain the validity of most of Marx's theories and have a doctrinaire approach to socialism. They advocate the collective ownership of the means of production (nationalization of basic industry) and national economic planning and distribution of goods. Maintaining that these measures are essential to socialism, they allege that collective ownership can be achieved without restricting democracy and freedom. They affirm the validity of the class struggle, but usually advocate that the proletariat work peacefully through established political institutions to achieve power. However, in general, such extra-parliamentary methods as strikes and demonstrations are also considered acceptable; and sometimes revolutionary overthrow of the existing government is not excluded. Marxist Socialists, tending to view the Communist party as a legitimate national political party rather than an appendage of the International Communist Movement, are inclined towards collaboration. They also advocate a neutral foreign policy involving cooperation with both the Free World and the USSR. However, this policy usually takes the form of pro-Soviet neutralism in which U.S. policies are condemned more than those of the USSR. In Latin America, the Socialist Parties of Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador largely conform to the Marxist Socialist pattern.

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THE LATIN AMERICAN SECRETARIAT OF THE  
SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

SUMMARY:

The Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International is as yet a rather ineffectual organization. After a fairly auspicious start in 1956, it did not hold any of its three scheduled meetings in 1957. The main theme of its two 1956 meetings was opposition to Latin American dictatorships, coupled with the allegation that "U.S. imperialism" supports these dictatorships. It called "on the peoples of the Latin American continent to fight /dictatorships/ with every means, to defend and develop democratic freedom, promote a vast popular movement to pave the way for the transformation of our agrarian structure, to free ourselves from imperialism, raise cultural standards, stimulate Latin American integration, and plan our national economies on Socialist principles." To promote this program the First Conference of Economic Experts of the Socialist Parties of Latin America and the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee were subsequently held at Santiago, Chile, during 15-19 April 1958.

The Third Conference of the Consultative Committee was marked by the participation for the first time, in observer status, of the Socialist Parties of Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama, and by the adoption of resolutions which, if carried out, would undermine the U.S. position in Latin America. Participating parties also agreed informally to solicit funds from their membership to support Chilean Socialist presidential candidate Salvador Allende Gossens, who is also being supported in Chile by the Communist and other Left Wing parties of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). Increased efforts designed to incite opposition of the Committee to Communism and at the same time to soften its anti-American bias appear in order, particularly if membership in the Consultative Committee is, as now contemplated, further expanded through affiliation of other Latin American parties of a Socialist orientation. The Fourth Conference of the Consultative Committee is now scheduled to be held at Quito, Ecuador in December 1958.

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1. The establishment of a "Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International" was suggested in July 1955 in conversations between the then Secretary of the Socialist International, Julius Braunthal, and Americo Ghioldi of the Argentine Socialist Party, Humberto Maiztegui of the Uruguayan Socialist Party, and Rodolfo Llopis of the exiled Spanish Socialist Workers' Party. All of these men were interested in encouraging the development of Socialist movements in Latin America in accordance with the model of the Argentine and Uruguayan Parties. These parties, reflecting the influence of European immigration, developed along Democratic Socialist lines and are now full members of the Socialist International.

2. The Bureau of the Socialist International subsequently, on 18 October 1955, approved the establishment of a Latin American Secretariat, which decision was affirmed by the Council of the Socialist International in March 1956. The tasks of the Secretariat were defined as follows:

- a. to become a center for the exchange of information and contacts between the Socialist parties of Latin America;
- b. to publish a bulletin in Spanish containing articles of interest to the Latin American Socialist movement;
- c. to form a Consultative Committee of the Secretariat, consisting of the Socialist Parties of Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile.

The Socialist International voted an annual subsidy of 750 pounds sterling, and Humberto Maiztegui was appointed part-time Secretary. It envisaged the establishment of the Secretariat

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as a step encouraging Democratic Socialist movements in Latin America, and eventually as the means of linking these movements with the Socialist International.

3. The Secretariat was activated by Maiztegui following the Bureau decision, and contact was initiated with the various Latin American Socialist parties. The first issue of the bulletin mentioned above appeared in March 1956. Early agreement was reached between the Argentine and Uruguayan Parties for formation of the Consultative Committee, but the Popular Socialist Party of Chile (PSP) at first showed no great interest. However, upon the visit of Secretariat representative Andres F. Cultelli to Chile during the general strike of January 1956, the PSP agreed to participate in the Consultative Committee on the understanding that this act would not mean affiliation with the Socialist International.

4. The first meeting of the Consultative Committee took place 11-13 May 1956 at Montevideo, Uruguay. The Socialist Party of Argentina was represented by Professor Americo Ghioldi and Doctor Alicia Moreau de Justo, both of whom also occupied positions on the Consultative Council of the Argentine Government; the Chilean Popular Socialist Party by Dr. Raul Ampuero Diaz, Senator and Secretary General of the Party, and by Dr. Federico Klein, head of the International Office of the PSP; the Uruguayan Socialist Party by Senator Dr. Jose Pedro Cardoso and by Dr. Arturo J. Dubra, member of Parliament and member of the Executive Committee of the Party; the Secretariat by Humberto Maiztegui. Terms of reference for participation in the Consultative Committee were approved as follows:

- a. affiliation with the Socialist International is not obligatory;
- b. only Latin American or related problems will be discussed;

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- c. a unanimous vote is essential to formal agreements;
- d. there should be no interference in problems within the national competence of individual parties;
- e. meetings should be held every six months.

In agreeing to limit discussion to Latin American problems only and to make participation in the Consultative Committee possible without affiliation with the Socialist International, Maiztegui sought to effect as wide a participation of Latin American parties as possible. Envisaged in these terms of reference was the eventual participation of the Socialist Parties of Brazil and Peru, wherein the respective constitutions prohibit political parties from joining an international organization. Also recognized were the differences in points of view on international affairs between the Marxist-Leninist Chilean PSP and the Democratic Socialist Parties of Argentina and Uruguay. It was agreed at the meeting that such differences in outlook should not prohibit cooperation on purely Latin American problems. It was also resolved to invite the Socialist Parties of Brazil and Ecuador to become members of the Consultative Committee.

5. In addition to establishing terms of reference, this first meeting of the Consultative Committee set the tone for future meetings. Opposition to Latin American dictatorships was set forth as a main theme, and "U.S. imperialism" was alleged to be a force supporting these dictatorships. The Committee condemned the then forthcoming meeting in Panama of the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, and the U.S. as "a further expression of the present policy of domination which the U.S. Republican Party is carrying on through the State Department, the most notorious

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result whereof is the prosperity of dictatorships and the economic bleeding of Latin America". The Committee also accepted the proposal of the Chilean Popular Socialist Party that a "Congress of democratic parties of Latin America be convened to survey publicly and condemn the despotic regimes of many countries of Latin America and the internal and external forces which support them". A precedent for this proposal existed. In 1946 the Socialist Party of Chile (of which the PSP then constituted a faction) sponsored a Congress in Santiago of representatives of almost all the Latin American political movements of Socialist orientation. The 1946 Congress was not considered a success, so that the PSP in 1956 sought the broadened sponsorship of the Consultative Committee in an effort to rally effective support for a future Congress.

6. The second conference of the Consultative Committee was held in Buenos Aires from 21-23 December 1956. Representation for the three participating Socialist parties was the same as in the Montevideo meeting except that Dr. Clodomiro Almeida replaced Dr. Federico Klein as the second Chilean delegate. Also in attendance at the Conference were Galo Achar of the Partido Febrerista Revolucionario Paraguayo; Jose Manzo Gonzalez and Augusto Malave Villalba of the Accion Democratica de Venezuela; and Victor Raul Montesinos of the Aprista Party of Peru.

7. The second conference specifically condemned the governments of Rojas Pinilla of Colombia; Batista of Cuba, Castillo Armas of Guatemala, Stroessner of Paraguay, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Perez Jimenez of Venezuela, and Somoza of Nicaragua. It called for the formation of a vast continental movement to combat and destroy these governments, which were described as "the expression of the feudal classes of those countries,

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instruments of imperialism, and frequently protected by the Catholic Church". Repudiating the regressive role of the Latin American dictators generally, the conference condemned "the militarism which maintains them, the imperialism whose tools they are, and the classes of society whose interests they defend". It called "on the peoples of the Latin American continent to fight them with every means, to defend and develop democratic freedom, promote a vast popular movement to pave the way for the transformation of our agrarian structure, to free ourselves from imperialism, raise cultural standards, stimulate Latin American integration and plan our national economies on Socialist principles."

8. To further this program, the Consultative Committee agreed to sponsor three meetings. The first was to be a conference at Santiago, Chile, of economic experts of the Socialist parties of Latin America. The subject contemplated for this meeting was "How Socialism can promote Latin American economic development". The Consultative Committee also agreed to hold its Third Conference at Santiago and to consider as its principal theme the "Analysis of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism in Latin America". The final meeting, previously proposed by the Chilean PSP, was scheduled as the Conference of Democratic and Socialist Parties of Latin America. The Secretary agreed to convene this Conference and to set forth the Declaration of Principles of the previous Congress of this nature which had met in Santiago in 1946. The agenda was to consist of

- a. Latin American economic integration;
- b. democratic development in Latin America,  
and
- c. coordination of action by the parties in  
attendance.

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The Secretary was authorized to invite the following Socialist and nationalist parties: Brazilian Socialist Party, Ecuadorian Socialist Party, Peruvian Socialist Party, Socialist Party of Colombia, Democratic Socialist Federation of Cuba, Socialist Groups of the Republic of Mexico, Democratic Action of Venezuela, Partido del Pueblo (APRA) of Peru, Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of Bolivia, Paraguayan Febrerista Party, and the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica.

9. The First Conference of Economic Experts of the Latin American Socialist Parties and the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee were subsequently held at Santiago, Chile, during 15-19 April 1958. These two conferences encompassed the agenda items of the previously contemplated Conference of Democratic and Socialist Parties of Latin America. In attendance were delegates from the Socialist Parties of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Uruguay. The delegates from the Socialist Parties of Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama participated as observers; and their respective parties, as well as the Brazilian Socialist Party, were invited to join the Committee. The Socialist Parties of Brazil and Peru and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) of Bolivia had planned to attend but declined at the last moment for internal reasons. Accion Democratica of Venezuela, the Paraguayan Febrerista Party, and the Partido del Pueblo (APRA) of Peru apparently refused to attend because of the political alliance of the Chilean Socialists with the Communists.

10. At the request of the Chilean Socialist Party, which is cooperating with the Communists, the question of relations of Socialist parties with Communist parties was not put to a vote. The delegates from the Uruguayan and Argentine Parties, however, opposed relations with the Communists, and the delegate from the Socialist Party of Ecuador

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said that his party accepted relations with the Communists in theory but considered them fatal in practice. The Chilean delegates recognized the danger of Communist penetration, particularly in the Chilean Socialist youth organization, but concluded that their party's cooperation with the Chilean Communists on balance was beneficial. All parties with the exception of the Ecuadoran Socialist Party, informally agreed to seek financial support from their membership to support Chilean Socialist presidential candidate Salvador Allende Gossens, who is also being supported in Chile by the Communists and other Left parties of the Popular Action Front (FRAP).

11. The most alarming aspect of the Third Conference was the Consultative Committee's emergence as an anti-U.S. organization. Even the Argentine and Colombian delegates,\* who are somewhat friendly to the U.S., indorsed final resolutions (a) alleging U.S. economic aggression against Latin America, (b) denouncing the Organization of American States as an instrument for U.S. imperialist subjugation of Latin America, and (c) condemning military pacts between the U.S. and Latin American countries. In view of their anti-U.S. character, the complete resolutions are set forth in attachment A. Also included are the official delegates of the five Socialist parties indorsing these resolutions. It is apparent that although the Consultative Committee competes with Communist Latin American regional organizations its recent resolutions contribute to the undermining of the U.S. position in Latin America. Accordingly, increased efforts designed to incite opposition of the Committee to Communism and to soften its anti-American bias appear to be in order, particularly if membership in the Consultative Committee is further expanded through affiliation of other Latin American parties of Socialist orientation.

\* The Argentine delegate did, however, protest and the Colombian delegate threaten to withdraw over what they considered extravagant attacks against the United States.

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## PRINCIPAL SOCIALIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

### SOCIALIST PARTY OF ARGENTINA (Partido Socialista Argentino, PSA)

#### SUMMARY:

The Socialist Party of Argentina (Partido Socialista Argentino, PSA), formed in 1896, was largely influenced by European immigrants who advocated parliamentary means to achieve Socialism, as opposed to the revolutionary methods advocated by orthodox Marxists. It is a Democratic Socialist Party and a member of the Socialist International. Although favored by leaders of high caliber, the PSA has never become a national party and has splintered to both the Right and Left. Its high point was reached in 1932, when it had 45 representatives in congress and dominated the General Confederation of Labor (CGT). Having suffered greatly under Peron, the Party was faced with a complete rebuilding task both politically and in the trade unions upon his overthrow in 1955. Subsequently the PSA regained some ground in the trade unions and placed third in the July 1957 elections for the Constituent Assembly, polling 525,565 votes. However, in the PSA Congress of November 1957, the PSA was rent by dissension when the followers of Americo Ghioldi withdrew as a result of a power struggle and differences over political tactics. In the national elections of 1958 the PSA presidential and vice-presidential candidates ranked fourth, polling only 263,844 votes. In the same elections the PSA failed to win any seats in the Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies. The PSA has firmly resisted Communist overtures for collaboration, and there is no positive evidence of Communist penetration within the Party. The Party aligned itself with the Free World and has displayed an attitude of critical friendship toward the U.S.

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I. Background:

The Socialist Party of Argentina (PSA) had its beginnings in 1895, when five Socialist groups agreed to draw up a joint program and to put up candidates for the elections of 1896. Subsequently, on 28 June 1896, these Socialist groups held a Constituent Congress and formed the Argentine Socialist Party. Principally responsible for the founding of the Party was Juan B. Justo, who inspired it until his death in 1928 and who in 1904 founded the present PSA newspaper, La Vanguardia. The Argentine Socialist movement received a considerable impetus from European immigrants, many of whom came to Argentina as a result of the suppression of the Paris Commune in 1871 and again in 1878 and 1880 as a result of Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws in Germany. These immigrants were instrumental in forming in 1882 the first Socialist organization in Argentina, the Vorwaerts Association.

The Socialist Party, although supported and led by intellectuals and professional men, was founded to further the interests of Argentine labor. The PSA's Declaration of Principles, formulated at the Constituent Congress, accepted the Marxist view of the evils of capitalism and the division of society into classes. It called for the replacement of capitalism by a "society in which ownership of the means of production shall be collective and social, in which everyone may own the product of his own work, and the economic anarchy and selfishness of the present shall be replaced by the scientific organization of production and a high level of social morality". It called on the workers to organize and to fight for their freedom through the Socialist Party, which would utilize existing political rights to achieve its objectives. The Declaration, more rational in tone than most early Socialist pronouncements, foreshadowed the moderate and evolutionary tactics which the PSA subsequently employed. Never modified, it remains today the ideological basis of Argentine Socialism.

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The first PSA platform, formulated in April 1895, advocated a minimum wage scale, a 40-hour week, equal pay for women, social security benefits, and the unionization of workers. The PSA also supported such political proposals as universal suffrage, proportional representation, separation of Church and State, and abolition of the standing army.

The PSA elected its first deputy, Alfredo L. Palacios, to the Chamber of Deputies in the elections of 1904. In succeeding elections through 1920 the PSA recorded steady gains in popular votes in spite of the defection of a group of Left Wing Marxists in 1917. A further defection occurred in 1921 when a second group of Left Wing Marxists split off and later joined with the first Marxist splinter group to form the Argentine Communist Party. Following this last defection, the PSA total vote dropped from 86,420 in 1920 to 83,448 in 1922. It increased to 101,516 in 1924 and then dropped to 73,130 in 1928 following the splitting off in 1927 of a Right Wing group called "Independents". The number of votes accruing to the PSA then increased to 123,621 in the elections of 1930. In 1931, when the administration of General Jose F. Uriburu barred the Radical Party candidates, the PSA gained greatly and secured 319,430 votes.

The PSA in 1932 consisted of 423 associations, as compared to 24 in 1902, and had about 21,000 members. It had 43 members in the Chamber of Deputies, 2 senators, 20 members of provincial congresses, 5 mayors, and more than 300 municipal councillors. It was the principal voice of the Argentine trade union movement, having secured control of the important railroad workers' union in the late 1920's and having achieved domination of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) formed in 1929.

After 1932, however, the fortunes of the PSA declined. In 1936 another Left Wing faction split off to form the Socialist Labour Party--a majority of which later joined the Communists.

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In 1937 and again in 1943 the Socialists failed in their attempts to form electoral alliances to oppose the incumbent National Democratic administrations. By 1943 the Communists had secured control of about half of the CGT membership. After the Revolution of June 1943 the Socialists resolutely opposed the ensuing dictatorships. This opposition led to a series of repressive measures by the successive Ramirez, Farrell, and Peron Governments through which Socialist control over Argentine unions was almost eliminated. In the elections of 1946 the PSA lost its previous representation in the national legislature. In the 1951 elections the PSA presidential slate of Americo Ghioldi and Alfredo L. Palacios polled only 54,920 votes, or less than 1 per cent of the popular vote. The PSA also failed to elect a single provincial governor or national legislator.

The PSA suffered further losses in 1953 when followers of Peron attacked and set on fire the PSA's Peoples' House. The modern printing press of La Vanguardia, where nearly all trade union papers were printed before the dictatorship, the Labour Library, and PSA headquarters were completely destroyed. Under pressure of the dictatorship the PSA suffered further splintering in 1953, when a group led by Enrique Dickman split off to set up the Revolutionary Socialist Party and another group, under the leadership of Dardo Cuneo, defected to found Socialist Action. Thus, upon the overthrow of Peron and the emergence of the civilian-military provisional government of 16 September 1955, the PSA was confronted with an almost complete rebuilding effort.

## II. Political Influence:

Between September 1955 and July 1957, when the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held, the PSA, while supporting the Provisional Government, intently worked to

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re-establish its influence both in politics and in the trade unions. The reconstruction of the Party was favored by the fact that the PSA had been in resolute opposition to the Peron Government and was recognized as the principal anticlerical party. It also counted among its leaders several elderly and highly respected individuals. Four of its leaders, Dr. Nicolas Repetto, Professor Americo Ghioldi, Dr. Ramon A. Muniz, and Dr. Alicia Moreau de Justo, became members of the National Consultative Junta advising the Provisional Government. Other Socialists were appointed by the Provisional Government as interventors in the trade unions. Thus, as a supporter of the Provisional Government, the PSA was provided with a forum and base from which to re-establish its influence. Its responsible attitude with respect to the Provisional Government also gained the PSA supporters, particularly among middle class anti-Peronists.

The Socialists emerged as the third strongest party in the July 1957 elections for the Constituent Assembly, polling 525,565 votes compared to 2,105,489 for the Popular Radicals and 1,848,546 for the Intransigent Radicals. The distribution of seats in the Constituent Assembly gave the Popular Radicals 76; Intransigent Radicals 76; Socialists 11; Christian Democrats 9; Democrats 9; Progressive Democrats 6; Federal Unionists 3; and others 15. Socialist gains were most notable in its traditional stronghold of Buenos Aires and in the Chaco. Lesser gains were recorded in La Pampa and San Juan.

In the national elections held on 23 February 1958 the Socialist presidential and vice-presidential slate ranked fourth, but received only 263,844 votes. This total compared to 4,049,230 for the Intransigent Radical slate; 2,416,408 for that of the Popular Radicals; and 277,237 for the Christian Democratic slate. Under the "Saenz Pena" electoral law, which gives the majority party two-thirds of each Province's representation in the National Congress and the runner-up party the remaining one-third, the Socialist Party won no seats in the

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Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies. The Intransigent Radicals clearly emerged as the nation's leading political party, winning the presidency and vice-presidency, the governorships of all 22 provinces, all seats in the Senate, and 133 out of 187 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (Popular Radicals 52 and Liberal Party of Corrientes 2). In the Municipal Council of Buenos Aires the Socialists won 6 seats compared to 12 for the Intransigent Radicals, 8 for the Popular Radicals, 2 for the Christian Democrats, and 2 for the Communists.

### III. Ideology and Objectives:

The PSA is a democratic Socialist party which subscribes to the principles of the Socialist International. As noted in Part I above, the PSA's Declaration of Principles, formulated in 1896, remains the ideological basis of Argentine Socialism. Although the Declaration accepts the Marxist analysis of society, emphasis has been placed in practice on the abstract and moral goals of Socialism, such as political and economic freedom, social justice, and equality, which are to be achieved through parliamentary democracy. The consistent pursuit of moderate and evolutionary policies and tactics by the PSA has resulted in defections to both the Right and Left. The Party has been able to overcome each of these defections and emerge stronger than before. However, its reasoned appeal to the electorate has failed to attract the popular support necessary to carry out its program.

The PSA at its Thirty-seventh National Congress in November 1950 set forth the following eight goals:

1. A democratic state with a civilian government,
2. The attainment of the fundamental rights of assembly, and expression,

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3. The stabilization of prices, and an increase in the purchasing power of wages,
4. The socialization of national resources and public services,
5. The socialization of public health services,
6. The solution of the housing problem,
7. Secularism in government, and
8. Free access for the public to all levels of education.

More recently the PSA at its Congress of 16-18 November 1957, at Cordoba, set forth a general platform calling for

1. Agrarian reform which would be effected by expropriation and division of large estates,
2. Exploitation of public services by the nation, the provinces, municipalities, or cooperative entities. /The expropriation of public utilities seems to be implied here but it is not specifically stated./
3. Lay education and divorce.
4. Exploitation and administration by the nation, with participation by the provinces, of petroleum deposits, minerals, water currents, and all other sources of energy, in view of their being considered the property of the nation. /Lacking in this plank is a statement calling for a state monopoly of petroleum distribution and the prohibition of petroleum concessions. However, the latter is inferable from the assignment of exploitation and administration functions to the state./

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Apparently the Party as a whole agrees with the PSA platform set forth above, although it was passed without the concurrence of the Right-Wing Ghioldi faction. This faction, representing some 100-odd of the 244 delegates, had previously walked out of the Congress because of tactical differences on political issues and because of its defeat in the maneuvering for power within the Party. It also did not participate in the selection of Dr. Alfredo Palacios and Dr. Carlos Sanchez Viamonte as the Socialist presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the elections subsequently held on 23 February 1958.

The influence of Americo Ghioldi in the PSA had been waning before the walkout. In the Party elections of 1956 for officials of the PSA's Executive Committee, Ghioldi placed behind Carlos Sanchez Viamonte, Ramon Muniz, and Alicia Moreau de Justo. At its meeting of 26 November 1956 the Executive Committee elected Alicia Moreau de Justo to succeed Ghioldi as editor of La Vanguardia. Sanchez, Muniz, Alicia Moreau de Justo, and Jose Luis Romero, who head the majority faction, are orientated to the Left of Ghioldi and were more firmly opposed to the government of Pedro Aramburu. Thus they opposed the government's declaration of a state of siege, an action which Ghioldi defended. They also opposed Ghioldi's advocacy of a political alliance to the Right, which, in Ghioldi's view, would have enhanced his and the Party's influence. The split in the PSA may well have been a factor in the poorer showing of the PSA in the national elections of 1958 as compared to its showing in the elections of July 1957 for the Constituent Assembly.

#### IV. Trade Union Work:

PSA influence in labor prior to the advent of Peron was exerted primarily among the urban workers in the Federal

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Capital and the Province of Buenos Aires. Socialist influence was greatest among the skilled workers who constituted a large part of organized labor. To the masses of unskilled or semi-skilled laborers, who were largely unorganized before Peron, PSA programs and tactics held little appeal. This lack of appeal was largely due to the PSA's inability to secure passage of legislation to benefit these sectors. Nevertheless, as previously noted, the PSA did achieve a leading role in the General Confederation of Labor (Confederacion General del Trabajo, CGT) upon its establishment in 1929. In the years immediately following, the Communists fought the Socialists for dominance of the CGT and by 1943 secured control of about half of the CGT membership. During the Peron administration the government took over control of the CGT and used it to organize the masses of unskilled and semi-skilled workers as Peron supporters. In this process Socialist influence in labor was almost completely eliminated.

With the establishment of the Provisional Government in September 1955 the PSA has set about building a democratic labor movement. The PSA favors a labor movement independent of government control and under Socialist control if possible. The Party also advocates single unions for each trade; and most, but not all, Socialists are against a united CGT. Socialist rebuilding in the trade unions has been facilitated by the appointment of several of their trade union leaders as interventors. In most unions in which Socialists were appointed interventors they were able to regain some support by effectively handling workers' grievances and by using the union's sizable funds to provide social benefits for their members. Emphasis was placed on legitimate trade union activities rather than on making the unions political organizations.

Socialists are active in the Comite Obrero Argentino de Sindicatos Independientes (COASI), the former exiled trade unionist committee now affiliated with the ICFTU and its Inter-American Regional Organization (ORIT), and in the movement

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for the Recuperation of Free Trade Unionism (Movimiento Pro-Recuperacion del Gremialismo Libre, MGRL). However, the Socialists have been plagued in their trade union efforts, as in the pre-Peron days, by a lack of unified direction. A pact of unity was signed in May 1956 between COASI and MGRL in Buenos Aires, but as of August 1956 this agreement had not prevented these groups from backing different persons in some of the unions. Also, as of the above date, it was reported that the activity of Socialists working in the trade unions in the interior was not coordinated by the Socialist Party or with COASI and the MGRL. This lack of coordination, as well as the considerable pro-Peron sentiment in the trade unions, has led to only moderate PSA gains which fall short of Socialist influence in the pre-Peron period.

V. Attitude Toward the Free World-Communist Conflict:

The PSA is both anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. In March 1949 the Party repudiated all connections with International Communism and aligned itself with the Western democratic powers in the struggle between the Soviet Bloc and the Free World. The PSA has subsequently adhered to this position. Like other Democratic Socialist parties of the Socialist International, it rejected the call of the CPSU at its Twentieth Congress for collaboration between Socialists and Communists and condemned Soviet oppression in Hungary. In fact, Alicia Moreau de Justo, after the Hungarian uprising, publicly urged that Argentina sever relations with the USSR and tried to organize Argentine stevedores to boycott Soviet ships in Argentine ports.

The PSA's attitude toward the U.S. has been one of critical friendship. In fact, since 1937 no other Argentine political party, and few parties if any in the rest of Latin America, have so consistently advocated cooperation with the

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U.S. It has urged, with some reservations, Argentine participation in hemispheric and world organizations. Within this framework the PSA has also criticized in a restrained manner the U.S. and its policies. A good example is the speech of Americo Ghioldi at the Fourth Congress of the Socialist International held in July 1955 at London. Citing the existence of dictatorial regimes in two-thirds of Latin America and the reasons therefore, Ghioldi stated:

"We must also point to the responsibility of the U.S. in the strengthening of Latin American dictatorships. With a pitiful blindness, that great country, claiming strategic needs, has given arms to dictators who have used them to oppress their own peoples. In the words of a well-known jurist of my own country, we may say that armaments and militarism in Latin America bite their own people, but only bark at outsiders."

Ghioldi also, by implication, criticized the U.S. when he said that capitalism in Latin America had been "fostered by powerful international forces, by imperialism in a strictly economic sense". He added, however, that the shortcomings of Latin American governments had encouraged capitalist development by allowing foreign capital to make a very high rate of profit. He called for economic aid to Latin America by the richer countries as a "manifestation of cooperative internationalism" rather than on a basis of national interests.

In international affairs, generally, the PSA has consistently adhered to the principles of Justo, who advocated cooperation in the reduction of armaments and in the elimination of barriers to world trade.

Recently, and particularly since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the Communists have been advocating a united labor front and a united front among Argentina's political

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parties. The Communists are also reported making strenuous efforts to capture the PSA by infiltration. However, the PSA has to date refused to be taken in by Communist united front overtures, and there is no positive evidence of Communist infiltration in the PSA.

VI. International Socialist Associations:

The PSA is a full member of the Socialist International and participates in the Consultative Committee of the Socialist International Secretariat. As previously noted, the PSA has to date followed the lead of the Socialist International on such important issues as the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and Soviet intervention in Hungary. The PSA views participation in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International as a means of combatting Latin American dictatorships and economic imperialism, and of channeling Latin American nationalism towards a Democratic Socialist development.

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SOCIALIST PARTY OF BRAZIL  
(Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB)

SUMMARY:

The Socialist Party of Brazil (Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB) was formed in 1947, largely under the aegis of former Communists and Trotskyites. It is a Marxist Socialist party which proposes to bring about the gradual socialization of the means of production through democratic processes. A minor party, it is represented by one senator out of 63 and 5 deputies out of 304. It commands the loyalty of some trade union leaders scattered throughout the trade union movement and is reported to have made some progress among the labor rank and file, notably in the Sao Paulo area. It is an ultranationalist party which agitates on all popular issues on the side of absolute neutrality. However, its espousal of nationalism of an anti-U.S. variety more often than not coincides with the position of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). It tends to view the PCB as a national Brazilian party rather than a party of the International Communist conspiracy, and has cooperated with it in the trade union movement. On the other hand, it disapproved of Soviet intervention in Hungary. Two PSB leaders who have been a source of comfort to the Communists are (a) Senator Domingos Velasco, who made two trips to Communist China and attended the World Youth Festival at Moscow in July-August 1957; (b) Deputy Roge Ferreira, who headed the Brazilian delegation to the World Youth Festival at Moscow in July-August 1957 and also attended the Fourth Congress of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held at Kiev in August 1957.

With respect to International Socialist associations, Dr. Febus Gikovate of the PSB National Executive attended the Fifth Congress of the Socialist International in Vienna, Austria, during July 1957 as an observer. The PSB has not

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as yet joined the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International, although reportedly it has indicated its intention to do so.

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### I. Background

The Brazilian Socialist Party was formed in 1947 from two main Socialist currents. The principal current was a group termed Esquerda Democratica, which had formed within the front (Uniao Democratica Nacional, UDN) organized to support Eduardo Gomes against Getulio Vargas in the presidential elections of 1945. After the elections the Esquerda Democratica withdrew from the UDN and organized as an independent party under the slogan "Socialism and Liberty." Its principal spokesmen were Joao Mangabeira and the prominent Left-Wing Catholic, Domingos Velasco, both of whom had been elected to Congress in 1945 under the UDN ticket. These were joined by Hermes Lima of the Distrito Federal, who later became the PSB's third federal deputy. All three of these leaders had been imprisoned briefly for alleged complicity in the revolutionary movement of November 1935, which involved Communists and dissatisfied elements of the army and navy.

The second current consisted of a number of ex-Communists who, in the 1930's, had formed Brazil's first Trotskyite organization, but who by the middle 1940's had declared their fealty to Democratic Socialism. They included Mario Pedrosa, one-time Communist youth leader and later Brazil's leading art critic; the important former Communist trade union leaders, Hilcar Leite and Joao da Costa Pimenta; and Plinio Mello, who in the late 1920's had been leader of the Communists in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This group rallied around a weekly publication, Vanguarda Socialista, launched by Pedrosa. Marxist but also avowedly Democratic Socialist, the newspaper

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advocated free trade unionism and the formation of a Brazilian Socialist Party. Under the aegis of the Vanguarda Socialista group in Sao Paulo, which was also active in Esquerda Democratica, the 1948 Convention of Esquerda Democratica changed the Party's name to Partido Socialista Brasileiro, and voted to admit without restriction the Vanguarda Socialista group.

II. Political Influence:

The PSB is a minor party both in the number of adherents and in parliamentary influence. It has one senator out of 63, Domingos Velasco from Goias, and 5 out of 304 federal deputies. Only in the state of Sao Paulo, did it present a slate under its own name for federal deputies in the 1954 elections and elected but 2 deputies, Roge Ferreira and Cory Porto Fernandes, out of a total of 48 from that state. There are more than 40 Socialist mayors and about 500 Socialist councillors. A Christian Democratic Party member, Janio Quadros, was elected mayor of Sao Paulo in 1953 with Socialist support. In 1954 Quadros was elected governor of Sao Paulo with the official support of only the Socialist Party.

III. Ideology and Objectives:

The PSB directs its appeal to the working class. It has consistently upheld the right to strike and advocates labor union freedom and autonomy from government control. To effect greater benefits for labor generally, the PSB proposes to bring about by democratic process the gradual and progressive socialization of the means of production. The Party admits the possibility of achieving some of its specific social and economic ends in a capitalistic society but affirms its conviction that a definite solution for socio-economic problems is not attainable without the execution of its full program. It advocates planned economic development by states, beginning in the economic sectors "on which the desired structural transformation and the productivity of national labor depend organically,"

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These sectors are, above all, those of credit (with bank reform), transport, the steel industry, electricity, the machine industry, and agriculture (with agrarian reform). Also advocated is a moving salary scale with a minimum wage to maintain a "certain stability of living standards" among salaried classes. The PSB program calls for the preservation of strategic minerals, for the prohibition of their export, for the establishment of an atomic energy program, and for the development of Petrobras, the Brazilian petroleum monopoly. The PSB program is to be achieved through independence from other political parties, though not through isolation.

IV. Trade Union Work:

Since 1948 the Brazilian Socialists have had moderate success in the trade union movement, notably in Sao Paulo. In the period following the re-election of Getulio Vargas in 1950 the Socialists gained adherents among trade union leaders and, to a lesser degree, among the rank and file of those disillusioned with both Vargas and the Communists. In recent years more lower echelon trade union leaders have been joining the PSB. An important factor in this development was the strike of six unions in Sao Paulo in 1953. Most of the leaders of the strike were independents, and some of them were Socialists. In the months after the strike some of these independent leaders joined the Socialist Party.

V. Attitude Toward the Free World-Communist Conflict:

The PSB is an ultranationalist party which agitates on all popular issues on the side of absolute neutrality. It seems in general to be opposed to International Communism, as illustrated by its disapproval of Soviet intervention in Hungary. On the other hand, its nationalism finds expression in attacks against U.S. "imperialism" in general, and against agreements concluded between the U.S. and Brazilian governments in particular. An example of such criticism is the PSB condemnation

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of the U.S.-Brazilian military accord whereby the U. S. is permitted to operate a missile radar tracking station on the island of Fernando de Noronha. The PSB termed the agreement "unconstitutional" because it amounted to the automatic commitment of Brazil to any war involving the U. S.; "politically unjustifiable" because the Brazilian people are against war except when attacked; and "morally without foundation."

PSB espousal of nationalism of an anti-U.S. variety more often than not coincides with the position of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and is exploited by the PCB. Moreover, the PSB tends to look upon the PCB as a national Brazilian party rather than a party of the International Communist conspiracy. Thus the PSB, in its Manifesto of June 1956, stated that it "considers that in all political parties, as in all sectors of the population, capable and patriotic persons exist who, on the basis of a program of immediate action, can do much to prevent the country from falling into illegality or being precipitated into the arms of dictators." Earlier, in February and March 1956, the Socialists had supported the PCB campaign for amnesty of political prisoners who were mainly indicted Communist leaders. The PSB also defends the legality of the PCB as essential to fulfillment of constitutional liberties; and from time to time when the Communists have fought against government domination of the trade unions, the Socialists have cooperated closely rather than carrying on independent activities of their own.

The extent to which nationalism and ideology motivate the PSB to support the PCB on various issues, as opposed to support motivated by Communist infiltration, is uncertain. However, in supporting the Communists on various issues, certain Socialists must be considered suspect on the basis of their activities. For example, Senator Domingos Velasco, after his first visit to Communist China, sang its praises in a speech before the Brazilian Congress. Subsequently, in June 1957, Velasco made a second trip to Communist China

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and proceeded on to Moscow to attend the World Youth Festival. PSB Deputy Roge Ferreira from Sao Paulo headed the Brazilian delegation to the World Youth Festival in Moscow in July-August 1957, and also attended the Fourth Congress of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Kiev in August 1957. He is outspoken in criticism of the U. S. and in praise of the USSR. More recently, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) charged in a press release that Janio Quadros, who has cooperated closely with the PSB and who is the Governor of the state of Sao Paulo, had helped defray travel expenses for some of the delegates to the Fourth Convention of the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), held in October 1957 at Leipzig, East Germany. Quadros is also alleged to have sent "warm, friendly greetings" to the delegates at Leipzig. The text of such a message was printed in the Rio Communist Party paper, Imprensa Popular.

VI. International Socialist Associations:

The PSB has been invited by the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International to become a member, and reportedly intends to join. The PSB did not however attend the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee held during the period 15 to 19 April 1958 at Santiago, Chile. Dr. Febus Gikovate, member of the National Executive of the PSB, attended the Fifth Congress of the Socialist International in Vienna, Austria, during July 1957. This fact would appear to indicate some PSB interest in associating with this international organization of Democratic Socialism.

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CHILE - SOCIALIST PARTY  
(Partido Socialista, PS)

SUMMARY:

The Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) in Chile was formed in July 1957 upon the confluence of the two main currents of Chilean Socialism, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh). It has 13 representatives out of 147 in the Chamber of Deputies and 8 senators out of 45 in the Senate. The Socialist Party groups within its ranks many ex-Communists, former Trotskyites, and Left-Wing Socialists. It claims that it is a Marxist-Leninist party, with the dominant Ampuero faction looking toward the Titoist regime in Yugoslavia as an illustration of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism. The leaders of the PS accept the concepts of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, while professing adherence to parliamentary means to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The PS cooperates with the Communists in both the Communist-led Popular Action Front (FRAP) and in the Communist-controlled labor confederation, Single Labor Central of Chile (CUTCh). This cooperation is marred by rivalry for leadership and by tactical differences. The PS views FRAP as an instrument of the workers to achieve power through their own efforts (Workers Front position). This position is opposed by the Communists, who believe that the present situation in Chile demands that the FRAP alliance be expanded into a "national liberation movement" with the inclusion of the Radicals. The Socialist view recently prevailed within FRAP when Socialist Salvador Allende was designated as the FRAP presidential candidate for the 1958 elections. The Socialists and Communists each have 10 members on the 25-member

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National Directive Council of CUTCh, although the Communists composed the largest single delegation at the First National Congress of CUTCh held from 15-18 August 1957.

Although Socialist-Communist cooperation is marred domestically by rivalry and tactical differences, the two parties are in agreement in exploiting issues running the whole gamut of Chile's political and economic relations with the U. S. Internationally the PS advocates that Chile assume a posture similar to that of the so-called neutrals, such as Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt. And the PS tends to identify itself with the so-called Socialist bloc opposed to capitalism and imperialism.

A considerable number of Socialists have collaborated closely with the Communists. These are listed in Part VIII of the Chilean section.

The PS, as did the PSP, participates in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International and was the host from 15 to 19 April 1958 at Santiago for the First Conference of Economic Experts of the Socialist Parties of Latin America and for the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee. These Conferences embraced the agenda of a Conference of Democratic and Socialist Parties of Latin America previously proposed by the PSP and accepted by the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International.

The principal dissident Socialist group in Chile at the present time is the Independent Socialist Party (PSI) which was formed on 4 May 1958 from the Socialist Recovery Movement. The PSI adheres to Democratic Socialist principles and is anti-Communist. Whether it can make serious inroads into the PS remains to be seen.

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I. Background:

The Socialist Party was formed in July 1957 upon the merger of the two main currents of Chilean Socialism, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh). These two factions had existed as separate parties since 1951. The Socialist Party is thus the principal manifestation of the Chilean Socialist movement, which was organized in 1933 as the Socialist Party of Chile.

The initial Socialist Party was formed from a wide variety of Leftist elements composed largely of white-collar and professional workers who preferred a less militant form of Socialism than that offered by the Chilean Communist Party. In 1936 the Socialist Party joined with the Radicals, Communists, and minor Leftist parties to form a Popular Front government. Beginning with the elections of 1937, at least one group of Socialist dissidents has run separate candidates in every succeeding congressional election. One of the most serious Socialist splits occurred in 1948 over the anti-Communist Defense of Democracy Law. The directorate of the Socialist Party supported the law, but the so-called Popular Socialists under Raul Ampuero maintained that it would adversely affect the labor movement as a whole. Consequently the Ampuero group split off to form the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). In 1951 the PSP itself suffered division when a faction led by Salvador Allende split off to form the Socialist Party of Chile (PSCh). The PSCh was then joined by most of the remnants of the old Socialist Party, which had become progressively weaker after the loss of the PSP faction.

The PSCh split from the PSP was over the question of supporting presidential candidate Ibanez and specific political issues rather than any basic doctrinal differences. Upon its split from the PSP, the PSCh aligned itself with the Chilean Communist Party in a "People's Front" which

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unsuccessfully supported Salvador Allende in the presidential elections of 1952. After the election of Ibanez, the PSCh continued collaboration with the Communists in the National People's Front, which, with the addition of the PSP in early 1956, was reorganized as the Popular Action Front (FRAP) embracing six Leftist parties.

In the period preceding the merger of the PSP and the PSCh, the PSCh, like the Communists, tended to favor political pacts beneficial to the Left and Center rather than the PSP concept of using FRAP as a political action group of Marxist parties under Socialist leadership for the achievement of political power. The extent to which the PSCh was infiltrated by the Communists is not clear, although some reports state that the PSCh was able to maintain its distinctiveness in spite of collaboration with the Communists. Nevertheless, its domestic and foreign policy lines were indistinguishable from those of the Communists. Moreover, PSCh leader Allende was active in several Communist fronts and was the PCCh's most important mouthpiece during this period.

The PSP supported Ibanez in 1952 and was closely associated with his administration through the congressional elections of 1953, in which the PSP more than tripled its previous congressional strength. Soon thereafter, differences developed between the PSP and Ibanez, and the PSP went into opposition. Until February 1956, the PSP rejected any firm political alliance with the Communist Party, despite willingness to work with it on labor issues and "anti-imperialist" programs. The Party statutes stated that such an alliance was impossible because Communists everywhere are "agents of expansionist Soviet totalitarianism" and place the interests of the Soviet Union above those of native workers. The PSP, in this period, also sharply criticized PSCh leader Salvador Allende for accepting an invitation to Moscow in August 1954. Nevertheless,

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the PSP on 29 February 1956 joined with the Communists in the Popular Action Front (FRAP) to fight against the arrest of all leading officials in Chile's central labor confederation, the Single Labor Central of Chile (Central Unica de Trabajadores del Chile, CUTCh) which the PSP had been instrumental in forming in 1953. PSP leader Ampuero justified his party's decision to ally itself with the Communists on the basis that the Communists were changing, as indicated in the call for Communist-Socialist collaboration by the CPSU at its Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956. The PSP subsequently took a militant position against the government's economic stabilization program and sought to extend PSP influence over the labor movement.

The present Socialist Party elected on 7 July 1957 a Central Committee of eighteen members. According to the best available breakdown, the Ampuero group of the PSP won eleven positions on the Central Committee as well as the position of Secretary General. The six remaining positions were filled by three members of the PSCh and three non-Ampuero members of the PSP. The members of the Central Committee are as follows:

Salomon Corvalan	Secretary General of the PS. Candidate of the Ampuero group who won over Eugenio Gonzalez by 84 votes to 70. Formerly local Secretary of the Socialist Party and the PSP in Concepcion and elected a deputy. Was an "Ibanista" and tried to specialize in economic affairs in the Chilean Congress. Is not considered a distinguished personality. Is a half-brother of Luis Corvalan of the PCCh Political Commission, but reportedly has no ties with Luis, either political or personally.
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Tomas Chadwick	(94 votes): Lawyer, former leader of the PCCh, later a member and leader of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers' Party. Has a personal fortune and belongs to one of the aristocratic Chilean families.
Victor Sergio Mena	(90 votes): Employee of the Public Employees and Journalists' Fund. Former leader of the Popular Socialist Youth Federation. Ampuero follower.
Armando Aguirre	(89 votes): Leader of the Single Labor Central of Chile (CUTCh). Ampuero follower.
Raul Ampuero	(83 votes).
Eduardo Ossorio	(82 votes): Former deputy from the Second District of Santiago. Ampuero follower.
Julio Cesar Jobet	(80 votes): Leader of the Congress for Liberty and Culture. Professor of history, and author of several books on Chilean political evolution. Ampuero follower.
Juan Reyes	(77 votes): Secretary General of the Popular Socialist Youth Federation. Ampuero follower.
Emilio Munoz	(74 votes): His candidacy sponsored by Aniceto Rodriguez. A personal friend of Ampuero.

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Mario Garay	(74 votes): Employee of the Ministry of Public Works. Ampuero follower. Proposed Ampuero's presidential candidacy.
Clodomiro Almeida	(74 votes): Former leader of the PSP.
Jose Toha	(73 votes): Former leader of the PSCh and Secretary General of the FRAP.
Galvarino Palacios	(70 votes): PSP senator from Temuco. President of the Organizing Committee of the Socialist Congress. Voluntarily renounced his candidacy for the Secretary Generalship of the new party, saying that he had no political experience and was not acquainted with the national political leaders because he had lived many years in the provinces.
Eduardo Long Alessandri	(70 votes): CUTCh leader, and former non-Ampuero PSP leader. Subsequently joined the PSCh.
Eduardo Sepulveda	(70 votes): Ampuero follower.
Belarmino Elgueta	(62 votes): Former deputy of the PSP from Chiloé.
Manuel Mandujano	(58 votes): Former Secretary General of the PSCh, prior to Salvador Allende.
Tito Palestro	(55 votes): Leader of the PSP in the commune of San Miguel.

## II. Political Influence:

The Socialist Party has 13 representatives (5 PSP and 8 PSCh) out of 147 in the Chamber of Deputies and 8 senators (6 PSP and 2 PSCh) out of 45 in the Senate. It has an estimated

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backing of 100,000 votes, an estimate based on the March 1957 congressional elections. The present Socialist representation compares unfavorably with that secured by the PSP and the PSCh separately in the congressional elections in 1953. In the 1953 elections the former elected 3 senators and 20 deputies, the latter one senator and 9 deputies. It is difficult to estimate with any degree of accuracy the true strength of the former PSCh faction because many of the votes of the outlawed Communist Party accrued to it. The Socialist Party's influence is concentrated in the urban and industrial centers, although the PSP in the 1953 elections was the only party besides the Radical which obtained votes in every district in the country. The Socialist Party's influence is extended through participation in the Popular Action Front (FRAP), which now includes the Communists and two minor Leftist parties.

### III. Ideology and Objectives:

The Socialist Party groups within its ranks many ex-Communists, former Trotskyites, and Left-Wing Socialists. It claims that it is a Marxist-Leninist party, with the dominant Ampuero faction looking toward the Titoist regime in Yugoslavia as an illustration of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism. The leaders of the PS accept the concepts of the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, while professing adherence to parliamentary means to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. What form the dictatorship of the proletariat would take should the PS achieve power-- i.e., whether it would be a one-party government as in Yugoslavia or a government led by the PS with participation by other political parties--is not clear. It is clear, however, that the PS desires to gain control of the Chilean government, which is allegedly supported by "United States imperialism." This desire is so strong that the Socialists would probably not be averse to achieving power through revolutionary means if the opportunity should arise.

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The Socialists claim that their Party is the instrument by which the workers may achieve power, in contrast to the Communist Party, which treats labor as a tool of the Party. In economic matters, the Socialists favor the organization of labor by syndicates wherein the workers would have a voice in production and distribution similar to that exercised by the Yugoslav workers through the Workers' Councils. Many Socialists, particularly the Ampuero faction, somehow consider that they must be even more "left" than the Communists. This tendency, as well as political expediency, leads in practice to doctrine being used often as a justification for action rather than as a basis for action. A good example is the Socialist "Workers' Front" concept, which is opposed within FRAP by the Communists, who desire to form a "National Liberation Front" alliance to include the Radical Party. Actually, a FRAP-Radical alliance would enhance the influence of the Left in Chile. However, because of the desire to be more "left" than the Communists and because the Communists and Radicals have joined forces against the Socialists in past alliances of this nature, the Socialists have formulated the "Workers' Front" concept and justified it on the basis that it is the correct doctrinal position.

Although the Socialists use doctrine to justify their actions, they are also influenced by doctrine. For example, there are indications that the Socialists have accepted at face value the Twentieth CPSU Congress line on Socialist-Communist collaboration. This acceptance is indicated in a reluctance to criticize Soviet foreign policy, in a more ready assumption of Communist views, and in the discussion of a possible United Workers Party. The latter two tendencies are also indicative of an unrealistic attitude toward the Communists which has plagued the Socialists since at least 1939. The Socialists have found it hard to accept the fact that every time they have allied themselves with the Communists, the latter have taken advantage of the alliance to infiltrate and weaken them.

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The Socialist Party directs the appeal of its program to the working class, including white-collar workers, and to middle-class professional elements. It is opposed to the present government and seeks to achieve power through a "Workers' Front" composed of Marxist parties aligned in the FRAP. It advocates a basic Socialist program to include progressive nationalization of the extractive industries, agrarian reform, revision of the tax structure, labor participation in management, a flexible salary scale based on fluctuations in the cost of living, and repeal of the Defense of Democracy Law. In the international sphere the Socialist Party platform calls for

1. a fight to establish Socialism in all the Americas;
2. coordination of economic and political planning for all of Latin America;
3. fraternal relations with popular movements in Latin America and opposition to colonialism in Asia and Africa;
4. a battle for the destruction of the Organization of the American States; and
5. opposition to capitalism and imperialism.

The platform, particularly the "Workers' Front" concept, represents the dominance in the Party of the Ampuero faction of the former PSP. Instrumental in presenting this concept was Tomas Chadwick, a former Communist Central Committee member who was expelled from the PCCh in 1936 because of his Trotskyist position. The concept of no political alliances outside FRAP was opposed as unrealistic by the Communists and by the Socialist faction led by the former Communist and Trotskyite, Oscar Waiss. Waiss commented that the Socialist Party had drawn up a plan for

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revolution and assuming power without possessing either the organization or the means. The plan was contradictory in another sense; it condemned the liberalism backed by the Committee for Cultural Freedom but elected as one of its directors Julio Cesar Jobet, who was active in that Committee.

#### IV. Trade Union Work:

Historically, the Socialists in Chile have vied with the Communists for leadership of the labor movement. Socialist-Communist rivalry during the years of the Popular Front (1936-1941) led to a split in the labor movement, the Communist labor confederation emerging somewhat stronger than the Socialist confederation. In 1953 the Popular Socialist Party joined with other political parties active in the labor movement, including the Communists, to form the Single Labor Central of Chile (CUTCh). Initially, CUTCh had a predominantly anti-Communist leadership, although the Communists occupied five key posts and a Communist-orientated president was elected. The Constituent Congress of CUTCh agreed in February 1953 that the organization would remain apart from politics and not become the instrument of any political party. However, with the formation of the PSP-Communist political alliance within FRAP in early 1956, CUTCh has increasingly followed a line similar to the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and has received some financial support from the WFTU. Although points of difference between the Socialists and Communists constantly arise, the two parties are cooperating closely within CUTCh. For example, it is reported that the Socialist and Communist members of CUTCh's National Executive Council meet in advance to formulate agreed positions so as to be able to present a solid front at Council meetings. The Communists, particularly since the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, have been disposed to make some tactical concessions to the Socialists in the interests of Socialist-Communist collaboration.

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The relative strength of the PS in CUTCh' may be seen in the composition of delegations to the First National Congress of CUTCh held from 15 to 18 August 1957. Of the 1,372 voting delegates, reportedly 250 were Socialists as compared to 514 Communists, 203 Radicals, 177 Christian Democrats, 18 Trotskyites, and 210 Independents. Of the latter, about 150 were estimated to be under Communist influence.

The Socialists and Trotskyites at the First National Congress of CUTCh advocated a Marxist declaration of principles. This stand was strongly opposed by the Christian Democrats, who desired that CUTCh should be a broad-based organization open to all, fighting solely for the unity and interests of the workers rather than becoming a tool for political purposes. They desired to delete the Marxist emphasis from the statement of principles. The Communists in the Work Commission supported the Christian Democrats because they viewed a broad-based organization not characterized as purely Marxist as a useful instrument which might serve to draw non-Marxist parties into the FRAP political alliance. However, in the plenary session the Communists, with a view to continued Socialist collaboration, changed their position and supported the Marxist declaration of principles advocated by the Socialists and Trotskyites.

The statement of principles adopted by CUTCh portrays the Marxist orientation of the Socialist Party and provides common ground for both Communists and Trotskyites. It states that the present capitalist regime in Chile is founded on private ownership of the means of production in which the exploitation of man by man divides society into two antagonistic classes. The workers would replace the capitalist regime by working through political parties. CUTCh's primary objective would be to organize all workers as well as to support

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vigorously a movement to regain control of Chile's raw materials, to carry out agrarian reform, and to expropriate imperialist firms without compensation. War was declared a consequence inherent in the capitalist regime, and support was promised for all struggles for national liberation.

In the voting for the 25-member National Directive Council of CUTCh, the Socialists and Communists each secured ten positions, the Independents two, and the Radicals three. The parity of the Socialists with the Communists on the National Directive Council reflects the fact that the Communists, although having the largest number of delegates, needed an alliance to command a majority. Concessions made by the Communists to the Socialists also reflect the need by the Communists to tread softly during the period when the Communist Party is illegal.

V. Attitude Toward the Free World-Communist Conflict:

As previously noted, the Socialist Party is a Marxist-Leninist organization. Its ideology and basic objectives are virtually indistinguishable from those of the Communists. In spite of these similarities, the Socialist and Communist Parties are competing for the role of the leading Marxist party in Chile. Both parties view their cooperation in FRAP and CUTCh as a means toward this end. Between the two parties exists a major difference over tactics to be employed by the United Left or FRAP in its efforts to gain power. The Communists maintain that the "Workers' Front" concept advocated by the Socialists is valid only under conditions favorable for the immediate seizure of power. In the Communist view such conditions do not now exist in Chile. They hold that the present situation in Chile demands the creation of a "national liberation movement" in alliance with the petit bourgeoisie (Radicals) to achieve a government of national liberation. In an apparent move toward the Communist position, Socialist Party Secretary General

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Salomon Corvalan reportedly assured the late Galo Gonzalez Diaz, Secretary General of the PCCh, that the "Workers' Front" position of the Socialist Party would be given loose interpretation in practice. However, in the FRAP Convention of September 1957, the Socialists succeeded in having Salvador Allende nominated as the FRAP presidential candidate for 1958 rather than FRAP's supporting a Radical candidate.

Although Socialist-Communist cooperation is marred domestically by rivalry and tactical differences, the two parties are in agreement in exploiting issues running the whole gamut of Chile's political and economic relations with the United States. Vociferously attacked through the propaganda media of both parties are "U. S. imperialism" and "U. S. economic aggression" in Chile, particularly the Klein-Saks mission, the Organization of the American States, and the Chilean-U. S. military agreement. Support is also voiced by Socialists and Communists alike for all "popular" movements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa fighting against regimes allegedly supported by "U. S. imperialism."

Internationally the Socialist Party advocates that Chile assume a posture similar to that of the so-called neutrals such as Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt. At its Unity Congress in July 1957 the Socialist Party voted down a proposal which would have equated Soviet imperialism with alleged United States imperialism. This resolution, proposed by Julio Cesar Jobet and Florencio Galleguillos (since defected), postulated that the Socialist Party should "maintain a position of criticism, not only of capitalism, headed by the United States and other industrial powers, but also of Soviet imperialism, headed by the bourgeois leadership of Russia." As reported in the Leftist daily Ultima Hora and in La Nacion, the Socialist Party at its Unity Congress tended to identify itself with the so-called Socialist Bloc opposed to capitalism and imperialism. This inclination toward the Communist Bloc was made in

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the hope that within the Bloc groups of democratic tendencies would ameliorate the excesses of the Communist system in accordance with indications appearing at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.

Several reports state generally that the Socialist Party is infiltrated by both the Communists and the Trotskyites. The extent of this infiltration is difficult to determine. First, there is a lack of specific information on this subject. Secondly, it is difficult to determine whether Socialist collaboration with the Communists is due to infiltration, the coincidence of objectives, or the ideological affinity existing between the Socialist and Communist Parties. It can be said that certain Socialists are suspect because of their activities and background. Some of them, together with data on their collaboration, are listed below in Part VIII of this section.

#### VI. International Socialist Associations:

The Socialist Party, as did the PSP, participates in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International without being affiliated directly with the Socialist International, and, as previously noted, was the host for the Socialist Conferences held at Santiago in April 1958. The PSP viewed the Consultative Committee as a means "to give a continental, organic, and unitarian feature to the action of the revolutionary parties of Latin America." The PSP considered itself a link between the sister parties of the Rio Plate, which are European in origin and structure, and the "massive, indigenous revolutionary movement of the Pacific Coast." The PSP, through the Consultative Committee, would have the opportunity, as envisaged by Bolivar, of making the bold effort of grouping together in one organization "all the Democratic, Socialist, Nationalist, and revolutionary forces of Latin America."

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In November 1956, the PSP, participating for the first time in an international Socialist conference, sent Federico Klein as a delegate to the Asian Socialist Congress at Bombay. Klein was so outspokenly anti-American and pro-Communist that he was criticized by several Asian Socialist delegates.

Between the old PSP and the Yugoslavs existed a close doctrinary relationship which presumably will be carried over into the unified Socialist Party. This relationship, established by PSP leaders Oscar Waiss and Aniceto Rodriguez on a visit to Yugoslavia in 1955, has been maintained through publications of both parties and through an infrequent correspondence between them. The optimistic Yugoslav interpretation of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU reportedly was the deciding factor in prompting PSP leader Ampuero to believe that the Communist movement was changing, and that therefore the PSP could cooperate with the Chilean Communist Party.

The influence of the Yugoslavs had also prompted the PSP not to seek affiliation with the Socialist International despite participation in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International. In July 1957 Raul Ampuero, former PSP leader and now a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party, visited Yugoslavia to study the structure of the Yugoslav government and the system of workers' self-management.

#### VII. Dissident Socialists:


The dissident Socialist group in Chile at the present time is the Independent Socialist Party (PSI) which was formed on 4 May 1958 from the Socialist Recovery Movement (Movimiento de Recuperacion Socialista). This latter movement had previously embraced the anti-Communist Socialist

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Federation which had been organized in selected areas for the March 1957 congressional elections and polled approximately 7000 votes. Led by Florencio Galleguillos, the PSI is also anti-Communist and proposes to attain "the restoration of Socialism" through evolutionary, democratic means. Whether the PSI can make serious inroads into the PS remains to be seen. The voting strength of the PSI is estimated to be around 10,000 votes.


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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SOCIALIST PARTY OF ECUADOR  
(Partido Socialista del Ecuador, PSE)

SUMMARY:

The Socialist Party of Ecuador (Partido Socialista del Ecuador, PSE) was formed in 1933, when elements dissatisfied with the evolution of the first Socialist Party into a Communist Party split off from the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE). The PSE is a Marxist Socialist party. Its immediate objectives and final goal of a revolutionary transformation of Ecuadoran society coincide with Communist aims. This identity of interests has led to close Socialist collaboration with the Communists in the labor, youth and student fields. There has also been intermittent Socialist-Communist political cooperation, generally directed against the Conservative Party and dictatorships of the Right. Within the framework of this cooperation some rivalry for leadership exists between the PSE and the Communists.

The PSE is divided into Left and Right Wing factions, primarily over the question of political tactics. The PSE Right Wing, which has been dominant in recent years, has favored alliances with the Right to combat the Conservative Party. In such alliances the Communists have been formally excluded, but their support has been accepted. The Left Wing has favored an "authentic democratic front" of the working class to include the Communists. At the PSE Congress held in Quito in January 1958 the Left Wing gained unilateral control of the PSE. At least superficial unity of the two factions was again achieved at a special congress, held at Ambato on 29 - 31 March 1958, in which a predominantly Right Wing directorate was elected. The PSE has 8 of the 71 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 senators of the 46 in the Senate.

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The Socialists have led the Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers (CTE) since 1949 and now hold 5 positions on the 11-member CTE Executive Committee compared to 4 for the Communists. They have favored the continued affiliation of the CTE to the Communist-dominated Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), an affiliate of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). However, the Socialist-Communist leadership was challenged at the Seventh CTE Congress held in 1957, and the possibility exists of a future split and a challenge to its Communist political orientation similar to that which occurred in the National Student Federation (FEUE). A split occurred in FEUE over the question of supporting Soviet intervention in Hungary. Subsequently, as a result of continuing rank-and-file pressure, the acting president of FEUE announced in late 1957 the withdrawal of FEUE from the Communist International Union of Students (IUS). At the Fourteenth FEUE Congress in December 1957 the pro-Communist faction resolved to hold a plebiscite on the matter in June 1958, but the anti-Communist faction considered the disaffiliation as final.

The PSE and the Communists are as one in attacking the United States; and the PSE, particularly its Left Wing, has tended to identify itself with the Soviet Bloc. In this situation it is even more difficult than normally to attempt an identification of Socialists who may be Communist penetrations. However, some differentiation of PSE leaders may become more readily discernible as opposition increases to Socialist-Communist leadership in the student and labor movement.

The Left Wing faction of the PSE rejected the invitation to participate in the Conferences of Latin American Socialists held in Santiago, Chile, from 15 to 19 April 1958. However, this decision was reversed by the new directorate formed at the Ambato Congress, and the Ecuadoran Party sent a delegate to the Santiago conferences. This delegate agreed that the PSE would be the host for the Fourth Conference of the Consultative Committee at Quito in December 1958.

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I. Background:

The present Socialist Party of Ecuador (PSE), like the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE), derived from the old Socialist Party of Ecuador formed in 1926. In 1928 the first Socialist Party began to participate in the Communist Third International (Comintern), and in 1931 changed its name to Partido Comunista del Ecuador (PCE). Dissatisfied with the tactics of the PCE and the Party's subservience to Moscow, dissident elements in 1933 formed the present Socialist Party of Ecuador in order to solve social problems through their own application of Marxist principles.

The PSE in general has achieved only moderate success in a country little touched by revolutionary tendencies in the Communist sense. The upper-class elite, the armed forces, and the Catholic Church have dominated political life through the Liberal and Conservative Parties. The majority of the population is composed of generally illiterate and politically apathetic Indians working on the large agricultural estates, and revolutions and counterrevolutions are a constant feature of the national political life.

In the years immediately following its establishment, however, the PSE made significant gains. In the constitutional convention of 1938, for example, the PSE controlled one-third of the delegates. The policy of the PSE during this period was to form political alliances with any party willing to combat governments considered by the Socialists to be dangerous. Generally such alliances were formed with other Left parties to combat the Conservative Party (Ecuador's largest party) and other Right Wing elements. Pursuant to this policy, the PSE in the middle and late 1930's (Popular Front period) formed "friendly" relations with the Communists. These relations have been maintained, with some interruptions, to the

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present, principally because of the PSE fear that a division of the Left would benefit the Conservatives.

In 1944 the PSE joined a loose coalition, the Democratic Alliance, which united political elements from the far Right to the Communists and which overthrew the Liberal dictatorship of Arroyo del Rio. The Socialist and Communist Parties, which dominated the Democratic Alliance, then delivered the presidency to a non-Leftist, Velasco Ibarra, and occupied several high government posts. From this vantage point the two parties effected government support for the unification of organized labor groups into the Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores del Ecuador, CTE). They also dominated the Constituent Assembly of 1944-1945, which drafted the Constitution of 1945. However, friction soon developed between Velasco Ibarra and his Leftist supporters. In January 1945 the Socialists and Communists occupying government posts resigned. In 1946 Velasco Ibarra suspended the Constitution and with Conservative support was proclaimed president until 1948. However, the Socialists, Communists, and Liberals opposed Ibarra and forced his removal in August 1947.

In the presidential elections of 1948 the PSE formed a coalition with the Liberals, but the election was won by the Independent Citizens' candidate, Galo Plaza. However, the PSE elected 15 members to the 71-member Chamber of Deputies and achieved considerable influence during part of the four-year tenure of Galo Plaza. In May 1951 two PSE leaders were appointed to the Cabinet, Colon Serrano as Minister of Economy and Dr. Carlos Cueva Tamariz as Minister of Education. In the elections of 1952 the PSE joined in the National Democratic Alliance, uniting the Independent Citizens and six other parties in support of Eduardo Salazar Gomez. However, the election was won by Velasco Ibarra. PSE representation in the Chamber of Deputies dropped from 15 to

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8, and the PSE adopted a position of resolute opposition. In the elections of 1956 the PSE joined with the Liberals to form the National Democratic Front (FDN), which backed Liberal candidate Raul Clemente Huerta. Although the Communists were formally excluded from the FDN, Communist support was tacitly accepted. The election was won by Ecuador's present president, Camilio Ponce Enriquez, Conservative Party member. The PSE, as in the case of the previous Ibarra Government, immediately adopted a position of resolute opposition. This opposition continues.

## II. Political Influence:

In numbers of representatives in Ecuador's bicameral legislature the PSE ranks as Ecuador's third largest party. It has 8 of the 71 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 senators of the 46 in the Senate. By contrast the Communist Party has one senator and no deputies. In recent elections the PSE has ranked behind the Conservatives, Liberals, and the Concentra-cion de Fuerzas Populares (CFP). PSE membership is estimated to be about 30,000, of which an estimated 10,000 are nominal followers of Left Wing elder statesman Manuel Agustin Aguirre. Conflict between the majority Right Wing and the Left Wing faction has seriously weakened the PSE. The strength of the PSE derives primarily from labor, student, and intellectual groups in Ecuador's main cities.

## III. Ideology and Objectives:

The PSE is a Marxist Socialist party which is grouped primarily into Left and Right Wing factions. The Left Wing faction can be sub-divided into a pure Marxist group which has boycotted the PSE and a group headed by Victor Zuniga which has worked within the PSE in efforts to gain control of the Party.

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In recent years the Right Wing faction led by Juan Isaac Lovato has controlled the PSE. However, the Left Wing elements headed by Victor Zuniga, President of the Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers (CTE), gained control of the PSE at the PSE Congress held in Quito from 28 to 31 January 1958. As a result, Zuniga was appointed editor of the official PSE organ, La Tierra, published in Quito.\* The Right Wing, led by Juan Isaac Lovato, challenged the decisions of the Congress on the basis that they were taken without a quorum and were therefore illegal. His group called for a special Congress which was subsequently held at Ambato from 29 to 31 March 1958.

The special congress was attended by an estimated 450 persons, 250 of whom were from Quito and other outlying areas. Guests included prominent Communist and Liberal Party leaders. Dr. Carlos Cueva Tamariz, rector of the University of Cuenca, and Dr. Luis Pachano Carrion spearheaded a unity movement which resulted in apparent Socialist unity for the 1958 congressional elections. The results of the congress constituted an ideological victory for the PSE Left Wing, for the congress rejected any political alliance with the Velasquistas or the Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares (CFP) and left the way open for possible agreements with the Communists. Other resolutions were similarly favorable to the Left Wing; and La Tierra, the

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\* Principal leaders of the Left Wing faction as revealed in its Executive Committee formed at the Twenty-fifth PSE Congress held in Quito from 28 to 31 January 1958 are

Leonardo Munoz, Secretary General  
Victor Zuniga  
Fabian Jaramillo  
Miguel Angel Guzman  
Nelson Leon  
Luis Riofrio  
Ruben Silva.

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PSE daily newspaper in Quito, remained in Leftist hands. The newly-elected Directorate, however, was inclined toward support of Juan Isaac Lovato, leader of the PSE Right Wing. Of the prominent Left Wing Socialists, only Victor Zuniga was named to the new Directorate.\*

\* The new Directorate of the PSE consists of

Ricardo Cornejo, Secretary General  
Guillermo Baquerizo  
Victor Zuniga  
Eliecer Irigoyen  
Florencio Gonzalez  
Jose Perez Arellano  
Daviil Villena.

The alternates are

Washington Cevallos Salas  
Jose Jaramillo Hidalgo  
Pablo Duque Arias  
Abdon Calderon  
Captain Jorge Poveda  
Noe Villacreces.

Prominent Right Wing leaders not on the Directorate are

Juan Isaac Lovato  
Gonzalo Oleas Zambrano  
Manuel Davila  
Emilio Gangotena  
Corsino Cardenas  
Humberto Garcia Ortiz  
Luis Maldonado Tamayo  
Luis Maldonado Estrado  
Alfredo Gomez Arellano  
Alfredo Hernandez Zamora.

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Subsequently the Right Wing Socialists in the important province of Pichincha breached the agreement made at the Ambato Conference and concluded an election alliance with the CFP. The Left Wing Socialists refused to participate in this alliance and Manuel Agustin Aguirre agreed to head a competing Communist-front list of candidates. The Right Wing Socialists then expelled nine Left Wing Socialists from the Party including Dr. Aguirre; Miguel Arauz, head of the Medical School of Quito University; and Telmo Hidalgo, head of the Pichincha Workers' Federation. Both factions are seeking rank-and-file support.

Although the PSE is divided into Right, Left, and extreme Left factions, all factions accept Marx's tenets and agree that the Party's ultimate objective is a revolutionary transformation of Ecuadoran society. Such a transformation would include an agricultural and industrial development of Ecuador in which the people would benefit, rather than a government of "reactionary feudalism" and "North American imperialism". Aware that only about one-fourth of Ecuador's 1.2 million labor force is employed in the manufacturing industry as contrasted with nearly one-half in agriculture and forestry, the PSE advocates a revolutionary alliance between workers and peasants to effect agrarian reform. Large estates would be nationalized and the land distributed to the peasants who now work these properties. Particular efforts would be made to solve the problem of the Ecuadoran Indians. For labor generally, the PSE advocates such much-needed reforms as wage increases, worker education, a forty-hour week, and social security for manual workers. In pursuit of these objectives, the PSE has long collaborated with the Communist Party in the labor, youth, and student fields.

The PSE is bitterly anti-clerical and resolutely opposed to the Conservative Government of Camilio Ponce Enriquez. During 1957 the controlling Right Wing of the PSE intensified its attacks on the Catholic Church and the Ponce

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Government, such attacks in some instances appearing stronger than those of the Communists. There was also an increased disposition to cooperate unofficially with the Communists in efforts to form an anti-Conservative front. The Right Wing was also instrumental in securing municipal premises in Quito for the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party, and spokesmen for both the Right and Left Wings of the PSE participated in the PCE's Sixth Congress.

Although the Right Wing of the PSE recently adopted a more leftward orientation, it failed to bridge the gap between it and the Left Wing even though making concessions to the Left Wing at the Ambato Conference. This gap has stemmed primarily from differences over political tactics to advance the PSE's program. The Right Wing has felt it necessary to commit the PSE to political alliances with the Right as well as the Left in order to maintain "Ecuador's scant democracy" and to advance the PSE program through Ecuador's existing political institutions. Such alliances with the Right have frequently involved PSE collaboration with the Liberal Party, such as in the National Democratic Front (FDN) formed in 1955 to support the Liberal candidate, Raul Clemente Huerta, in the presidential elections of 1956. The PSE Right Wing has given a Marxist-Leninist justification for such alliances, pointing out that during the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks formed similar ties to reduce the power of the bourgeoisie. In alliances such as the FDN, the PSE Right Wing has officially rejected Communist membership but has unofficially welcomed and accepted Communist support.

The Left Wing of the PSE, whose elder statesman is Dr. Manuel Agustin Aguirre, has viewed Socialist collaboration with the "class enemy" (Liberal Party) as a betrayal of Socialism to the bourgeoisie by Right Wing intellectuals in the PSE. In its view the PSE should be a revolutionary workers' party collaborating only in an "authentic democratic

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front" of the working class. This front would include the Communists and other "democratic" elements and would seek to intensify the class struggle in Ecuador. The Left Wing has criticised Communist support of Liberal-Socialist alliances, claiming that in refusing to support such alliances it is following Marxism better than the Communists. Nevertheless a particularly close doctrinal affinity exists between the Left Wing and the Communists, and Dr. Aguirre has stated in effect that it is useless to insist that there is a difference between Socialism and Communism.

The Left Wing of the PSE has been actively opposed to the PSE Right Wing leadership since August 1955, when the PSE Provincial Council of Pichincha, composed of members of the Left Wing, resigned in protest against PSE participation in the National Democratic Front (FDN). In early 1956 some Left Wing adherents formed a Theory and Action Fraction which for a time was subsequently known as the Center of Marxist Studies. This group was divided between those who wanted to form a new party and those who felt that the only course was to renovate the PSE from within. The former group boycotted the PSE Congress in 1956. It subsequently continued activities as a separate Theory and Action Fraction but failed to achieve popular support for a new party. In August 1957 the Fraction began sponsoring a series of Marxist orientation courses, which sponsorship was not to be construed as initiating a separate political movement. This group derives its main support from labor, principally the Federation of Workers of Pichincha (FTP).

Those Left Wing elements who elected to renovate the PSE from within apparently rallied around CTE President Victor Zuniga. Although supporting the FDN in 1955, Zuniga is a militant Left Socialist. At the Sixth PCE Congress in May 1957 Zuniga stressed the need to unite all workers "to safeguard democracy" and asserted that workers in the PSE

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and PCE "constitute the vanguard against reaction". He also lauded "the heroic struggle" of the Communists throughout the world "in defense of the rights of the workers". In November 1957 Zuniga went to Moscow to attend the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution.

#### IV. Trade Union Work:

As previously noted, the PSE, in conjunction with the Communists and other Leftist supporters of Velasco Ibarra in the 1944 revolution, was instrumental in uniting organized labor groups into the Confederation of Ecuadoran Workers (CTE). Because of Socialist and Communist political support, the government of Velasco Ibarra initially encouraged labor unions and financially supported the first Congress of the CTE in July 1944. Although the CTE began as a joint Communist and Socialist federation, the Communists initially dominated the organization. They secured seven positions on the first national executive committee to four for the Socialists. Pedro Saad, present Communist leader and functional senator for labor from the coastal region, won the position of Secretary General against the bid of the rival Socialist contender, Juan Isaac Lovato. The Communists were also instrumental in securing the affiliation of the CTE with the Communist-dominated Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL), regional affiliate of the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

The PSE has subsequently continued to cooperate with the Communists in labor matters, wherein an improvement of the lot of the worker is the stated objective of both parties. Within the framework of this cooperation, however, the Socialists have competed with the Communists for positions of leadership. By 1949 the PSE had succeeded in ousting the Communists from the majority of positions on the CTE

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National Executive Committee. Since that time the Communists have not been able to win more than 4 positions on the 11-member Executive Committee. The Socialists have held a majority of the remaining positions, including that of president. Communist concern is indicated in a statement made in 1955 by the now dissident Communist Modesto Rivera Jarrin. At that time Rivera stated that the PCE must make efforts to throw the Socialists out of important positions among the workers.

Under the predominantly Socialist leadership the overall strength of the CTE and its affiliates has declined in recent years. The CTE is now estimated to have about 40,000 members as opposed to a claimed membership of 66,000 in 1953. The CTE conforms to the usual pattern of labor organizations and consists of two main groupings: (a) provincial federations which include unions grouped together on a geographic basis and (b) functional federations which unite unions by occupation on a national basis. Under this arrangement an individual union may belong to both the provincial affiliate where it is located and also to its own national functional federation.

The largest and most active CTE provincial affiliate is the Federation of Workers of Pichincha (FTP) which includes the capital city of Quito. This federation has been the source of strength of the extreme Left Wing faction of the PSE and until recently exerted a preponderant influence on the CTE. The extreme PSE Left Wing still controls this important labor federation, although the Communists exert considerable influence through two members of the FTP's 11-member Executive Committee. The current president of the FTP is Left Wing Socialist Jose Telmo Hidalgo Diaz, who was re-elected in 1957.

The affinity between the Communists and the PSE (particularly its extreme Left Wing) is aptly illustrated in the resolutions with political overtones proposed for adoption by

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the FTP Executive Committee in 1956. Some of the resolutions were (a) advocacy of agrarian reform, to include giving land to the peasant farmers and liquidating large estates as the only means of freeing the Indian; (b) rejection of the "colonizing role" of foreign capital; and (c) opposition to holding the next Inter-American Conference in Ecuador because such a conference would be used to "rivet the chains of oppression on the Latin American people", as allegedly occurred in Guatemala.

With respect to the Ecuadoran labor movement as a whole, important developments occurred in 1957. A serious split in the CTE was revealed at its Seventh National Congress held at Guayaquil, 17-21 September 1957. Independent and Rightist elements, represented mainly by the chauffeur and textile unions, walked out of the Congress in protest against the policies of the partisan Socialist-Communist leadership. These elements particularly disagreed with the attempts of the CTE leadership to foment a nation-wide strike in support of the workers of the U.S.-owned Manabi Exploration Company. The Seventh National Congress of the CTE was also marked by a decline in influence of the extreme PSE Left Wing leadership of the Federation of Workers of Pichincha (FTP). This group, led by Jose Telmo Hidalgo Diaz, found itself in a minority position at the Congress and consequently abstained from voting for the new CTE Executive Committee.

A new CTE Executive Committee was elected by a vote of less than half of the delegates. Selected were five Socialists, three nominal Communists, one dissident Communist, and two Independents. The President of the CTE is Victor Zuniga, who emerged as the leader of the Left Wing Socialist elements actively working within the PSE in efforts to gain control of the Party. The election was marked by cooperation between the Communists and the so-called moderate Socialists represented by the Right Wing elements and Left Wing followers of Zuniga. Other Socialists elected included

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Nelson Chavez Olmedo  
Octavio Teran  
Wilfredo Leon Camus  
Pablo Rafael Duque Arias.

The CTE adopted two resolutions which follow the Communist political line. These resolutions were (a) a demand for termination of all nuclear experiments and (b) an expression of "solidarity" with the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions and its Fourth World Labor Congress, subsequently held in October 1957 at Leipzig, East Germany.

However, Socialist/Communist leadership of the CTE is reportedly threatened by rank-and-file sentiment to remove political influences from the CTE. The walkout of anti-Communists at the Seventh National Congress noted above is considered symptomatic of this sentiment. CTE Vice-President Noe Villacreces, a Right Socialist, heads the opposition favoring the removal of political influences. The possibility thus exists of a split in the labor movement and a challenge to its Communist political orientation similar to that which occurred in the National Student Federation (FEUE) when its acting president in late 1957 announced the withdrawal of FEUE from the Communist International Union of Students (IUS).

V. Attitude Toward the Free World-Communist Conflict:

As previously noted, the PSE is a Marxist Socialist party. Its immediate objectives and long-range goal are to create a revolutionary transformation of Ecuadoran society coincident with Communist objectives. This identity of interests has led to close Socialist collaboration with the Communists in the labor, youth and student movements, although both parties are competing for positions of leadership. While citing ideological affinity and a similarity of objectives as the basis

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for such collaboration, spokesmen of the dominant PSE Right Wing have emphasized that the two parties are separated by a "profound difference in their concept of the methods to be used to transform the country socially and politically". Politically, the PSE Right Wing has opposed any formal alliance with the Communists in the belief that open association or collaboration with the PCE would alienate rather than attract votes. It has, however, accepted verbal or unofficial Communist support in elections and has concluded formal alliances with the PCE for local municipal elections in isolated areas where the stigma of Communist association is not considered harmful. The PSE Left Wing, on the other hand, would formally accept the Communists in a workers' anti-Conservative front.

Communist spokesman Gonzalo Villalba Coloma recently stated that relations between the Communist and Socialist parties were better than they had been for some time, as a result of Communist support of Independent-Socialist candidate Carlos Andrade Marin, who won the Quito mayoralty elections in November 1957. Although their support was not officially recognized, the Communists actively participated in the election committees supporting Andrade and at times achieved outright control of some committees.

The Fourth National Congress of the Socialist Youth of Ecuador (Juventud Socialista del Ecuador, JSE), held in Quito on 15 March 1958, reaffirmed maintenance of close relations with the Communist Youth of Ecuador (Juventud Comunista del Ecuador, JCE). It also ratified a proposal for affiliation with the Communist World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and rejected affiliation with international Socialist movements on the basis that they are dominated by North American imperialists.

The capability of the Socialists and Communists to control student and labor activities through collaboration has declined recently. At the Thirteenth Congress of the Ecuadoran Student

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Federation (Federacion de Estudiantes Universitarios, FEUE) in November 1956 anti-Communist students who objected to FEUE affiliation with the Communist-front International Union of Students (IUS) bolted the Congress. In mid-1957, in response to continuing pressures, the acting head of the FEUE announced the withdrawal of FEUE from the IUS; this action, however, was subject to ratification by the next FEUE Congress. At the Fourteenth FEUE Congress held in Guayaquil in December 1957 a split occurred on this matter, an anti-Communist faction considering the disaffiliation as final and a pro-Communist faction, including Socialists, planning to hold a plebiscite on the matter in June 1958. Similarly, as previously noted, fissures appeared at the Seventh National Congress of the Ecuadoran Federation of Workers (CTE) held in Guayaquil in September 1957. Although the Socialist-Communist leadership was maintained and support for the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was reiterated, an opposition movement displayed considerable strength and appears to have a potential for further growth.

Although rivalry exists between the PSE and PCE within the framework of their cooperation in the student, youth, and labor movements and some differences as to tactics separate the two parties in political matters, they are as one in attacking the United States. Both parties follow the line that the Ponce Government has destroyed Ecuador's national sovereignty through acceptance of U.S. economic aid. Both parties denounce "North American imperialism", particularly such "instruments" as the United Fruit Company, for impeding the agricultural and industrial development of Ecuador. The Inter-American Conference scheduled to be held in Quito in 1959 is also opposed by both parties, which term it a means for the U.S. to maintain economic and political subjugation of Latin America. The triumph of Castillo Armas in Guatemala was attributed by the PSE to the "bloody and shameless intervention of forces representing the great North American monopolies". More recently the PSE, through its official organ La Tierra, chortled over the failure of the U.S. satellite while lauding the USSR and "Socialist superiority".

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It has been reported that most Ecuadorans tend to view the Socialists and Communists as one and the same. On the basis of the facts discussed in the preceding sections, grounds do admittedly exist for this conclusion. In this situation it is even more difficult than normally to attempt an identification of Socialists who may be Communist penetrations. However, such Socialists may become more readily discernible as opposition increases to Socialist/ Communist leadership in the student, youth and labor movements. Such opposition is likely to cause some Socialists to differentiate their positions from those of the Communists. For example, in 1956 Hugo Herdoiza Herrera, Left Wing Socialist President of FEUE, condemned Soviet intervention in Hungary over the opposition of the Communists.

  
Luis Freire, a member of the Left Wing Socialist Theory and Action Fraction who attended the Fourth World Congress of the WFTU in Leipzig, was arrested en route home in Colombia on charges of being a Communist agent.

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(S)(3)

VI. International Socialist Associations:

The Ecuadoran Socialist Party has been reluctant to participate in the international organizations of Democratic Socialism. On the contrary, as previously noted, it participates in the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) through the Ecuadoran Confederation of Workers (CTE) and in the International Union of Students (IUS) through the Ecuadoran Student Federation (FEUE). The Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International elected at its first meeting in May 1956 at Montevideo to invite the PSE to become a member of the Consultative Committee. Humberto Maiztegui of the Latin American Secretariat subsequently

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attempted to obtain the PSE's participation and issued an invitation to the PSE to participate in the Socialist conferences subsequently held at Santiago, Chile, from 15 to 19 April 1958. However, the Left Wing faction which seized control of the PSE at its Twenty-Fifth Congress, 28-31 January 1958, rejected participation in the proposed Latin American Socialist gathering. This decision, however, was reversed by the new and predominantly Right Wing directorate formed at the Ambato Congress. The PSE sent Gonzalo Oleas as its representative to the Santiago conferences. He participated as an observer and agreed that the PSE would be the host for the Fourth Conference of the Consultative Committee at Quito in December 1958.

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SOCIALIST PARTY OF URUGUAY  
(Partido Socialista del Uruguay, PSU)

SUMMARY:

The Socialist Party of Uruguay (Partido Socialista del Uruguay, PSU) was formed in 1910. Its political philosophy resembles that of the German and French Socialist Parties. It is a Democratic Socialist party and a member of the Socialist International. Within the framework of Uruguayan democracy the PSU has remained a minor party, competing for the 10 to 15 per cent of the vote which has traditionally gone to the Left Wing minority parties. It has 1 senator out of 31 in the Senate and 3 deputies in the 99-member Chamber of Deputies.

The PSU is divided over the question of collaborating with the Communists in the labor field in order to achieve the PSU goal of a Central Union of Workers. Although PSU adherents are scattered throughout the labor movement, most of them are in the anti-Communist Confederacion Sindical del Uruguay (CSU). In the 1957 elections to the 10-member CSU Directive Council, Socialists won 5 positions, including that of president. The Right Wing faction of the PSU, led by its founder and General Secretary, Emilio Frugoni, until recently opposed any collaboration with the Communists even in the labor field and viewed the CSU as the vehicle to effect a Central Union of Workers. The Left Wing faction of the PSU, led by German D'Elia, PSU Secretary for Labor Affairs, favored Socialist collaboration with the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union, established in October 1956. It sought unsuccessfully in 1956 to intimidate Socialist leaders in the CSU and to collaborate with this Communist-controlled front organization. In August 1957 it was announced that the PSU National Executive Committee had concluded that neither the CSU nor the Communist-controlled

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Coordinating Committee for a Central Union could accomplish the desired unification of the labor movement. This formula appears to have resulted in a retreat by the PSU Right Wing from a position of no collaboration with the Communists to a position of willingness to cooperate with the Communists in a new Central Union effected by neither the CSU nor the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. However, the CSU at its Fourth Congress, held in December 1957, resolved to promote "authentic labor unity" under its auspices. This stand resulted in the expulsion from the PSU of four Socialists active in the CSU, including the new CSU Secretary General, Idalino Fleitas. Thus, whether the retreat by the PSU Right Wing will lead to further Communist inroads in the Uruguayan labor movement will depend considerably upon the ability of the PSU to assert party discipline over its remaining members in the CSU.

The PSU advocates a Third Force position in the Free World-Communist conflict and holds that Socialism should be a Third Force movement. It has condemned both Communist and capitalist imperialism, and in particular the "capitalist imperialists" of North America. The PSU rejected overtures for Socialist-Communist collaboration made by the CPSU at its Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 and also rejected similar overtures made by the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU). However, under the aegis of the PSU Left Wing, the PSU qualified its rejection of the PCU proposal of 27 November 1957 by stating: "It does not displease us to join with worker political forces in the development of an action favorable for the working people."

Left Wing advocacy of cooperation with the Communists in trade union matters appears to have been prompted by a limited acceptance of the Twentieth CPSU Congress line and by a favorable assessment of the Chilean Socialist concept of unity of action with the Communists. Another possible factor contributing to the PSU Left Wing's advocacy of collaboration with

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the Communists in the labor field is Communist infiltration. However, except for Orisman Leguizamon, who was expelled from the CSU Directive Council for his collaboration with the Communists, firm identification of Communist penetrations is lacking.

The PSU participates in the Consultative Committee for the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International, which it views as a means to achieve "coordination of action between the Latin American Socialist and revolutionary parties against imperialism, feudal oligarchy, bourgeois reaction and Stalinism".

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I. Background:

Socialist groups were formed in Montevideo as early as 1895 by European immigrants and by Uruguayan workers who had been influenced by the founding of the Argentine Socialist Party in 1886. In 1904, Dr. Emilio Frugoni succeeded in uniting these groups to form the Socialist Labor Center or, as it was later known, the Socialist Center Karl Marx. A second major Socialist group called Emile Zola was later formed in 1910. These two groups merged under the leadership of Dr. Frugoni to form the Uruguayan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista del Uruguay, PSU) on 12 December 1910.

The PSU was formed as an essentially revisionist Marxist party similar to the German and French Socialist Parties. Although radical in theory the PSU, like the European parties above, stressed democratic methods. This advocacy of democratic methods resulted in the Party's pursuance of pragmatic policies. In its declaration of principles the PSU accepted the Marxian thesis regarding the evils of capitalism, the division of society into two antagonistic classes,

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and the necessity for the socialization of the means of production to achieve socialism. It stipulated, however, that the Party "must take advantage of the rights inherent in democracy, recognizing that victory by democratic means over the 'powers-that-be' is a precondition for the realization of its goal". Organization of the workers into trade unions was set forth as another of the most effective methods to resist capitalist abuses. In its domestic program the PSU advocated such measures as separation of church and state, compulsory and free education on a secular basis, proportional representation on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot, land reform, an eight-hour working day, and a minimum wage.

In elections from 1910 through 1919 the PSU received about two per cent of the total vote and secured one or two seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In the labor movement the PSU gained considerable influence at the expense of the Anarchists. Throughout this period a struggle raged within the PSU between the revisionist Marxists who favored parliamentary means to achieve socialism and the orthodox Marxists who favored a more revolutionary approach. In September 1920 the orthodox Marxists constituted a majority of the PSU and decided to join the Communist Third International or Comintern. The remaining revisionist Marxists under the leadership of Frugoni split off in April 1921 to reconstitute the PSU as a Democratic Socialist Party.

The new PSU had to start afresh in both the political and labor fields. After receiving only about one-half of one per cent of the total votes cast in the elections of 1922 and 1925, the PSU received nearly one per cent of the total votes in the elections of 1928 and elected one deputy. In subsequent elections through 1954, the PSU has increased its strength, averaging between two and three per cent of the total votes and electing one to three deputies. The PSU in 1942 was also instrumental in setting up a trade union federation independent of the one controlled by the Communists.

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The PSU throughout its history has been guided by its founder and present General Secretary, Emilio Frugoni. This remarkable leader was born in 1880 of a well-known Montevideo family. He received a degree in law and achieved recognition as a poet, journalist, statistician, and as a professor at Montevideo University. Frugoni was a pupil of the founder of the Argentine Socialist Party, Juan B. Justo, with whom he developed a close friendship. This relationship resulted in close cooperation between the Socialist parties of Argentina and Uruguay. Frugoni has always been an ardent champion of democracy and has firmly opposed the Communists.

The National Executive of the PSU elected for the period 1957-59 is as follows:

Herbert Berriel  
Walter Burghi  
Jose P. Cardoso  
Guillermo Chifflet  
Antonio F. Coscia  
Andres F. Cultelli  
Gualberto Damonte  
German D'Elia  
Arturo J. Dubra  
Emilio Frugoni  
Eduardo Jaurena  
Humberto Maiztegui  
Hugo Prato  
Vivian Trias  
Francisco Troita

## II. Political Influence:

Political life in Uruguay has traditionally been dominated by the Colorado and National Parties. Under their leadership,

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civil liberties and representative government have been firmly established and considerable social legislation has been enacted. Within this framework the PSU has remained a minor party, competing for the 10 to 15 per cent of the vote which has traditionally gone to the Left Wing minority parties. The PSU has one senator out of 31. He is Jose Pedro Cardoso, who became the PSU's first elected senator in the elections of 1954. In the 99-member Chamber of Deputies the PSU won three seats in the elections of 1954. These are now held by Arturo J. Dubra, Vivian Trias, and German D'Elia. The 3.26 percentage of total votes won by the PSU in 1954 is the highest since 1938, when the PSU reached its peak of 3.68 per cent of the total vote. In the municipal elections, four Socialist councillors were elected for Montevideo, one for Salto and one for Rio Negro. In contrast to Socialist gains in the elections of 1954, the Communists lost their seat in the Senate and three of their five seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

### III. Ideology and Objectives:

The PSU is a Democratic Socialist party which subscribes to the principles of the Socialist International and strives to achieve Socialism within the framework of Uruguay's existing democratic institutions. Like most European Socialist parties, the PSU accepts democracy as a necessary condition for achieving Socialism. At the same time, the PSU as a whole retains the Marxian view of the evils of capitalism. It accepts the concept of the class struggle and the theory of achieving Socialism through socialization of the means of production.

The PSU directs its appeal primarily to the working class. Its manifesto of February 1956 exhorted the workers to unite with the Socialist Party to achieve the following program: agrarian reform, unemployment security, control of investments and credits, rebuilding of the public services, an industrial development directed toward social needs, redistribution

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of the national income, effective legislation against the rise in the cost of living, strengthening the labor unions, and increasing the strength of the Socialist Party.

Like most Democratic Socialist parties, the PSU contains a Left Wing inclined more toward complete acceptance of Marxism than the Democratic Socialist leadership. In general, the Left Wing factions of Socialist parties are more violently opposed to capitalism than the moderate Socialists and are inclined to cooperate with the Communists in efforts to displace capitalism. In Latin America, these Left Wings are motivated further to cooperate with the Communists because of hatred of the U.S., the alleged imperialist pillar of capitalist regimes in Latin America. The Left Wing of the PSU, although subscribing to parliamentary means, is no exception in these respects. It advocates unity of action with the Communists in labor matters and has frequently taken a pro-Communist labor line in the PSU newspaper, El Sol. At the present time the Left Wing seems to have a slight edge over the moderate faction of the PSU, which is opposed to cooperation with the Communists. As yet, however, there are no indications that the PSU Left Wing intends to effect changes in Party program and policy other than cooperating with the Communists in the labor field.

#### IV. Trade Union Work:

The PSU officially views the trade union movement as a field of action in the class struggle but holds, in contrast to the view of the Communist Party, that the movement should remain independent of political factions. The PSU trade union charter of 1938 stipulates that the Party should seek to win the confidence of organized labor through clarity and correctness of policy, support of labor's interests, and unselfish collaboration. The PSU has thus not built up a disciplined organization to direct its labor leaders, who are scattered throughout the labor movement.

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This has resulted in Socialist efforts in the labor field being less effective than those of the more disciplined Communists. An attempt by the Left Wing of the PSU to reverse this position and unite Socialist leaders in support of the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union has thus far been unsuccessful.

Most of the Socialist labor leaders are active in the anti-Communist Confederacion Sindical del Uruguay (CSU), which the PSU was instrumental in establishing. Socialist labor leaders achieved 7 positions on the 10-member CSU Directive Council elected in 1955, and retained 5 positions, including that of president (Delio Troitino), on the Directive Council elected at the Fourth CSU Congress held in December 1957. However, in spite of the prominence of Socialists in its leadership, the CSU has refused to become an adjunct of the PSU. This independence was illustrated during the CSU Special Congress in November 1956, when a number of Socialists and a majority of the CSU committee considering labor unity voted for collaboration with the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. However, the CSU Congress in plenary session rejected collaboration with the Communist Coordinating Committee. More recently, at its Fourth Congress, the CSU resolved to promote "authentic labor unity" under its auspices. This stand constituted a rejection of the Socialist Party position that the CSU cannot effect labor unity, and resulted in the expulsion from the PSU of four Socialists active in the CSU, including the new CSU Secretary General, Idalino Fleitas.

The PSU has been on record since its Thirtieth Party Congress of October 1955 as favoring the unification of all trade unions. Because of significant gains made by the Communist-controlled Union General de Trabajadores (UGT) and the establishment by the Communists in October 1956 of the Coordinating Committee for a Central Union, the problem of achieving labor unity has become increasingly involved with the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

question of cooperation with the Communists. The Left Wing of the PSU, reportedly led by Deputy and PSU Secretary of Labor Affairs German D'Elia, has supported the Communist Coordinating Committee for a Central Union since the creation of this Front organization in October 1956. The moderate faction of the PSU led by Emilio Frugoni and reportedly Arturo V. Dubra has opposed any collaboration with the Communists. This factional split runs through the PSU itself and through Socialist leaders in the labor movement.

The two factions in the PSU appear to be fairly equal, the Left Wing having a slight edge. A PSU resolution of August 1956 was interpreted by the Left Wing faction to mean that PSU members are obliged to participate in the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. Prior to the Special Congress of the CSU in November 1956 the PSU Left Wing effected a Party position threatening expulsion from the PSU of Socialist members in the CSU, including President Delio Troitino, if they did not press for CSU participation in the Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. However, this threat was not then carried out because several Socialists in the CSU refused to be intimidated, and the CSU as a whole refused to cooperate with the Coordinating Committee.

The pro-Communist slant given to labor issues in the PSU newspaper El Sol also indicates that the Left Wing exerts major influence on this organ, if not control. This pro-Communist attitude has been particularly evident since the resignation of Eduardo Jaurena in early 1957. Jaurena resigned because a special committee of El Sol refused to permit publication of an article which defended U.S. labor and which was prepared in response to an attack on U.S. labor made previously in El Sol. On 20 September 1957 German D'Elia, in the name of the PSU National Executive Committee, published in El Sol a strong statement of support for Orisman Leguizamon, a PSU member who was expelled from the CSU for collaboration with the Communists in the rice strike and events following that strike.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

The moderate faction of the PSU has been handicapped because of the illness and age of its leader, Frugoni. Although Frugoni still has great prestige and is important to the PSU because of his financial support, he does not command sufficient following within the PSU to enforce a resolution against PSU collaboration with the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. As a result of this weakness, the PSU during most of 1957 followed an ambiguous policy concerning unity of action with the Communists in the labor field. For example, the Thirtieth Ordinary Congress of the PSU held in February 1957 formulated a document on labor unity stating

- a. that the document was published to enable PSU members to counteract "demagogic Communist united-labor propaganda", and
- b. that "the doctrine of labor unity postulated by resolution of this Congress does not imply that members should not be in all unions, nor does its platform for unity exclude any labor group outside its orientation".

Subsequently an attempt was made by the PSU National Executive Committee to reach a position acceptable to both Right and Left Wing factions. On 5 August 1957 it was announced that the PSU National Executive Committee had concluded, after separate meetings with Socialist labor leaders in the CSU and with those Socialists active in the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union, that neither labor organization could accomplish the desired unification of the labor movement.

However, the formula noted above failed to deter the PSU Left Wing from its advocacy of collaboration with the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. In the 16 August 1957 issue of El Sol Emilio Frugoni felt it necessary to warn all PSU members against participation in the Coordinating Committee for a Central Union and stated that free unions

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-G-R-E-T~~

can remain free only under a democratic society. On the same page of El Sol Left Wing PSU member Raul Sendic stated that the PSU in its line for a central union does not exclude any sector, whatever its orientation.

Subsequently the formula appears to have resulted in a retreat by the PSU Right Wing from a position of no collaboration with the Communists to a position of willingness to cooperate with the Communists in a new Central Union effected by neither the CSU nor the Communist-controlled Coordinating Committee for a Central Union. Such a retreat is indicated in the resolutions of the PSU Ordinary Congress held on 6-8 December 1957. In the resolution on a Central Union of Workers the PSU stated that the majority of the labor movement wishes to eliminate division and constitute a Central Union of Workers which would include all unions whatever the ideology of their leaders. A retreat is also indicated in a letter of 7 December 1957 from Emilio Frugoni to the Executive Committee of the PCU which rejects the Communist proposal of 27 November 1957 for joint action. Although he had previously rejected such Communist proposals, Frugoni included a sentence stating literally: "It does not displease us to join with worker political forces in the development of an action favorable for the working people."

The above developments in the PSU must be interpreted as a gain for the PSU Left Wing. This conclusion is also borne out by other results of the PSU Congress, principally the vehement condemnation of the CSU and more detailed criticism of the ICFTU's Inter-American Regional Organization (O.R.I.T) as opposed to the Communist Confederacion de Trabajadores de America Latina (CTAL). The subsequent expulsion from the PSU of four Socialists active in the CSU for not following Party instructions is another indication of the ascendancy of the Left Wing. In so far as the PSU can by asserting Party discipline over its remaining CSU members damage the CSU, the result could well be further Communist inroads in the Uruguayan labor movement.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

V. Attitude Toward the Free World-Communist Conflict:

The PSU advocates a Third Force position in the Free World-Communist conflict and holds that Socialism should be a Third Force movement. This position was officially adopted by the Thirtieth Congress of the PSU which met in Montevideo on 25-30 October 1955. On the one hand the PSU repudiated Stalinist Communism as a "system that denies freedom and Socialism, that rests on police terror and state capitalism, and that leads to the shameful exploitation of the working masses at the hands of the bureaucracy and a privileged minority of the party." On the other hand the PSU rejected "capitalist imperialist exploitation of colonial regimes which brings despair and starvation to millions of people representing more than two-thirds of mankind". It condemned "in particular the capitalist imperialists of North America who deprive the Latin American countries of their wealth and maintain them in backwardness and poverty, adding to the oppression imposed upon these countries by their own oligarchies and dictatorships". It expressed solidarity with all anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements and pledged support to the people of all continents struggling for self-determination and for freedom from foreign occupation and domination.

The call of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at its Twentieth Congress in February 1956 did not change the PSU's Third Force position. The PSU in March 1956 rejected CPSU overtures and adopted a position similar to that of the Socialist International. Dr. Frugoni stated that the attack against Stalin was to the Socialists "a strategic spectacle with a view to easy penetration by Communists of the free democratic world".

Subsequently, as noted in the trade union section, the Left Wing of the PSU has advocated unity of action with the Communists in the trade union field. This stand seems to have been prompted by a limited acceptance of the Twentieth CPSU Congress line, particularly the view that the Communist movement is

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

changing toward liberalization. Considerable impetus for this view was reportedly provided by the visit of Chilean Socialist leader Raul Ampuero to Montevideo in May 1956. He expounded the Chilean Socialist concept of unity of action with the Communists in the light of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU. Another possible factor contributing to the advocacy by the PSU's Left Wing of collaboration with the Communists in the labor field is Communist infiltration.

The Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) has increasingly sought to effect unity of action with the PSU in matters both of politics and of labor. In spite of PSU rejection of its earlier proposals for joint action, the PCU on 27 November 1957 made a renewed appeal to the PSU. In his reply of 7 December 1957 Emilio Frugoni again rejected the Communist offer for joint action but, as previously noted, left the door open for Communist-Socialist collaboration in a Central Union of Workers.

Although advocating a Third Force position, the PSU is violently anti-American. At its Fourteenth Special Congress in Montevideo on 14 September 1956, the PSU repudiated all military pacts in the Americas. It demanded "the repeal of the Inter-American Defense Treaty, signed in Washington in 1951, because it is an instrument of imperialist American domination, and of the military pact signed in the USA in 1952". It termed military treaties "instruments in the hands of oligarchic-imperialistic reactionaries in Latin America disguised under the cloak of anti-Communism". Such a stand obviously plays into Communist hands, as does PSU propaganda support of Communist-inspired "liberation" movements in colonial areas and PSU advocacy of trade with Communist countries.


The extent of Communist infiltration in the PSU is uncertain. There are several reports stating generally that a number of the PSU Left Wing favoring collaboration with the Communists are infiltrated Communists. However, these

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

members have not been identified. Another report states that Communist penetrations of the PSU appear chiefly in the labor and youth sections of the Party. Most reports concerning Communist penetration of the PSU are inferred from views expressed by certain PSU members supporting Communist objectives. Whether such views result from Communist penetration or stem from the common outlook of both parties is difficult to determine. It can be said that such Socialists are suspect.

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

VI. International Socialist Associations:

The PSU is a full member of the Socialist International and participates in the Consultative Committee of the Socialist International's Latin American Secretariat. The PSU also supplies the Secretary of the Socialist International's Latin American Secretariat, Humberto Maiztegui. The PSU has to date followed the lead of the Socialist International on such important issues as the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and Soviet intervention in Hungary. Because of French intervention in the Suez, the PSU demanded the expulsion of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) from the Socialist International unless the French Socialist rank and file repudiated its leaders. The PSU views participation in the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International as a means to achieve "coordination of action between the Latin

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

American Socialist and revolutionary parties against imperialism, feudal oligarchy, bourgeois reaction and Stalinism". Objectives to be achieved are

1. Agrarian reform;
2. Economic planning, coordination and diversification;
3. Establishment of a Latin American federation under Socialist leadership on the basis of federal agreements between the peoples.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ATTACHMENT A

Resolutions of the Third Conference of the Consultative Committee of the Latin American Secretariat of the Socialist International and Delegates Indorsing these Resolutions (Santiago, 18 to 19 April 1958)

1. Taking into consideration the fact that foreign dominion and control of the basic resources of Latin American production is a determining factor in the colonial and dependent character of its economy and a decisive drain on its financial resources, be it resolved that the basic objective of the Latin American Socialist policy shall be the integration to its economy of the sources of its raw materials, taking back the ownership and control of these materials from foreign dominion and protection.

2. In consideration of the fact that one of the new forms of imperialistic penetration of Latin America consists of direct investment of foreign capital in the industries which produce for local consumption, often in partnership with Latin American capital; that in this way the foreign investors take advantage of protectionist legislation and the market created to favor national industry; and that in this manner our destiny is being progressively endangered by burdening indefinitely our disposable holdings with the obligation to serve and amortize their capital, be it resolved that we denounce the danger of this form of foreign penetration as an instrument of imperialism for the purpose of converting the Latin American middle classes into their unconditional allies, with an eye to displacing the genuinely national industry of the Latin American market, and that we protect the branch businesses of our economies from being supplied with capital goods coming from foreign countries; that we

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

support the development of Latin American heavy industry and of its sources of energy under our own trade mark as the only way to prevent this new form of economic vassalage.

3. In consideration of the fact that the U.S. is carrying out a protectionist policy in relation to its domestic production by means of subsidies, price supports, exportation of excess agricultural supplies in the form of "dumping," fixing of exportation rights, and tendentious regulation of its purchases in Latin America, while at the same time the U.S. proclaims itself outside the country as the defender of a liberal economy which it tries to impose on the rest of the world, be it resolved:

- a. that we denounce the protectionist policy of the U.S. as a real aggression against Latin America;
- b. that we show up the danger of the liberalist policy set forth by the U.S. for other countries as one which tends to disarm and economically weaken Latin America in order to make it possible for the imperialistic monopolies to exploit our economy more easily;
- c. that we claim the inalienable right of the Latin American nations to sell their exportable products to any country in the world, taking into account their commercial conditions.

4. In consideration of the fact that the OAS and its legal instruments, especially the Caracas declaration, binds Latin America to solidarity with the North American political line and permits joint action in these countries to suppress popular movements under the pretext of fighting Communism, be it resolved:

- a. to denounce the OAS publicly as an instrument for the political subjugation of Latin America

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

to the imperialistic designs of the U.S., and to support the abolition of the treaties which affect the sovereignty and independence of the countries of Latin America;

- b. to proclaim the necessity of creating, in place of the OAS, an intercontinental Latin American organization which, insofar as it expresses the will of the people, can serve as a basis for our living together, for solidarity, and for the economic and social development of the continent.

5. In consideration of the fact that the Catholic Church, in transforming itself into the strong political bulwark of the most regressive forms of social organization, has associated itself more and more closely with the capitalist system and in recent years with that of the U.S., be it resolved:

- a. to denounce publicly the reactionary and pro-imperialistic character of the action of the Catholic Church in Latin America and its alliance with capitalistic groups, and to call on the people to struggle openly against this new attempt to use religion as a means of political, national, and social subjection;
- b. to denounce the close political relation between the Catholic Church and the regressive Latin American dictatorships, which the Church abandons only when popular insurrections get out of hand, to appear later as a factor in an oligarchical restoration under the misleading form of a false democracy;
- c. to say that Socialism, as a defender of liberty of conscience, is respectful of the faith of all peoples, but that this does not prevent it

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

from rebelling against political interference on the part of religious organizations.

6. In consideration of the fact that the Pan American military commitments and the bilateral pacts between our countries and the U.S. mean the conversion of Latin America into a part of a war machine which is foreign to our interests, be it resolved that we call upon the peoples of Latin America to organize a vast continental movement in behalf of the total and absolute repeal of the above-mentioned commitments, thus regaining our full sovereignty over our armed forces.

7. In consideration of the fact that the expenditures for national defense in Latin America constitute one of the most important causes for the poor economic condition of our countries, be it resolved to make an appeal to the Latin American governments for an agreement about a reciprocal limitation of armaments.

8. Socialism declares that cultural and technical interchange between peoples must be adjusted along lines that will not further the ideological penetration of imperialism. The need for international relations in the field of education and scientific research is fundamental for the progress of the people, for which reason we denounce the colonialist practice of using such relations as instruments to lull and lessen the strength of the national conscience of our peoples. That is especially true in the case of foreign interference in the primary, secondary, and university institutions of learning. For this reason we believe that there should be a large increase in the national budgets for education. Popular education should be transformed into a determining factor in the fulfillment of the essential objectives which tend to elevate the human condition of the men and women of Latin America.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

9. The resolutions noted above were indorsed by the following delegates:\*

Argentina: Dr. Alicia Moreau de Justo, member of the Executive Committee of the Argentine Socialist Party, Chief of the International Department, and director of the newspaper La Vanguardia. Delegate to the Consultative Committee.

(Dr. Leopoldo Portnoy, professor of world political economy of the faculty of economic sciences of the University of Buenos Aires. Delegate to the Conference of Economic Experts.)

Uruguay: Vivian TRIAS, professor of history, member of the Executive Committee of the Uruguayan Socialist Party. Delegate to the Consultative Committee.

(Mario Buchelli, professor of economic theory of the faculty of economic sciences of the University of the Republic of Uruguay. Delegate to the Conference of Economic Experts.)

Chile: Clodomiro ALMEIDA, lawyer, former Minister of Mines, professor of the faculty of political and administrative sciences of the University of Chile. Delegate to the Consultative Committee.

(Raul AMPUERO Diaz, lawyer, senator, former Secretary General of the Socialist Party. Delegate to the Conference of Economic Experts.)

\* The designated party delegate to the Consultative Committee cast the official vote of each party.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Colombia: Dr. Luis Emiro VALENCIA, professor of the National University of Colombia. Secretary General of the Colombian Socialist Party. Delegate to the Consultative Committee.

(Dr. Jorge VILLA Cantillo. University professor. Expert in economic development. Delegate to the Conference of Economic Experts.)

Ecuador: Gonzalo OLEAS. Official of the Ecuadoran Socialist Party. Delegate to both the Consultative Committee and to the Conference of Economic Experts.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(S)(1)

(S)(3)

INDEX

ACHAR, Galo, 5  
[REDACTED]

AGUIRRE Ahumada, Armando, 32, [REDACTED]

AGUIRRE, Manuel Agustin, 56, 59, 60, 61

ALLENDE Gossens, Salvador, 1, 8, 26, 29, 30, 33, 40, 44

ALMEIDA, Clodomiro, 5, 33, 90

AMPUERO Diaz, Raul, 3, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 42,  
82, 90

ANDRADE Marin, Carlos, 66

ARAMBURU, Pedro, 16

ARAUZ, Miguel, 59

ARROYO del Rio, Carlos, 55

BAQUERIZO, Guillermo, 58  
[REDACTED]

BATISTA, Fulgencio, 5  
[REDACTED]

BERRIEL, Herbert, 74

BRAUNTHAL, Julius, 2

BUHELLI, Mario, 90

BURGHY, Walter, 74

[REDACTED]  
CALDERON, Abdon, 58

CARDENAS, Corsino, 58

CARDOSO, Jose Pedro, 3, 74, 75, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

CASTILLO Armas, Carlos, 5, 67

CEVALIOS, Salas, Washington, 58

CHADWICK, Tomas, 32, 36

CHAVEZ Olmedo, Nelson, 65

CHIFFLET, Guillermo, 74

CLETT Galleguillos, Victor

~~S-E-C-R-E~~

(5)(1)  
(5)(3)

CORNEJO, Ricardo, 58  
CORVALAN, Luis, 31  
CORVALAN, Salomon, 31, 40  
COSIA, Antonio F., 74

[REDACTED]  
da COSTA Pimenta Joao, 22  
CUEVA Tamariz, Carlos, 55, 57  
CULTELLI, Andres F., 3, 74  
CUNEO, Dardo, 12

DAMONTE, Gualberto, 74  
DAVILA, Manuel, 58  
D'ELIA, German, 70, 74, 75, 78, [REDACTED]  
DICKMAN, Enrique, 12  
DUBRA, Arturo J., 3, 74, 75, 78, [REDACTED]  
DUQUE Arias, Pablo Rafael, 58, 65

ELGUETA, Belarmino, 33  
[REDACTED]  
ESPINOSA Gonzales, Sergio, 47

FARRELL, Edelmiro, 12  
FERREIRA, Roge, 21, 23, 26  
[REDACTED]  
FLEITAS, Idalino, 71, 77  
FREIRE, Luis, 68  
FRUGONI, Emilio, 70, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79, 81, 82

GALLEGUILLOS, Florencio, 40, [REDACTED]  
GANGOTENA, Emilio, 58  
GARRAY, Mario, 33  
GARCIA Ortiz, Humberto, 58  
GHIOLDI, Americo, 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 16, 19  
GIKOVATE, Febus, 21, 26  
GOMES, Eduardo, 22  
GOMEZ Arellano, Alfredo, 58

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

HERDOIZA Herrera, Hugo, 68  
HERNANDEZ Zamora, Alfredo, 58  
HIDALGO Diaz, Jose Telmo, 59, 63, 64  
HUERTA, Raul Clemente, 56, 60

IBANEZ del Campo, Carlos, 29, 30  
IBARRA, Velasco, 55, 62  
IRIGOYEN, Eliecer, 58

JARAMILLO, Fabian, 57  
JARAMILLO, Hidalgo, Jose, 58  
JAURENA, Eduardo, 74, 78

[REDACTED]  
JOBET, Julio Cesar, 32, 37, 40  
JUSTO, Juan B., 10, 19, 74

KLEIN, Reidel, Federico, 3, 5, 42, [REDACTED]

LEGUIZAMON, Orisman, 72, 78, [REDACTED]  
LEITE, Hilcar, 22  
[REDACTED]

LEON Camus, Wilfredo, 65

LEON, Nelson, 57

LIMA, Hermes, 22

LLOPIS, Rodolfo, 2

LONG Alessandri, Eduardo, 33, [REDACTED]

LOVATO, Juan Isaac, 57, 58, 62

MAIZTEGUI, Humberto, 2, 3, 4, 68, 74, [REDACTED]

MALAVE Villalba, Augusto, 5

MALDONADO Estrado, Luis, 58

MALDONADO Tamayo, Luis, 58

MANDUJANO, Manuel, 33

MANGABEIRA, Joao, 22

MANZO Gonzalez, Jose, 5  
[REDACTED]

MELLO, Plinio, 22

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(S)(1)  
(S)(3)

MENA, Victor Sergio, 32  
MONTESINOS, Victor Raul, 5

[REDACTED]  
MOREAU de Justo, Alicia, 3, 13, 16, 18, 90  
MUNIZ, Ramon A., 13, 16  
MUNOZ, Emilio, 32  
MUNOZ, Leonardo, 57

OLEAS Zambrano, Gonzalo, 58, 69, 91  
OSSORIO, Eduardo, 32

[REDACTED]  
PACHANO Carrion, Luis, 57

[REDACTED]  
PALACIOS, Alfredo L., 11, 12, 16  
PALACIOS, Galvarino, 33  
PALESTRO, Tito, 33  
PEDROSA, Mario, 22

[REDACTED]  
PEREYA, Juan A., 83  
PEREZ Arellano, Jose, 58  
PEREZ Jimenez, Marcos, 5  
PERON, Juan Domingo, 12, 13, 16, 17  
PLAZA, Galo, 55  
PONCE Enriquez, Camilio, 56, 59, 67  
PORTNOY, Leopoldo, 90  
PORTO Fernandes, Cory, 23

[REDACTED]  
POVEDA, Jorge, 58  
PRATO, Hugo, 74

QUADROS, Janio, 23, 26

[REDACTED]  
RAMIRIZ, Pedro P., 12  
REPETTO, Nicolas, 13  
REYES, Juan, 32, [REDACTED]

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

RIOFRIO, Luis, 57  
RIVERA Jarrin, Modesto, 63  
RODRIGUEZ, Aniceto, 32, 42  
ROJAS Pinilla, Gustavo, 5  
ROMERO, Jose Luis, 16

[REDACTED]

SAAD, Pedro, 62  
SALAZAR Gomez, Eduardo, 55  
SANCHEZ Viamonte, Carlos, 16  
SENDIC, Raul, 80  
SEPULVEDA, Eduardo, 33  
SERRANO, Colon, 55  
SILVA, Ruben, 57  
SOMOZA, Anastacio, 5  
STROESSNER, Alfredo, 5

TERAN, Octavio, 65  
TOHA, Jose, 33  
TRIAS, Vivian, 74, 75, [REDACTED] 90  
TROITINO, Delio, 77, 78  
TROTTA, Francisco, 74, [REDACTED]  
TRUJILLO, Molina Rafael, 5

URIBURU, Jose F., 11

VALENCIA, Luis Emiro, 91

[REDACTED]

VARGAS, Getulio, 22, 24  
VELASCO, Domingos, 21, 22, 23, 25  
VILLA Cantillo, Jorge, 91  
VILLACRECES, Noe, 58, 65  
VILLALBA Coloma, Gonzalo, 66  
VILLENNA, Davil, 58

WAISS, Oscar, 36, 42

ZUNIGA, Victor, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, 64

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~