


~~Smith~~ S
~~Secret~~
C - Foster *Patrol* 9/25
- Jordan
- Cunningham
- Taylor

MANDATORY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-28
Document # 2



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's
Analysis of the War- -III*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2001

~~Secret~~
9

22 September 1967
No. 1389/67

~~WARNING~~

~~This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.~~

~~GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
22 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

North Vietnam Defense Minister Giap's
Analysis of the War--III*

1. The concluding segment of North Vietnamese Defense Minister Giap's latest analysis of the war emphasizes his view on several points debated by the Hanoi leadership over the past two years. Perhaps most important is Giap's reaffirmation that although the Vietnamese Communists cannot hope to match the number of troops the US and its allies put into South Vietnam, they can nonetheless wage the war successfully. Giap argues that the Communists can overcome the numerical superiority of the allies by improving the quality of the Communist forces and by using superior tactics.

2. The defense minister says he expects the US soon to increase its troop strength in South Vietnam by 50,000, and eventually by as many as another 100,000 to 200,000. Even so, according to Giap, the Communists can maintain a "stalemate" situation. To do so, however, Giap indicates that the irregulars must play a greater role and that irregular strength must be raised. The relative importance of the guerrillas versus the regulars has long been a point of dispute within the Hanoi leadership. Giap has argued that the guerrillas, in conjunction with regular forces, could tie down and disperse US forces, thus prolonging the war until the US became tired. His opponents have argued that Communist main force units could successfully defeat the US and its allies in conventional warfare and that the role of the guerrillas should be subordinated to that of the regulars.

*This is an analysis of the concluding portion of Giap's article which was received out of sequence. The remainder will be reviewed during the next several days.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the office of Current Intelligence.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. Giap's statement sets forth his concept of the over-all strategy for the war. The tactics and types of Communist forces employed at any given moment in South Vietnam and in any given battle are dictated by the actual situation. Thus, in the area just south of the Demilitarized Zone, North Vietnamese regulars appear to be carrying the weight of the fighting. Giap appears to be arguing, however, that sufficient guerrillas of high quality could more effectively tie down US forces and thus limit the number of US troops available for search-and-destroy operations against North Vietnamese regulars. Giap dismisses the concept of a "barrier" across the northern portion of South Vietnam in a few sentences, stating that it would be ineffective.

4. Giap also addresses himself to the problem of the defense of North Vietnam, both against air strikes and against invasion, which he mentions as a possibility. He recites the usual exaggerated claims of the number of US aircraft shot down over North Vietnam but admits that some North Vietnamese air defense units have performed poorly. He calls for "disciplinary measures" against those whose "negligence" has caused avoidable damage and losses.

5. To improve the quality of the North Vietnamese forces Giap says the Communists must "develop the superiority of our existing weapons," invent "highly effective tactics," and improve the military organization. He comes down hard on the need for more and better military training. The North Vietnamese Army rapidly expanded in 1965 and 1966 to meet the challenge posed by the introduction of US combat troops into South Vietnam and, as a result, the quality of the army dropped. A number of North Vietnamese soldiers captured in South Vietnam have indicated they received insufficient training before being sent south. Also Hanoi's need to create a large air defense system almost overnight resulted in its putting many poorly trained personnel on the firing line. The defense minister clearly hopes to improve the quality of his troops during the coming year.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6. Giap concludes his analysis on a note of determination. He warns that the US can be expected to launch "fiercer and more bloody" attacks, but asserts that the Communists will be able to overcome their enemies no matter how difficult the task.

-3-

~~SECRET~~