

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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GROUP 1
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SEP 8 23 35 Z

CITE

DIST 8 SEPTEMBER 1967

COPY

COUNTRY [REDACTED] SOVIET UNION/VIETNAM/KOREA

DOI JUNE-AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS' STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE WAR.
SOVIET BLOC AND NORTH KOREAN AID TO NORTH VIETNAM.

- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRIED~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~LEONHART~~
- ~~ROCHE~~
- ~~SAUNDERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~

ACQ 28 AUGUST 1967

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

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SUMMARY: [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS

[REDACTED] THOUGHT THE VIET CONG HAD THE INITIATIVE IN THE VIET-
NAMESE WAR AND THAT THE US WOULD EVENTUALLY BE DEFEATED BY A BREAK-
DOWN IN MORALE, FATIGUE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE WANT A ONE-THIRD INCREASE IN AID FOR 1968 AND PARTICULARLY
ASKED FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. THEY SAID THEY EXPECT HAIPHONG TO
BE BLOCKADED AND ARE PREPARING TWO NEW PORTS AGAINST THIS EVENTUALITY.
THE CHINESE HAVE 200,000 UNARMED WORKERS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND ARE
SUPPLYING LARGE QUANTITIES OF FOODSTUFFS TO NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

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5
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[REDACTED] MANY SOVIET PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN WOUNDED

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[REDACTED]

IN NORTH VIETNAM AND [REDACTED] THE SOVIET ADVISORY GROUPS THERE NUMBER OVER TWO THOUSAND. INFORMATION AVAILABLE [REDACTED] INDICATES THAT ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IS LOST FOR EVERY 7.2 MISSILE FIRINGS IN NORTH VIETNAM BUT THAT AMERICAN COUNTERMEASURES ARE CONSTANTLY INCREASING THE RATIO. NORTH KOREA IS TO SUPPLY INCREASED AID TO NORTH VIETNAM IN 1967. NORTH KOREA HAS ALSO SENT A TOTAL OF 130 FIGHTER PILOTS TO NORTH VIETNAM, OF WHOM 20 HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 16 WOUNDED. END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN JUNE 1967, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE PRIME MINISTER, PHAM VAN DONG, DEFENSE MINISTER VO NGUYEN GIAP AND OTHER OFFICIALS. [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] THAT A PARTICULAR WEAKNESS IN AMERICAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN VIETNAM WAS THE COMMITMENT OF ONLY 38 PERCENT OF THE FORCES TO COMBAT WITH THE REMAINDER IN A SUPPORT ROLE. THE VIETNAMESE BELIEVED THE VIETCONG HAD THE INITIATIVE BECAUSE IT COULD FORCE THE US INTO THE TYPES OF ENGAGEMENT PREFERRED BY THE VIETCONG. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BELIEVED THE US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BEYOND 650,000 MEN.

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2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS [REDACTED] THOUGHT THE US COULD ACHIEVE NOTHING BY MILITARY MEANS. THEY EXPECT THE WAR TO BE LONG AND THAT THE AMERICANS WILL IN THE END BE DEFEATED BY A BREAKDOWN IN MORALE, FATIGUE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS.

3. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ASKED FOR CONTINUED AND INCREASED AID FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, WHICH THEY FEEL THEY DESERVE BECAUSE VIETNAM IS FIGHTING IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. A REQUEST WAS MADE MAINLY FOR MORE ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY WEAPONS.

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[REDACTED]

4. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE [REDACTED] EXPECT HAIPHONG TO BE BLOCKADED. THEREFORE, TWO NEW PORTS ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED TO SUPPLANT HAIPHONG AND WORKSHOPS ARE BEING BUILT IN UNDERGROUND CAVES IN CLIFFS NEAR THE SEACOAST. A NEW PORT HAS BEEN BUILT NEAR THE CHINESE-NORTH VIETNAMESE BORDER WHERE MAJOR UNLOADINGS ARE ALREADY TAKING PLACE. FROM THIS PORT, THE OFFLOADED CARGOES ARE TRANSPORTED TO NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] NOT [REDACTED] CLEAR WHETHER THIS PORT WAS ON THE CHINESE OR THE VIETNAMESE SIDE OF THE BORDER. NOR [REDACTED] WHETHER THE LAND TRANSPORT OF CARGOES WAS BY RAIL OR ROAD.)

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5. IN ADDITION, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE [REDACTED] THOUGHT VIETNAM WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE REUNITED UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. THEY SAID MORALE AMONG THEIR PEOPLE WAS HIGH AND THAT THEY WERE EAGER TO PURSUE THE WAR.

6. ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS [REDACTED] BY SOVIET OFFICIALS IN HANOI, THERE ARE ABOUT 200,000 CHINESE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE CHINESE ARE UNARMED AND ARE PRINCIPALLY ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTATION AND ROAD REPAIRS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] LOST CONFIDENCE IN AND BECAME FEARFUL OF COMMUNIST CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION BEGAN. NONETHELESS, THE CHINESE ARE SENDING LARGE FOOD SHIPMENTS TO NORTH VIETNAM.

7. NORTH VIETNAM REQUESTS AID THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS, INCLUDING APPROACHES TO INDIVIDUAL MINISTRIES IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. THUS, A [REDACTED] TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY DELEGATION WAS INVITED TO NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RAILS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT ARE NOW BEING DELIVERED TO NORTH VIETNAM BY SURFACE TRANSPORTATION. DURING 1967 A NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAS VISITED EVERY SOVIET BLOC COUNTRY TO DISCUSS AID FOR 1968. HANOI'S AID REQUESTS ARE GENERALLY ONE-THIRD HIGHER THAN THE AMOUNTS SUPPLIED IN 1967. ACCORDING TO SOVIET SOURCES, THE QUANTITY OF ARMS SUPPLIED

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NORTH VIETNAM BY THE USSR IN 1967 IS GREATER THAN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CAN POSSIBLY USE DURING THIS YEAR AND THEY SHOULD NOT TURN TO OTHER COUNTRIES FOR ADDITIONAL AID DURING THIS PERIOD. EQUIPMENT IS GIVEN VERY POOR MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THE SOVIETS HAVE SENT COMPLICATED DEVICES TO 450 INSTITUTIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS WAS NOT FURTHER CLARIFIED.)

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THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT BEING USED BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY TO GET IT ASSEMBLED. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SEEKING EQUIPMENT OF MORE IMMEDIATE APPLICATION TO THE WAR, E.G., FIELD WORKSHOPS AND MACHINERY FOR REPAIR AND ASSEMBLY PURPOSES. MOST RECENTLY, ON 20 AUGUST, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY ASKED THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE FREE TRANSPORTATION BY SHIP FROM GDANSK TO HAIPHONG FOR ONE THOUSAND RAILROAD RAILS, WHICH HANOI HAD RECEIVED AS A GIFT FROM EAST GERMANY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID RAIL SHIPMENTS VIA CHINA WERE DIFFICULT NOW.

8. NORTH VIETNAM'S WISHES WITH RESPECT TO SUPPLIES ARE VERY HIGH. EAST GERMANY PROPOSED TO THE COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC AID (CEMA) THAT AN ORGANIZATION BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE BLOC AID IN ORDER TO TAKE CARE OF HANOI'S NEEDS. [REDACTED] THIS WAS NECESSARY SINCE THE VIETNAMESE WAR IS A GREAT BURDEN TO THE BLOC COUNTRIES, WHICH NOW MUST ALSO MEET NEW OBLIGATIONS TO THE ARAB STATES.

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9. THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPPLIES, E.G., ARMAMENTS AND AMMUNITION, ARE BEING TRANSPORTED TO NORTH VIETNAM BY RAIL VIA CHINA. THE JOURNEY REQUIRES 20 TO 25 DAYS. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

PRESUMABLY [REDACTED] (THE ENTIRE JOURNEY AND NOT THE TIME REQUIRED TO PASS THROUGH CHINA.) THE ONLY GOODS DELIVERED VIA HAIPHONG BY SEA ARE FUEL, CEMENT, FOOD, TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT AND OTHER BULK CARGOES. NO STRICTLY MILITARY GOODS ARE TRANSPORTED VIA HAIPHONG.

10. A [REDACTED] DELEGATION TO NORTH VIETNAM VISITED UNDERGROUND HOSPITALS AND OBSERVED MANY WOUNDED SOVIETS WHO HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO MISSILE AND AIR BASES. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IT IS NOT KNOWN PRECISELY WHEN THESE OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE.) THERE ARE TWO SOVIET ADVISORY GROUPS IN HANOI FOR THE AIR FORCE AND FOR THE MISSILE UNITS. SOVIET SPECIALISTS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE AIR AND MISSILE BASES. THEIR NUMBER IS ESTIMATED AT OVER TWO THOUSAND.

11. INFORMATION AVAILABLE [REDACTED] INDICATES THAT ONE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IS SHOT DOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM FOR EVERY 10-12,000 ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRINGS. WITH RESPECT TO MISSILES, ONE AIRCRAFT IS SHOT DOWN FOR EVERY 7.2 FIRINGS. EFFECTIVE TACTICS AND ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES BY THE AMERICANS ARE CONSTANTLY

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