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General Staff Acts to Control Radical Press Weighing More Curbs For Portuguese Leftists

Anti-Communist military leaders yesterday moved to bring much of the radical Portuguese press under direct government control—a further indication that they intend to capitalize on their victory this week by neutralizing leftist political opposition.

The country's leftist press has been virtually dismantled with the dismissal of the management and editorial boards of eight newspapers and magazines. According to a communique issued by the armed forces general staff, the publications, most of which were dominated by the Communists or the far left, will remain suspended until the government can appoint new administrators.

The armed forces general staff has been running Portugal by fiat since martial law was declared earlier this week during the rebellion by leftist paratroops.

Prime Minister Azevedo indicated last night that the state of emergency in the Lisbon military region will be lifted soon and that the government will resume its normal functions.

Pro-Communist Lisbon newspapers had undermined from the outset the government's efforts to establish its authority and put an end to political factionalism in the armed forces. Although the Communists were not specifically mentioned in yesterday's action, they were the principal target.

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Discussion of Short-Term Prospects in Angola

The Daily today offers the precepts of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, "Angola: Short-Term Military and Political Prospects," issued yesterday.

The prospects for Angola are bleak. The fighting shows every sign of continuing indefinitely. Neither the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) nor its adversaries—the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—can hope to gain effective military control over all of Angola in the near term.

Prospects for a political solution are equally remote, since at present there exists no basis for agreement among the three movements for participation in a government of national unity.

The military advantage in Angola already appears to be shifting once again in favor of the MPLA, largely owing to substantially increased foreign military assistance. Angola's strong ethnic and regional divisions, reflected in the three liberation movements and reinforced by the fighting among them, will make it exceedingly difficult for any one movement to gain effective political and military

control over the entire country.

Nevertheless, it may soon be possible for the MPLA to challenge the FNLA and UNITA in their ethnic strongholds in the north and south and to extend its military presence throughout much of the territory. Even so, the MPLA would continue to be threatened by serious political and military opposition, and its Luanda-based regime would be both politically and economically unstable, possibly for years to come.

Ideally, some kind of political solution could be found in which all three of


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



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Prospects in Angola . . .

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Angola's liberation groups could participate in a government of national unity. The major obstacle to a government of national unity is the MPLA, which has arrogated to itself the role of Portugal's successor. It has been encouraged to maintain an uncompromising stand toward its rivals by the massive military and political support it is receiving from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The future of the FNLA and UNITA depends on their ability to force the MPLA, either militarily or politically, into accepting them into a government of national unity. While this seems to be UNITA's preferred option, it is less certain that the FNLA would even now be prepared to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the MPLA.

The ability of FNLA and UNITA to force a military stalemate depends in part on their obtaining continued military assistance on a par with that provided the MPLA by Moscow and Havana. Without this support FNLA-UNITA strength is likely to erode gradually, leaving them

dependent on foreign political pressure to convince the MPLA to agree to a coalition government.

Equally important is the ability of the two movements, which have both suffered serious organizational weaknesses in the past, to survive the likely intensification of MPLA military pressure. Moreover, given the undercurrent of mistrust and suspicion that still exists between the FNLA and UNITA, their continued political and military cooperation cannot be counted as certain.

The MPLA's political dominance is by no means assured. The MPLA's African supporters have mounted a campaign to reverse the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) policy of neutrality toward Angola and gain OAU endorsement of the MPLA.

The longer the fighting continues without a political solution in sight, the greater will be the pressure within the OAU to grant recognition to the MPLA in order to avoid protracted and acrimonious debate over the Angola problem, which has already placed severe strains on African unity.

Initially, Portugal's refusal to recognize either of the self-proclaimed "governments" in Angola influenced many non-African countries to remain neutral. Leftist pressures in Lisbon and "radical" African pressure on the OAU to recognize the MPLA continue, however.

If Lisbon and the OAU, or even significant numbers of OAU members, recognize the MPLA regime, there will be little reason for other countries not to follow suit. If Lisbon refuses to extend recognition, its position eventually will become irrelevant—if it hasn't already—and more countries will look to the OAU for guidance on recognition.

Portugal . . .

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Other actions aimed at limiting leftist strength that reportedly are being considered include:

- Military action to put an end to the Communist-inspired occupation of farms in the fertile agricultural south.
- Disarming of illegally armed civilians, possibly by means of a nationwide house-to-house search.
- A crackdown on foreign revolutionaries, mostly Latin American, who, according to some reports, have formed an international brigade to assist Portuguese leftists.

The general staff also announced yesterday that all labor contract negotiations will be suspended until the end of the year. The official communique stated that the government will define a wage policy aimed at eliminating large wage inequities.

Communist-led construction workers recently forced the government to agree to excessive wage demands. The general staff's decree is apparently aimed not only at reversing this trend, but at promoting a long overdue program of economic stabilization.

