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Upheavals Eliminate Right

Struggle for Control of Portugal Now Limited to Leftist Factions

Portugal has had several political crises since the Armed Forces Movement seized power in April 1974. In each case, a layer from the right side of the political spectrum was peeled away until only various shades of leftists remain in ruling circles.

Those still in contention are now deeply split into three factions. Ideological divisions are not neat and some of the disagreements derive from personality clashes as well as genuine differences over how best to solve the many problems facing Portugal.

- The group associated with Prime Minister Goncalves is thought to be closely connected with the Communists and their sympathizers.
- A second faction, led by internal security chief Otelo de Carvalho, is anti-communist, but promotes radical nationalist policies that are often more extreme than those of the Communist Party.
- The third group, led by former foreign minister Antunes, is not as extreme as the other two groups,

although many of its revolutionary goals mesh with the aims of the other two factions.

In the past two weeks, Antunes has spearheaded an effort to oust Goncalves. He and his supporters have sought support from all quarters for his effort to reverse the steady move toward Communist domination of Portugal.

Portuguese President Costa Gomes' refusal to remove Goncalves, even in the face of overwhelming opposition, is an important element in the confused political situation. The President appears



Ex-foreign minister Antunes

to have no ideological affinity with Goncalves; his reluctance to act seems to be based on his concern over a possible violent reaction by the Communists and on the close relationship that has developed between the two men and their families.

There have also been reports that Costa Gomes is being blackmailed by the Communists, who allegedly have documents (See Search... Page 3)

Indonesia Readies Timor Plan



Indonesian armed forces are continuing preparations in case President Suharto decides to authorize an invasion of Portuguese Timor.

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EUROPE

In the Effort to Force Goncalves Out . . .

Search for Consensus Weakens Portuguese Anti-Communists

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proving he cooperated with the Castano regime.

Costa Gomes' delaying tactics on behalf of Goncalves could not have worked, however, had the opposition been determined and better organized. There appear to be no strong leaders among the nine dissidents dismissed from the Revolutionary Council for circulating an anti-regime document drafted by Antunes.

The anti-Communist forces seem to

have fallen victim to the same weakness that has plagued the military's efforts to govern—the desire to make decisions by consensus.

Non-Violent Revolution

The difficulties of carrying out a revolution by consensus have been compounded by the Portuguese aversion to bloodletting. For all the radical statements hurled back and forth since the Armed Forces Movement took power in a near-bloodless coup in April 1974, the Portuguese revolution has been essentially non-violent. Even the anti-Communist rioting of the past two weeks has resulted in only five deaths, none of them among the Communists whose facilities were being attacked.

The reluctance of the Portuguese to deal harshly with their fellow countrymen can also be seen in the willingness of the security forces to permit demonstrators to operate with near impunity while troops look on, and in the refusal of troops to obey orders to go to the Azores to control the separatists.

The twin motives of obtaining consensus and avoiding violence have prevented anti-Communists from moving to a showdown with Goncalves or Costa Gomes. The manifesto drafted by Antunes reportedly has obtained the support of some 80 percent of the armed forces—even the pro-Communist press credits the anti-Communists with the support of 60 percent—but Antunes appears to want something approaching unanimity.

This would also explain why Antunes is now reportedly working on a compromise document that will take into consideration some of the views put forward in a much more radical program drafted by officers under the command of Carvalho. If Carvalho decides to join forces with Antunes, and some reports say he already

has, the move to depose Goncalves will have at least the tacit agreement of nearly every important military unit. Such contrived unity, of course, will begin to break down almost as soon as it is accomplished.

Carvalho's Support

Carvalho's support seems especially important to Antunes because of the security chief's following in those units stationed in and around Lisbon that are most closely associated with Prime Minister Goncalves. Some of these units, such as the military police stationed near the presidential palace, are also believed by many Portuguese to have stockpiled weapons for dissemination to Communist militants in the event of a showdown.

Antunes may also fear that without control of these units, the Communist Party will be able to put up a stiff fight for control of Lisbon.

If such fighting were to develop, it could degenerate into civil war despite the Portuguese aversion to violence; passions have reached a high pitch in recent weeks. There are some indications, however, that the Communist Party may already be backing away from Goncalves, whose position looks more and more in jeopardy.

The Communists may have yet another move to try. The party is sponsoring a mass rally in the conservative north, despite the possibility of a serious incident developing. At the same time, however, the party appears to be looking for a way to retain as many of the gains it has made as possible.

The Communists have based their hopes for an eventual takeover in Portugal on maintaining close ties with the Armed Forces Movement, and if the Movement deserts Goncalves they may have little choice but to do the same.

Communist Party secretary Cunhal

continues to have kind words for Prime Minister Goncalves, but he has also renewed his pitch for unity of the "revolutionary forces" including the Socialists. He must know that such unity has little chance of developing as long as Goncalves hangs on.

The Communists, like General Carvalho, are opportunists and could seek a



Otelo de Carvalho

modus vivendi even with Melo Antunes, himself an avowed Marxist, if he began to emerge the winner. The Communists, however, would find Carvalho and his radical leftist followers more attractive.

Frustrations Building

With frustrations building each day, a break must come soon. There has been an upsurge in rumors that a coup is imminent—this weekend has been mentioned. If the anti-Goncalves group continues to hold back, the small but determined Communist minority may yet find a way to turn things around.

The Communists and Goncalves retain essential control of the state machinery, and with Carvalho's position uncertain, a few key arrests, with trumped up charges if necessary, might give Goncalves the time he needs to consolidate his position.

A continuation of the present confused situation, with no faction clearly emerging on top, would also set the stage for rightists—like the exile group under the leadership of former president Spínola—to launch an effort to recapture power.

Most reports on the exile groups indicate they have projected late September or early October as the time when the deteriorating economy and political situation would give them the best chance of success. There are growing indications, however, that the timing might be moved forward to take advantage of the current situation.

Rightists see the continued dominance of Goncalves and the Communists as providing the most propitious setting for their move. Support for a move by Spínolista forces would be seriously undercut if the Antunes group succeeds in wresting power from Goncalves.

The exiles are as opposed to Antunes—whom they see as a leftist—as they are to Goncalves.

The rightists have little chance of success, particularly if they move too soon, and they might succeed in maintaining Goncalves in power. A rightist move would permit the Prime Minister to rally the nation and the armed forces around him and lend substance to the charges that Antunes is opening the way for a turn toward fascism.

Portuguese Communists Plan To Reassert Presence in North

The Portuguese Communist, who have been nearly driven underground in the northern part of the country, have scheduled a rally for tonight in the northern town of Alcobaca—site of one of the first incidents of anti-Communist violence.

The decision to reassert a Communist presence in the north was announced by party leader Cunhal at a Lisbon rally on Thursday. Cunhal, who had not appeared in public for several weeks, said that Communist militants should not fear returning to those areas in the north from which they have been forcibly driven out.

This well-advertised challenge to the anti-Communists in the north may result in violence; the Communists would not venture into this area unless they were well armed. Last week, however, the Socialists and the Communists merely shouted slogans at each other when they held rival demonstrations in the southern town of Evora.

The Communist-controlled labor federation has called for a brief general strike on Tuesday. The strike itself will have little impact, but it is another sign that the Communists are prepared to take the offensive.

