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The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for Unity

An Intelligence Assessment


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The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for Unity [REDACTED]

An Intelligence Assessment

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Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

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The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for Unity

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 31 May 1984
was used in this report.*

Lack of unity continues to hamper the Afghan resistance. We believe disunity limits resistance efforts to influence international opinion, to have a voice in negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to ensure diplomatic support and the flow of money and weapons, and to coordinate military efforts.

Initiatives for unity have come from the exile community in Europe, the resistance community in Peshawar, and local insurgent commanders in Afghanistan. In Rome, former Afghan King Zahir Shah is attempting to join all elements of the resistance and develop international support for a United Front of Afghanistan. The Front probably will attempt to form a government-in-exile:

- Zahir probably will fail to develop support from the USSR and Pakistan. The Soviets want to maintain control over Afghanistan, and the Pakistanis want control over negotiations and fear that resistance unity could be a powerful force in domestic politics.
- Deep divisions among fundamentalist resistance leaders and insurgent commanders will prevent the United Front from achieving legitimacy.
- Many Afghans feel nostalgia for Zahir but probably not loyalty.

A weak, unevenly supported Afghan government-in-exile could pose diplomatic recognition problems for Western nations and increase tensions within the resistance.

We believe the Peshawar resistance groups will not develop more than temporary, loose alliances formed for financial advantage and because of outside pressure.

In our view, the guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan will gradually improve cooperation in military operations and maintaining supply lines. Major Soviet operations in spring 1984 prompted several such improvements. The insurgents, however, are unlikely to develop regular interregional cooperation because of ethnic and language barriers, political and religious differences, and communication problems.

Over the long term, the resistance probably will draw only slightly closer than it is now.

Figure 1



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The Afghan Resistance: Struggling for Unity

The Afghan resistance continues to be hampered by lack of overall unity, despite initiatives to achieve that objective. The absence of an organization able to speak for the resistance as a whole limits its efforts to influence international opinion, to have a voice in negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to ensure continued diplomatic and material support, and to coordinate military efforts.

The most publicized and ambitious of the initiatives for unity, that of former Afghan King Zahir Shah, envisions joining all Afghan elements opposing the Kabul regime. Zahir's backers have heavily lobbied Western governments to support the former Afghan King as he moves toward forming a government-in-exile. We believe this initiative has mainly grown out of fear that the Afghan resistance may be left out of any political settlement on Afghanistan. Zahir's backers also fear loss of influence to rival resistance organizations unless the former King leads the cause.

Initiatives in the resistance community in Peshawar primarily seek stable political coalitions to ensure the flow of funds and weapons. Initiatives among the insurgent commanders in Afghanistan have military cooperation as the main goal. We believe that prospects are dim for all these initiatives.

Divided Insurgents

The exile groups as well as the guerrillas inside Afghanistan tend to be fractious, and their alliances frequently shift. The common elements among the resistance groups are Islam and a desire to oust the Soviets and replace the Kabul regime (see box and

appendixes A and B). In our view, however, the common elements are insufficient to overcome rivalries and grudges, social and ethnic differences, and conflicting religious views. Some commanders in Afghanistan have begun efforts toward unification. Although the insurgents have shown gradual improvements in military cooperation, the sort of unity that would permit significant interregional military cooperation has remained elusive.

The Afghan resistance is divided into hundreds of different groups. Significant disagreements exist even about what it means to defend Islam and to free Afghanistan from the Soviets. Most bands probably are poorly acquainted with the goals of the fundamentalists or the moderates. In northeastern Hazarehjat, for example, several bands routinely switch allegiance from one Peshawar-based group to another.

Those bands seek considerable autonomy for their regions or ethnic groups and prefer minimal interference in local affairs from Kabul. Other groups, such as Maoists and social democrats, have little power and are unlikely to influence the resistance much.

Another factor that hampers intergroup ties is that the leadership structure is in flux in Afghanistan and among the refugees who provide the guerrillas' manpower pool. According to Western journalists, young men with automatic weapons have replaced village elders as the highest authority in areas hard hit by the war. Only traditional leaders who are combatants retain their influence. In the refugee camps, rival groups have formed over distribution of food and arms and the issue of religion. As they have for centuries, tribal and ethnic ties continue to divide as well as unite Afghans. A Pakistani refugee official told Western journalists that it is impossible, for example, to put Ghilzai tribesmen into a Durrani camp, since



Afghan refugee camps near Peshawar, Pakistan

neither side would accept such a situation, though both are ethnically Pushtun. Similar divisions persist inside Afghanistan, including among the rural inhabitants who have sought refuge in Kabul.

Control over distribution of food and weapons, however, can sometimes cause tribal and ethnic ties to loosen.

Insurgent efforts to influence international opinion continue to be hindered by an inability to decide on a common program. The Peshawar groups, who do the

most fighting among themselves, also have the greatest access to the world press. Instead of promoting a common program, however, insurgents provide the media primarily with fragmentary, exaggerated claims of successes against the Soviets and the Kabul regime.

Zahir Shah's Initiative


Zahir's effort to unify the resistance is ambitious and extensive. Backed by the Peshawar moderate alliance, Zahir publicly opened his campaign in summer 1983. His principal goal is to create a United Front of Afghanistan that can participate in negotiations leading to a Soviet withdrawal. In summer 1983 an aide to Zahir said that creation of a government-in-exile would depend on the will of a national assembly, which Zahir's supporters hope to convene when sufficient backing has developed. Professing a desire to serve as a personage around whom the Afghan resistance can coalesce, Zahir in press conferences has portrayed himself as a conciliator rather than a leader, disavowing personal ambitions or any attempt to restore the monarchy (see box and appendix C). The former King and his supporters apparently believe that international support will make him influential enough to bring the major resistance leaders to his side. Some observers believe that ambitious advisers will push Zahir into forming a government-in-exile without adequate backing.

The Soviet Position

We believe Zahir is not likely to get Soviet support, though he realizes the need for it. In a press interview in June 1983, Zahir indicated that he considers friendly relations between Afghanistan and the USSR a necessity, though he harshly condemns the Soviets and the Kabul regime.

The Soviets have not taken a public position on Zahir Shah's initiative. In January 1984 limited attacks on Zahir by Afghan Government media—which are controlled by the Soviets—testified to Soviet concern about Zahir's unity effort. The Soviets probably fear

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Chachagari Refugee Camp west of Peshawar, Pakistan



Muhammad Zahir Shah, former ruler of Afghanistan

that the former King may succeed where the Peshawar-based resistance leaders have failed, yet Moscow does not want to improve his prospects by mounting a major propaganda campaign against him.

The Soviets may also still hope that Zahir will ultimately help the Afghan Communists consolidate their control of Afghanistan. Members of his entourage have told US academic experts there have been periodic contacts between the Soviets and emissaries of the former King, although he denies it. Moscow's preference could be for Zahir to return to Afghanistan as a figurehead like Souvanna Phouma in Laos after the Communist takeover there. We doubt that Moscow would ever permit the King real power.

The Pakistani Position

Zahir's backers claim to have the support of President Zia, but that is not likely. In our view, Pakistan would have several reasons for opposing the former Afghan King. A unified resistance would diminish Pakistan's authority in negotiations toward a political settlement of the Afghanistan issue. In late autumn 1983


Pakistan wanted to increase its influence over the resistance by establishing direct ties with insurgents in the field and circumventing the Peshawar parties.

the Pakistani Government wanted to sponsor the formation of an Afghan exile political council in Peshawar that could negotiate, under Pakistani guidance, with the Soviets to pursue a peace settlement. In December 1982 Pakistani officials expressed strong

reservations about promoting Afghan resistance unity, claiming that the resistance had sufficient coherence to sustain military operations in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis feared that resistance unity could be a powerful force in domestic politics should the refugees' hope of returning to a free Afghanistan fade. Finally, the Pakistanis disliked Zahir when he was in power because of his association with the Pushtunistan issue.

We believe, however, that Pakistan will not obstruct Zahir Shah's efforts. Obstruction could invite international criticism and jeopardize relations with Muslim states that support the resistance.

Pakistan had not formulated any policy in regard to Zahir Shah. Pakistan is not opposed to a government on good terms with the Soviets. Recently, Pakistan quietly provided courtesies to Zahir's backers. the Pakistani Government provided facilities and security for Zahir's representatives in fall 1983 when they tried to develop support for the former King among refugees in the North-West Frontier Province and adjoining tribal areas.



The Fundamentalists' Position

We believe the opposition of the fundamentalist resistance groups will prevent Zahir and his backers from achieving any legitimacy that the planned United Front may eventually claim. Fundamentalists' reaction to Zahir's program has ranged from passive opposition to outright hostility.


fundamentalists in Peshawar will not support a national assembly planned by Zahir's backers. Programs approved by such an assembly would be meaningless without participation by most fundamentalist leaders, because they influence the most effective insurgent groups. the fundamentalists believe Zahir is morally bankrupt and has ignored the insurgency while living in comfort in exile. Some fundamentalists also suspect the moderates are manipulating Zahir and find that sufficient reason to distrust him.

The Jamiat. Jamiat leader Rabbani apparently considers a united resistance desirable for dealing with the Soviets and Kabul regime, but he would probably

wish to head such an organization. We believe his opposition to Zahir Shah is more personal than ideological. Rabbani believes the former King's plan to develop a united front is unrealistic. In a Western press interview, Rabbani said the front would have to be built on Islamic principles, free from foreign domination. He sees Zahir as having close ties with the West and not the Afghan people. The front, said Rabbani, "may not be led by persons whose relations with the people are weak and loose." In an interview with a fundamentalist publication in early 1984, Rabbani labeled Zahir's efforts as "impracticable expectations."

some other Jamiat officials also oppose the return of Zahir. They blame his policies for leading the Soviets to invade and believe he would be unfit as spokesman for the resistance because he lacks influence among the populace inside Afghanistan.





The Kabul Regime's Position

We believe the Kabul regime has carefully limited its attacks on the King, fearing the publicity might promote Zahir's cause among regime opponents.

the regime has attacked Zahir Shah in Afghanistan's English-language press but not the vernacular press. A commentary in January 1984 entitled "Mad Fantasies of Zahir Shah" played up charges that the King is backed by the United States, that he is living in luxury, that his feudal tenure caused starvation and poverty, and that he ruled by exploiting conflicts among tribes and ethnic groups. In autumn 1983, Kabul television implied criticism of Zahir by briefly showing a photograph of him that was propped against weapons allegedly captured from insurgents.

Afghan Popular Views

The Afghan people, in our judgment, have little more than a nostalgic affection for Zahir. That good will, however, could develop into active support should the former King receive widespread backing by other resistance leaders.

Western reports of Zahir's press interviews aroused warm memories in Kabul's bazaars of the days before the Soviet invasion and prompted hope that the Soviets would soon leave Afghanistan and the King would return. Western observers note, however, that the public showed little dismay when the King was overthrown and regarded some of the King's advisers with considerable hostility.

Other Initiatives for Unity

The Peshawar Resistance Groups

In our view, the Peshawar resistance groups are capable of only temporary, loose-knit alliances. The alliances, we believe, have usually developed for financial advantage rather than from common goals and have existed more on paper than in reality.

the Afghan insurgents have never been interested in the formation of a common front (see box). The principal leaders have long resisted unifying, fearing curbs on their powers



The Fundamentalist Alliance

According to press reports, the seven major fundamentalist resistance groups based in Peshawar formed a loose coalition in 1981 and decided to merge in May 1983 to improve finances. Resistance sources said the parties continued to function separately, however, and that bickering in the leadership caused the alliance to lose influence within Afghanistan. In December 1983, Yunus Khalis publicly charged alliance leader Sayyaf with misusing funds and pulled his group out of the alliance. According to a Western observer, the fundamentalist alliance functioned in little other than name before Yunus Khalis's departure.

Alliance members' differences sometimes have led to bloodshed. According to a reliable source, in October 1983, Gulbuddin's forces attacked Sayyaf's forces in Wardak Province, and Gulbuddin claimed the attack was in response to Sayyaf's interference in Hizbi affairs.

According to Western observers, wide divisions exist between the Jamiat and most other fundamentalists. US Embassy sources recently speculated that Khalis and Rabbani may ignore the other fundamentalists and seek to establish a new alliance. A reliable source reports that in spring 1984 Sayyaf was using alliance funds to buy the personal loyalties of guerrilla leaders and not distributing money to other alliance members. The same source reports that conservative missionaries supported by Sayyaf have prompted armed clashes within the resistance in three provinces.

and criticism of their activities and decisions. In spring 1984 the fundamentalists and moderates made an unprecedented call for unity and for assistance to the Panjsher Valley insurgents, who became the target of a large-scale Soviet offensive. cooperation among insurgent groups in the Panjsher Valley area has improved, but internecine fighting has continued in several Afghan provinces.

In our view, one indication of the depth of the divisions among the Peshawar groups is that major moves toward unity have not arisen from within.

pressure on the fundamentalists in spring 1983 to form an alliance came from members of the Muslim Brotherhood in several Persian Gulf states and from the Pakistan Jamaat Islami Party. The outsiders urged an end to quarreling, disbanding individual parties, election of officers, and tighter financial control. The inducement was as much as \$40 million in aid to the alliance but not to an individual.

We believe differences between the moderates and fundamentalists are irreconcilable.

Rabbani has said that, if he is not elected resistance head, he and the Jamiat will follow no other leadership. Rabbani added that, even if Zahir succeeded in convening a national assembly as a step toward founding a United Front, there would still be a split between the moderates and fundamentalists. Should Zahir be elected leader, Rabbani believes, most of the moderates would come over to the Jamiat. Rabbani indicated that he would in any case continue to try to unite elements of the Afghan resistance within Afghanistan under the Jamiat.

The moderates have been more successful than the fundamentalists in maintaining cooperation.

no likelihood exists of the three moderate parties forming a consolidated front. the three-party moderate alliance holds together because of strong pressure from "elements in Europe," presumably the Afghan exile community. We believe that the moderates' European backing and dealings with Zahir Shah will prevent reconciliation between them and the fundamentalists. even the moderates' ostensibly common goal of setting up Zahir Shah as resistance spokesman has created tension. Mojadedi and Nabi may have reservations about the initiative, which they see primarily as a Gailani move.

Major Peshawar Resistance Organizations

| Group | Leader | Ethnic Composition | Political/Religious Composition | Area of Strength |
|---|-------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|---|
| Harakat-i-Inqilabi-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) | Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi | Pushtun | Traditionalist | Eastern Afghanistan |
| Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) (Gulbuddin) | Gulbuddin Hikmatyar | Pushtun | Islamic fundamentalist | Eastern Afghanistan |
| Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) (Khalis) | Muhammad Yunus Khalis | Pushtun | Islamic fundamentalist | Nangarhar Province |
| Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan | Abdul Rasul Sayyaf | Pushtun | Islamic fundamentalist | Eastern Afghanistan (mainly Kabul City) |
| Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan (Afghanistan National Liberation Front) | Sibgatullah Mojadedi | Pushtun | Moderate Islamic | Eastern Afghanistan |
| Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) | Burhanuddin Rabhani | Tajik | Islamic fundamentalist | Northern and Western Afghanistan |
| Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Front) | Sayyid Ahmad Gailani | Pushtun | Moderate Islamic | Eastern Afghanistan |

The Insurgent Commanders Inside Afghanistan Factors Hampering Unity. Several insurgent commanders in Afghanistan have promoted guerrilla unity, but [redacted] poor communications are a major barrier to unification. Ethnic, cultural, political, and religious differences deter cooperation as do mountainous terrain, great distances, and hostile troops between district commanders and their various headquarters. [redacted]


Most commanders also lack local and regional political ties. Even if the Peshawar exile groups unified, the effect on the insurgents in Afghanistan would be slight. [redacted] the number of insurgent bands having nominal ties with exile organizations has increased in the past three years. The exiles, however, do not appear to have any greater control over the fighting, and most exile leaders have only limited influence even with the bands that acknowledge their authority. [redacted]

We believe that many commanders lack political skills and care about little but their own small areas of

influence. [redacted] one Hazarehjat leader does not understand why foreign governments do not recognize him as the chief of state of an independent nation. He also believes the Soviets do not launch operations into his area because they are deterred by insurgent strength, rather than by the Hazarehjat's strategic unimportance. [redacted]

some insurgent leaders are good fighters or skilled managers of people, but that few have both skills and even fewer attempt to control civilians in their areas of influence. [redacted]

Efforts Toward Unity. In our view, of all the insurgent commanders in Afghanistan, Panjsher commander Masood has made the most ambitious effort to build alliances. [redacted] Masood strengthened his standing with the local populace and with insurgent commanders outside the Panjsher Valley following a cease-fire arrangement with the Soviets in early 1983. In December 1983, Masood held a



Probably far more typical than Masood is the Shura commander of the Hazarehjat, Sayyid Muhammad Hassan Jaglan.

Jaglan has concluded a cooperative arrangement with Jamiat forces in Ghowr Province. Under the arrangement, Jaglan prevents rival Hizbi convoys from passing through the Hazarehjat to Ghowr. In return, Jamiat forces block the movement of Iranian arms to a group that rivals Jaglan's in the Hazarehjat. Throughout 1983,

Jaglan was so preoccupied with fighting rival insurgent groups that he had neither the time nor the manpower to initiate actions against the Soviets.

Jaglan is trying to improve cooperation with other groups that share his enmities, but his attempts seem inept. In early 1983, for example, Jaglan sent leftists as emissaries to a conservative Jamiat group in Faryab Province. The same source reports that Jaglan wants self-rule in the Hazarehjat and has little interest in who governs in Kabul so long as the Hazarehjat retains its autonomy.

conference of Jamiat commanders from eight provinces. A Western observer also noted commanders from other parties and organizations in attendance.

Masood hoped to win allies without alienating other groups. His approach involves being unemotional and carefully balanced, finding capable aides, and having sufficient military supplies to distribute to new groups or groups whose support is needed.

By December 1983, Masood had expanded his ties to both Jamiat and non-Jamiat commanders, establishing links with major groups in Balkh, Herat, and the Hazarehjat. He was also seeking close links with Jalaluddin, a powerful Hizbi (Khalis) commander in Paktia Province.

Masood believes a further political move now—such as setting up an Afghan political council—would be premature and would lack popular support. no merger is possible because of traditional rivalries as well as Masood's distrust of the hardliners and the hardliners' suspicion of Masood for his willingness to negotiate.

Outlook

Over the long term, the resistance probably will not draw much closer together than it is now because of political and religious differences. Outside pressure is unlikely to bring the resistance politically closer together. Various Saudi groups provided the impetus for the fundamentalist alliance, but it has never developed more than nominally and now seems to be disintegrating. More funds from Saudi sources will not keep the alliance from breaking up. Afghan exiles in Europe have persuaded the moderates to maintain a loose alliance but can do little more. Iran's influence is limited to the extreme fundamentalists. Pakistan, because of its own concerns for control, has little desire to see a truly unified resistance. No other nations have sufficient influence with major resistance elements to be able to affect moves toward unity.





Saudi Red Crescent Medical Clinic at Afghan refugee camp, Peshawar, Pakistan

After the Soviets

In spite of the optimism of some resistance figures, we believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will pull out of Afghanistan without a pro-Soviet government firmly in place.



In our view, an Islamic government could function only if it allowed a large measure of autonomy to the tribal and ethnic regions of Afghanistan.

We believe an even chance exists that Zahir Shah and his backers—with exaggerated claims of support—will convene a national assembly and set up a government-in-exile. Any Afghan government-in-exile will lack solid support from the insurgents and various resistance organizations because political, religious, and ethnic differences are likely to remain very strong. A weak, unevenly supported government-in-exile would be worse than none at all because it would increase tensions among resistance factions. We see little hope, moreover, that the Soviets will seek a negotiated settlement that would result in an Afghan regime acceptable to all major parties (see box).


We believe the Peshawar parties will continue quarreling and that their control over insurgent commanders will remain quite limited. Inside Afghanistan, the commanders will probably continue to increase cooperation gradually, with Jamiat forces in particular growing more cohesive. We believe, however, that unity will elude both the political and military elements of the Afghan resistance.

recognition problems for Western nations that maintain embassies in Kabul. Were the United States or other Western governments to recognize the government-in-exile, little justification would exist for maintaining embassies in Kabul. Were the embassies to close, an international window on the war would close. Western ties to a government-in-exile formed by Zahir and the moderates would generate greater anti-Western feeling among the fundamentalist insurgents. Soviet countermeasures could include military pressure on Pakistan or aid to opposition elements in any country serving as host for the government-in-exile.

Implications for the United States

A weak, unevenly supported Afghan government-in-exile would present several problems for the United States and its allies. Its establishment could embarrass the host country and give rise to Soviet countermeasures and pressure. It would also pose diplomatic

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Appendix B

The Influence of Sufism

Religion, like tribal ties, divides as well as unites Afghans. Approximately 75 percent of Afghans are Sunni Muslims and 25 percent are Shia. Within each of the two communities, according to Western observers, a wide range of opinion separates numerous factions. In our view, no sect can become influential enough to unite the resistance, though one group, in particular, may be working to do so. Sufism—an ascetic, mystical form of Islam that has both Sunni and Shia adherents in Afghanistan—provides cohesion in certain areas. Western observers indicate that Sufis have recently begun attempts to spread their beliefs among Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In some places Sufism is both a religious and a political force, serving to bind together adherents from different ethnic groups and insurgent organizations. A Western observer reported in autumn 1983 that a Sufi insurgent organization, the Madrasa-i-Koran, is working to unite the various Afghan resistance organizations. The group's leader claims to have 10,000 members dispersed throughout other insurgent organizations in Afghanistan and 70,000 civilian members.

Mirajan Saheeqi, leader of the Madrasa, claims that his members have infiltrated major resistance organizations and are moving into senior positions. They believe they will have to fight the Soviets for years and are preparing for the struggle by providing political and religious indoctrination to all members, insurgents and civilians. The leaders are working on a representative form of government for Afghanistan that would bear no resemblance to the authoritarian government in Iran. The organization has published in Dari several books and manuals for its membership. Some are doctrinal and political, and others are military training manuals.

A Western observer indicates that Sufism as a political-religious force is most influential in northwestern Afghanistan, where spiritual guides arbitrate differences between insurgent groups resulting from ethnic frictions or partisan rivalry. In Faryab Province, one Sufi leader has been very successful in controlling internecine feuding. Where their influence is strong, Sufi religious leaders can determine who becomes a resistance organization province chief. Herat is the largest Sufi stronghold in Afghanistan. In the insurgent organizations based around Herat City, most local commanders and their followers are members of a single Sufi organization. In eastern Afghanistan, Sufi political leaders such as Gailani seldom spend time on religious responsibilities, devoting themselves instead to resistance politics.

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Appendix C

The United Front of Afghanistan

[redacted] the United Front is to be governed by a council that will follow Islamic principles and will represent all elements of Afghan society. The council is to consist of representatives from each province and district, from the nomadic tribes in the various regions of the country, from each resistance organization, from refugees in Pakistan and Iran, from European Afghan exiles, and from immigrants to the United States, India, and other countries. Religious figures, spiritual leaders, prominent civil and military personalities, intellectuals, and tribal chieftains will also be included [redacted]

The publicly announced principles for the United Front are based on UN resolutions that:

- Afghanistan be a neutral, nonaligned Islamic state.
- All Soviet forces be withdrawn.
- Afghanistan's territorial integrity be respected.
- Afghanistan has the right to self-determination with no foreign interference.
- Afghanistan's spiritual and national values be restored.

[redacted] plans for forming the front involve following the traditional Afghan pattern of calling a national assembly to ratify a charter for the United Front. Sources close to the former King have told the press that the front will act as an official voice of the resistance, not as a movement to restore the monarchy [redacted]

[redacted] the alliance of moderate resistance groups, the Islamic Unity, will perform the functions of the United Front until it can be established. [redacted]

The most important of Zahir's supporters are the three moderate resistance leaders, since they are the only ones who retain any influence among the insurgent commanders within Afghanistan. The personages who approved the plan for the United Front of Afghanistan at meetings in Rome in August 1983, [redacted] include:

| | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Abdul Hakim Tabibi | Former Afghan Ambassador to the UN. |
| Toriyalay Osman | Former Foreign Ministry official. |
| Humayun Assifi | Zahir's brother-in-law. |
| Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi | Head of the Harakat. |
| Sayyid Ahmad Gailani | Head of the National Islamic Front. |
| Sibghatullah Mojadedi | Head of the Afghan National Liberation Front. |
| Muhammad Yussuf | Former Afghan Prime Minister. |
| Abdullah Malikyar | Former Afghan Ambassador to the United States. |
| Abdul Wali | Former head of the Afghan Army, Zahir's son-in-law. |
| Tariq Aref | Close friend of Abdul Wali. |