

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: 1/10/83

(b) (1) (2) (3)

TOP SECRET  
UMERA [REDACTED]  
NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON


CIA Internal Use Only

PERSPECTIVE

AFGHANISTAN IN MARCH [REDACTED]

The following is a review of significant military, economic, and political developments regarding Afghanistan in March. [REDACTED]


Military Developments



Throughout provinces bordering Pakistan, increased Afghan troop concentrations were reported, [REDACTED]. In Qandahar, Gardez, Ghazni, and Jalalabad, the buildup was believed to be a prelude to counterinsurgency operations throughout the south, and additional security posts were established on the Qandahar-



CIA Internal Use Only



Base 504535 9-80 (545424) 5-80



CIA Internal Use Only

Herat highway. [REDACTED]

Qandahar-Ghazni: [REDACTED] insurgents attacked a post within Qandahar City and [REDACTED] there were increasingly frequent reports of convoy ambushes between Qandahar and Kabul, particularly in Ghazni. Travelers and visitors to Qandahar report that the city and the province are the scene of increased Mujahadeen activity despite the concentration of Soviet forces in the area. [REDACTED]

Kabul: Kabul City in March saw a slight increase in resistance activity and several assassinations, [REDACTED] and nighttime skirmishes were routine. On 19 March, Sayyed Baba, President of Ariana Airlines and an official with close ties to Babrak Karmal, was murdered. It is not clear, however, whether he was assassinated by the resistance or slain for some other reason. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] insurgent attacks on powerlines have continued to cause frequent blackouts and periodic interruptions in Kabul radio transmissions. Because diesel fuel supplies are short, the city remained dependent on limited power generated by the gas turbine at Pol-e Charkhi. [REDACTED]

North of Kabul, in the Shomali region, heavy fighting took place over several days in early March and began with aerial and tank bombardment of villages, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

19 April 1983  
NESA M 83-10085CX  
SC7A M 83-10074CX

[REDACTED]

Economic Developments

The energy shortage affected not only Kabul but idled Qandahar's fruit and cotton processing factories and had a similar effect in Ghazni and Herat, [REDACTED]. Deteriorating highways and weakening road security also increased demands on Afghanistan's limited domestic civilian air traffic capacity. [REDACTED]

There was also strong evidence that a reorientation in Afghan trading practices is taking place, [REDACTED]. As the value of the afghani over the winter dropped more than 25 percent in relation to hard currencies, more and more Communist bloc goods began appearing in Kabul shops. The shift in Afghan commerce toward the Communist countries can be expected to accelerate to the extent that Eastern Europeans can be induced to accept payment other than hard currency for their goods. In addition, the suspension of flights by the state-controlled Ariana Airlines to Western Europe will create difficulty in bringing Western goods to Kabul by air. A decline in agricultural production in some key areas is increasing the dependence of urban areas, particularly Kabul, on Soviet staple commodities such as wheat and sugar, [REDACTED].

Internal Political Developments

According to [REDACTED] press reports, the regime media event of the month was a staged press conference by captured French doctor Phillippe Augoyarde. He testified that he had seen no evidence of Soviet/DRA use of CW but asserted that US, Chinese, and Egyptian instructors were training the insurgents in CW use. [REDACTED]

The feud between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA continued in March. [REDACTED] the Parcham faction strengthened its hand with several high-level appointments of staunch Parchamis, including the new Minister of Education. [REDACTED]

International Political Developments

UN Mediation Effort

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moscow  
may hope prolonged talks will help reduce international pressure on the USSR while it continues to consolidate its hold on Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Italy: King Zahir Shah

Abdul Wali, the son-in-law of King Zahir Shah, has implied that the King would consider returning to Afghanistan as the head of a genuinely popular government after only a partial Soviet troop withdrawal,

[REDACTED]

Wali also plans to solicit Saudi funds and to sound out Pakistani authorities on a united resistance movement headed by the King. [REDACTED]

Pakistan: Policy Toward Insurgents

[REDACTED]

the Zia regime does not want the Afghan insurgent groups to unite. Islamabad is concerned that a united resistance would be strong enough to make demands on the Government of Pakistan. It might also

[REDACTED]

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~

negotiate with the Soviets independently of Pakistan and could revive the demand for an independent Pakhtunistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Zia needs a continuing Afghanistan crisis to justify his martial law regime and to maintain the support and assistance Pakistan is receiving from the West. We believe that Pakistan will continue to pay lip service to a united insurgency, but like Moscow has an interest in keeping the insurgents disunited. [REDACTED]

### Iran: Refugee Policy

Recent Western, [REDACTED] and Pakistani visitors report that Iran's treatment of its Afghan immigrant and refugee population is still mixed. Iran allows the Peshawar fundamentalist parties to have offices in a number of cities, including Tehran and Qom, and does not harry Afghan immigrants who came to work during the mid-1970s economic boom. However, Iran still places travel restriction on the Afghan refugees who arrived after the April 1978 Communist coup and forbids them to hold jobs, though many do. Moreover, [REDACTED] 40,000 Afghan Sunnis have been herded into three camps where they are behind barbed wire and under military guard. [REDACTED]

Iran's restrictions on the Afghan refugees probably arise from fear of economic competition, drug smuggling, and general lawlessness, and from the belief that Afghans who become integrated into Iranian life will be less inclined to return to Afghanistan to fight. Iran may have singled out the Sunnis for particularly close surveillance because it has greater control over Shia Afghans, who receive most of their aid from Iran. [REDACTED]