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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.

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EDITORS INTRODUCTION

IN September, the Office of Training issued the introductory number of *Studies in Intelligence*. Our purpose, we said, was to stimulate thinking and writing about the fundamentals of intelligence work, and to sponsor the beginnings of a professional intelligence literature. We especially emphasized two requirements basic to the production of such a literature: first, all that we publish will be entirely unofficial and will represent only the opinions of the individual author; second, the success of the project will depend on participation by the whole intelligence community. Successive *Studies*, that is to say, will appear only as worthwhile manuscripts reach our desk; and we will be able to judge the impact of what we publish only as we receive reader comments.

In presenting this issue on "capabilities" we call your attention to a concept whose applications extend to nearly every aspect of intelligence work. Just about everyone, at one time or another, is in the capabilities business, from the case officer who keeps current and reports on the "capabilities" of a national Communist Party to the Board of National Estimates which turns out exhaustive studies on the "capabilities" of the Soviet Bloc. One of the classic definitions of intelligence is, indeed, "the analysis of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign countries, relevant to US security interests." Both authors tackle the subject at its most basic: what do we mean by the word and, if our meaning is not always clear and consistent, what should we mean? What experience do we draw on in analyzing "capabilities" and how, in specific cases, does the analysis proceed?

Both Abbot E. Smith and Harold D. Kehm bring to bear on the subject an abundance of experience in intelligence (specifically in capabilities analysis) and related fields. Mr. Smith, a Rhodes Scholar and a distinguished historian, has taught at

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Bard College and Columbia University. During World War II, and immediately after, he served in the US Navy in a variety of roles: as Acting Chief, Naval Division, Allied Command in Austria; as Chief of the Historical Section, US Naval Forces in Europe; and as a member of the Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since 1948, Mr. Smith has been with CIA. Col. Kehm has been an Instructor in Economics and Government at West Point and Chief of Instructor Training at the Command and General Staff College, G-2 of the Ninth Army during World War II, Army Attache in Dublin, and Assistant Commandant (i.e., Chief of the School) at the Strategic Intelligence School. Col. Kehm joined this Agency in 1954.

The two articles that follow by no means exhaust the subject at hand — it is much too broad and involves too many side-issues for that. At least two directly related problems, each worth a *Study* in itself, have occurred to us as we have reflected on Mr. Smith's and Col. Kehm's contributions. One is the problem of the special characteristics of *national*, as distinct from departmental, intelligence. To put it in the form of a question: to what extent is the experience and the methodology of, e.g., military intelligence directly applicable to the production of national intelligence? The terminology has carried over, to be sure; but in Mr. Smith's and Col. Kehm's articles there are differences in usage of the capabilities concept that may result in part from basic differences in the problems the national and the military intelligence officer are asked to solve. Then, too, there is the problem, raised in both articles, of the lack of a national G-3 — which may, again, complicate the process of applying the systematic and time-tested methodology of the military intelligence officer to national intelligence. And surely there are many other problems of "capabilities" that could usefully be addressed in subsequent issues of this series; these are but two of the more obvious.

We invite suggestions and prospectuses, therefore, for some of these unwritten *Studies* and comments on the present one — comments which we would like also to publish in subsequent

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issues. To repeat something we think bears a lot of repeating: if indeed these *Studies in Intelligence* are to help in the airing of intelligence principles and methods, in the recapturing of experience, and eventually in the building of authoritative doctrine, then we are going to need the advice and the participation of every member of the intelligence profession to do the job well.

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