TITLE: Counterintelligence Interrogation

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Some precepts for the practical application of an esoteric art.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION

C. N. Geschwind

The general topic of interrogation is a vast one, opening into all fields of theoretical and applied psychology and leading at its distant limits in one direction to the wellsprings of human nature and in another to the roots of political power. The specialized form we call counterintelligence interrogation—that done to secure information on a hostile intelligence service and the cooperation of the subject with a view to neutralizing it—being a more subtle art than the interrogation, say, of ordinary prisoners of war or criminal suspects, has ramifications almost equally far-reaching. The ordinary intelligence officer cannot begin to master the enormous body of literature on the topic.¹

Because of this and because a really first-class talent for interrogating—as for managing people in general—is a rarity, what is needed as a matter of practical reality is a simplified doctrine and standard procedures that officers of average ability can follow. The soaring doctrines of the theorist and the virtuoso have to be brought down to earth and confined to what will work for you and me. This kind of simplification has been performed in several guides and manuals.² What I want to discuss in this article are selected aspects of counterintelligence interrogation which have been slighted or in my opinion simply require highlighting.

Managerial Aspects

It is a peculiar feature of most works on interrogation that they begin with the "how to" phase; one starts out in a room face to face

¹A good place to sample it is in A Study for Development of Improved Interrogation Techniques: Study SR 117-D, by Albert D. Biderman of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., with its bibliography of hundreds of references. This is the final report, March 1959, on contract AF 18 (600) 1797, monitored by the Rome Air Development Center with technical assistance from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.

²See Interrogation Guide (Counter Intelligence Corps Supplemental Reading, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird: SupR 38000 June 1958) and Intelligence Interrogation (Department/Army FM 30-15, 1960), especially Chapter 12, "CI Interrogation."
with the subject, all ready to interrogate him. In reality, many things have to be done before we reach that point. The following paragraphs cite some of them.

The need. First of all we have to decide whether the subject actually has to be interrogated. Like a marriage, a CI interrogation should not be embarked upon unless it is unavoidable. Does the subject really know enough to be worth while? Can he do something useful for us if we swing him around? Would some other subject be better worth our time?

In answering these questions, we have to keep in mind our purpose, at least latent in most CI interrogations, of getting the subject to collaborate with us, later, perhaps in an entrapment or double-agent operation, perhaps for example by surfacing hostile operations or testifying in court. We have to guard against a very natural desire to get the truth out of someone just because we want to prove something or satisfy our curiosity. It takes just as long and costs just as much to interrogate a bum as it does to lay open the secrets of an opposition case officer who has defected.

Now there will be times when we do not know enough about a subject to decide whether he is worth interrogating or not. We should get the facts—by file checks, other investigation, screening assessments, etc.—before we render a decision. In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that some agent handlers have a tendency to push their disposal or discipline problems into interrogation channels. Those in charge of interrogations should be careful never to buy a pig in a poke, or act until they have reviewed whatever operational files there are.

Control. A second thing to be established is the control situation. Authorities vary on many points in interrogation doctrine, but they are all agreed on one: the better the control, the better the outlook for success. A man firmly behind bars can be put under a good deal more control than one we meet in a safe house, not to mention his own home. Though obvious, this is often overlooked.

We should therefore catalog, in writing, the factors of control which we have and those we can develop. Can we jail the man? Can we convince him that we can? Could he flee across the border, or would he face a worse fate there? Are his emotional treasures (family, etc.) where we can reach them? What hard evidence have we in documents or witnesses? Are we free to use it? These and many other questions must be studied.
Bargaining position. In every interrogation there is an overt or tacit bargaining situation, and the quid pro is the single most potent means of moving the subject to action. Are we going to pay for his information? What can we do for him if he collaborates? Will he face jail if he does not? How can we protect him from retaliation? What can we do about his special problems? Before entering upon interrogation we must be quite clear as to what offers may be made or implied and what may not.

Care and feeding. It should always be settled in advance where the subject will be housed and under what conditions, where he will be fed, how his laundry will be handled, where he can go and what he can do for amusement, what medical care will be available, who will provide transport, where he can get religious ministration, etc.

Security. We do not need to be reminded about protecting our security from the subject, but what about his security? Will he be quartered out of sight from the public? How can he be transported securely? How will he be guarded? Can he go out nights? Will he be supplied with funds and documentation to protect him? How and for how long can he remain away from his regular haunts without attracting hostile attention? What cover can be arranged for our contact with him? A CI interrogation differs from most other types in the critical respect that we may wish to keep it completely secret, not only to protect ourselves and him but to safeguard operational potentials and values that may be derived from him—potentials of which we may have no inkling until we are well along in the interrogation.

Covert aids. We should have firm plans on whether and how to introduce stool pigeons among the subject’s associates, whether to read his mail, surreptitiously search his belongings and quarters, put eavesdropping devices in his vicinity, put him under surveillance, and so on.

Manpower. There is the question of what interrogators are to be reserved—one might say expended. How much time will they have? Will they have suitable facilities? What help will they have? Are they actually up to handling the subject? Will the polygraph be made available? How much control of it will the interrogator have? Are recording devices on hand?

Legality. The basic paper work often turns out to be most important. There should be some authorization in hand spelling out
the right to interrogate this particular subject and why. It is well
to secure some agreement in writing from him also, if only a security
agreement. Most subjects can be talked into signing some sort of
paper. There must be a clear-cut understanding of how the local
law or legal officials fit into the picture. After the subject has com-
plained to the district attorney is the wrong time to think about this
aspect.

*Females.* Female subjects, whether young or old, require special
handling not only because they are more difficult to interrogate but
because they can cause scandals. If female interrogators are not
available, a witness, possibly through a mirror-window, should *always*
be arranged. Neglect of this point can lead to extremely painful
incidents.

*Interpreters.* The use of interpreters poses many problems. In
professional work there should be someone listening in at least from
time to time to report what the interpreter is really saying. The
availability and the ability of interpreters should be determined in
advance.

*Concurrent research.* It would be nice to have an interrogator who
knew all the topics of the interrogation as well as the subject did, but
in most cases the interrogator's knowledge will be deficient in one or
more respects. He may therefore not recognize the significance of
certain information the source provides or could provide, may waste
valuable time getting information that is already well known, may
misinterpret information, or may not even reach a common under-
standing with the subject on what they are talking about. Every
interrogator, however well informed, has blind spots and therefore
needs to have his "take" reviewed concurrently, while the subject is
available to supply further or clarifying data.

This means that concurrent research support should be arranged,
if not at the site of the interrogation then near enough that the inter-
rogator can have the drafts of his reports reviewed daily and can
discuss the trend of the interrogation with one or more competent
analysts. In practice, unfortunately, the U.S. services have been so
organized that the consumer-analysts are far away and first see the
interrogation reports long after both subject and interrogator are busy
with other things.

*Spot interrogation.* Many times the subject is available only at
intervals—a border crosser, a possible double agent, a defector who
has steady employment elsewhere, a prisoner of the police to whom access is but fleeting, or some person whose contact with us must be concealed. In such cases the planning must be especially thorough and details of questions well worked out with the help of the best analysts available.

**Supervision.** The interrogator must of course be alone with his subject a good deal of the time, and he must have a wide latitude in dealing with him. He may spend quite a bit of time discussing trivia without necessarily being out of line. He cannot do his job with someone breathing down his neck. The simplest means of supervision, short of closed-circuit TV, is a microphone in the interrogation room, so that when the supervisor is minded and has time he can listen to what is going on. This is a good way to keep interrogators on their toes and keep some track of the development of the interrogation. The mirror-window (if suitably camouflaged, as in a medicine cabinet) is also a big help.

**Communications.** A one-way telephone is most helpful, one that does not ring but can be used by the interrogator for outgoing calls. A light and buzzer system to show when the corridors are free and enable the interrogator to call for assistance or block the corridor is one of a number of refinements that can be elaborated at an interrogation center but are usually too costly for smaller setups.

**Comforts.** It is important to be sure the refreshment facilities are adequate. Toilets, snacks, coffee, etc., must be handy and controlled by the interrogator without his having to leave the subject alone.

**Disposal.** Planning should be quite concrete on what is to become of the subject after the interrogation is over. Provision for the signing of receipts, quit-claims, security and recontact agreements, etc. should be made in advance; you can’t tell when an interrogation may suddenly be terminated.

**Conversion.** It will almost always be a major objective to win the cooperation of the subject at least to the extent of maintaining secrecy. Is your interrogator able to argue ideologies? Can he handle the man in such a way as to win his allegiance? These are matters to have in mind before the struggle begins.

The golden rule of counterintelligence interrogation is take care of the housekeeping before the how-to part, being sure that everything is as efficient, secure, dignified, and impressive as you can possibly make it.
The Interrogator Job

It is a truism to say that most men who have the ability to handle interrogation have more sense than to want to. In many ways the interrogator has become a forgotten man of intelligence and counterintelligence, looked upon as a question-machine and seldom given adequate career prospects. The work is just about the hardest there is, for it includes the two separate jobs of questioning people and writing reports. And it is of key importance: interrogation and investigation are the twin pillars of counterintelligence.

The Communist services have provided the most elaborate interrogation careers and facilities procurable. They rely very heavily upon interrogation not only to get facts but to grind people down to their specifications. Successful interrogators can look forward to positions of increased importance. One East German, a certain Gustav Szinda, who used to beat subjects up first and ask questions afterward, with the twin objectives of knocking them off balance and convincing them that he meant it when he threatened violence, eventually wound up as chief of a provincial headquarters of his service. Others have been given such positions as chief of operations and illegal rezident abroad. The Communists consider interrogation training to be the building of a fundamental skill, and a successful interrogator they seem to look upon as so heavily compromised to the regime as to be trusted on foreign missions.

We, on the other hand, seem to have made the job a drudge assignment which does not lead anywhere. The easiest way out of this dangerous situation would be to make a half-year or so of interrogation duty routine in the development of all officers who aspire to run secret agents. This would yield a reservoir of interrogators for any situation, train agent handlers in the skills of questioning and reporting, strongly reinforce their knowledge of counterintelligence topics, foreign languages, hostile thinking, etc., and at the same time provide manpower with motivation to handle the presently much neglected basic job of interrogation.

In any case, those upon whom the interrogation task is laid require more than routine good handling; they have to be made to feel that their work is appreciated and the greatest care taken to steer their careers away from blind alleys. Above all, one must see to it that unimportant or curiosity interrogations are not imposed upon experienced men; nothing is so demoralizing to an interrogator as to struggle with worthless subjects to get a product that will soon find
its way into the classified trash. As good sources become scarce, pressure develops to fish out marginal ones and dubious individuals such as fabricators for the sake of producing some kind of report. Consistent resort to this practice risks killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.

The best protection against such misuse is to give established interrogators the responsibility for assessing and evaluating their sources. If an interrogator says a subject shows signs of mental aberrations or other deficiencies or is worthless in point of knowledge, his judgment should be accepted unless there are very important reasons for overriding it. In the latter case these should be candidly explained. If at all possible, interrogators should function in groups or as a staff led by a senior interrogator. This is a great morale-builder and stimulant to productive competition.

The *How of Interrogation*

The general successf u ln ess of interrogators in eliciting compliance makes for a difficulty in analyzing scientifically the bases of their effectiveness. A high rate of success is apparently achieved by many different kinds of personalities, employing a wide variety of methods, on the basis of assumptions and lines of reasoning which, to the extent that they are articulated at all, are frequently unfounded or mutually incompatible.*

It seems to me that this finding is substantially correct. That is to say there are all sorts of people and all sorts of approaches that work. There is no best way. There are not even many general rules. People are complex, variable, and vulnerable or invulnerable at the most unexpected points. More important, depending on the person doing the interrogation and the personal equation that evolves between him and the subject, the vulnerabilities may change. An elderly woman, for example, may develop a strong interest in impressing a personable young male interrogator and entirely reject another elderly woman. On the other hand, she may refuse to talk at all except to another woman in the same age bracket. Many people, of course, make adaptations, so that an interrogator not basically compatible with the subject assigned him may soon get along swimmingly.

The tricks and tactics of interrogation worked out by generations of interrogators can be found in many books; all of them have validity some of the time. There are many tomes on how to assess

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* Biderman, op. cit., p. 48.
the vulnerabilities of subjects, mostly in rather abstruse psychological language. What it all boils down to is that what works with one person may not work with another.

It seems to me that we have again to fall back heavily on what are in the main the managerial aspects. We have to arrange a suitable setting and props in accordance with the role to be given the subject in our interrogation psychodrama. Is he to play the role of a captured spy? A fellow conspirator? A terrified victim? A hero? An oracle? A being entitled to every consideration and protection? A suspect? Is he to change roles, and if so when and how? When we have a controlled situation, we have enormous power to force a role upon the subject because we can manipulate his environment.

Unless our subject is highly sophisticated, he will hardly realize he is being offered a part to play. He may, of course, seek to play a part of his own, but if we have assessed him and the situation correctly and approach him skillfully, we can fairly easily maneuver him at least to take one of two roles we prefer. Insensibly he drifts into the part and begins to respond as if he were the person represented in that role.

In counterintelligence interrogation, no matter where we start we want at the end to have our subject playing the same role—the oracle; this is the pose that makes him as productive as a gusher. We can hardly start with it if he is recalcitrant, but we can lead toward it from the beginning by getting him to pontificate on trivia and harmless matters. The best interrogators—sometimes unconsciously—all head in that direction.

The worst interrogators are those who (usually unconsciously) want to be the heroes of the drama themselves and so beat the subject (mentally) to the ground. The interrogator must firmly suppress all impulses to dramatize himself, unless for the purpose of arousing the subject to compete. He can boast of his own operational achievements, for example, and quite possibly get a recalcitrant subject to top his story.

We must decide early on whether we are going to interrogate on many topics and in detail or only on a few or superficially. When we are in for a long siege, the managerial aspects become very important indeed, and the problems of writing, accuracy, concurrent research, and keeping the subject productive become more difficult. If we confine ourselves to a few topics—relatively rare in counterintelligence interrogation—we need not expect too much trouble with the source once he has been made productive.
Some Approaches

Making the subject productive is the first goal of any interrogation, and it can be reached, as we have said, by many avenues. The problem may range from coping with open hostility to working around mental blocks. In a paper of this length we had better concentrate on ways of transforming a recalcitrant subject into an oracle, and of these on a few that are not covered in nearly every work on interrogation. The following are some that have proved profitable.

Hypnotism. In a legal and control situation where chemical or natural hypnotism can be induced by qualified practitioners, its value does not lie in questioning an entranced subject. You get worthless suggestion-results, fabrications, and distortions. What it can do is enable you to change the subject's attitude toward the interrogation. He can be made to see foes as friends (a good CI interrogator of course is never a foe, but only a man who wants to get the subject on his side), and post-hypnotic suggestion can often make him cooperative after he is out of his trance.

The polygraph. This machine is the stethoscope of interrogators, used in diagnosis of areas of deception. It is also a fabulous stalking horse, offering the interrogator many openings to give the subject an excuse for not holding out any longer.

The ideological argument. Every interrogator should be prepared to refute tenets of Communism such as that the end justifies the means. The ideological line vis-a-vis a subject, however, should not be to prove him wrong but to provide him with rationalizations which he can use to justify to himself his changing sides (which every person to some extent wants to do).

The quid pro quo. CI officers are sometimes in a position to make substantial offers to a recalcitrant subject—protection, a chance to "work against the Communists on our side," etc. Backstpped and approved on the proper level, such inducements can occasionally shortcut weeks of effort. Quite a few subjects who do not want to say so are actually very much interested in "what's in it for me."

Threats. Threats to turn the subject over to local authorities, to return him to the Communists, of blacklisting, public exposure, solitary confinement, deprivations, deportation, confiscation of property, physical violence, etc. are dangerous instruments, for if they fail of their effect it usually means the loss of irreplaceable ground. Under no circumstances should a threat be made overtly without
having been cleared beforehand on the highest level. The fear element can be stimulated easily and safely by manipulating the situation in such a way as to imply the threat.

If threats are employed, it should always be implied that the subject himself is to blame—"you leave us no choice but to . . ." He should never be ordered to comply "or else." Readers familiar with the Jailer case will recall that he was told he left us no choice but to blacklist him everywhere. This potent threat to his swindling future brought him almost at once around to an agreement to tell us the truth now if we would keep quiet and not bar him from future deceptions. Essentially the threat is the basis for a quid pro quo. One should always be prepared to carry out an explicit threat, for the subject will generally sense a bluff.

Confrontation. There is a strong temptation, when we are in possession of hard evidence such as a witness, documents, or self-contradiction, to face the subject with it. Certainly in many cases it becomes necessary eventually to use this type of ammunition openly, but the moment should be put off until all else has failed, always until after our advantage has been used in polygraph tests or a decision made not to run any. There is nothing so valuable to interrogators as having a question on which the subject is known to lie, especially when he has no idea that we know it.

A woman agent of the East German MfS, for example, was observed shoplifting by our surveillants. In the general polygraph examination she was casually asked whether she stole things, and the resultant reaction became an invaluable gauge. Later interrogated on the same point, she almost immediately admitted it; if this had happened before the polygraph test the effect would have been lost. Coming as it did, the confession was the turning point in the interrogation, proving an entering wedge for other detailed admissions.

In the instructions issued by Communist services to their agents there is usually a section on what to do under interrogation. They are told to stick to their story and try to find out what evidence there is against them, and particularly to be alert for anything indicating who has betrayed them. It is well to bear this in mind in surfacing evidence in the confrontation maneuver or in the "we know everything" ploy.

Divide-and-conquer tactic. Whenever two or more persons are under interrogation on the same topic, for example two agents from the same network, the opportunity arises to play one off against the
other, not only as sources of detail exposing and refuting cover stories and other lies, but also as levers. A clever interrogator can get the idea across to each subject that the other is leaking, especially if he has reliable derogatory information he can let slip into his questioning. In the still hours of the night, when the subject is free to mull over the day’s exchange, he will stumble on the “slips” and their significance, with very weakening effect on his morale.

Harassment. Three things very hard on a subject are to have to go back over the same ground, to change abruptly from topic to topic, and to be interrogated at irregular intervals, say once at dawn, another time at midnight, etc. They are particularly effective if done under the pretense of “emergencies in which your help is needed” rather than as a hostile measure. But harassment which goes so far as to impair the functioning of the subject’s nervous system reduces his capacity to provide accurate and complete information. All harassment and threats build up the subject’s sense of moral superiority and so his resources for resistance.

Isolation. We often find that resistant subjects are kept in compounds with open-mesh fences, windows, etc. which allow them visual contact with the outside world. In some cases they have been allowed to listen to broadcasts or receive newspapers. Resisters draw great strength from this. They should be isolated visually and in every other way, so that they come to regard the prison as their world and gradually respond to the fully controlled environment.

Violence. There is little doubt that violence, correctly applied, often gets crude results quickly, but it lowers the moral caliber of the organization employing it and soon corrupts the interrogation staff, which degenerates until it cannot operate without violence. There are many more powerful persuaders, and violence should never be used.

Miscellaneous Considerations

Most of the following topics are each worth a book to themselves; here we are only hitting a few points where an interrogation can be helped or hurt.

Questionnaires. It should be a function of the concurrent research analysts to work out as thoroughgoing a biographic questionnaire as possible, so that a junior interrogator, if no one else is available, can get down the main facts on which the interrogation plan will have
to be based. The standard Personal Information Report forms in use are inadequate but far better than nothing. Special questionnaires should also be devised to cover each main topic. By using questionnaires we do risk stereotyping the questioning process, but we gain so much in the way of systematic coverage that the disadvantage is trivial. This is hard work that has to be done before the subject has even been contacted. It is a staff job.

Subject assessment. Tomes have been written on how to determine the character of individuals, their strengths, interests, weaknesses etc. It remains a fact that the best clue to the future behaviour of any man is his past performance. The more you can find out about the subject’s past reactions in situations which confronted him with unpleasant choices and problems, the better you can determine who should interrogate him and can plan the interrogation tactics. It is quite beyond this paper to get into details on this enormous topic.

The plethora of aids is confusing. If you have psychiatric assistance it may prove quite valuable. The polygraph can be used as an assessment tool. So can handwriting analysis. Direct interviews, batteries of tests, etc., all have some validity. But the situation is often the determining factor.

Thus a basically dishonest millionaire would scarcely ever be a thief because he has no need to steal, while an honest man faced with necessity can perform quite spectacular larcenies. A weakling being asked to divulge information when it would mean death for a beloved child will put up a hell of a battle, while a hardnosed fighter type may be quite easily induced to cooperate in exchange for a fortune or the chance to do in a personal enemy. It is accordingly illusory to devote too much time to assessing a subject’s inherent resistance potential.

Far more important is to select an interrogator whose personal equation meshes with the subject’s. And that is easily done by trying out a few people in harmless personal interviews. Most of us have the gift of being able to tell whether we like and are liked by given individuals. Another very important thing is to be sure to determine whether the subject can in fact tell an accurate story about anything. Some criminals with jail experience habitually put out a screen of confusing tales on any and all topics when confronted by authorities. Such people can often be trapped by stool pigeons.

Clues on bona fides. Only detailed research and investigation can confirm bona fides. There are, however, some warning signs that
Interrogation should be looked for. Subjects who use or understand jargon they could not know unless they were "hep" should be trapped with more jargon, provocation, etc. Subjects who defend one or another aspect of Communist doctrine while disavowing Communist affiliations should always be viewed with suspicion. Subjects with a fund of "garage house lawyer" talk, like those who do not seem to be able to tell a straight story about anything, are often found to have had extensive criminal involvement. Subjects who get off on side issues in great detail but are brief on certain central matters are worried about the latter.

Pocket litter. Never forget to turn out all pockets, cuff linings, etc. and where possible conduct a full body search. Make sure the subject gets a chance to explain each item.

The interrogation plan. This should be made by the interrogator and approved by the supervisor. It should include deadlines. Never start without one.

Story building. As far as possible, the first interrogation should be conducted as if it were the last, with detail piled on detail. It is not a good idea to have different people give the subject "once over lightly" treatments. As he tells and re-tells his story he will develop it, plug loopholes, resolve contradictions, add corroborative detail, learn how to talk under questioning, etc., making the job of the detailed interrogator and the breaking of recalcitrance harder and harder. Some subjects even begin to believe their own lies.

Commanders should politely but firmly resist the efforts of visiting firemen to "get immediate information on a few important points" while the detailed interrogation is postponed. If there is need for haste on particular matters, as in order to get evidence for making arrests, this interrogation should be done, in detail, by the assigned interrogator. The visiting firemen can if need be sit (or better just listen) in, but it is a very bad error to let them take over unless political considerations have precedence. These smash-and-grab artists not only contaminate the subject by providing him with all sorts of information in their efforts to get immediate answers but also put him in the position of being able to say much later, when cornered: "Oh that, why I told the big man with the white mustache all about that—didn't he tell you?"

Recording hints. Full tape recordings are usually useless because they include too many preliminary and clarifying verbal exchanges
and other confused matter. Cut the recorder in while you summarize out loud, paragraph by paragraph, what the subject has just said, asking him to confirm or correct you. This greatly reduces volume and error and in effect gives you the first draft of your report.

Reporting hints. All interrogation reports, unless they have been fully verified by research, should be labeled "Unevaluated Information." They should distinguish carefully between what the subject has directly observed, what he has heard, and what he deduces, e.g., "Subject infers, because of so and so, that..." The interrogator's comment should always be carried in footnotes, never inserted in the body of the report. If the results of research and check-ups such as confirmatory name-traces are to be mentioned, they too should appear as footnotes. There should also be a statement informing the reader how much confirmatory research was done; otherwise a heavily annotated report will give the impression of having been fully researched although only aspects of a pivotal nature (or those interesting the interrogator) had been checked out.

Maps and plans. Beware of letting the subject have maps or building plans to work with until he has drawn what he can from memory. Nothing suits a fabricator better than to get a map thrust into his hands from which to give verisimilitude to his lies about installations, escape routes, etc. When the subject has produced his memory work the comparison with maps and plans will yield many interesting insights.

Questions on organization and functions. The rarest of birds is a man who really knows how his organization is set up and functions. It is well to be very careful in taking any subject's say-so, no matter how sincere and confident he is, on how his outfit works. The best safeguard is to do detailed biographical and job interrogations concerning all his colleagues; then do an organization and function interrogation; then examine whether the job descriptions of individuals confirm the organic picture.

Two-man teams. A prolific source is a heavy burden on a single interrogator. It is not extravagant but highly efficient to use two interrogators alternately on different topics, one questioning while the other is off writing up what he has gleaned, so that the subject is kept continuously occupied. This not only leaves no time for idling and brooding but introduces a measure of variety and competition into the interrogation process.
Operational officers as interrogators. Their use is often unavoidable, as in handling double agents. It is poor practice to use them for ordinary interrogations, both because it ties up specialized manpower and because no operational officer can be expected to buckle down to detailed interrogation work not directly affecting his own operation.

Interrogator training. Other things being equal, it is better to get people who are interrogators more or less by nature and inclination. The training really has to be done on the job. It is possible to lecture and give a dry-run, ground-school type of training, with each man interrogating a fellow student and being in turn interrogated (the latter aspect is often overlooked); but the best results and the quickest assessment of ultimate suitability are obtained by putting the man to work interrogating real but second-class subjects. Sometimes arrangements can be made to assign candidates to local security or police interrogation work for a few months.

CI background. No interrogator will be useful or productive unless he has had full CI operations training and experience and acquires an extensive and detailed knowledge of the organization, functions, personnel, tactics, methods, etc. of the Communist services against which he is to work.

Indigenous interrogators. As a rule, these will have a great deal of trouble winning the confidence of indigenous subjects, who generally distrust their countrymen's security and resent the imposition of a mere fellow countryman's will. If they have to be used, their original motivation should gradually be reinforced, as by inducing them to apply for U.S. citizenship and providing a career path that leads to attractive goals. One should make sure that they are soon moved on to other and better work, not left stuck in an interrogation rut.

The interrogator's attitude. The most important single attribute every successful interrogator appears to have is an inflexible determination to get the facts. Persons who quail at difficulties, look for fast and easy solutions, are lazy, have turned out to be misfits in other jobs, etc. should not be disposed of into the interrogation team. They will not only lower morale but be the cause of costly failures. When the recalcitrant subject meets with an interrogator who he senses is absolutely determined, his resistance is invariably weakened. And the subject soon perceives the caliber of the man who faces him.
Never forget that some day the subject may have an opportunity to tell his side of the story to the press or other public medium, friendly or hostile. He certainly will talk to individuals. What he should honestly be able to say about us is that we are tough but fair. If he decides to paint us in other colors falsely, he probably won't be convincing. In any case, let's not provide him with ammunition.