INTELLIGENCE HANDBOOK

THE DETERIORATION OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: 1956-1966

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence

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TOP SECRET
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FOREWORD

This handbook traces the Sino-Soviet dispute as it has developed during the past ten years. Individual sections of the handbook have been separately classified to enable the reader to use the material herein to fullest advantage.

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Comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence.
CONTENTS

FOREWORD 1

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. SELECTED CHRONOLOGY 4

III. LANDMARKS OF THE DISPUTE

1. The 20th CPSU Congress and Its Aftermath 12
2. The 1957 Moscow Conference 13
3. The Soviet Military Proposals of April 1958 14
4. The Chinese Communes and the "Great Leap Forward" 15
5. Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 16
6. The Peng Te-huai Affair 17
7. Sino-Indian Border Conflict 18
8. The Soviet Attempt to Reach Detente With the US, 1959 19
10. Withdrawal of Soviet Technicians 21
11. The November 1960 Moscow Conference 22
12. The 22nd CPSU Congress and the Break With Albania 23
13. Sino-Soviet Border Tensions 24
14. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Aftermath 25
15. Chinese Challenge to Soviet Far East Territories 26
16. The Chinese Spring 1963 Offensive 27
18. Khrushchev Attempts a "Resolute Rebuff," --1964 29
19. Sino-Soviet Conflict Continues Despite Ouster of Khrushchev and Chinese Visits to Moscow, Fall 1964 30
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>The Meeting of 19 Communist Parties in Moscow--Spring 1965</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Chinese Obstruction of &quot;Unity of Action&quot; on Vietnam</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Chinese Party Underscores Rift With Moscow, Early 1966</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ANNEX: The Soviet Cutback in Economic and Military Assistance to China</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

Relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China have deteriorated so far in the past ten years that we can say with validity that they are now engaged in their own "cold war." The two capitals no longer see eye-to-eye on how to conduct their campaign against the West, on how Communist parties in the free world should come to power, on domestic policies that those in power should effect, or even on what constitutes a true "Marxist-Leninist" party today.

Party, economic, military, and even state relations between them have dwindled to the smallest possible correct minimum. The validity of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty now is debatable. The 4,000-mile common frontier has again become a locus of trouble and conflict, as it was many times before 1949. The two countries can be regarded as heading two avowedly separate wings of the Communist movement, engaged in a head-on struggle for leadership of the entire movement.

The virulence of the present confrontation, the directness of the insults and accusations that have been hurled from each side, and the theological certainty of both disputants reflect dimensions of antagonism which are too extensive to be bridged. Because both regimes are headed by dedicated Communists, the dispute has been couched in doctrinal terms; each attempts to prove the heresy of the other by quoting from the scriptures of Marxism-Leninism.

This propensity for dialectics has led some observers to believe that the dispute was merely an "ideological" one, simply a matter of counting the number of angels—or devils—that would fit on the head of a pin. Nothing could be further from the truth. The dispute, fundamentally, is one of deep national antagonisms, a power clash of opposing national interests. This is recognized by both sides and has been expressed by their leaders in private in the past.

That the doctrinal argumentation has tended to obscure the existence of diametric differences over
basic policies and interests does not mean that the doctrinal or ideological issues are not themselves an important part of the dispute. Couching the dispute in doctrinal terms has enabled the Chinese to pretend to be more Communist than the Soviets, and at the same time to demand the right to lead the international Communist movement. The Chinese attempt, beginning openly about the middle of 1959, to gain at least an equal voice in the establishment of bloc policies so that they would support Chinese interests has led inevitably to a profound Chinese challenge of Soviet authority.

The struggle that ensued for the support of various Communist parties has resulted in the emergence of two centers of Communist truth and opened the way for a multiplicity of interpretations. This has exaggerated the problem that has haunted Soviet leaders ever since Stalin's death led to a loosening of the structure of the Soviet bloc and the Communist world. Soviet policy makers, and the Chinese as well, now are unable to impose their wills on unwilling satraps, or to manipulate them for their foreign political and economic policies without taking their interests into account.

The present rupture signifies that Communist ideology has not only failed to overcome nationalism within the bloc, but has indeed aggravated such sentiment. The USSR, of necessity places its own interests—which it defines as bloc interests—before those of China. Peking, believing that such Soviet behavior imperils China's ambitions, at home and abroad, insists in turn that only the Chinese interpretation of Leninist doctrine can save the Communist movement—and China's interests—from serious harm.

These basic positions seem unlikely to change under successor leaderships, as they did not change with the replacement of Khrushchev with new Soviet leaders. They involve a profound competition for authority. They will probably be intensified to the degree that China emerges as a great world power. For these reasons, the prospect is probably for increased levels of tension between these two states. They may remain nominal allies for some time, but even so this tension will almost certainly be reflected in increased opposition, more attempted
subversion of the other's supporters, and more regard for border defenses. There will consequently be a growing incompatibility between Soviet and Chinese interests accompanied by an accelerated emergence of two competing and hostile Communist world centers.

The history of the Sino-Soviet relationship over the past ten years is an extremely complex one, not easily summarized. By concentrating on decisive landmarks, however, this handbook attempts to present an account of the struggle as it developed from 1956 to 1966. A selected chronology attempts to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of the decisive events. An annex describes Sino-Soviet economic and military relations,
II. SELECTED CHRONOLOGY

1956

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>20th CPSU Congress—Khrushchev makes secret speech attacking Stalin, setting in motion Eastern European attempts to reduce Soviet control. The Chinese, for the first time, play a role in decisions that had once been only Moscow's to make. (1)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Chinese article implicitly corrects Soviet &quot;one-sided appraisal&quot; of Stalin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Togliatti article advocates &quot;polycentrism&quot; for Communist movement. CPSU Central Committee resolution responds to foreign CP criticism on Stalin issue, rebuking Togliatti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>During unrest in Eastern Europe, Gomulka is restored to power in Poland over Soviet opposition, with Chinese support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November</td>
<td>Liu Shao-chi [redacted] visit to Moscow. Hungarian Revolution breaks out and is crushed by Soviets, urged on by Chinese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-November</td>
<td>Soviet Government statement promises correction of &quot;errors&quot; in intrabloc relations. Chinese Government applauds statement, criticizes &quot;big-power chauvinism.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Tito publicly criticizes Soviets over Hungary, demands &quot;democratization&quot; of bloc relations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Chinese politburo article rebukes Tito, defines limits of tolerable diversity.</td>
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*The numbered items are 25 landmarks of the dispute which are treated in detail in Part III.
1957

January  Chou En-lai visits Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest, warns Gomulka and Kadar not to press autonomy further.

February  Mao Tse-tung gives secret speech urging use of "persuasion" rather than "repression" in handling popular grievances.

May  "Hundred Flowers" period at peak in China, criticism invited by regime. Mao stunned by public outcry against Chinese Communists.

June  "Hundred Flowers" criticism is abruptly halted by regime; savage retribution against all critics of regime.

October  Sino-Soviet secret agreement on "assistance to defense technology" is signed.

November  Conference of Communist movement is held in Moscow. Mao publicly endorses Soviet as bloc leaders, privately presses Soviets for harder bloc foreign policy line.(2)

1958

January-May  Series of high-level Chinese party gatherings map out radical turn in Chinese domestic policies.

April-May  Chinese reject secret Soviet military proposals designed to put rein on Peking. Mao makes secret speech belittling value of Soviet military assistance. (3)

July-August  In Khrushchev-Mao talks in Peking, Khrushchev objects to Chinese plans for communes.
August Chinese communes are formally unveiled. Peking implies it has found a shortcut to full Communism ahead of the USSR. (4)

August-September In Taiwan Straits crisis, Chinese find Soviet support to be too little and too late. (5)

1959

January Mikoyan makes exploratory visit to United States.

January-February At 21st CPSU Congress, Khrushchev makes indirect attack on principles of Chinese commune system. The CPSU declares that war can be eliminated while capitalism remains.

March-April For first time, CCP, in private talks with visiting Communist leaders, challenges Soviet authority to lead world movement.

April Tibetans revolt against Chinese rule. Chinese press attacks India for aid given to Dalai Lama, Soviet press does not.

June Soviets refuse to give "sample atomic bomb" to Peking, thereby "tearing up" October 1957 military aid agreement.

Spring-Summer Defense Minister Peng Te-huai returns from visit to Moscow, challenges Mao's economic and military policies with Soviet encouragement and is purged. (6)

August-September Sino-Indian border clashes begin. USSR adopts unprecedented posture of public neutrality, infuriating Chinese. (7)
Fall

Khrushchev visits United States, and Soviet propaganda takes very soft line toward US. Chinese begin indirect criticism of Soviet detente line. (8)

September-October

Khrushchev visits Peking after touring US. Heated arguments in these final Khrushchev-Mao talks. Subsequent Soviet indirect attacks on Mao.

1960

February

Chinese observer at Warsaw Pact meeting voices strong opposition to Soviet disarmament and detente policies.

Spring

Chinese launch massive press attack on Soviet line. After Powers' U-2 flight, Mao refuses secret invitation to visit Moscow, and Khrushchev retreats from detente line by torpedoing summit conference with Western leaders. Chinese lobby against Soviets at WFTU meeting in Peking. Soviets organize unsuccessful counterattack at Communist gathering at Bucharest. (9)

Summer

Soviets abruptly pull thousands of aid technicians out of China and break off aid to unfinished industrial contracts, greatly worsening Chinese economic problems, and delaying Peking's advanced weapons program. (10)

Summer

Sino-Soviet border incidents bring exchange of Foreign Ministry protests. Soviet plot to overthrow pro-Peking Albanian leadership fails. Soviets and Chinese send secret letters throughout world Communist movement attacking each other.

October-November

World Communist movement holds another conference in Moscow. Soviets fail in all-out effort to force Chinese to acknowledge CPSU authority. (11)
1961

Spring Soviets end economic aid to Albania, withdraw Soviet naval units from Albania.

Fall 22nd CPSU Congress hears first direct public Soviet attacks on Albania; Chou En-lai walks out of Congress and goes home early after public and private arguments with Khrushchev. Soviet-Albanian state relations ruptured. (12)

Fall-Winter Soviets campaign to get world Communist movement to attack Albania and China.

1962

January-March Soviets stage extensive military maneuvers near Vladivostok simulating repulse of attack by "aggressors" from Chinese territory.

Spring Public polemics are temporarily dampened. Moscow and Peking spar in secret correspondence over terms for convening new world Communist meeting.

Spring Unrest in Sinkiang among minority peoples, allegedly encouraged by Soviets, leads to mass flight into USSR. Central Asian borders are reinforced on both sides. Soviet consulates are thereafter closed by Chinese. (13)

September Secret report to Chinese 8th Central Committee plenum says Chinese are rightful leaders of Communist world.

Fall Cuban missile crisis coincides with Chinese invasion of India. Soviet backdown over Cuba brings violent Chinese attacks on Soviet "Munich." Soviets organize counterattacks on Peking at East European party congresses. (14)

1963

March Peking publicly challenges Soviet right to Far Eastern territories once belonging to China. (15)
Spring-Summer Chinese call on all Communists to revolt against Soviet "baton," and announce Chinese "general line" to replace Soviet "general line." Sino-Soviet party talks in Moscow fail. (16)

Summer Soviets accept partial test ban with US on terms previously rejected. Moscow uses Chinese rejection of test ban in propaganda campaign to attempt to isolate Peking. Vituperative polemics on both sides hit all-time high. (17)

September Train carrying Chinese nationals home from USSR with anti-CPSU propaganda is halted by Soviet troops; Chinese, forced from train, urinate all over Soviet railroad station. Foreign Ministries exchange protests over incident.

September

Fall-Winter Soviet drive to convene world Communist conference without Chinese is stalled by opposition of some parties in Soviet camp. CPSU temporarily mutes polemics, Chinese do not.

1964

April Soviets resume polemics with publication of Suslov Central Committee report attacking Mao's cult, calling Chinese Trotskyites.

Spring-Summer Khrushchev opens all-out new campaign for world Communist meeting to isolate Chinese and bolster CPSU authority, despite Chinese refusal to attend and continued opposition in Soviet camp. (18)

Fall Khrushchev is ousted from CPSU leadership. New Soviet leaders hold talks with Chou En-lai, but offer for the record to renew economic assistance but refuse to promise disavowal of all old Soviet policies and a public apology. After initial hiatus, Chinese resume attacks on CPSU. (19)
Fall
Chinese explode first nuclear device. Soviets strengthen forces on Sino-Soviet border.

1965

February
Kosygin visits North Vietnam and North Korea, reflecting decision of new Soviet leaders to seek expansion of Soviet influence at Chinese expense in Asia and among radical anti-US wing of Communist movement generally. (20)

February
Mao and Kosygin talk in Peking. Mao sarcastically rejects Soviet request for end of Chinese attacks on CPSU, says polemic will go on for 10,000 years. (21)

March
Preliminary Communist meeting--planned by Khrushchev to prepare world conference--held in Moscow without Chinese or their followers. Soviets forced to put off world meeting indefinitely, but Chinese violently attack March meeting anyway. (22)

March

Spring
Chinese obstruct and delay transit through China of Soviet air defense aid to North Vietnam. Chinese reject Soviet private call for "unity of action" over Vietnam, despite Hanoi's sympathy for idea. (23)

September
India and Pakistan fight over Kashmir. Chinese issue ultimatum to India, then back down. Soviets send secret letter to Peking supporting India, warning Chinese of danger of US involvement. Later, Soviets sponsor India-Pakistan talks at Tashkent, attacked by Chinese.
October  Abortive coup in Indonesia leads to major
Chinese foreign policy disaster, decimation
of Indonesian Communist Party, largest pro-
Chinese party outside of the bloc. Soviets
privately denounce Peking as instigator of
foolish coup attempt.

November  Chinese publicly call for organizational
split in Communist movement.

Fall-
Winter  Soviets exploit bloc meeting's proposal for
coordination of aid to North Vietnam, which
Chinese oppose. Chinese openly dare Soviets
to ship military aid to Vietnam by sea, de-
mand creation of crisis in Europe to help
Hanoi.

1966

January-
February  Soviet letter denouncing Chinese disseminated
to CPSU and throughout world Communist move-
ment, and details of letter are leaked to
Western press. Moscow accuses Peking of seek-
ing to provoke Soviet-US war.

January  In secret letter to Moscow, Chinese mock
Sino-Soviet military alliance, term Soviets
"negative factor" in any Sino-US war. (24)

January  Shelepin visits Hanoi, obtains public North
Vietnamese promise to attend 23rd CPSU Con-
gress.

March-
April  Chinese publish refusal to attend CPSU Con-
gress. Only a handful of parties follow
Chinese example. Soviets score important
victory as North Korea and North Vietnam at-
tend CPSU Congress, endorse Soviet "unity
of action" line. (25)

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III. LANDMARKS OF THE DISPUTE

1. The 20th CPSU Congress and Its Aftermath

In 1956, the Chinese Communists for the first time took a policy disagreement with Moscow into the public arena to assert a role for themselves as arbiter of intrabloc relations. The Chinese were affronted by the violent attack on Stalin made by the 20th CPSU Congress and by the fact that they had not been consulted in advance. Above all, Mao saw the Soviet assaults on Stalin’s "cult of the personality" as an implicit rebuke to his own very similar cult. In April, the CCP published a major statement "correcting" the appraisal of Stalin and presenting a Marxist "explanation" of how Stalin’s "mistakes" had occurred and how similar mistakes could be prevented. A series of private protests over the manner of de-Stalinization were conveyed by Mao, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai in conversations with Soviet leaders in Moscow and Peking in late 1956 and early 1957.

When de-Stalinization helped to produce a crisis in Moscow’s relations with Eastern Europe in the fall of 1956, the Chinese intervened, first to make matters worse for the CPSU, and then to help reassemble the pieces for the Soviets. There is good evidence that the Chinese party encouraged the Poles to assert their autonomy in October, and the Chinese have claimed that they warned Khrushchev against using force against the new Gomulka regime. When the Hungarian Revolution broke out, however, Liu Shao-chi secretly went to Moscow, and there—according to the Chinese—urged the Soviets to use force to prevent Nagy from taking Hungary out of the Communist bloc. Thus Peking intervened to influence decisions which had previously been Moscow’s alone.

Subsequently, alarmed by what had happened in Hungary, Mao stopped encouraging the expansion of autonomy in Eastern Europe. In January 1957 he sent Chou En-lai to Warsaw, Budapest, and Moscow to warn Gomulka and Kadar to respect the USSR’s position as head of the bloc, and to warn the Soviets against repeating the error of "great power chauvinism." (Map) Although this helped stabilize the Soviet position in Eastern Europe for the time being, the Soviets continued to resent the effrontery of the Chinese in presuming to define the relationship between the USSR and bloc countries. As the Chinese have said, the Soviets thereafter "nursed rancor" against them and regarded the CCP as their "biggest obstacle."

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-12-

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2. The 1957 Moscow Conference

In November 1957—less than a month after the signing of an agreement providing for Soviet assistance to China in the area of "new technology for national defense"—Mao came to Moscow to attend a meeting of the leaders of the world Communist movement. Perhaps in part payment for the agreement, he publicly acknowledged Soviet "leadership" of the bloc. This public concession was largely negated, however, by attacks on Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" strategy in "heated exchanges" during the private negotiations between the Chinese and Soviet delegations.

In a lengthy secret speech to the conference as a whole, Mao sought to demonstrate that there had been a decisive change in the East-West balance of forces which dictated a new forward strategy for the international Communist movement. Mao belittled the military and economic power of the West, and minimized the consequences of a nuclear war should one result from a new bloc offensive. The Chinese followed up with vigorous attempts to force the Soviets to correct "errors" in their draft of the final declaration to be published by the bloc parties attending the conference. The changes the Chinese compelled the Soviets to accept all testified to Peking's desire for a harsher bloc foreign policy line—particularly toward the United States—and for greater emphasis on the need for violence by nonbloc Communist parties.

The Sino-Soviet confrontation in November 1957—following on the heels of the Chinese intervention in Eastern Europe the year before—increased Soviet resentment at Mao's growing assertiveness in bloc policy determination. At the same time, the Soviets began to become alarmed at the adventurous tone of the policy the Chinese were pressing. This Soviet uneasiness over Mao's advocacy of a more aggressive and hazardous policy line probably played a large part in the Soviet decision in April 1958 to make major military proposals to Peking calculated to give the USSR greater control over Chinese actions. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. The Soviet Military Proposals of April 1958

In the spring of 1958, the Soviet Union presented Communist China with far-reaching proposals which the Chinese later publicly described as "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control." One of the Chinese leaders has declared that Moscow proposed that a long-range Soviet radar station be established on Chinese soil and that a joint Chinese-Soviet fleet be set up. This event, the Chinese have stated, marked the real turning point after which Sino-Soviet relations began a sharp decline. Khrushchev has confirmed that such Soviet proposals were made. Other clandestine reports, which lack complete confirmation, speak variously of Soviet proposals to establish a Soviet radio station and Soviet or joint Sino-Soviet submarine, air, and missile bases in China and--of special importance--to deploy and control nuclear weapons in China. All clandestine reports confirm the Chinese public statement that "these unjust demands" were "firmly rejected."

The USSR apparently made these proposals because of misgivings about some of the promises of assistance in military technology made or implied in the Sino-Soviet agreement of October 1957, particularly in view of the adventurous foreign policy statements made by Mao in Moscow the following month. Having rejected the April demands, the Chinese leadership began to count less on Soviet help. In May or June, Mao made an important speech to the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP in which he disparaged the importance of nuclear weapons and the value of Soviet military assistance. There is evidence that Khrushchev and Mao had a personal altercation about the April proposals when the two leaders met in Peking in August 1958.

The following year the Soviets refused what was evidently a specific Chinese demand pursuant to the October 1957 agreement for a "sample atomic bomb," and reportedly made--or renewed--an unacceptable proposal for a joint defense system in the Far East with Soviet control of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in China. The mutual suspicion and distrust evidenced by the events of April 1958 were to be greatly increased following the August 1959 fall of Defense Minister Peng Te-huai, who was apparently the leading Chinese advocate of acceptance of the Soviet proposals.
4. The Chinese Communes and the "Great Leap Forward"

A new area of friction between Moscow and Peking was created by the radical turn in Chinese domestic policy during 1958. The Chinese announced a "Great Leap Forward" intended to transform China into a major industrial power in a single decade. They pressed China's hundreds of millions of peasants into some 20,000 giant communes capable of organizing their labor in semi-militarized fashion. They deliberately turned away from the Soviet model of relatively cautious planning, investment, and emphasis on material incentives, and sought to achieve fantastic increases in industrial and agricultural production through maximum propaganda exhortation, intensive use of cheap labor, and native "innovations" such as backyard steel furnaces. These irrational policies produced havoc throughout the economy, and helped bring on a subsequent general economic decline.

Worst of all, from the Soviet point of view, the Chinese claimed in 1958 that the final achievement of full Communism in China was no longer far off, and thus implied that the Chinese would reach Communism before the Soviets. In these claims and the policies of the "Great Leap" as a whole, the CPSU saw a new and dangerous challenge to its leadership of the Communist world. As a Soviet comment stated in 1963, "things were depicted as though only they (the Chinese) were really engaged in Communist construction, leaving other countries behind," and the Chinese leaders tried to present their "totally unsound and harmful policy...as an objective law" and "as a prescription or recipe for other countries."

In his talks with Mao in early August 1958, Khrushchev personally protested these "innovations." Later, as deteriorating economic conditions in China forced the collapse of the "Great Leap" and the abandonment of the communes in all but name, Khrushchev repeatedly gibed at the Chinese with thinly veiled references to Communist leaders who had become "estranged from the masses," to disobedient "children" who had "burned their fingers," and to the foolishness of those who desired "pantless Communism." Since Khrushchev's fall, the new CPSU leaders in secret correspondence with other Communist parties have continued to attack Mao and his cronies for the mistakes of the "Great Leap" and the commune program. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
5. Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958

In the summer of 1958 the Chinese precipitated the Taiwan Straits crisis. "Liberate" Taiwan propaganda rose sharply and on 23 August a sustained bombardment of the offshore island of Quemoy began. It was a direct challenge to the US, and it risked counteraction which would bring the mutual assistance treaty with Moscow into play.

The Chinese intention seems to have been not so much to mount a major invasion of the offshore islands as to exercise political and psychological pressure on the Quemoy garrison and the Washington-Taipei alliance. To make its threat fully effective, Peking needed a firm, early, public, and high-level Soviet commitment of support. This it did not get until after the crisis had passed its peak, and even then Khrushchev pledged support only if the US directly attacked China.

Pravda during the critical first two weeks contained ambiguously worded pledges of support for China's "just struggle," but Moscow refused to commit itself to any specific military follow-up. In particular, it avoided assurances of support with nuclear weapons--undoubtedly the pledge Peking wanted most.

Meanwhile, the US 7th Fleet moved forces into the area in support of the Chinese Nationalists. Faced with lukewarm Soviet backing and this demonstration of American determination, Chou En-lai suddenly offered on 6 September to renew ambassadorial-level talks with the US. Chou's statement marked the turning point. The Chinese reduced pressure on the offshore islands and the prospect of an expanding conflict diminished.

It was not until after Chou's offer to negotiate that Khrushchev wrote President Eisenhower that a US attack on China would be regarded as an attack against the USSR. A second letter warned that an atomic attack on China would be rebuffed "by the same means."

Five years later, at the height of the polemical exchanges, the Chinese accused the Soviets--we think correctly--of perfidiously withholding a strong commitment until it could be given without risk. The deliberate course taken by Moscow in the Straits crisis indeed suggests that Soviet leaders were seriously concerned that they might be dragged into a nuclear conflict in pursuit of interests not shared with the Chinese. (CONFIDENTIAL)
6. The Peng Te-huai Affair

At the Lushan plenum of the Chinese Communist central committee in July and August 1959, Chinese Defense Minister Marshal Peng Te-huai, with Soviet encouragement, directly challenged Mao's leadership and policies, and was purged after a "violent confrontation" with Mao. Peng had returned to China in June after a six weeks' tour in the USSR and Eastern Europe. While in Moscow, he apparently had discussed with the Soviets his dissatisfaction with Mao's domestic and military policies, and he may have been warned of Soviet sanctions if the Chinese did not make further retreats in their "Great Leap Forward" and commune programs. Soon after Peng's return home, the Soviets formally refused a Chinese request for a "sample atomic bomb." The Chinese later claimed that by this action, the Soviets had "torn up" the October 1957 agreement on military assistance. Peng apparently used these Soviet pressures in arguing for a change of line in July.

At the central committee plenum, Peng circulated a memorandum attacking the "Great Leap Forward" and the communes and urging an "about face." Peng also evidently demanded that Mao make concessions on military policy in order to ensure continued Soviet military, technological, and economic assistance. There is evidence that the Soviet asking price for such assistance included—in addition to abandonment of the "Great Leap Forward"—acceptance of a joint defense system in the Far East featuring Soviet control over nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in China. Both Soviet and Chinese sources report that Peng pressed to have the CCP accept this demand.

Instead, Mao rallied his supporters, counterattacked, and defeated Peng. With the defense minister fell the army chief of staff and a number of other senior military figures. The events of the Lushan plenum constituted another decisive turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, and Mao and his party-machine supporters have not forgiven the Soviet attempt to undermine their authority at home by using other Chinese leaders on this occasion.

(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
7. Sino-Indian Border Conflict

The border dispute between China and India from the first skirmishing in 1959 to the outbreak of major hostilities in 1962 further inflamed Sino-Soviet differences. (Map) The Soviet refusal to stand beside Peking against bourgeois India was viewed as outright betrayal.

China and India had long pressed conflicting claims to hundreds of thousands of square miles along the remote frontier. In the fall of 1959 forward patrolling was stepped up and tension rose rapidly. Peking clearly hoped for at least tacit support from Moscow, but the Soviets on 9 September took a completely neutral stand, despite frantic, last-minute efforts by Peking to dissuade Moscow from any public announcement. The Soviets later accused the Chinese of deliberately timing their military action against India to embarrass Khrushchev on the eve of his trip to the US.

The Soviet premier's public statements did nothing to appease the Chinese. In November he described the Sino-Indian dispute as a "sad and stupid story" and hinted that he favored compromise. He disparaged the disputed area as uninhabited and practically valueless and drew attention to how amicably the USSR had settled its differences with Iran over similar barren territory. His obvious concern that Chinese military actions were jeopardizing Moscow's relations with New Delhi was another sore point with the Chinese.

In late 1962 the Chinese launched a brief full-scale military offensive at both ends of the frontier, but Moscow, much to Peking's rage, subsequently continued its extensive aid to India, sold transports and helicopters to be used in deployment of Indian forces, and talked of providing a MIG-fighter factory.

Tension again rose in September 1965 when, during the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir, Peking threatened military intervention and Moscow counseled Chinese caution. In the end Peking ignominously backed down, and the subsequent success of the Soviet mediation effort at Tashkent only added salt to China's wounds. (SECRET

-18-
Some time ago a prominent Western statesman declared that Khrushchev is afraid of war and that therefore he will not start it. In a conversation with Mr. Eisenhower, I asked him: What do you think? Is this statement correct or not?... He replied: I am a military man and frankly, I am very much afraid of war. You are quite right, I told him. Only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days.

Khrushchev speech in Vladivostok after visit to Peking, 8 October 1959

Should we be afraid if the war maniacs... unleash a war? Comrade Mao Tse-tung has given a Marxist-Leninist reply to this question... (1) we are against war; (2) we are not afraid of war.

Yu Chao-li article in Red Flag, 1 April 1960
8. The Soviet Attempt to Reach Detente
With the US, 1959

The year 1959 saw a markedly faster deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, in large part because of Soviet moves toward easing tensions with the United States. Moscow’s intention to make more vigorous efforts along this line was signaled by Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan’s exploratory visit to the United States in January. Khrushchev’s arrival in the United States and his meeting with President Eisenhower ensued in the fall, accompanied and followed by the softest line Soviet propaganda had taken toward the US since World War II—or has taken since.

All this was anathema to Peking, which considered the United States the principal obstacle to its ambitions in Asia and viewed the exertion of maximum Communist revolutionary pressure against the US in all parts of the world—and the creation of international tension—as essential to China’s national interests. When Khrushchev came to Peking to see Mao at the end of September, on the heels of his US trip, this final meeting between the two men was a stormy one. Khrushchev and Mao argued over the Sino-Indian border dispute, which had meanwhile broken out. Khrushchev also is said by the Chinese to have asked Mao to accept an independent status for Taiwan, and thus to remove it as a cause of crises with the United States. Mao vehemently refused, and the Chinese later said that their party “has not forgotten and will not forget this.” Moreover, the Soviet leader further outraged his hosts by warning them, in a public address on 30 September, against “testing by force the stability of the capitalist system.” After Khrushchev had gone home, Chinese propaganda began to voice disbelief in US peaceful intentions more and more vigorously. Six months later, Peking opened an all-out attack on Soviet policy. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Peaceful coexistence, while not retarding social changes in countries where these conditions are ripe, must at the same time ensure a situation in which internal processes in particular countries do not lead to military clashes of the two antipodal systems.

*International Affairs, Moscow, April 1960*

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No force on earth can hinder or restrain the people of the colonies and semicolonies from rising in revolution and smashing the yoke they are under. All revolutionary Marxist-Leninists should support these just struggles resolutely and without the slightest reservation... The Marxist-Leninists and the modern revisionists, starting from fundamentally different viewpoints, draw fundamentally different conclusions on this situation.

*Lu Ting-i speech, 22 April 1960*

As the Chinese saw it, Khrushchev's actions during 1959 had set a new record of error and betrayal: he had rebuffed them on the question of atomic military assistance, interfered in Chinese internal affairs against Mao, hobnobbed with the leaders of US "imperialism," suggested that Peking should renounce its claim to Taiwan, and upbraided the Chinese publicly for their domestic and foreign policies.

In April 1960, a month before a scheduled Soviet summit conference with Western leaders, the CCP unleashed a massive propaganda assault aimed at the policies--and implicitly, the authority--of the Soviet Communist Party. Central to the many indirect indictments of Khrushchev's policies published in the leading Chinese organs was the contention that the "peaceful coexistence" line as applied by the Soviets was discouraging revolutionaries throughout the world from staging violent uprisings. In effect, the Chinese were appealing to the interests of anti-US radicals and bloc leaders around the world both to diminish Soviet influence and to bring pressure on the USSR for a modification of Soviet policy.

Khrushchev's position was made more difficult by the Soviet presidium's decision to publicize the U-2 incident in early May, and shortly thereafter Khrushchev took a step back from his 1959 detente line by torpedoing the Paris summit meeting. At about the same time, Mao—who had just refused a secret Soviet invitation to come to Moscow for talks—publicly taunted Khrushchev over the U-2 incident.

In early June, the Chinese went a step further by using a meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking to lobby against the Soviets among both Communist and non-Communist delegates. The Soviets now began to counterattack. Late in June, they organized a "surprise assault" on the Chinese at closed sessions of a Romanian party congress in Bucharest, where secret CPSU documents attacking Peking were read and foreign Communist delegates were urged to demand that the Chinese yield to Soviet dictates. This attempt to cow the CCP was totally unsuccessful, and the Chinese and Soviet representatives at Bucharest finally agreed to put off a showdown until a general conference of the world Communist movement in the fall. (SECRET)
10. Withdrawal of Soviet Technicians

The core of China's industrialization program consisted of Soviet-designed plant facilities which Moscow had promised to build, and Peking's economic plans assumed continuing Soviet technical help. Thus in a very meaningful sense, the Soviet pullout in 1960 collapsed China's timetable for industrialization.

In the summer of 1960 Western observers in Peking reported that a large-scale withdrawal of Soviet personnel was under way, and it soon became apparent that Chinese authorities had had very little advance warning. Peking protested in vain. In justifying its move to Communists abroad, Moscow claimed the pullout was caused by Chinese attempts to indoctrinate technicians, by abuse of Soviet equipment, and by refusal to accept technical advice. The primary factor, however, was unquestionably Moscow's desire to force Peking to back down in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Some teaching personnel remained, but the withdrawal of industrial technicians was virtually complete. In recalling over 1,300 technical experts abruptly, Moscow showed no concern for making a smooth transfer of responsibilities to Chinese experts. The effect on China's industrial construction program was immediate and devastating.

A prime example of a major project that had to be abandoned is the San Min Gorge dam—a project as large as Hoover Dam. It was built between 1955 and 1959 under Soviet technical supervision. It was designed to be equipped with eight huge 150,000-kilowatt generators made in the USSR, but only one was ever delivered. This arrived just before the Soviet withdrawal and was later severely damaged when the Chinese attempted to install it themselves. The lake created by the dam is now rapidly silting up. One disgruntled Chinese Communist official has commented that the only solution is to blow the whole dam up.

In other areas such as modern weapons development the Chinese did not have to abandon projects completely but lost valuable headway. If the Soviet Union had not renounced its commitments, the Chinese by the early 1960s might have been capable of producing nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles such as jet bombers and guided-missile submarines. China is now not expected to achieve a significant nuclear weapons capability until 1970 or later. The Chinese aircraft industry, for example, was well established in 1960, but the Chinese had to suspend production of combat planes and when they finally resumed in late 1965 it was with the now obsolescent MIG-19 jet fighter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
In November 1960, the absolute majority of the fraternal parties rejected the incorrect views and concepts of the CCP leadership. The Chinese delegation at this meeting stubbornly upheld its own particular views and signed the statement only when the danger of its complete isolation became clear. It is now perfectly clear that in appending their signatures to the 1960 statement, the CCP leaders were only maneuvering. Shortly after the meeting they resumed the propaganda of their policy, using as their mouthpiece the leadership of the Albanian party.... Behind the back of our party they launched a campaign against the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government.

CPSU Open Letter of 14 July 1963

The leadership of the CPSU...relying on a so-called majority, endeavored to bring the delegations of the Chinese and other Marxist-Leninist parties to their knees and compel them to accept its revisionist views. However, the attempt by the leaders of the CPSU to impose things on others met with failure.... The outcome of the struggle at this meeting was that the revisionist line of the leadership of the CPSU was in the main repudiated and that the Marxist-Leninist line gained a great victory.... But the leaders of the CPSU...did not care two hoots about the document which was jointly agreed upon by the fraternal parties. The ink was scarcely dry on their signatures to the 1960 statement before they began wrecking it.

People's Daily - Red Flag joint editorial.

6 September 1963
11. The November 1960 Moscow Conference

The Soviets regarded the gathering of leaders of the world Communist movement in Moscow in November 1960 primarily as an opportunity to bring pressure on the Chinese, to show them how isolated they were in the world movement, and thus perhaps to induce them to abandon their challenge to Soviet policy. The Soviet leaders had hoped that the heavy economic sanctions applied in the summer would force the Chinese to accept this position. The Chinese regarded the meeting as an opportunity to disseminate their views before this unique audience and to demonstrate to the assembled leaders of 81 parties that Moscow's will could be successfully resisted. It was the Chinese who won.

When the conference opened, the Soviets started off--as they had at Bucharest--by distributing a lengthy new letter condemning Peking. During the weeks of debate that followed, the CPSU mustered its adherents and, in Peking's words, "engineered converging assaults on the CCP." Chinese party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping vehemently refused to yield to the pro-Soviet majority. In the end, an ambiguous document was produced and signed, embodying the mutually contradictory positions of the two parties on many issues. While the CPSU perhaps succeeded in getting more of its points included than did the Chinese, Moscow nevertheless suffered a major defeat on the central issue of authority by failing to establish the principle of "majority rule" in the international Communist movement. What is more, the Soviets also failed in efforts to obtain a condemnation of "factional activities" which would inhibit future Chinese opposition to Soviet policies. The Chinese later boasted that this was "an event of great historical significance" because it "changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of the errors of the CPSU leadership was tolerated and its word was final."

Although the signing of the conference statement was accompanied by public pledges of undying solidarity and mutual affection, privately neither Moscow nor Peking regarded the document as anything but a temporary makeshift. Nor did either intend to abandon the struggle for supremacy. Soon after the conference, in fact, Khrushchev renewed his attack on the Chinese position at what he evidently regarded as its weakest point--Albania, the chief CCP ally in Peking's battles with Moscow during 1960.

(SECRET)
12. The 22nd CPSU Congress and the Break With Albania

As early as the summer of 1960, the Soviet Union had begun to move against the Albanians, who had been the most ardent supporters of the Chinese at Bucharest in June 1960. In August, the Soviets incited certain Albanian military and political leaders to try to overthrow party leader Hoxha. This plot failed, and the pro-Soviet leaders were arrested. Soviet economic pressures followed, culminating in the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and the complete termination of Soviet economic aid in April 1961 and the withdrawal of Soviet naval units from Vlore in May (Map-Photo). An acrimonious exchange of secret messages was climax by a violent CPSU letter to the Albanian party in August 1961.

By October 1961, when the 22nd CPSU Congress opened, the Soviets were apparently determined to force the Albanian issue into the open, presumably hoping thereby to repair the damage done to their authority by the Chinese at the November 1960 Moscow conference. An unprecedented torrent of abuse was hurled publicly at the absent Albanians by CPSU spokesmen--most of all by Khrushchev, who went so far as to call explicitly for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership. The Soviet leaders at the same time renewed their attack on Stalin, in obvious contradiction to Chinese views.

The leader of the Chinese delegation, Premier Chou En-lai, responded by reproving Khrushchev publicly for his open attack on the Albanian party, by laying a wreath on Stalin's tomb, and by suddenly leaving for Peking before the congress ended. According to Chinese statements, Chou also "frankly criticized the errors of the CPSU leadership" in private talks with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.

Following the congress, the CPSU stepped up a campaign to mobilize the bulk of the world's Communist parties against the Albanians and Chinese. In December 1961, the Albanians provoked a mutual withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from Tirana and Moscow. Soviet-Albanian state, party, and military relations have been effectively ruptured ever since. (SECRET)
13. Sino-Soviet Border Tensions

As Sino-Soviet verbal mudslinging intensified in the early 1960s, both sides attempted to exploit their conflicting frontier claims and to strengthen border security. In early 1962, according to refugees, the Soviets began spreading reports among border tribesmen in Sinkiang that living conditions were better on the Soviet side and that there would be no Soviet restrictions on border crossing. Two separate major migrations appear to have resulted. About 6,000 border tribesmen crossed during April 1962 and more than 50,000 followed in May. Riots broke out when the Chinese belatedly acted to stop the flow. Peking promptly closed the two Soviet consulates in Sinkiang which had been centers of subversion. Soviet consulates elsewhere in China were shut down shortly thereafter.

The Chinese are clearly concerned over Soviet capabilities to foment unrest among ethnic minorities, and probably fear that tribesmen who crossed over to Soviet asylum may return on subversive missions. Chinese leaders on several occasions have explicitly accused the Soviets of subversion.

Since 1962 the Chinese have been steadily tightening border controls in the Sinkiang area. They have moved in "agricultural" troops--mostly ex-servicemen--to settle key stretches of the frontier, and in 1963 they began urging people in overpopulated areas of East China to resettle in Sinkiang. Native inhabitants have since been moved back about 20 miles from the border, creating the kind of cordon sanitaire that exists elsewhere between Communist and non-Communist states. In the Manchurian sector of the frontier, no large-scale incidents have been detected, but the Chinese have tightened security controls there, too, by establishing dozens of new border defense stations.

There is also evidence of Soviet concern over Chinese intentions along the 4,100-mile common frontier.
The present crisis is a crisis of US aggression against Cuba. It is also a crisis of carrying out an appeasement policy toward US aggression and a crisis of encouraging US imperialism to pursue ever more in- sitably its policies of aggression and war. But Premier Castro has said, "Cuba is not Austria; nor is it the southeastern part of Czechoslovakia, or the Congo." This is perfectly correct. But US imperialism is not satisfied with that and is determined to destroy the Cuban people. It is the same sort of imperialist aggression as that aimed at Czechoslovakia and Congo. Trying to cater to the absurd demands of the US aggressor at the expense of Cuban sovereignty only encourages this aggression. The attempt to play another Munich with the Cuban people is doomed to complete failure."

Kwangming Daily editorial, 5 November 1962

Just what do these people who call themselves Marxist-Leninists want? During the crisis around Cuba, they acted plainly as people provoking a conflict. They wanted the Soviet Union to clash with the United States. What would it mean for these two great world powers to clash? It would mean to unleash a world thermonuclear war. But these people did not, ever dream of such a conflict. It is interesting how they themselves would conduct themselves in such a war. I do not think that they would like to take part in it. They apparently would prefer to sit it out. But then the question arises: why do they really want the blood of the peoples of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the other socialist countries to be spilled?

Khrushchev Supreme Soviet speech, 12 December 1963
14. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Aftermath

The Chinese Communist Party made an extreme effort to use the Cuban missile crisis of late October 1962 to injure the Soviet position both in Cuba and throughout the world. Shortly before and during the crisis, the Soviets had made conciliatory gestures to Peking in the vain hope of buying Chinese forbearance. In mid-October talks with the Chinese ambassador, Khrushchev asked that Mao forget the past and "start our relations with a clear page." On 25 October, Pravda carried an editorial on the Sino-Indian hostilities which for the first and last time in the years of Sino-Indian border conflict leaned toward Peking. When these acts of appeasement proved useless, the Soviets quickly edged back to public neutrality on the Sino-Indian issue, and began to prepare a thorough-going counterattack against Peking's campaign of denunciation.

Once Khrushchev had backed down in the Cuban crisis, the Chinese released a torrent of vituperative editorials, broadcasts, speeches, and diplomatic notes to Cuba condemning the Soviet "Munich." The Chinese did their best to complicate Mikoyan's post-crisis discussions with Castro by denouncing Khrushchev's agreement to allow inspection of the missile sites and to remove the IL-28 bombers as infringements of Cuban sovereignty. This was done both in the press and in private conversations with Cuban diplomats in Peking and in other posts around the world.

The Soviets responded with a campaign organized in November and the first week of December at four successive party congresses of Moscow's European followers. Each of these gatherings saw a mounting number of the CPSU's foreign adherents dragooned into joining a chorus of denunciation first against the Albanians and later against the Chinese as well. The climax came on 12 December, when Khrushchev delivered an angry speech before the USSR Supreme Soviet impugning Chinese motives and policies. Soon thereafter, the Chinese at last made their challenge to Soviet authority over the world Communist movement public and official. (TOP SECRET Dissem)
Based on a Chinese Communist textbook, "A Brief History of Modern China", published in Peking in 1954
15. Chinese Challenge to Soviet Far East Territories

Defending Soviet conduct during the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev in a speech in December 1962 remarked on China's continued toleration of the "colonialist outhouses" of Hong Kong and Macao. This prompted bitter Chinese editorial reaction. In March 1963, Peking pointedly raised the issue of Russian imperialist aggression against China and listed Tsarist Russia among the "colonial powers" that had annexed territory by compelling Chinese governments to sign "unequal treaties." The Chinese cited three 19th century treaties under which Russia acquired vast territories in Central and East Asia, and asserted that Peking reserved the right to raise the issue of "unequal treaties" at some time "when conditions are ripe." (MAP)

The USSR answered in September 1963 by attacking those who agitate for "revision of historically developed frontiers" and warning against the "artificial creation" of territorial problems.

A year later Mao himself raised the question in an interview with a visiting Japanese delegation. After endorsing return of the southern Kurile Islands to Japan, he accused the USSR of extensive land-grabbing in both Eastern Europe and Asia. This was China's first public support for Japan on the Kurile Islands issue, which had been a major stumbling block to a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty, and Mao's remarks sparked a heated Soviet denunciation of Chinese expansionist aspirations. Pravda in early September accused Peking of claiming more than a half million square miles of Soviet territory, and called this clear evidence of "how far the Chinese leaders have gone in their 'cold war' against the Soviet Union."

The intensity of the polemical invective made it clear that nothing had come of the Sino-Soviet border talks which had begun in Peking in February 1964. From the start there had been reports of Chinese intransigence, and the Soviet ambassador in Peking claimed that the Chinese were insisting on a written acknowledgement that the existing border resulted from unequal treaties imposed by Tsarist Russia.

One of the most recent Soviet letters to foreign parties confirms that the bilateral talks collapsed amid bitter wrangling, and contains Soviet charges that China's negotiators went so far as to warn that Peking would consider "other ways" of settling the territorial question. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
East and West in Moscow, July 1963

Teng Hsiao-ping, Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Secretary General (R), receives chilly reception from Soviet Communist Party Presidium member Mikhail Suslov as he arrives in Moscow for “comradely” talks in July 1963.

Soviet leader Khrushchev warmly greets Western negotiators Averell Harriman (L) and Lord Hailsham (R) at the beginning of three power nuclear arms talks in Moscow in July 1963.
16. The Chinese Spring 1963 Offensive

Beginning in mid-December 1962, the Chinese party at last made explicit its past grievances and present ambitions. Peking now openly called on all Communists to revolt against the "baton" of the CPSU, and derided the Soviets' "temporary majority" in the world Communist movement. It publicly challenged Moscow to convene a meeting of the world movement, apparently expecting to profit at Soviet expense as it had in November 1960. (Later, when Khrushchev tried to turn this to his advantage by seeking to convene a world meeting which would condemn the Chinese, Peking reversed its position, and has since refused to take part in any world Communist gathering.) The Chinese at last attacked, by name, the CPSU and its leading adherents in the West as betrayers of revolution, and repeated over and over that the real focus of revolutionary struggle was in the underdeveloped world and that the real leader of this struggle was the CCP. The Soviets replied—with some justice—that the Chinese were seeking to divide the revolutionary movement along geographical and racial lines.

The high point of the Chinese 1963 offensive came on June 14—three weeks before the scheduled opening of Sino-Soviet bilateral talks in Moscow—when Peking published its first explicit attack on Soviet domestic policies and threatened to split every Communist party whose leadership continued to support Moscow. The Chinese also promised to anoint as honorary "Marxist-Leninists" all revolutionaries outside the Communist movement who would carry their banner.

The CPSU responded forcefully. The Chinese officials who had distributed the offensive document in the Soviet Union were formally expelled, and the CPSU published its answer in an "Open Letter" of mid-July. Meanwhile, a high-level Chinese party delegation had arrived in Moscow for scheduled bilateral talks with the Soviet party. After each side had privately reiterated its implacable opposition to the other's views and actions, the talks petered out, and the Chinese eventually went home. In contrast to the icy reception given the Chinese leaders in Moscow, a US delegation led by Under Secretary Harriman—which arrived simultaneously to negotiate the future partial test-ban agreement—was greeted with ostentatious warmth by Khrushchev. *(CONFIDENTIAL)*
In late July 1963, Khrushchev, in the face of China's open defiance, signed the nuclear test ban agreement and proceeded to exploit the issue as a convenient and effective weapon to isolate and discredit Peking. He portrayed the agreement as a success for his policies toward the West and played on fears of Peking's nuclear ambitions in a new campaign to undercut China's pretensions to leadership of the world Communist movement.

China countered with a stepped-up volley of increasingly violent polemical attacks. Mutual recriminations multiplied, culminating with an official government statement in mid-September which presented a scathing indictment of the attitudes and ambitions of the "wildmen" in Peking.

The Russian statement pointed to the "irresponsible stand" taken by the Chinese on the test ban treaty as an indication of their overriding compulsion to obtain nuclear weapons. The Russians quoted 1957 statements attributed to Mao himself to drive home the point that Peking was pushing the world toward nuclear war, after which--according to the Chinese--"half of mankind would remain alive anyway and would build an even more wonderful future." The Soviet statement even attributed to the Chinese leaders the view that "the more people perish, the better for the cause of the revolution."

Exaggerated and distorted as these Soviet charges were, they tended to highlight China's isolation and general disrepute on the key issues of war and peace. Largely dropping the ideological garment in which the conflict had previously been cloaked, Moscow was able to make the Chinese look more chauvinistic than ever before. The Russians painted an image of the Chinese party as one led by hard-boiled, fanatical, self-seeking nationalists.

Khrushchev then tried to administer the coup de grace by convening a multiparty meeting to condemn China. He was forced to back off, however, by foreign party reluctance to excommunicate the Chinese. In the fall of 1963, Moscow reverted to a posture of relative restraint, suspending its anti-Chinese propaganda and calling for a "chance to calm down" before carrying the struggle any further. (CONFIDENTIAL)
Apparently the leaders of the CPSU consider themselves the natural leaders, who can lord it over all the fraternal parties. According to their logic, their programs, resolutions, and statements are all infallible laws. Every remark and every word of Khrushchev's are imperial edicts, however, wrong or absurd they may be. All the fraternal parties must submissively hear and obey and are absolutely forbidden to criticize or oppose them. This is outright tyranny. It is the ideology of feudal autocrats, pure and simple.

However, we must tell the CPSU leaders that the international Communist movement is not some feudal clique....

People's Daily – Red Flag
Joint editorial, 4 February 1964

The Chinese leaders are now holding as an object of special pride their complete disdain of the international discipline of Communists.... The Chinese leaders are now creating many difficulties for the Communist parties /In capitalist countries /.... Such insulting epithets are applied to the well-tried leaders /of these parties/ as "faint-hearted mice," "parrots," "double-dealers," and so on.... The Chinese leaders are...trying to plant at the head of the working class movement in some countries all sorts of renegades, degenerates, and adventurers.... The CCP leadership...has openly chosen to knock together—as a counterbalance to the world Communist movement—a bloc of those who share its views, with its own platform, with group discipline, and with its center in Peking.

Suslov Report to 14 February 1964
CPSU Central Committee Plenum
18. Khrushchev Attempts a "Resolute Rebuff"--1964

The restrained, "statesmanlike" posture assumed by Khrushchev in late 1963 failed to check or appease Peking, and Moscow seemed to be losing ground before the abusive Chinese onslaught. At the turn of the year, as China's attacks increased in intensity, Khrushchev decided to fight fire with fire.

Angered by Peking's scornful characterization of the Russian leaders as "untrustworthy cowards" and the USSR as "a tin-pointed spear," Khrushchev attempted to implement the "most resolute rebuff" he had threatened earlier. In early April, after a five-month suspension of polemics, the Soviets launched a public counteroffensive stressing that the USSR and China "differ on all basic questions." Moscow took steps to gather maximum foreign support in an attempt to ensure that the rebuff would be a "collective" one.

From spring 1964 until his ouster in October, Khrushchev engaged in a tit-for-tat polemical exchange with China and tried to force other parties to join the Soviets in ostracizing Peking. Many prominent foreign Communists, however, were reluctant to endorse the organizational step proposed by Moscow--an international meeting of Communist parties to discredit and isolate China.

Khrushchev was so obsessed by a compulsion to quash the Chinese--who had begun to attack him by name--that he was essentially unmoved by the objections voiced by key parties such as the Italian, Polish, and Rumanian, and oblivious to the consequences of his strong-willed behavior. As a result, his self-defeating tactics evoked increasing consternation abroad and weakened Moscow's position in the movement. Khrushchev's flamboyant and compulsive style also met with some disapproval in the Kremlin, strengthened the hand of dissatisfied members of the top Soviet leadership, and contributed to his overthrow.

When the new leaders took over in October, they reverted to a restrained though firm public attitude toward China. They also chose the course of least resistance by deferring a controversial multiparty meeting to prepare a world conference which Khrushchev--despite the refusal of China and others to participate--had scheduled for December. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
19. Sino-Soviet Conflict Continues Despite Ouster Of Khrushchev and Chinese Visit To Moscow, Fall 1964

The Chinese, of course, took great delight in the overthrow of Khrushchev, but they were probably not overly optimistic that his successors would make any essential changes in Soviet policy. Although both sides adopted a wait-and-see attitude and refrained from polemics for a time, it was clear at the outset that neither had the slightest inclination toward compromise or concession on the substantive issues in dispute.

Private remarks by Soviet and Chinese officials reflected considerable skepticism over the possibility that Sino-Soviet relations could be appreciably improved, even with Khrushchev gone. At a Kremlin reception only days after his removal, the Chinese ambassador expressed Peking's continuing contempt when, with a gesture toward Soviet presidium members, he remarked that "they are all responsible" for difficulties with China.

The new Soviet leaders, however, displayed a cautious attitude with regard to the anti-Chinese meeting of Communist parties which Khrushchev had scheduled for December and which had become a cause celebre, the focus of Sino-Soviet tactical maneuvering. As the propaganda lull continued, Peking decided to send a top-level delegation headed by Premier Chou En-lai to Moscow to sound out the situation.

In private talks with the Soviets, the Chinese premier pressed them to repudiate Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West and abandon all plans for a multiparty rump meeting. Chou returned home empty-handed, however, and a week later the Chinese renewed their offensive, demanding total Soviet surrender as the price of any improvement in relations. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Beneath the "correct" and nonpolemical posture assumed by Khrushchev's successors emerged a basic decision to meet Peking's challenge and to disprove its allegations that Moscow is soft on "US imperialism." As a first step, the USSR launched a campaign to make inroads among the Asian parties which Peking considered within its exclusive sphere of influence.

The Russian leaders appeared convinced that the success of their new tactics against China depended in large measure on a vigorous assertion of Soviet support for North Vietnam--the only Communist state engaged in active, though indirect, hostilities with the leader of the imperialist camp. Accordingly, Moscow took the dramatic step of dispatching a high-powered delegation led by Premier Kosygin to Hanoi in early February. The Kosygin mission was a direct challenge to Chinese influence in North Vietnam and throughout the Communist movement.

The situation took a drastic, unanticipated turn when the Viet Cong attacked the US base at Pleiku and the US began bombing raids over North Vietnam. The Soviets nevertheless made clear their determination to honor their commitment to Hanoi's defense, despite the consequent deterioration in Soviet-US relations.

The Soviets have already supplied North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles, fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, and other military, economic, and diplomatic support. This aid has not, of course, prevented Chinese charges of Soviet treachery and cowardice. Nevertheless, Moscow probably deems its record to date, together with repeated expressions of "profound gratitude" from Hanoi, evidence enough to give a hollow ring to Peking's allegations. The bitterness of China's reaction was demonstrated by its efforts last spring to obstruct the passage of Russian aid to North Vietnam.

The post-Khrushchev approach improved Moscow's position not only with the North Vietnamese but also with North Korea. The North Koreans have taken a few steps back from Peking toward a position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Pyongyang's propaganda media no longer follow China's lead in condemning Moscow. The Soviets have even resumed certain military aid, apparently in return for the more forthcoming Korean attitude on intrabloc affairs. (TOP SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

-31-

TOP SECRET TRINE
21. Kosygin's Talks With Mao Reflect the Depth
Of Sino-Soviet Antagonism--February 1965

Soviet Premier Kosygin stopped over in Peking on
route home from Hanoi in February 1965 and talked with
Mao Tse-tung and other top Chinese leaders. Kosygin
professed to desire unity, but the Chinese dismissed the
idea out of hand. He then tried to get them at least
to halt their abusive polemics, but on all counts he ran
into a stone wall.

Actually, Kosygin's confrontation with Mao was an
educational--perhaps even traumatic--experience for the
new Soviet leaders. The encounter helps to explain the
unguarded remarks by Brezhnev
and Kosygin to the effect that "China is a bad place
today" and the oriental mind is indeed "inscrutable."

In answer to Kosygin's plea for an end to polemics,
Mao waxed poetic. "Open discussion causes no harm,"
he contended. "The sky will not fall, fish will not
stop swimming, women will continue to give birth. The
battle of pen and paper does not kill. I am in favor
of it, and it will continue for 10,000 years more."

The Russian premier claimed that, with Khrushchev
gone, "things have changed. We are meeting you half
way, fraternity." Summarily rejecting this approach,
Mao berated the Soviets once again for the policies
laid down at their 20th and 22nd party congresses, and
their "mistreatment" of Albania. Both Chou En-lai, and
Liu Shao-chi joined in this denunciation of Moscow.
The Chinese leaders demanded that the Soviets publicly
apologize for all their past "errors," and this Kosygin
indignantly rejected as "impossible."

Kosygin's stress on the need for Communist "cohesion"
against the "imperialists" elicited the response from
Mao that unity will be possible only "when they rise up
against one of us." He predicted a US attack within
ten years. Angered and perplexed, Kosygin abruptly took his
leave and returned to Moscow to report on the arrogance,
disdain, and "inscrutability" he encountered in the For-
bidden City. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE
ONLY)
22. The Meeting of 19 Communist Parties
In Moscow--Spring 1965

From the outset, Khrushchev's successors were faced with finding a way to retreat, at tolerable political cost, from the anti-Chinese preparatory conference Khrushchev had scheduled for December 1964. Although talks with Chou En-lai in Moscow in early November produced no agreement, the Soviets worked out an arrangement, in consultation with other parties, to postpone the meeting. In order to avoid granting Peking a complete tactical victory, Moscow--rather than canceling the gathering altogether--announced that it had been rescheduled for 1 March 1965.

The Russian leaders knew only too well that they would come under fire from many quarters on this issue, and were resolved not to repeat the mistakes of their heavy-handed predecessor. Accordingly, in early 1965, under pressure from several influential foreign parties, the Soviets downgraded the status of the 19-party meeting that took place from 1 to 5 March in Moscow.

Khrushchev had called for a formal session of a 26-party "editorial committee" to prepare an all-party conference, and had made it clear that plans would proceed whether or not the Chinese agreed to attend. His successors reduced the deferred project to a mere "consultative" gathering, and gave special stress to their ostensible hope that all invitees would participate. Nevertheless, as expected, the Chinese and six other invited parties boycotted the session, and the Italians, British, and others attended very reluctantly.

The March meeting was the scene of serious dissension over how best to meet the Chinese challenge. No consensus could be reached. The bland communiqué released after the meeting reflected its inconclusive results and, in particular, Moscow's retreat on the question of a world Communist conference.

Nevertheless, the Soviets still periodically pay lip service to the conference proposal. Evidently they feel they cannot afford to let it collapse completely. Moreover, Moscow seeks to exploit China's opposition to such a meeting in order to demonstrate that Peking is not at all interested in resolving interparty differences, and that it fears the views of the "vast majority" of parties. The Chinese, for their part, attacked the March meeting in characteristically scurrilous terms and repeated their demand that the USSR capitulate--and publicly apologize--on all major issues in dispute.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

-33-
ALTERNATE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY ROUTES TO NORTH VIETNAM

- Rail routes actually used
- Potential sea routes urged on Soviets by Chinese
23. Chinese Obstruction of "Unity of Action" on Vietnam

Throughout 1965, there were bitter and protracted negotiations among Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam over Soviet military aid shipments to the DRV. The Chinese sought—particularly that spring—to obstruct and delay the growth of a Soviet military presence in North Vietnam for fear Soviet political influence would follow. To this end, they refused a Soviet request in late February for an "air corridor" across China, and vetoed a massive Soviet airlift of military goods to the DRV.

About the same time, the Chinese vehemently rejected a Soviet request for air bases in South China, near the Vietnamese border, to be manned by Soviet personnel. The USSR apparently intended these bases to serve as assembly points for MIG fighters shipped by rail from the Soviet Union, but may also have wished to use them to permit Soviet pilots to give advanced training to DRV pilots over Chinese airspace. In denouncing this Soviet request as a demand for "military occupation," the CCP presumably recalled the Soviet military proposals it had rejected in April 1958.

In addition, rail shipment of Soviet air defense weapons across China was delayed for many weeks in the early spring of 1965 by an impasse in Sino-Soviet negotiations. In the fall, long after this problem had been solved, the Chinese used procedural excuses to obstruct other Soviet military rail shipment to North Vietnam for several months.

Finally, the Chinese repeatedly rejected Soviet proposals for a "joint statement" by Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi and a joint summit meeting of the three countries to coordinate aid to North Vietnam—despite North Vietnamese support for these proposals. In the fall, the Soviets further exploited Chinese obduracy by lobbying for a bloc conference on aid to the DRV, which the Chinese predictably also rejected. Peking has countered by challenging Moscow to ship its military aid to North Vietnam by sea, despite the risk of confrontation with the United States, and by demanding that the Soviets create a crisis in Europe to divert US energies. (MAP) The CPSU has responded by accusing the Chinese of seeking to provoke a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. (TOP SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The treaty of friendship and mutual assistance worked out by Mao and Stalin in 1950 no longer has real validity.

The secret Chinese letter of 7 January 1966 to the Soviet Union reinforced earlier evidence that Peking no longer expects Moscow to honor its treaty commitment. The letter --another wide-ranging polemical assault on the Soviet leadership--implied that Moscow has attempted to use the treaty as a lever to force Peking into line and added that the Chinese look on the Russians as a "negative factor" in the event the Vietnam war spreads to China.

Soviet apprehensions over Peking's recklessness appear to have increased rapidly in recent years. Moscow's lukewarm support during the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis sorely disappointed Peking, as did Khrushchev's advice, after his talks with President Eisenhower, to seek a "peaceful solution" which would result in accepting "two Chinas."

By the end of 1962 the Chinese were implying that the treaty was a worthless document and the following year they said so openly. In August 1963 a Chinese representative at a conference in Tokyo angrily rejected a claim by the Soviet delegate that Russian nuclear weapons provided a protective umbrella for Peking. He claimed the Chinese relied mainly on their own strength to discourage US attack. A senior Chinese official told [redacted] member at about the same time that the treaty could be considered a "dead letter."

In an interview with Egyptian newsmen last spring, Chou En-lai implied that the USSR might not come to China's assistance if the US attacked and claimed that Peking would prefer the Soviets to stand clear. Chou also told a Western diplomat last November that the USSR would not help Peking or even try to prevent a US attack. Foreign Minister Chen Yi had gone even further in September when--in an obvious attempt to blacken Moscow—he suggested that the Soviets might join the US and its allies if they attacked China.

The Soviets have been more cautious, but have warned publicly that Peking does not hold a blank check on Russian military support. In private they have circulated a document which charges that China is trying to provoke a war between the USSR and the US. This accusation may be intended to prepare the ground for disavowing any military obligation to China should the latter become embroiled in war with the US. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSENM.BACKGROUND USE ONLY)
How can there be "a common ideology" and a "common program" between the Marxist-Leninists and the Khrushchev revisionists? How can there be a common basis for unity? . . . The relation between Khrushchev revisionists and ourselves is certainly not one in which "what binds us together is much stronger than what divides us," as alleged by the new leaders of the CPSU. On all the fundamental issues of the present epoch the relation is one of sharp opposition; there are things that divide us and nothing that unites us, things that are antagonistic and nothing that is common.

People's Daily - Red Flag joint editorial
11 November 1965

A. How can the CCP, which you look upon as an enemy, be expected to attend your congress? . . .
Over the last ten years, we have made a series of efforts in the hope that you would return to the path of Marxism-Leninism. Since Khrushchev's downfall, we have advised the new leaders of the CPSU on a number of occasions to make a fresh start. We have done everything we could, but you have not shown the slightest repentance. Since coming to power, some new leaders of the CPSU have gone farther and farther down the road of revisionism, socialism and great-power chauvinism. . . . You tell us that there was not a shade of difference between Khrushchev and yourselves on the question of the international communist movement or of relations with China . . . Far from publicly retracting . . . you have intensified your activities against China by more insidious tactics . . . Since you have gone so far, the CCP . . . cannot send its delegation to attend this congress of yours.

CCP Letter to CPSU of 22 March 1966
replying to Soviet invitation
to 23rd CPSU Congress
25. Chinese Party Underscores Rift With Moscow, Early 1966

The USSR sent another high-level delegation to North Vietnam in early January 1966. This group was headed by a top Soviet troubleshooter—politburo member and party secretary Aleksandr Shelepin. As in the case of Kosygin's visit 11 months earlier, Moscow's paramount aim was to increase its influence in Hanoi at China's expense.

Initially it looked as though Shelepin had failed. His cautious efforts to persuade the North Vietnamese to give serious consideration to political alternatives to the war, and to disregard Chinese advice, were clearly unsuccessful. Nor could he obtain much in the way of support for Moscow's anti-Chinese line.

The only commitment he elicited was a North Vietnamese promise to send a delegation to the Soviet party congress in late March. This hardly seemed an earth-shattering gain but when contrasted with Peking's later arrogant rejection of the Soviet invitation it gained added resonance.

The Russians were delighted at the self-imposed exclusion of the Chinese, particularly since both North Vietnam and North Korea sent high-level delegates. These representatives pleased Moscow by their clear, if cautious, appeals for Communist unity, a tactical line Moscow has used to underscore China's isolation and intransigence.

Thanks to Peking's absence the Soviet leaders were able to conduct their congress without fear of disruption. Predictably, they assumed an above-the-battle attitude. More in sorrow than in anger, they pointed out that—through no fault of their own—relations with China "remain unsatisfactory."

The absence of the Chinese from the Soviet party congress was a measure of Peking's determination to steer a dogmatic, uncompromising course. China's aging leaders apparently felt compelled to demonstrate in this manner their scornful and total rejection of Soviet policies. Only the Albanian, Japanese, Indonesian, and New Zealander Communists joined China in boycotting the congress—the Japanese only after a good deal of pressure by the Chinese.

Explaining his party's rejection of the Russian invitation, the Japanese party chief declared that "the Japanese and Soviet Communist parties are, so to speak, in a state of diplomatic break." The same can be said of party relations between Moscow and Peking. (SECRET)
COMMUNIST CHINA: BALANCE OF TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

1950-65

MILLION US $

1,200
1,100
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0


CHINA'S IMPORTS

EXPORT SURPLUS

CHINA'S EXPORTS

*The sharp increase in Communist China's imports in 1965 reflects the transfer to China of joint stock companies and other Soviet-held assets.
I. Economic Assistance

The abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the abandonment of major aid projects in 1960 was a devastating blow to Peking. The Chinese economy has never fully recovered, and bitterness over the Soviet pullout has been an important factor in the deterioration in relations between Moscow and Peking.

The massive program of Soviet assistance was the key element in Communist China's rapid industrial and technological growth in the 1950s. During the decade the USSR provided more than $1 billion worth of machinery and equipment for complete industrial plants. At least 10,000 Soviet advisers and hundreds of tons of blueprints and technical information were sent to China. About 8,000 Chinese technicians and researchers went to the Soviet Union for training and an additional 7,000 Chinese pursued academic studies there.

Since 1960, China has sharply reduced its dependence on the Soviet Union and has paid off its debts to Moscow. In the past six years Sino-Soviet economic cooperation has declined drastically.

A. Trade and Aid

In 1959, when Sino-Soviet commercial relations were at their high point, the Soviet Union accounted for 50 percent of China's foreign trade. The USSR exported to China as much as it did to all free world underdeveloped countries combined. Half of all Soviet exports of machinery and nearly three out of every four complete plants sent abroad went to China.

In 1959 China rivaled East Germany as the USSR's principal trading partner, supplying twice as much to the Soviet Union as all free world...
underdeveloped countries together. China supplied a fifth of the Soviet Union's total imports, two thirds of its food imports, and three quarters of its textile imports. Soviet willingness to accept Chinese agricultural raw materials and large amounts of industrial consumer goods, especially textiles, helped China pay for the large-scale imports for industrialization. (GRAPH)

Communist China has acknowledged the receipt of long-term Soviet loans amounting to $1,404 million. Of this, the lion's share was probably used for military purposes. The share allocated to economic development--$430 million--has been small.

Since 1960, there have been major changes in the pattern of China's foreign trade. After the collapse of the "Leap Forward" and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in 1960, grain from the free world began to replace machinery and equipment from the Soviet bloc as China's chief import item. Since 1961 Communist China has been importing 5 to 6 million tons of Western grain each year at an annual cost of $300 to $400 million.

Sino-Soviet trade has declined each year since 1960, and in 1964 it dropped to a level of $450 million--only one quarter the level of 1959. Despite this reduction, however, China maintained a large export surplus to pay off its indebtedness ahead of schedule. 

B. Soviet Industrial Projects in China

The Soviet withdrawal crippled Communist China's program for rapid industrialization which depended on the Soviet commitment to assist in the building of 291 major industrial plants by 1967. The Soviet equipment for these plants was valued at $3.3 billion. By the end of 1959, $1.35 billion worth of equipment for these projects had been delivered and about 130 projects had been completed. With Soviet and Eastern European support, Communist China expanded production of heavy industry from 1952 to 1959 at an annual average rate of about 30 percent, a rate of growth impossible to achieve without the aid. This flow of equipment
and technical assistance had a vital effect on the quality of China's industrialization, enabling China to produce such prestige items as jet aircraft, submarines, large electric generating equipment, metal-cutting machine tools, tractors, trucks, and electronic equipment. (MAP)

When the Soviet technicians left, much work remained to be done on the important steel complexes of Pao-tou and Wu-han, and on construction of large hydroelectric stations on the Yellow River. Projects which never got beyond the planning stage included facilities for the production of chemicals (nitrogen fertilizer, plastics, and synthetic fibers), the development of a more balanced steel industry, additional support to defense industries (aircraft, shipbuilding, and ground armaments), and the provision of specialized machine tools and precision instruments.
II. Military Assistance

Communist China was determined to grow into a modern military power and Soviet military aid provided a good start along this path. Immediately following the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty in February 1950, Soviet advisers began arriving in China. China's entry into the Korean War later in 1950 greatly accelerated the flow of Soviet military hardware.

As the Chinese industrial and scientific base grew, the Soviet Union provided an increasing amount of industrial technology. This permitted the Chinese first to assemble and then to manufacture a broad array of Soviet military hardware, including tanks, interceptor aircraft, submarines, and electronic equipment. Similar Soviet assistance was provided to the Chinese nuclear and missile programs. Chinese scientists and technicians were trained to provide a base which could support native Chinese production of Soviet-designed weapons. (Map)

In mid-1960, however, the blow fell. The Soviet Union withdrew almost all the specialists participating in these military-related programs, the Soviet military mission was terminated, and the program of massive military assistance to China apparently also ended about this time.

A. Ground Forces Support

The Chinese Communist army of 1950 was essentially a mass of infantry men armed with rifles and a few automatic weapons, with only a minimum of artillery and an extremely haphazard logistical organization. There were about 1,710,000 troops, organized into about 210 ill-equipped infantry divisions, 3 artillery divisions, 3 understrength armored units, and other support units.

In 1955, a National Military Service and Conscription Law was promulgated and the conversion of what was largely a guerrilla-type ground force into a modern army began. At that time the army
had grown to 2,289,000 troops. The infantry was reorganized into 115 divisions, but these were stronger and better equipped. The number of artillery and armored units had increased significantly with the flow of Soviet artillery and tanks into the Korean conflict. By the end of 1958 when the first T-54 type tank rolled off the assembly line at Pao-tou, the Chinese Communists had about 2,600 T-34 and a small number of heavy JS tanks, sufficient to equip a little more than half the tank regiments. Although the Pao-tou tank plant is large and is capable of producing at least 500 tanks per year, there is good evidence that production has not reached this figure and may even have dwindled to 100 or less per year by 1963.

B. Aircraft

Apart from providing a large number of military aircraft, the Soviet Union had embarked on a program designed to give the Chinese a capability to manufacture certain types of aircraft. In July 1954 the Chinese produced their first native-built aircraft—a piston trainer. In July 1956 the first jet engine reportedly was produced. In September 1956 the first jet aircraft—a MIG-17/Presdo—was turned out at a "Soviet aid" plant at Shenyang. In 1957 the first AN-2/Colt light transport was produced in a Chinese plant at Nanchang. Assembly of MIG-19/Farmer jet aircraft at Shenyang began in 1960 but was suspended a few months later as a result of the Soviet withdrawal.

It is not clear whether Soviet deliveries of combat aircraft were completely discontinued after mid-1960. The 35 MIG-21/Fishbeds now in the Chinese air force were first detected in 1962 and apparently were received sometime after 1960. There can be no doubt, however, that the supply of spare parts was cut off, and that this was the reason for the decline in the IL-28 inventory from nearly 500 in 1960 to about 250 at present.
A reduction in numbers of MIG fighters and Soviet-made transport aircraft—attributable to a shortage of spare parts—has also occurred over this period.

C. Naval Support

From an almost nonexistent base in 1950, the Chinese Communists, with the support of the Soviet Union, proceeded to develop a naval shipbuilding industry. Under Soviet supervision Chinese yards built five distinct classes of naval vessels: medium-range submarines, destroyer escorts, subchasers, minesweepers, and motor torpedo boats. By 1959, the Chinese appeared to have assumed responsibility for the ship assembly aspect of these programs, the most important of which was the one for the W-class torpedo-attack submarine. When the Soviets withdrew their technicians and stopped shipping naval equipment to China, the industry was severely disrupted. Although 17 of the 24 W-class units that had been launched by 1960 had been completed, it took the Chinese three more years before they could finish the last seven units. Construction of two or three R-class submarines did not begin until 1962, and construction of one G-class submarine was not completed until 1965.

D. The Chinese Advanced Weapons Program

Soviet assistance to the Chinese advanced weapons program began in early 1955 and expanded rapidly in the following three years. Construction of the rail line that was to serve the missile test range at Shuangchengtzu was begun in mid-1956 and preparations for a nuclear test program apparently began in early 1957. The scope of these activities in the early years clearly indicated that Chinese military personnel were to have been trained in the operation of Soviet delivery systems.

Nevertheless, by the spring of 1958 strains in Sino-Soviet relations evidently prompted the Soviets to put forward explicit proposals for joint control of any Soviet weapons systems provided
to China. The dispute soon cut into the whole spec-
trum of Soviet aid to Peking's advanced weapons
program, causing the Soviets in mid-1959 to with-
hold from China even a sample atomic weapon and
the halting of construction of an important uranium
metals plant. By the time of the departure of the
Soviet technicians in mid-1960, the entire assist-
ance program in the advanced weapons field had
evidently been withdrawn.

In the atomic energy field, the Chinese
were able to overcome the Soviet withdrawal, but
still were unable to detonate their first nuclear
device until the fall of 1964. In the missile
field, on the other hand, available evidence in-
dicates that they have had more difficulty. Most
of the firings at Shuangchengtzu probably have
involved missiles left behind by the Soviets.
During the past few years, however, there have
been signs of the development of an indigenous
Chinese missile test program. (TOP SECRET...