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## THE CIA AND ACADEME

Ralph E. Cook

Close ties between the Central Intelligence Agency and American colleges and universities have existed since the birth of the Agency in 1947. The bonds between national intelligence and the academic world actually predate the Agency, for William J. Donovan, President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information, established a research team of distinguished academicians to assist him in 1941. Donovan proposed a novel idea: have the information that he was collecting, mostly from the military services and the Department of State, analyzed not only by the intelligence components within the War and Navy Departments but by his team of "scholars, economists, psychologists, technicians, and students of finance." To head his research group, Donovan chose James Phinney Baxter, president of Williams College and a noted specialist in American diplomatic history.

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Research and Analysis Branch of what became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) rapidly expanded. After Baxter's departure in 1942, William L. Langer, the distinguished historian from Harvard, took over direction of the branch and remained in that post until disestablishment of OSS in late 1945.

While many of the scholars who had participated in the analytic part of OSS returned to their campuses after the war, some remained with the government. Those who had been in the Research and Analysis Branch were transferred to the State Department. Then, as the Central Intelligence Group and, after 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency grew in size and responsibility, a number of academicians who had served with OSS returned as analysts in the new Office of Research and Evaluation.

During the great expansion of CIA following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Agency recruiters appeared in significant numbers on academic campuses across the nation. Also in 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence, General Walter Bedell Smith, called upon William Langer to return to Washington to organize the new Office of National Estimates (ONE). This office had seven board members, including four historians and an economist drawn from the ranks of academe,\* a combat commander, and a lawyer. One of the historians, Sherman Kent, succeeded Langer as Director of ONE in 1952 when Langer again returned to Harvard. At roughly the same time, the noted economist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Max Millikan, was brought to Washington to organize the economic intelligence effort in the newly created Office of Research and Reports.

\* The four historians were Sherman Kent, Ludwell Montague, De Forrest Van Slyck, and Raymond Sontag; the economist was Calvin Hoover.

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Meanwhile, as the Agency expanded, its recruiters turned to established figures in the academic world for leads and referrals to the best among their students.\* Many of the personnel already on board similarly informed their colleagues still on the university campuses of the need for and opportunities awaiting those who had the requisite background for work in the Agency.

As a large number of the members of OSS and the early recruits to CIA came from prestigious private schools in the Northeast and the Far West, with some representation from the large Midwestern universities, it is not surprising that a disproportionate number of the new recruits came from the same schools. Similarly, professors who had joined the Agency often turned to their former colleagues still on the campuses for consultation and assistance. This "old boy" system was quite productive in providing new employees in the professional ranks. Thus, there was an early linkage between the Agency and the Ivy League, or similar schools.

### A Souring in the Sixties

Relations between academe and the CIA were cordial throughout the 1950s. During much of that period the Cold War was at its height and the nation's need for the Agency and its activities were seldom questioned by faculty or students. There was no criticism worthy of note following the Agency's alleged involvement in Iran in 1953 or Guatemala the following year. The 1960s were to be different.

There was some criticism on campuses over CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs expedition in 1961 and the barrage of denunciation increased as the Agency, along with the rest of the government and the "establishment," found itself under intensified attack as the war in Vietnam continued. In part to mitigate this opposition, the Office of Personnel in 1962 established the Hundred Universities Program in which recruiters and senior officials of CIA made presentations before selected faculty members and placement officers in an effort to publicize CIA's role in national security and to emphasize the Agency's recurrent personnel needs.

Meanwhile, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, aware that the close ties that had bound Agency officials and analysts with their colleagues on the campuses were loosening, and concerned about developments in China (explosion of an atomic device in 1964 and the subsequent beginning of the Cultural Revolution), asked the Deputy Director for Intelligence in 1966 to take action to improve the Agency's expertise on China. The DDI created the office of Coordinator for Academic Relations (CAR), a part-time job for John Kerry King, a former professor at the University of Virginia who had been with the analytic part of the Agency for several years.

\* Beginning in 1951 and continuing for several years thereafter, the Agency tried, without much success, to establish a "University Associates Program"—a program of using professors at a selected list of 50 colleges and universities as consultant-contacts who would receive a nominal fee for spotting promising students, steering them into studies and activities of interest to the Agency, and eventually nominating them for recruitment.

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The DDI specifically charged the CAR with, *inter alia*, responsibility for exploiting the capabilities of the various China studies centers in the universities, devising means for attracting China specialists to work for the Agency, and developing and managing relations with academic consultants on China.

One of the nation's best China centers was at Harvard. It was logical that the Agency would seek help from that institution. Subsequently, several DDI analysts were enrolled in the graduate program at the Harvard East Asian Research Center. Unfortunately, by 1967 the local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society was aware of the participation of these analysts and a campaign against their presence on campus was launched. Attempts by Professor John K. Fairbank, director of the Center, to explain the difference between operations officers and analysts at CIA fell on deaf ears.

King also set about organizing a number of "China seminars" in Boston, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, in which a few noted China scholars engaged Agency experts in low-profile and informal discussions. King, during his four-year tenure as CAR, also initiated a program of passing unclassified reports prepared by the Agency to a select group of academicians in an attempt to gain comment on the reports and good will for the CIA.

Despite individual examples of continuing cooperation with the Agency, relations with academia as a whole continued to sour. The deterioration was given impetus in February 1967 by the disclosure in *Ramparts* magazine that the CIA had been funding the National Student Association for a number of years. Additional disclosures of Agency involvement with private voluntary organizations and foundations resulted in President Johnson's appointment of a three-person committee, chaired by Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, to review government activities that might "endanger the integrity and independence of the educational community."\* Following its investigations, the Katzenbach Committee recommended that federal agencies halt covert financial relationships with "any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." While the recommendation was never issued as an executive order or enacted as a statute, it was accepted by the President and led to major adjustments within the Agency.

Recruiters for the Agency, meanwhile, were experiencing increasing problems on college campuses. Many of the schools that had provided superior candidates in the past were now home for the most militant of students. Picketing of recruiters began in 1966, rapidly spread across the nation, and peaked in 1968 when 77 incidents or demonstrations occurred. Procedures were changed with interviews held off campus and, whenever it appeared that a visit might precipitate incidents, the visit was canceled. The Hundred Universities Program was suspended in 1968.

The Academic Coordinator, working on behalf of the analytic offices, continued to expand contacts with academicians wherever possible. By 1970, seminars on Soviet matters were added to those on China. By 1974, scholars on

\* The other two members were Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Cardiner and DCI Richard Helms.

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Cuba and most of the rest of the world had been added to the list of academicians with whom the CAR kept in touch. The CAR was promoting visits by academicians to CIA Headquarters to confer with those in the DDI having similar interests and he was assisting analysts and administrators in securing the participation of outside experts in Agency-sponsored conferences and seminars.\*

Sensational allegations of wrong doing by CIA and other components of the intelligence community, which erupted in the media in the early 1970s, led to congressional demands for investigations and the creation in 1974 of select committees in the House, under Representative Pike, and in the Senate, under Senator Church. (Two other groups also were formed to investigate intelligence activities—a Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission, and a commission appointed by President Ford and led by the Vice President, the Rockefeller Commission.) The various investigating bodies focused much of their attention on CIA's covert action, most of which had little to do with the Agency's relations with academia. There was some discussion, particularly in the Church Committee final report, which tended to lump relations with schools along with Agency relations with the media and religious organizations.

The final report of the Church Committee (the Pike Committee report was never formally released) interpreted "academic community" far more broadly than had the Katzenbach Committee. In particular, the former focused more heavily on individuals whereas the latter had concentrated on institutions. The Church Committee found that hundreds of academicians in over 100 colleges, universities, and related institutions had a covert relationship with the Agency providing leads and "making introductions for intelligence purposes." Others engaged in intelligence collection abroad, assisted in the writing of books and other propaganda materials, or collaborated in research and analysis.

While the Church Committee recognized that the CIA "must have unfettered access to the best advice and judgment our universities can produce," it recommended that that advice and judgment be openly sought. The committee concluded by placing the principal responsibility for altering the existing relationship between CIA and academe on the backs of the college administrators and other academic officials. "The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of . . . the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members. This report on the nature and extent of covert individual relationships with the CIA is intended to alert (the academic community) that there is a problem."

\* Harold Ford succeeded John Kerry King as CAR in 1970 and was followed in 1974 by Gary Foster. In late 1976, with the reorganization of the DDI as the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), relations with academics were coordinated by two professional staff employees working full time. [redacted] (b)(3)(c) [redacted] were the original incumbents and were followed by James King and [redacted]. In January 1981, the author became CAR as the post reverted to one-person status. In 1982, the CAR was transferred from the Office of the DDI to the Office of External Affairs under the DCI and in mid-1983 to the newly created Public Affairs Office.

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The report set off a flurry of activity within academic ranks and led to numerous articles in newspapers and periodicals. Among several letters addressed to DCI George Bush was one from William Van Alstyne, president of the American Association of University Professors, demanding that Bush give the same assurance against covert use of academics that he had earlier given to missionaries and journalists. The DCI replied that the Agency sought only "the voluntary and witting cooperation of individuals who can help the foreign policy processes of the United States." Where relationships are confidential, noted Bush, they are usually so at the request of the scholars rather than of the Agency. He refused to isolate the Agency from the "good counsel of the best scholars in our country."

Bush's argument was to be adopted and enlarged upon by his successor, Stansfield Turner, who engaged in a long and eventually unsuccessful effort to reach agreement with Derek Bok, president of Harvard University, on relations between that university and the Agency. Bok, acting on the Church Committee suggestion, appointed a committee to prepare guidelines to assist members of the Harvard community in dealing with the CIA. The guidelines were accepted by Bok and published in May 1977. It was immediately apparent that some of Harvard's concerns (unwitting employment of academics and use of scholars in preparing propaganda materials) were no longer at issue due to changes in Agency policy and issuance of Executive Order 11905 by President Ford. There were still two issues on which no meeting of the minds was possible. One of these had to do with what the guidelines termed "operational use" of faculty and staff by the CIA. The other concerned covert Agency recruitment of foreign students for intelligence purposes. Additionally, the guidelines specified that all faculty and staff "should" report any and all relations with the Agency to their deans, who should report them in turn to President Bok.

Attempts by the DCI to point out that these were exceptional cases of academics who might be employed by the Agency on a strictly confidential mission abroad because of their unique access to foreign individuals or information failed to change Bok's mind as did Turner's contention that the confidentiality of a relationship with an academic was frequently at the professor's, rather than the Agency's, request. Finally, Turner pointed out that the CIA's responsibility to provide secret foreign intelligence left the Agency with no alternative to engaging in the activities which Bok deplored, but Bok was assured that "the rein" would remain tight in such cases.

Publicity regarding the dispute over the Harvard guidelines allowed Morton Halperin and John Marks of the Center for National Security Studies to launch a campaign to have other colleges and universities adopt similar or more stringent restrictions on intelligence activities on campuses. While some ten academic institutions took action toward adoption of similar guidelines, in most cases modifications were included which limited the impact of any restriction on Agency operations. For the great majority of schools where the issue arose, the faculty and the administration rejected any guidelines, usually on the ground that existing regulations and practices were adequate to protect both the institution and the individual from corruption.

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**Scope of Current Cooperation**

Relations between the Agency and the academic world have slowly improved since 1977, more or less in inverse correlation to the state of East-West relations.\* The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in particular, opened new doors to cooperation with CIA on many campuses. The depressed state of the economy in recent years has also been cited as a catalyst for greater interest in Agency employment on the part of recent graduates as well as the cause of increased willingness to cooperate with CIA by those who sell their services as consultants or external research contractors.

A number of recognized authorities who could be of value to the Agency's research effort decline all attempts to gain their assistance. Most are political scientists, or in an allied social science, and many have expertise in the Third World. Many scholars on the developing nations of the world, aware that reports that they have collaborated with American intelligence could prejudice their research activities (including their sources), are reluctant even to come to Langley. Interestingly, some of these scholars are prepared to discuss substantive issues if an Agency analyst is willing to visit them in their homes or at their offices.

Specialists on the Soviet Union or other communist countries have traditionally been less reluctant to work with the intelligence community, presumably because they are believed to be in touch with the Agency anyway. Experts on Western Europe and other developed nations, in their willingness to cooperate with the Agency, fall somewhere between the general cooperativeness of the Sino-Soviet specialists and the reluctance of the Third World experts.

At present the Agency enjoys reasonably good relations with academe and gains much from its contacts with faculty and students. The Office of Training and Education uses a large number of academics in its courses. Other offices within the Directorate of Administration, specifically Logistics and Medical Services, have contracts with educational institutions or with individual academicians. This fall, 27 professors spent two and one-half days at Headquarters in the Conference on US Intelligence: the Organization and the Profession, conducted by the Center for the Study of Intelligence.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)(n)

The Foreign Resources Division has relationships with scores of individuals in US academic institutions. In all cases these links are voluntary and

\* Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University has written extensively on the CIA. He maintains that congressional attempts to restrict Agency activities are strongest and most likely to be implemented during periods of detente in East-West relations; conversely they are most unlikely to succeed in periods of increased tension. The charting of relations between the CIA and academe would appear likely to show a similar pattern of close ties during periods of heightened tension between the US and USSR and strained relations during periods of detente.

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witting. Many of the individuals also are contacts of the DCD. These American scholars do not "recruit" foreign students or researchers for the Agency, but assist by providing background information and occasionally by brokering introductions.

Many academicians are willing to provide expert assistance to Agency analysts and the research component (b)(1)

(b)(3)(n) Additionally, scores of other academicians were willing to consult on an ad hoc basis, some without reimbursement. Components within the National Intelligence Council and the Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology sponsored nearly 50 conferences during 1982 at which specialists from colleges, universities, or "think tanks" were present.

The DDI, the DDS&T, and the NIC also sought help from the academic world through contracts for external research, with the results usually presented as written reports. (b)(1)

(b)(3)(c)  
(b)(3)(n)

Since 1977, the Intelligence Directorate has also brought in (b)(3)(c) scholars, usually on sabbatical, to the Agency as contract employees to assist analysts through an exchange of ideas, a review of written reports, and the production of finished intelligence for dissemination to policy makers. In exchange, these "Scholars-in-Residence" are, for one or two years, privy to information that would never be available to them on campus.

The Supreme Court decision in the Snapp case in early 1980 had some dampening effect on the willingness of professors to work with the Agency. Some of them feared that if they signed the requisite secrecy agreement, their future independence to publish would be severely restricted. Another potential Scholar-in-Residence declined to take the polygraph test, describing it as "demeaning."

The Agency also provides numerous services for the academic community. Since 1972, unclassified CIA reports have been available to the public and have been widely sought by colleges, universities, and individual scholars. The FBIS —Daily Reports have long been standard items on the shelves of many university libraries.

Requests for unclassified briefings of students or faculty members at CIA Headquarters or on campuses normally receive a positive response. During 1982, 31 groups containing over 1,100 individuals were given briefings on intelligence or on some substantive topic at Headquarters. In the same year, at least 60 Agency officials spoke at various schools throughout the nation.

Fourteen college presidents were brought to Langley in 1982 to meet the Director and other senior officials and to be briefed on Agency activities. This program, which has generated considerable good will and understanding for the Agency, was begun in 1977 and has involved a total of 58 presidents from large and small schools throughout the nation, all of the schools important to the Agency as sources for recruitment of staff employees or consultants, or for other operational requirements.

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The Office of Personnel presently is active at approximately 300 schools. Several offices in the DDI and DDS&T also recruit directly from colleges and universities. Recently there has been a program, originating in the Directorate of Operations, sending special representatives onto campuses in an attempt to attract high-caliber career trainees.

The Graduate Studies Program, which began in 1967, provides summer internships for students who will be attending graduate school in the fall. Most of the 57 graduate students from 42 schools accepted in 1983 were attached to the Intelligence Directorate. A number of "alumni" of earlier Graduate Studies programs subsequently became staff employees.

For undergraduates, the Agency maintains a cooperative Student Trainee Program. The goal of this program today, as it was when it began in 1961, is to provide a long-range method of recruiting occupational skills which are in short supply. The program allows the student, who must be registered in a college with an established coop program, to gain practical work experience by alternating periods of study at school and work at the Agency. Originally, the program sought engineers exclusively but in recent years has added those who major in computer science, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and accounting.

The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity since 1969 has been recruiting at, and negotiating contracts with, minority schools. Faculty members and placement officers from traditionally black schools have been brought to Headquarters for briefing sessions.

Finally, the Agency has long sought to gain recognition for itself as a center for intellectual activity comparable to the best institutions in the academic world. The claim has often been made that CIA could staff a major university because of the diversity of disciplines represented among its employees. Graduate degrees earned by staff employees give some indication of the training acquired—over 600 Ph.Ds and more than 2,300 Masters' degrees.

To gain recognition for the Agency's employees among their counterparts in academe, overt employees have been encouraged to participate in meetings of academic and professional societies. Of the over 700 attendees in 1982, a significant number joined in panel discussions or presented unclassified research papers.

### Work for the Future

The wide ranging program described above puts the Agency on generally good terms with the academic community. There is, however, considerable work for the future if CIA is to continue to count on securing the best possible recruits for its staff employees and the participation of faculty members in improving its analytic product. One of the problems, a long-term trend in academic institutions toward ever decreasing numbers of students in area studies programs, is currently being examined by a joint committee made up of representatives from the universities, business, and the federal government, including CIA.

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There is also a continuing need to improve the Agency's image at many colleges and universities. While the number of demonstrations against CIA has drastically diminished over the past decade, there are still occasional minor incidents, as happened when CIA and NSA recruitment was protested at Middlebury College last winter.

Some recent Agency activities, including expanded recruitment efforts by substantive intelligence officers on the campuses, increased numbers of CIA participants at academic conventions and conferences, and a growing use of external research contracts with non-annuitants, are all valuable tools in breaking down barriers and increasing confidence between the Agency and the academics.

One promising recent activity involves visits to selected college campuses by intelligence officers who are seeking to locate, or create, a body of faculty members favorably disposed toward the Agency. This is accomplished principally through conversations with faculty members and by briefings, when requested, to classes or to faculty groups. These friendly contacts in the ranks of academe can be of inestimable value. The goals are to have professors remind their best students that CIA is a potential employer, to correct erroneous accusations on campus against the Agency, and, perhaps, to identify other faculty members who might be willing to attend conferences or participate in substantive consultations at Langley.

There is some danger from an uncoordinated rapid expansion of recruitment trips by the many Agency components now engaged in the effort. Unless oversight of the campaign is centralized, it could result in several Agency representatives appearing on a campus in rapid succession or even concurrently. This "overexposure" could have negative repercussions; specifically, irritation on the part of Agency friends and consternation among others—both faculty and students. All recruitment visits to academic institutions should be cleared in advance at some point within the Agency—possibly within the Office of Personnel, possibly at the Academic Coordinator's office.

The opportunity exists, of course, for any overt employee attending an academic convention or symposium to assist in furthering good relations for the Agency. Understandably, many academicians are most impressed by the participation of Agency employees on panels. Beyond that, any Agency officer attending a professional meeting can gain good will for CIA by being friendly and, within the limitations of security, informative about the Agency. Most academicians are curious about CIA and grateful for any clarification of its mission and its activities.

The occasional vigorous criticism of the Agency from faculty members or students tends to focus on covert action. While some critics will not be satisfied by any argument, others can be reconciled to the need for covert action through a dispassionate explanation of its synergistic role with other more conventional means of conducting international relations and a reminder of the oversight function of the Congress.

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From the author's own experience with a number of college groups briefed at Headquarters over the last few years, it is obvious that there is a vital need to correct misconceptions held by a large percentage of students and also by some faculty members. Illustrative of this point were the comments on a short written quiz given by an Agency briefing officer *prior* to her presentation before a student group. To the question, what is your reaction and that of your classmates on campus to the words "Central Intelligence Agency?" the recurring response was "fear."

Yet, when the briefings are over there are often voluntary expressions of support for the Agency, inquiries regarding careers, and, from the faculty, offers to meet with DCD or to serve as Agency consultants. If the students and their teachers are made aware of the truly symbiotic relationship between the academic and intelligence worlds, there is little question but that the great majority will support the continuing efforts of what Ray Cline terms this "peculiarly American combination of spies and scholars, working in tandem."

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