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*noted by DCE*

13 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Rusk in his office Saturday, September 12th - 10:00 to 11:30 a. m.

1. I told Rusk of my increasing concern over the evidences of dynamic military effort on the part of the Soviets, the appearance of more single silos, the continuation of the testing of new and larger missiles, evidences that they are engaged in an extensive radar development which may mean ABM deployment or an anti-satellite effort -- we could not tell, continuing improvement of their nuclear submarine program, etc. I said that I was so concerned about all of this that I felt immediately upon the completion of 11-8 and 11-3 that the President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and I must sit down and review those estimates and concern ourselves with the consequences. I said that it was apparent to me that the Soviets were saying one thing in Geneva and publicly and doing quite another thing privately, from the standpoint of the arms race. Rusk agreed and said the meeting was necessary. He hoped that the issue might not get into public print prior to the election.

2. Reviewed the reasons for flying a U-2 [redacted] Rusk is opposed to this and will oppose it with the President. His position is that the political consequences of the loss of a plane outweigh the advantages of the intelligence gained. I said it was not possible for me to do anything but advance the arguments favorable to the flight from an intelligence point of view and let the President, after hearing me and receiving the advice of others, make the policy judgment. Similar problem arises in connection with the

(b)(1)  
(b)(7)(C)

[redacted]

3. Rusk then raised the question of the total effort of collecting intelligence and its relation to policy. [redacted]

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[REDACTED] We must always concern ourselves with our position as a world leader." I made no comment on this statement

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(b)(3)  
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4. Rusk questioned me concerning the ChiCom nuclear weapon program [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Rusk said that Dobrynin had told Thompson at lunch that the ChiComs "would get off a test at any time." This is a departure from Gromyko's position with Rusk and Khrushchev's position with Harriman a few months or a year ago.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

Rusk felt the French should probably not risk the dangers of getting caught. However, he could see the validity of the argument and did not dismiss the possibility. (Note: I do not wish to put this forward in any formal way, however, it is, in my opinion, a possibility worth noting.)

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(b)(1)S  
(b)(3)

6. Rusk queried me concerning the reports from Saigon of military presence and military personnel wandering around in armored cars, jeeps, etc. At this point Bill Bundy came in. I said that we had had a flood of coup rumors, that they came from factors that were

dissatisfied with Khanh's recent concessions, that they were representative of the deepening schisms between factions in Vietnam, but I didn't think there was enough of an organization to present a formidable opposition to Khanh or get away with a coup.

7. Rusk asked what I thought was going on in the Communist world. He noted the growing indications of independence on the part of satellite leaders, deepening rift between Russia and Communist China, and he wondered just what Khrushchev had in mind in trying to organize an international conference. I said that we too had observed the indicators. I was particularly interested in Tito's trip to Hungary and I didn't think Tito was trying to mend Khrushchev's fences, that on the contrary, he was trying to increase his own independent strength. I also said that we agreed that the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening, we had noted the deployment of the Soviet division to the Chinese border and also the differing positions of local Communist parties, such as North Korean castigation of the Russians and their apparent cooperation with the ChiComs.

8. Rusk questioned the publication of the Togliatti letter in Moscow which I could not explain. I agreed that our demonologists would take a fresh look at the situation and report from time to time on our analysis as the situation evolved and unfolded.

9. Rusk asked if he should order Taylor to go immediately from Honolulu to Saigon, stating it would look bad if the American Ambassador was in Honolulu during a political disruption in Saigon. Both Bill Bundy and I felt that while the situation was unstable, there was no urgent reason for issuing such an order for Ambassador Taylor.

