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Joint Assessment

Cuban Subversion in Latin America

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America

Summary

1. The paucity of hard evidence of current Cuban participation in violent subversion--particularly in view of the ease with which such evidence was uncovered in the past--indicates that Havana's involvement in this activity is at its lowest level since Fidel Castro assumed power. Only in Guatemala is there information about direct Cuban participation with an active Latin American guerrilla force; Havana's subversive assistance to other Latin American groups consists primarily of continued propaganda and probably limited insurgent training and funding. Cuba's foreign intelligence apparatus now seems to be geared more to intelligence collection and political action than to support of insurgent movements. Castro would probably insist upon a very low risk factor and a high probability of success before lending substantial Cuban support to an effort to unseat an "unfriendly" Latin American government by violent means. It has taken him almost a decade to learn that sponsorship of violent subversion often bears bitter fruit and that there are more subtle ways of promoting his foreign policy objectives with less risk to his own revolution.

2. Stung by the failure of Che Guevara's guerrilla team in Bolivia and by the many other defeats in similar operations abroad, and hard pressed by the domestic economic situation to devote more attention to internal affairs, Castro in 1968 began a gradual disengagement from those violent subversive operations that showed little promise of success. At the same time, he moved to improve his relations with his chief economic benefactor--the USSR--and worked to re-establish ties with Latin American Communist parties formerly alienated by his seemingly unrestricted support of revolutionary movements. He also attempted to refurbish his image among non-Communist circles in the hemisphere and, although he continued to give verbal support to violent revolution, he reduced his material commitment to rebel movements to such an extent that some guerrilla chieftains complained publicly of a withdrawal of Cuban assistance.

3. Events of the last three and one-half years--notably the political developments in Peru, Chile, and until recently Bolivia--have led Castro to believe that a trend in Cuba's favor has materialized and that it is growing stronger. As long as he can continue to take advantage of this trend and dilute the isolation imposed on Cuba by the Organization of American States (OAS), he will be less inclined to chance an international political reversal occasioned by blatant involvement in violent subversive operations. His adoption of a new policy on subversion, however, does not mean that he has rejected completely his support of violent revolution; neither does it represent an abandonment of other forms of subversion, which he is believed to continue to regard as valid and useful political tools.

Background

4. Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees ever since the Cayo Confites expedition in 1947. Almost every Latin American Republic has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms ranging from direct personal participation, as in the Cayo Confites adventure against dictator Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of arms and ammunition as in Nicaragua in 1959 and Venezuela in 1963. His efforts have consistently met with failure, with the single exception of his war against former Cuban President Fulgencio Batista.

5. As soon as Castro assumed power in Cuba in January 1959, Havana became the center for subversive operations against other Latin American countries. In 1959 alone, expeditions were mounted against Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama. These ill-planned and poorly executed operations, developed during the euphoria created by the unprecedented success of Castro's guerrilla forces, were total failures.

6. Undeterred by his early failures, Castro continued dabbling in subversion. In the early and mid-1960's, Cuban support--in the form of money, weapons, training, propaganda, and/or personnel--was directed to those rebel groups in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Central America, and the Caribbean willing to take to the hills and adopt guerrilla warfare. Proof of Cuban involvement in many of these affairs was irrefutable. In 1963, for example, a cache of several tons of weapons and ammunition, much of it traceable to Havana through identification of serial numbers and restoration (through scientific processes) of partially

obliterated imprints of the Cuban Army's coat of arms, was unearthed by government officials on a Venezuelan beach where it had been secreted by the Cubans for use by Venezuelan guerrillas.

7. The Tricontinental Conference, held in Havana in January 1966 was an effort by Castro to assume a major role in the leadership of revolutionary movements throughout the world. At the Conference, which was co-sponsored by the USSR and Cuba and was attended by more than 500 delegates, the African-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization (AALAPSO) was formed to coordinate the activities of all "anti-imperialist" rebel movements. A Cuban, Captain Osmani Cienfuegos, was appointed AALAPSO Secretary General and Havana was designated as the location of the organization's headquarters. Following the conference, a second meeting, also sponsored by Cuba and attended by the conference's Latin American delegates, was held at which the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) was formed. Havana was declared the permanent seat of LASO and Cuba presided over the LASO's ruling Permanent Committee. Castro apparently intended that LASO would function as a support mechanism for guerrilla expeditions such as Che Guevara's Bolivian operation which was already in the formative stage, but by the time LASO held its first congress in July 1967, the Bolivian guerrillas were already doomed, thanks largely to the premature exposure of the group in March long before it was ready for combat.

8. Further proof of Havana's sponsorship of subversion surfaced in May 1967 when four Cuban military officers were captured near Machurucuto, Venezuela. The Cubans were attempting to infiltrate into the Venezuelan interior and had been brought to the infiltration point by a Cuban fishing boat, the SIERRA. The equipment they brought with them readily identified them as prospective guerrillas.

9. Castro was dismayed by the embarrassing turn of events in Venezuela but he suffered an even more damaging blow in October 1967 when it became clear that the Bolivian armed forces had liquidated Guevara's band. The Bolivian adventure represented Castro's most important attempt to "export the revolution" and it was carried out with the most expert leadership and generous financial support that Havana could provide. The fall of Guevara apparently forced upon Castro the realization that, unless very specific and unique conditions were present, subversive operations of the magnitude that Havana could muster enjoyed little chance of success.

10. The unsuccessful operations in Venezuela and Bolivia, culminating almost a decade of failures in international subversion, caused Castro to pause and reassess his foreign policy. He probably realized that his adventures abroad had been expensive in terms of personnel, money, and prestige and that they did little more than give his opponents justification for advocating continued restrictive measures designed to further Havana's isolation.

11. Although Castro had predicted that success in guerrilla warfare in Latin America would be a long-range prospect and that victory could not be expected in the short term, he clearly was exasperated with the failure of Cuban-supported revolutionary movements to gain momentum, and he openly criticized those rebel leaders such as Douglas Bravo in Venezuela who had had opportunities but had "fumbled them away."

12. Furthermore, Castro was aware that his espousal of violent revolution had sparked bitter opposition in the local Communist parties in Latin America. Local Communist leaders judged themselves to be in a better position than Castro to determine what was the proper way to achieve power in their respective countries. Whereas Castro looked upon them as ossified hacks too concerned with creature comforts to engineer a seizure of power, they considered Castro a country bumpkin, a Johnny-come-lately who had come to power through a political accident and who, despite his gross political and ideological inexperience, had the effrontery to press upon them his naive and fallacious interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory. These leaders made their dissatisfaction with Castro known in Moscow and Moscow in turn relayed this dissatisfaction on to Castro.

13. Although Castro had largely ignored previous admonitions to restrain his subversive activities--his promises to orthodox Communist leaders to that effect in May 1963 and November 1964 were never honored--he was in a less favorable negotiating position in late 1967 and early 1968 because of serious domestic pressures. Faced with the decision of continuing an aggressive but sterile policy or shifting to a more pragmatic approach that offered to be more productive in the long run, Castro chose the latter. In 1968, he began the painful process of improving his relations with the USSR, re-establishing ties with the Latin American Communist parties, and refurbishing his image in the hemisphere.

14. Castro's decision was not adopted without some vigorous nudging from Moscow which had expressed its irritation in various ways. The Soviet ambassador in Havana was not immediately replaced following his recall in April 1967 and, at the height of the Middle East crisis, party chief Brezhnev is said to have likened Castro to the Chinese and to have threatened that Moscow would not keep Cuba "afloat" if the Cuban leader did not soon come to his senses. Premier Kosygin paid a personal call on Castro following his visit to the US in the wake of the June 1967 war and there were reports at the time that he dropped hints in line with Brezhnev's admonitions. By the spring of 1968, however, the situation began to improve and in May a new Soviet ambassador was sent to Havana, filling the post left vacant for 13 months.

15. Castro's reluctant endorsement of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, backhanded though it was, constituted the first major public concession by Havana in the interest of improving Cuban-Soviet relations. Perhaps the high point in Havana's campaign to please Moscow came in April 1970 when Castro delivered a speech slavish in its praise of Lenin and, in a pointed affront to one of the specific prerequisites for an improvement in Cuban-US relations, calling for even closer military ties with the USSR.

16. Havana's gradual disengagement from guerrilla groups could not fail to please both the USSR and the local Communist parties. In addition, special radio programs that were sources of considerable irritation to the Communist Parties of Chile, Venezuela, and Brazil were dropped from Radio Havana's broadcasting schedule and contacts were developed which eventually led to the restoration of formal ties between the Cuban Communist Party and several Latin American Communist parties. Cuba continued to provide safe haven for revolutionaries who fled their homelands by hijacking airplanes, being exchanged for kidnaped diplomats, or other means, but Castro could hardly have retained his credentials as a revolutionary had he denied entry to those seeking refuge.

17. The process of disengaging left Castro extremely sensitive to charges that his revolutionary fervor might be on the wane. When guerrilla leaders in Venezuela and Colombia complained in late 1969 and early 1970 that Havana had withdrawn its assistance, Castro responded in a bitter attack, promising that revolutionaries "like Che," willing to fight and die, could always count on Cuba's aid but that pseudo-revolutionaries who fumbled away precious opportunities would get nothing. Probably because of that sensitivity, his break

with large-scale support of violent revolution was neither quick nor clean. Deeply impressed by the headline-grabbing exploits of the Tupamaros in Uruguay and Carlos Marighella and other revolutionaries in Brazil, Castro conducted a short-lived flirtation with urban terrorism. Following the death or capture of important pro-Cuban rebel leaders in Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, Panama, and Haiti all in the space of a few months beginning in late 1969, however, Castro seemed to lose interest even in this form of violent revolution.

18. To present a more respectable image in Latin America, Havana encouraged increased contacts with foreign nationals through expansion of PRENSA LATINA; exchanges of sports, technical, and cultural delegations; participation in international meetings and conferences (e.g.: FAO and ECLA meetings in various Latin American capitals); and developing trade. PRENSA LATINA itself was reshaped to give the outward appearance of a Latin American rather than Cuban press agency but it remained a branch of the Cuban foreign intelligence apparatus and continued to serve as an intelligence collector.

19. After the emergence of a nationalistic military regime in Peru in October 1968, Castro expanded his definition of "revolutionary" to embrace not only guerrilla movements but any regime which in his opinion demonstrated its independence from "US imperialism" and initiated basic domestic reforms. In July 1969, he publicly expressed approval of the military government in Lima and began a campaign of cautious cultivation of the Peruvians. He succeeded in getting approval for the opening of a PRENSA LATINA office in Lima and it was through this office that Havana, quick to take advantage of the opportunity, arranged for the dispatch to Peru of blood plasma, medical personnel, and relief supplies in the wake of the disastrous earthquake of May 1970. Seeking to extract the maximum propaganda value from the occasion, Havana gave wide publicity to its relief efforts and outdistanced even the Peruvians in demanding special consideration for the earthquake victims in the United Nations. The propaganda value accruing to Havana far exceeded the actual cost of the relief effort and is an example of Castro's new sophistication. The Cubans now have a permanent medical mission in Peru and--in contrast to Havana's aid to Peruvian guerrillas in the mid-1960s--are building six field hospitals in areas hardest hit by the earthquake. The Peruvian government has responded by ignoring OAS sanctions and selling 105,000 tons of fishmeal to Cuba.

20. Chile also responded to Castro's new posture. Although direct trade was resumed during the administration of President Frei early last year, in November the government of President Allende re-established diplomatic relations with Havana and a marked increase in Cuban-Chilean trade occurred. Normal political, commercial, and cultural contacts have been resumed between the two countries and a contingent of Cuban Interior Ministry officials are in Chile engaged in training Chilean intelligence and security officers.

21. Comments indicating a favorable attitude concerning the ending of OAS sanctions against Cuba and reintegrating Cuba into the hemispheric community have also been made by important political leaders in Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Trinidad and Tobago and, up until the recent coup in Bolivia, the Torres government in La Paz had been expected to announce the resumption of diplomatic relations in the near future. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela followed Peru's lead and permitted PRENSA LATINA to open offices in their respective capitals. Several countries have hosted Cuban sports teams and many countries have permitted sports delegations to travel to Cuba to participate in various competitive events. Cuban technical groups have visited British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Martinique, and Guadeloupe in the past two years and return visits from several of these areas have been accorded special attention by Havana. Although Havana has attempted, unsuccessfully so far, to establish commerce with some of the English-speaking islands of the Caribbean, a modest trade has been conducted with the French islands for at least the past two years.

The Current Picture

23. Havana has undoubtedly maintained contact with other revolutionary organizations in Latin America and probably is involved in some funding and guerrilla warfare training. There

is very little evidence of this, however, and the level of activity is well below that of 1967 and previous years when proof of Cuban-sponsored subversion was comparatively easy to uncover. Fidel Castro apparently weighed the results of almost a decade of subversion against the potential dividends of a longer term but more realistic and flexible foreign policy and he opted for the latter. Rather than trying to create opportunities to enhance his own revolutionary influence in other countries through the use of violence, he now seems willing to be more flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they arise in order to promote his policy aims.

24. His adoption of a new policy, however, does not mean that he has rejected subversion as a valid and useful political tool. As he has frequently stated, he will continue to support revolutionary movements; but his definition of what constitutes a revolutionary movement has changed radically. He no longer restricts the term to units engaged in waging rural guerrilla warfare according to textbooks such as those produced by Che Guevara and Regis Debray. Defined much more broadly, the term revolutionary movement can now even include governments which adopt a strongly nationalistic, "anti-imperialist" stance such as the governments of Allende in Chile and Velasco in Peru. The nationalization of foreign-owned businesses and genuine agrarian reform are two key criteria in Castro's determination of a government's "revolutionary" status.

25. Castro views the trend of events in Latin America as having shifted in his favor. He is aware that by reducing direct revolutionary involvements abroad he has created an atmosphere in which he can much more easily take advantage of opportunities precipitated by growing Latin American nationalism. Since he reduced his sponsorship of violent revolution, Cuba's isolation has diminished and he is unlikely to risk a reversal of this trend by giving support to small and relatively ineffective rebel groups intent upon the overthrow of governments such as those in Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador. He probably views these countries as potential friends that will someday follow independent policies similar to those already taken by Chile and Peru. Uruguay, he claims, may reach this stage later this year via the Frente Amplio. His foreign intelligence organization will presumably concentrate on such "enemy" countries as Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and Nicaragua but will probably restrict itself more to intelligence gathering activities in these areas, content to keep its subversive apparatus in check until a particularly advantageous opportunity presents itself.

26. Certain countries are expected to be excluded entirely from the threat of Cuban-sponsored subversion. Trinidad and Tobago is in this category primarily because Prime Minister Eric Williams has gone on record as favoring Cuba's integration into the hemispheric community. Williams' remarks, including those made at an FAO conference in Caracas, Venezuela, last year, were particularly pleasing to Castro who responded by sending a shipment of breeding cattle to Port of Spain as a gift of the Cuban government. Guyana is another country in this category as is Jamaica. The latter is a prospective trading partner and a convenient transportation transfer point while the former, under the independent-minded Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, has carried out activities (e.g.: the nationalization of Canadian-owned mining interests) in line with Castro's own political thinking. Chile and Peru of course, are already following paths which have produced deep satisfaction in Havana and thus will not be targets for Cuban-supported violent revolution. [redacted]

27. [redacted] that Chile's President Allende is anxious to see Havana adhere to its more pragmatic approach in foreign relations. Allende reportedly has urged Castro to maintain his stand-down on subversive activities so that Chile could persuade other governments to reassess their attitudes toward Cuba. Castro should be receptive to the idea because it would require nothing more than a continuation of Cuba's present policy in return for the valuable intercession of a respected and able politician. There is evidence that Allende has already embarked on such a campaign on Cuba's behalf.

ANNEX I - CUBAN STATEMENTS ON SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION

1. Although Fidel Castro continues to give verbal support to Latin American revolutionaries, his statements have changed in much the same manner as has Cuba's policy. Whereas the term "revolutionary" formerly was restricted largely to the individual seeking to overthrow a government by means of rural guerrilla warfare, it has been expanded to include incumbent government officials pursuing policies "of economic and social growth" that, in Castro's opinion, constitute a course independent of US influence. Thus, Castro today can describe the governments of Peru and Chile as "revolutionary governments" worthy of Cuba's support. In addition, the definition of the term "revolutionary movement," formerly a guerrilla band operating in the mountains, has evolved to include a broad front composed of political, labor, student, and other groups pressing for social change. The Church and the military are no longer looked upon solely as pillars of the establishment and defenders of the oligarchies but are now recognized as potentially valuable vehicles for achieving favorable political and social change.

2. The slogan "The duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution" that was so prominent in the mid-1960s at the high point of Cuba's involvement in subversion is rarely heard today and is subject to wide interpretation. The Asian-African-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, formed in 1966 with such promise of revolutionary achievement, has degenerated into nothing more than a discredited printing press tirelessly cranking out its propaganda pamphlets and literature. The Latin American Solidarity Organization, created in 1967 to support such movements as Guevara's Bolivian operation, has become totally defunct.

3. Sometimes, however, Castro's oratory and that of other Cuban spokesmen seems contradictory and reflections of policy changes become apparent only under more-than-casual scrutiny and over an extended period of time. Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a key official in the Cuban hierarchy, for example, said as late as last November:

> "I would say categorically that our frequently presented revolutionary position that armed struggle is the basis for revolutionary development in Latin America has not been altered."

4. In his statement, Rodriguez seemed to be reiterating the old "hard" line; he went on to compare Cuba's support for revolution elsewhere in Latin America with the disregard for political boundaries shown by men like Bolivar and San Martin during Latin America's nineteenth century struggles for independence:

> "So when one country helps another at present, it is following the liberators' glorious path ....So therefore we are not concerned because there have been Cubans in several parts of the world. We feel very proud, very satisfied, that Cubans feel every country's freedom is like that in their own country."

5. It is important to take into consideration, however, the setting in which Rodriguez made these statements; he was replying to a pointed question directed to him during a press conference in Santiago, Chile, where Salvador Allende, taking office as Chile's new president, had proved that leftists could attain power through participation in legitimate elections, a process the Cubans had long scorned. Rodriguez, therefore, having in September 1969 derided the decision by the leftist political parties to attempt to achieve power through elections, was on the defensive and apparently felt obliged to reiterate Cuba's position in strong terms or risk a loss of face among the hemisphere's revolutionaries.

6. At the Lenin Centennial ceremony in Havana on 22 April 1970, Fidel Castro himself was on the defensive on the same subject. Evidently feeling the sting of criticism for having cut off Cuban funding for such rebel chieftains as Douglas Bravo in Venezuela and Fabio Vasquez in Colombia, Castro said:

> "Cuba has never nor will it ever deny support to the revolutionary movement. This is not to be confused with support of any impostor just because he is using the name of revolutionary....That type of pseudorevolutionary can expect no aid from Cuba, of course. But revolutionaries like Che, willing to struggle to the final consequences, willing to fight, to die--they will always be able to count on Cuba's help....But one must not worry about our position toward the revolutionary movement. So long as there is imperialism, so long as

> there are people struggling, willing to fight for their people's liberation from that imperialism, the Cuban revolution will support them."

7. Well before that, however, Castro had given the first indication that he was willing to scrap the dogmatic guerrilla-oriented theories expounded in the mid-1960s by Regis Debray and accept as "revolutionary" a peaceful, evolutionary process of social changes being brought about by an incumbent Latin American government. On 14 July 1969, he called attention to the "revolutionary measures" being effected in Peru to accomplish agrarian reform and nationalization of foreign businesses and, in a major concession to some of his strongest critics, acknowledged that guerrilla warfare was not necessarily a prerequisite for a true revolution:

> "It is only fair that each country develop its revolution, its own revolution in its own style, in accordance with the conditions of each country ....The Cuban revolution will support with firm decision any revolutionary process in any Latin American country....If someday, as a result of the revolutionary development in Peru or any country in Latin America the criminal blockades and imperialist aggression and threats arise, our people will support that threatened people."

8. Except for his sensitive reaction on 22 April to criticism of the withdrawal of support to guerrilla groups, Castro devoted little comment to Cuban backing of revolutionary movements during his speeches in 1970. In 1971, however, he again used the term "revolutionary movements" in the context of "revolutionary governments" and "radicalized masses" rather than guerrilla warfare-oriented organizations. On 19 April 1971, he added the people and government of Chile and the people (but not the government) of Bolivia to the "revolutionary" classification and boldly reaffirmed Cuba's commitment to assist revolutionaries:

> "Cuban revolutionary fighters have shed their blood helping peoples of other continents, aiding peoples of Africa and Latin America....The people of Algeria are at a great distance from us, but at a difficult moment for them, our men sailed across the ocean and arrived in time to

> assist the Algerians. That is a part of our history and our tradition. This means that the revolutionary peoples of Latin America can count on us; the revolutionary governments of Latin America can count on us....We say that we have supported, we now support, and we will continue to support the revolutionary movements in Latin America....As far as Latin America is concerned, any time that other revolutionary sister nations ask for aid, they will have it: whether it is technical aid, as technicians, or as soldiers, even as soldiers. And we will do this as the most sacred of all duties, as fighters."

9. The themes reappeared in Castro's address on 26 July 1971 as he cast a hopeful glance toward the elections to take place in Uruguay later this year:

> "If we pay close attention, we can see how circumstances change, how history marches on inexorably: we now have the Chilean revolutionary process on the march, the Peruvian revolutionary process on the march. The conditions in each country and the methods employed are different in each case. There are these three, but we also have Uruguay. The armed struggle of the Uruguayans is growing stronger as is their Broad Front ....There is no reason to dismiss the possibility that, by the end of the year, Uruguay, too, may have a people's government guiding her destinies."

10. Castro, in the same speech, also analyzed the situation in Bolivia and, after expressing a willingness to consider favorably any initiatives of the Bolivian government toward restoring diplomatic ties with Cuba, said:

> "If, in the future, the people of Bolivia, the workers of Bolivia, the students and the peasants of Bolivia, should find themselves face to face with difficulties; if the advance of the Bolivian revolution should lead to strife, blockade, and sacrifice; we say to you--the representatives

> of the people of Bolivia--that you can count on Cuba's solidarity and you can be sure of one thing: Cuba's solidarity will not fail."

11. So in 1971, Cuba's assistance is offered to revolutionary governments and revolutionary peoples to help defend against the counterrevolution and imperialist reaction whereas in 1967 it was offered to guerrilla warfare-oriented movements aimed at violent overthrow of the government.

ANNEX II - SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE IN LATIN AMERICA

General

During the last two or three years, the availability of firm, proven facts about Cuban involvement in current subversive activities in Latin America has declined substantially. This is believed to reflect a decision by the Cuban government following the disastrous failure of its Bolivian guerrilla venture in late 1967 to cut back sharply on its direct involvement in revolutionary violence in favor of a more sophisticated and cautious approach for supporting revolutionary causes. Thus visible signs of a direct Cuban role in the various subversive or revolutionary movements currently active in the area are generally absent, and of the relatively few recent reports of such involvement that have been received, most have been difficult or impossible to confirm. This is as true of the larger Latin American countries as the smaller ones. As the following material shows, much of the tangible evidence of Cuban meddling in Latin America consists of continued propaganda attacks on some governments and such indications of support for revolutionary organizations and individuals as providing safehaven to Latin American revolutionaries freed from Latin American jails as the result of political kidnapings.

Colombia

Cuban support for insurgency in Colombia, never very substantial, has declined since 1968, when guerrilla activity there began to decrease. While the pro-Cuban Army of National Liberation (ELN) remains as a revolutionary group in Colombia, its combat effectiveness has been severely weakened by the success of the Colombian government's counter-insurgency efforts. Relations between the ELN and Castro continue at a low level, and there have been no reports of training in Cuba since January 1968. ELN leader Fabio Vasquez has, in fact, publicly complained about the drop-off of Cuban support. There is no evidence of Cuban contact with the other armed subversive groups in Colombia which are either pro-Soviet or pro-Peking.

Dominican Republic

Havana long has extended guerrilla warfare training to Dominican revolutionaries. This support has been supplemented by sporadic doses of propaganda aimed at undermining the Balaguer administration. Cuba has also offered its territory as safehaven

for Dominican revolutionaries, including those who have hijacked aircraft, those released from Dominican prisons in exchange for kidnap victims, and those who have sought asylum in foreign embassies in Santo Domingo to escape arrest. Most (19 of 20) of the revolutionaries released in exchange for the kidnaped US air attache in March 1970, for example, went to Cuba, and some openly admitted their intention to return to the Dominican Republic to overthrow the government. Prominent Cubans (including Fidel Castro himself) have neither confirmed nor denied occasional foreign press allegations that Dominican revolutionary Francisco Caamano, military leader and "president" of the rebel government in the Dominican civil war of 1965, is in Cuba training an invasion force for an attack on the Dominican Republic. Castro has, however, commented that he thinks Caamano has the necessary qualities to lead a Dominican revolution.

Haiti

For many years, the only hard evidence of Cuban interest in supporting subversion in Haiti has come from Havana's regular radio broadcasts in the Creole language beamed toward Haiti. These broadcasts, which occasionally feature inflammatory language, urge and exhort the Haitian people to revolt against the Haitian government. The general tone and frequency of such broadcasts have not changed appreciably since President Francois Duvalier's death in April 1971. Since that time, the Cuban line has been that conditions in Haiti have not been changed by Duvalier's death and that violent revolutionary action is the only way to bring about such change. References to President Jean Claude Duvalier in these broadcasts are generally scurrilous in tone.

Nicaragua

Cuban interest in and support for moves against the Nicaraguan government are almost as old as the Castro government itself. A Cuban air force plane delivered arms and supplies to Central America in 1959 for use in anti-Nicaraguan government activities, and since that time the Cuban government has provided training and some other support to pro-Castro Nicaraguan groups, notably the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Cuban radio broadcasts have sporadically given propaganda support to anti-Somoza and pro-rebel themes. Such broadcasts usually publicize the goals and activities of the FSLN whose chief, Carlos Fonseca Amador, is presently in Cuba. He arrived there late last year after he and several other jailed Central American terrorists were released in return for the freeing of the passengers of a Costa Rican airliner that had been hijacked to Cuba.

Uruguay

Despite the close ideological kinship between the Cuban revolution and the terrorist activities of the National Liberation Front (MLN) in Uruguay, there is no evidence of significant Cuban aid to this group, popularly known as the Tupamaros, or to any other subversive group in the country.

In June 1971 the Uruguayan government shut down the Montevideo Bureau of the Cuban News Agency Prensa Latina and expelled its Director, following its publication of interviews with the abductors of British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson. The closure decree, signed by President Pacheco and his Cabinet, also charged that the Bureau was a conduit for exchanging subversive material with Havana. The decree also prohibits telegraphic companies from transmitting and receiving Prensa Latina reports.

ANNEX III - SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Brazil

Cuban involvement in subversive activity in Brazil probably is limited to training guerrillas, [redacted] Havana is the favorite haven for Brazilian revolutionaries and terrorists, however, including many who have been exchanged for kidnaped foreign diplomats. At least 150, and probably well over 200, Brazilians have received guerrilla training in Cuba since 1961. Of those trained since 1967, the largest number have been members of the National Liberating Action (ALN). Its founder, Carlos Marighella, had very close ties to Cuba and the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) until his death at police hands in late 1969.

[redacted]

The Brazilian terrorist groups are now badly demoralized and disorganized as a result of internal dissension in their organizations and an intensive government campaign to eliminate them. Many insurgents have been imprisoned or killed, their support groups have been destroyed, and caches of arms and documents have been seized by security forces. Although only remnants remain of some insurgency groups, they still retain the capability of carrying out isolated actions such as assassinations or kidnapings.

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