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Directorate of Intelligence

Africa Review [REDACTED]

27 March 1995

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Africa Review [REDACTED]

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The nearly 650,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees in camps in western Tanzania are posing a security and environmental problem for the ruling party as it gets ready for the country's first multiparty general election in October. [REDACTED]	
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within the CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, [REDACTED] Office of African and Latin American Analysis, [REDACTED]

Tanzania: Refugees Become Political Problem [REDACTED]


The nearly 700,000 Rwandan and Burundian refugees in camps in western Tanzania are becoming a political problem for the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party as it gets ready for the country's first multiparty general election in October. Tanzanians in the Kagera Region are complaining about mounting security concerns and environmental deterioration, prompting President Mwinyi's national security advisers to suggest at least two solutions. In one plan the Tanzanian military and police would forcibly secure the camps and arrest perpetrators of past acts of genocide, while the other plan calls for regional cooperation with Rwanda and the United Nations to persuade refugees to return home. Dar es Salaam appears likely to keep its options open on both plans more as a way to disarm its critics and outmaneuver the fledgling opposition than as real solutions to the refugee crisis. [REDACTED]

Social and Political Costs Mount

Although initially reluctant to deal with the refugees, who began arriving in April 1994, Dar es Salaam has been compelled to pay attention because of growing insecurity near the refugee camps. In recent months, numerous incidents of murder, robbery, and banditry against Tanzanian citizens have prompted military and local leaders to call for stiff measures. Press reports say that Tanzanian security forces have arrested more than 600 Rwandan and Burundian refugees charged with crimes against Tanzanians. Moreover, Burundian military forces recently crossed into Tanzania in pursuit of Hutu militia who they believe conduct raids into Burundi from Tanzanian territory, according to press reports. Minister for Home Affairs Nyanda has threatened to take action against the Burundian troop incursions, claiming that the troops terrorized local villagers and vandalized property. Dar es Salaam faces longer term problems in the western districts, which have suffered economic hardships and ecological degradation since the influx of refugees last year:

- Minister of State for Defense Kinana charges that the refugees have forced local Tanzanians from their land and usurped much of their property, [REDACTED]. Press reports say that refugees have denuded forests to gather wood and have taken over Tanzanian land to plant and build shelters.


- The Member of Parliament for Ngara district says that the refugees have destroyed the environment, depleted local food stocks and severely strained social and welfare facilities, according to press reports. [REDACTED]



- Press reports say that residents in Ngara district have already formed a militia force to protect themselves from further attacks, while those in Biharamulo district are organizing a force. [REDACTED]


Perceived UN inaction has also sparked Tanzanian criticism. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the UN agencies are unwilling to rein in camp leaders who he believes coordinate violent attacks against Tanzanian locals. [REDACTED] former Rwandan Army (FAR) troops and Hutu militia have created military training bases inside the refugee camps and are regularly training youths'. [REDACTED]



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Refugee Camps in Tanzania, March 1995



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[REDACTED]

Operation Sweet Home. Bowing to pressure from his national security advisers, Mwinyi in February approved a plan to deal with the refugee situation militarily. Mwinyi delayed implementing the plan, however, after the UN opposed the use of military force in the camps,

[REDACTED]

We believe that separating and arresting extremist Hutu leaders and war criminals from the refugee population would be difficult because the suspects are not easily identified. In addition, camp leaders claim a significant following and are likely to be shielded by their supporters. For example, in June approximately 5,000 refugees rioted in support of a former Hutu leader who had been detained by the Tanzanian police—and set for removal by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—at the Benaco refugee camp. [REDACTED]

Trilateral Agreement. Dar es Salaam has [REDACTED] a less controversial plan to encourage voluntary repatriation

[REDACTED]


Although the trilateral approach has the advantage of sharing responsibility for repatriation [REDACTED], temporarily insulating Mwinyi from domestic criticism, it is likely to be difficult to implement. [REDACTED]

Refugees Add to Election Pressures

As preparations for the general election in October increase, the CCM will be challenged to address the refugee problem. Opposition parties are gaining support in the western regions far removed from the country's power centers. [REDACTED] CCM officials are concerned that the opposition could

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encourage refugees illegally to vote for opposition candidates. The CCM already is recovering from several recent political setbacks, including the defection of a prominent and popular member of the cabinet to the opposition and the nullification by the courts of two municipal election victories because of fraud. Moreover, former President Julius Nyerere—Tanzania's founding father and highly influential elder statesman—recently blasted Mwinyi as being inept and corrupt, according to press reports. [REDACTED]



The CCM probably wants to relieve overburdened districts in time for the election campaign, and is probably frustrated by its inability to act unilaterally. We believe the two plans developed by the government are meant for public consumption in order to burnish the CCM's tarnished domestic image and dispel charges of ineptitude. [REDACTED]

We judge that Dar es Salaam might be satisfied in the short term with modest refugee repatriation and a significant decrease in violent activity near the camps. Such an outcome may reduce criticism of the CCM in the months before the election and ease the pressure to act more forcefully, but cannot be achieved without outside help. If the trilateral agreement does not yield tangible results, however, and especially if security in Kagera deteriorates sharply before October, we believe the government may seek to implement Operation Sweet Home at least partially. Without sufficient forces to carry out the plan, however, the aggressive initiative may spark a violent and bloody confrontation. (S NF NC OC)

Because Operation Sweet Home is costly and controversial, the government is unlikely to implement it unilaterally without at least some international support. [REDACTED]

