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	<i>Page</i>
Articles	
[REDACTED]	1
Tanzania: Adopting Aggressive Approach Toward Refugees [REDACTED]	5
Dar es Salaam is taking a tough line against Burundian and Rwandan refugees camped in western Tanzania and against the Tutsi-dominated Burundian Armed Forces, which it accuses of fomenting instability along the border. [REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]	11
[REDACTED]	17
[REDACTED]	19

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23

Chronology



27

Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within the CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, [redacted] Office of African and Latin American Analysis, telephone. [redacted]

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Tanzania: Adopting Aggressive Approach Toward Refugees

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Dar es Salaam is taking an increasingly tough line against the more than 750,000 Burundian and Rwandan refugees camped in western Tanzania and the Tutsi-dominated Burundian Armed Forces, which Dar es Salaam blames for fomenting instability along the border:

- President Mwinyi closed Tanzania's border with Rwanda and Burundi earlier this year, maintaining that Tanzania could not tolerate the insecurity and the social and economic costs of the refugees.
- Dar es Salaam increasingly doubts the international community's commitment and ability to solve the regional refugee problem.
- The government is also sensitive to domestic pressure and demands from within the ruling party to address the refugee issue before Tanzania's first-ever multiparty election is held in late October.

[REDACTED]

The Mwinyi government appears committed to maintaining its hardened position to improve the ruling party's standing before the election, and its attitude will be driven by perceived threats of more refugees and Burundian incursions. In addition, Dar es Salaam probably views Zaire's recent forcible expulsion of thousands of Rwandan refugees as a potential Tanzanian option. The government could use Zaire's lead as an excuse to begin repatriation, which would attract much-needed domestic support. [REDACTED]

Government Removes the Welcome Mat
Tanzania in 1994 accepted over 750,000 refugees who fled the violence in Rwanda, and to a lesser extent, Burundi. Early this year, however, the government became concerned after the UN announced that it could no longer manage the large refugee caseload. Tanzania has consistently claimed that the refugees have ruined the local economy, brought insecurity to the area, crippled the western regions' weak infrastructure, and destroyed the environment. [REDACTED]

In February, Mwinyi approved "Operation Sweet Home," which called for Tanzanian military and civilian forces to seal the border, secure all camps, segregate war criminals, and escort repatriating refugees to the border. ¹ In late March, Dar es Salaam deployed troops to close the border. [REDACTED]

Dar es Salaam has defended the border closing by citing examples of growing insecurity in the western regions. It maintains that the refugee influx has led to soaring crime and a flood of arms. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


The military, however, has proven unable to seal the border, and its frustrations have been evident in several incidents this year:

- [REDACTED]
- In June, the TPDF fired warning shots at about 10,000 refugees attempting to cross into Tanzania, according to the press. UN officials claimed that the TPDF regularly harassed and robbed refugees, according to the press, and it was expelling up to 500 of them weekly. [REDACTED]
- Mwinyi dispatched more troops in June in a bid to prevent more refugees from entering Tanzania. He informed UN Assistant Secretary General Kouyate in July that Tanzania would not accept additional refugees under any circumstances. [REDACTED]

¹ For additional details on "Operation Sweet Home", see "Tanzania: Refugees Become Political Problem" in the *Africa Review*, 27 March 1995. [REDACTED]

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Refugee Camps in Tanzania, August 1995



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Questioning International Commitment

The Mwinzi government increasingly doubts the international community's commitment to solving the regional refugee crisis. The UN publicly announced in June that it might need to reduce assistance to the refugees significantly because of funding shortfalls. A

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UNHCR officials are reducing their existing aid programs by about 30 percent. Dar es Salaam points to these developments as indications that the UN is gradually losing interest in easing Tanzania's burden.

[REDACTED]

Domestic Pressure Increases

Although most Tanzanians initially paid little attention to the massive refugee camps along their western borders, the refugees are becoming a fiery political issue:

[REDACTED]

- The government has been criticized by officials in the border area and by members of parliament from affected districts. In May, the National Assembly called on the government to expel all refugees, claiming that districts along the border are in a state of war, according to the press.

[REDACTED]

- Former President Julius Nyerere—still the most influential political voice in the country—added to the chorus of complaints in June by calling for all refugees to return. [REDACTED]

Nyerere Speaks Out on Refugees

Although former President Nyerere initially refrained from speaking publicly on the refugee situation, his call in June for the return of all Rwandan refugees emphasized that the international community must foster repatriation and that Kigali must persuade Rwandan Hutus to return. [REDACTED]

Nyerere is willing to mediate in Rwanda and Burundi under OAU auspices if he is invited by all parties. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Burundi Becoming the Focus of Tanzania's Ire

Armed elements—probably rogue Burundian Army troops—have crossed into Tanzania on several occasions this year in pursuit of Hutu extremists allegedly operating in the western regions. Dar es Salaam has said the forays have terrorized Tanzanian citizens along the border and destroyed their property, according to press reports. Mwinzi publicly threatened in June to retaliate if the incursions continued. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Dar es Salaam has protested that increased violence in Burundi risks more refugees pouring into Tanzania. In June, it accused Bujumbura of instigating a systematic campaign of terror against its majority Hutus to drive them into neighboring countries, according to press


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
Tanzania Ill-Prepared To Intervene in Burundi

Although Dar es Salaam's proposal to head an all-African intervention force in Burundi appears sincere, the TPDF would require substantial external assistance to lead such a mission:

- **Tight Finances.** *The TPDF has seen its budget severely slashed in recent years. It cannot unilaterally fund a significant and long-term deployment in Burundi.*



reports. The government also publicly charged Bujumbura with violating international law and sponsoring "crimes against humanity." [redacted]



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
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Tanzania's Invasion of Uganda

The TPDF historically has been active in eastern and southern Africa, deploying troops to Mozambique and the Seychelles and assisting freedom fighters in former Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda to depose then President Amin who had seized power in 1971 from Milton Obote:

- In 1972, pro-Obote Ugandans who took refuge in Tanzania organized an ill-planned invasion into Uganda with Tanzanian logistic support, but they were beaten back by Amin's troops and relations between the two countries quickly deteriorated.
- In 1978, Amin ordered an incursion into Tanzania to divert attention from his growing domestic problems. In response, a 1,000-man Ugandan militia, bolstered by about 45,000 TPDF troops, launched a counteroffensive that repulsed the Ugandans and overthrew Amin.

Although TPDF ousted Amin, the operation drained Tanzania's military resources and severely strained its already-weak economy. For the invasion, the TPDF doubled in size to approximately 60,000 troops, and the six-month campaign reportedly cost Dar es Salaam about \$1 million per day. President Nyerere bore heavy criticism for the invasion—condemned by the OAU—both at home and abroad. Tanzania stationed troops in Uganda until late 1981 to help the restored Obote regime. Although in the early 1980s Dar es Salaam continued to station about 50 military instructors in Uganda, Tanzania declined Kampala's requests for troops to help fight Ugandan insurgents.



Assessing Dar es Salaam's Options

Although Dar es Salaam's plan to lead an intervention force in Burundi was hastily conceived and lacks international support, the government may act on its own if renewed violence in Burundi threatens a massive refugee flow. We also believe that, if Burundian military incursions continue, the government may be forced to retaliate. At a minimum, Dar es Salaam would significantly increase its deployments along the border to prevent more refugees and the Burundian Army from crossing into Tanzania.

Although massive voluntary repatriation is unrealistic, Dar es Salaam believes security in Rwanda has improved and may seek modest repatriation to disarm its domestic critics. Dar es Salaam almost certainly will continue to pressure Kigali and the international community to repatriate refugees. However, if Dar es Salaam determines that Zaire's approach could prove useful, it may unilaterally attempt a similar repatriation program.

Dar es Salaam has offered to help arrest and bring to trial suspected genocide perpetrators, but Kigali and the UN have shown no signs of cooperation. To accelerate the process, the government could begin unilaterally to arrest genocide perpetrators if it calculates that such a plan would convince some Rwandans to return and would force Kigali and the UN to cooperate. Nevertheless, if Kigali and the UN decline to help and if political considerations mount, Dar es Salaam could implement parts of Operation Sweet Home to foster repatriation.

Dar es Salaam almost certainly hopes that its rigid stance on the refugees will build popular support for the CCM as the October election approaches. There is widespread popular support for repatriating all refugees, and the CCM is trying to use the issue for political gain. Although the increasingly popular opposition

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has not capitalized on the refugee problem for now, the CCM wants to burnish its leadership position and preempt opposition criticism. [REDACTED]

We believe that the refugee issue and security concerns will help define the election, and we judge that whoever wins, the new government is unlikely to back down significantly. A CCM victory could lead to a slight easing of its antirefugee stance as the political imperative to appear tough lessens, but, if, as we expect, the opposition wins significant parliamentary seats, it will pressure the new government to address the economic and security problems caused by the refugees. If the opposition wins the presidency, however, we believe it may seek to establish its populist credentials by hastening repatriation. Voters will expect decisive actions from any new regime and the refugees are an easy target. [REDACTED]

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