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
ALGERIA

SECTION 54

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

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CHAPTER V


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This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAR	Compagnies Autonomes de Réserve (Autonomous Reserve Companies)
CDR	Centres de Rééducation (Reeducation Centers)
CIASN	Centre d'Instruction et d'Application de la Sûreté Nationale (Center of Instruction and Application of the National Security Organization)
CMI	Centres Militaires d'Internement (Military Internment Centers)
CRS	Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (Republican Security Companies)
CTT	Centres de Tri et de Transit (Transit and Screening Centers)
DGSA	Direction de la Sûreté Générale en Algérie (Directorate of General Security in Algeria)
DGSN	Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale (General Directorate of National Security)
DPU	Dispositifs de Protection Urbaine (Urban Protection Units)
DST	Direction Active de la Surveillance du Territoire (Territorial Surveillance Directorate)
ENP	Ecole Nationale de la Police (National Police School)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)
GD	Gendarmerie Départementale (Departmental Gendarmerie)
GM	Gendarmerie Mobile (Mobile Gendarmerie)
GMPR	Groupes Mobiles de Protection Rurale (Mobile Rural Protection Groups)
GMS	Groupes Mobiles de Sécurité (Mobile Security Groups)
IGAME	Inspecteur Générale de l'Administration en Mission Extraordinaire (Inspector General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission)
PAF	Service Central de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières (Central Office of Air and Frontier Police)
PJ	Service Central de la Police Judiciaire (Central Office of Criminal Police)
RG	Sous-direction des Renseignements Généraux (Subdirectorate of General Investigation)
SAS	Sections Administratives Spécialisées (Specialized Administrative Sections)
SAU	Sections Administratives Urbaines (Urban Administrative Sections)
SN	Sûreté Nationale (National Security); popular name for DGSN
SNA	Sûreté Nationale en Algérie (National Security Agency in Algeria); popular name for DGSA
SP	Service Central de la Sécurité Publique (Central Office of Public Security)
UT	Unités Territoriales (Territorial Units)

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54. Public Order and Safety

The user can supplement the information in this Section by referring to Section 52, Structure of the Government, for a discussion of governmental practices which may affect the operations of the forces of law and order.

A. General

Governmental machinery for the assurance of public order and safety in Algeria is an integral part of that of metropolitan France. This machinery includes large and well-trained police forces, a system of civil and military courts, and an extensive penal and detention system. Since the outbreak in Algeria of the Muslim nationalist rebellion of the National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*—FLN) in November 1954, however, the French Government has been able to maintain its authority and tolerable conditions of public order and safety in much of the area only by the employment of a military force of up to half a million men, in addition to the regular police and security forces. Because the rebels engage in individual acts of terrorism as well as in organized military activities, the French Army in Algeria has become increasingly involved in police work. (The strictly military aspects of the maintenance of public order and safety in Algeria in the present circumstances of civil war are not discussed in this Section; however, the role of the military in the administration and operations of the police and penal systems is discussed where appropriate.)

Until 1955, the police forces of Algeria were autonomous, that is, they formed a part of the Algerian administration, under the Governor General. In January 1955 the Mendès-France government decreed the integration of the Algerian police into the metropolitan police organization, the *Sûreté Nationale*, in order to strengthen central government control over the Algerian force. Until January 1960 the administrative control of the police of Algeria was centered in the Ministry of the Interior. The municipal police in Algeria, though not immediately affected by the 1955 decree, were also gradually brought under control of the *Sûreté Nationale* through a process of steady amalgamation of municipal police units into the Algerian *Staté Policé*.

The integration of the Algerian police into the *Sûreté Nationale* did not bring about the desired degree of central government control but, on the contrary, reduced it. The Algerian police were freed by this integration from responsibility to the

executive authorities in Algiers; at the same time the *Sûreté Nationale* in Paris was too distant to exercise effective control over its nominally subordinate unit in Algeria. The independence of the Algerian police of all effective control was enhanced during the period of integration by the fact that the police services remained in the hands of European Algerians or their sympathizers. Following the settlers' and army revolt of May 13, 1958, an army colonel, Yves Godard, who had played an important part in the revolt, became director of the entire Algerian security system. In these circumstances grave doubt existed concerning the loyalty and reliability of the police in matters where the interests of the European settlers might come into conflict with central government policies. The equivocal performance of the police during the settlers' insurrection at Algiers in January 1960 finally led the government to change both the administrative structure and the top-ranking personnel of the Algerian police. In February 1960 the police were returned to the control of the Algerian administration, headed by the central government's representative in Algiers, the Delegate General, who has since then directly supervised their activities. At the same time, it was decided that the appointment of *Sûreté Nationale* personnel to key positions in the Algerian police hierarchy would facilitate the imposition of central government authority. Colonel Godard was replaced as director of the Algerian police organization, the National Security Agency in Algeria, by Jacques Aubert, a member of the French prefectural corps and a former official of the *Sûreté Nationale*.

The Algerian police, like the French police, are highly centralized. Yet effective functioning of the police services throughout the Algerian territory often requires considerable decentralization of police authority. One important feature of the administration of the police system in Algeria is the fact that all units of various police services (for example, Criminal Police mobile brigades, State Police companies, and Mobile Security Groups) which are assigned to a given civil jurisdiction are usually subordinated to, or "placed at the disposition of," the responsible civilian official in charge of the jurisdiction. Thus, the

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Ministry of the Interior places Republican Security Companies at the disposition of the Delegation General. The Delegation General places State Police companies and mobile brigades of the Criminal Police at the disposition of the departmental prefects. The prefects in turn delegate their responsibilities to subprefects and mayors. The Ministry of the Armed Forces similarly places gendarmery personnel at the disposition of civil authorities throughout Algeria. This procedure is also followed when it is necessary to supplement the police forces of an area in an emergency situation. When law and order break down to a point at which army units must be brought in, these units too may be placed at the disposition of the prefect or subprefect. Where large numbers of troops are required for long periods, as has been the case in much of Algeria since late 1954, it has been the practice to replace civilian authority by military authority. Many posts of prefect in Algeria have been filled for varying periods of time by army officers, although all prefects are now civilians.

The Algerian penal system, like that of France, is governed by the French Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. The Penal Code defines law violations and their punishment; the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth procedures by which persons are brought to justice, tried, and punished. French law recognizes three general types of offenses: 1) *crimes*, which include felonies such as arson, murder, and serious acts involving the security of the state; 2) *délits*, which roughly correspond to lesser crimes and misdemeanors in Anglo-Saxon law; and 3) *contraventions*, or minor infractions.

The outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 brought an increase in the number and character of criminal acts committed in Algeria, and posed serious problems to the French and Algerian authorities in restoring and maintaining order. These problems were aggravated by several factors, including the chronic inadequacy of administration by the French in much of the territory and their reluctance, at least in the early and critical stages of the uprising, to consider the rebellion as other than an increase in individual crimes and acts of terrorism. The judicial establishment then, as now, was similar to that of the metropole, but the courts were soon overwhelmed by the volume of cases arising out of the rebellion, which nevertheless had to be investigated and tried under ordinary judicial procedures. The Law of Special Powers in Algeria (*Loi sur les Pouvoirs Spéciaux en Algérie*) of March 16, 1956, enacted by the Mollet government, attempted to adapt the administration of French justice to the emergency in Algeria by giving competence—though not sole

competence—to the military courts and increasing the number of chambers in each court. Subsequent decrees passed under authority of this law increased the number of military courts in Algeria from 3 to 13, and further extended their competence to include every type of criminal act (*crimes* and *délits*) committed against the external security of the state or committed "for the purpose of giving direct or indirect aid to the rebels." The burden of the courts would have been even heavier if the law had not permitted the administrative internment without trial or other judicial procedure of thousands of persons suspected of complicity in the rebellion.

Three separate detention systems function in Algeria: the regular prison system, under the Ministry of Justice; the Transit and Screening Centers and Civilian Internment Centers, under the control of the Delegation General and the prefects; and the Military Internment Centers, under army control. The regular Algerian prisons are old, overcrowded, and inadequate in many respects. Plumbing is rudimentary or lacking. In some prisons there have been chronic epidemics. Though medical and hospital facilities are fair to good, they are overburdened. Institutions for juvenile delinquents are under the supervision of a separate Directorate of Supervised Education within the Ministry of Justice. Conditions in them are more satisfactory than in the prisons. Many modern techniques for caring for and reclaiming delinquent children are in use.

Reports of harsh practices and conditions at many of the internment centers in Algeria, mainly in some of the 80 or more civilian Transit and Screening Centers, in which persons allegedly or actually associated with the rebellion are initially confined, have occasioned concern in France and elsewhere. French military officers have been charged with, and some have admitted, employing torture in the interrogation of prisoners. Other charges include illegal detention of prisoners and unhealthful and seriously deficient conditions at detention installations. Thousands of persons whose activities are deemed dangerous to the security of the state are detained in Civilian Internment Centers and elsewhere without trial or conviction of any offense, under the authority of legislation granting the government emergency powers in Algeria.

The French Government has invited or permitted about a dozen investigations of internment conditions in Algeria since the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954, seven of which were carried out by committees of the International Red Cross. These inspections have invariably confirmed the existence of the practices and conditions charged, including torture and illegal detention of prison-

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ers. The latest report, dated December 15, 1959, noted some improvement over conditions reported by a previous inspection team that had visited internment centers in Algeria in 1958.

B. Police system

The first Algerian police services, patterned after those of metropolitan France, were established in 1844 in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran. Their strength was insufficient to maintain order in the areas outside the principal cities, and French military units eventually had to be called upon to assume, under civil administrative guidance, responsibility for many police functions. Since that time, though the Algerian police forces have been steadily increased and strengthened, the increments have never been sufficient to permit the army's role in the maintenance of public order to be ended. In recent years, the line between military and civil police authority has been blurred, particularly in the areas outside the major cities. Various paramilitary bodies acting in the countryside have operated alternately under civilian and military control as the public order situation has oscillated between comparative quiet and widespread disorder. Since the beginning of the nationalist rebellion in November 1954, civil and military police functions have become practically indistinguishable as police and army units have acted under joint command to oppose nationalist military action and to counter terrorist activities.

Until January 1955, the Algerian police were autonomous, that is, they were under the sole control of the Governor General, and personnel was not interchangeable with the police of France. By a decree of January 20, 1955, however, the Algerian police were integrated into the overall French police system under the General Directorate of National Security (*Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale*—DGSN), commonly known as the *Sûreté Nationale* (SN), in the Ministry of the Interior. (See NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54, for details of police organization in metropolitan France). Appropriate additional legislation, notably decrees of January 26, 1955, June 4, 1957, and December 10, 1958, set forth the conditions of the integration of the several Algerian services into the corresponding units of the *Sûreté*. The reorganization was intended in part to assist the central government in restraining the autonomous Algerian police in their sometimes brutal repressive measures against the local Algerian population, and to strengthen the operation and increase the general efficiency of the police by making possible the orderly reinforcement of the often hard-pressed units in Algeria by trained units not immediately required in the metropole.

An unexpected result of this reorganization was to loosen the control of the civilian authorities in Algiers over the police without actually bringing the latter under close supervision in Paris. The extensive delegation of police powers to the military, and the appointment of an army colonel—Yves Godard—to the top security post in Algeria after the May 1958 uprising, had the effect of further diluting supervision of any sort over the police services, which were then fully responsible to no single organization. This serious defect became fully apparent at the time of the January 1960 insurrection. Neither the Delegation General nor the central government appears to have been sufficiently well informed in advance of the plot, of which scores of police, army officers, and civilians were at least aware.

After the collapse of the insurrection, the central government announced plans for the complete reorganization of the Algerian police. Control was returned to civilian hands by the replacement of Colonel Godard, and the organization was placed under the full, and presumably exclusive, control and authority of the Delegation General. By apparent coincidence, an order of the French Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*), dated January 29, 1960, lent support to the government's action: the order in effect held null and void the decree of January 1955, which originally integrated the Algerian police into the *Sûreté Nationale*, on the ground that a law, rather than a decree, would have been required for such an action. At the same time, the influence of the *Sûreté Nationale* in the Algerian police was strengthened by the transfer of many high-ranking officials from the metropole to key positions in the Algerian security organization, a move apparently aimed at securing tighter control of the latter for the central government.

Thus the Directorate of General Security in Algeria (*Direction de la Sûreté Générale en Algérie*—DSGA), commonly known as the National Security Agency in Algeria (*Sûreté Nationale en Algérie*—SNA), remains the top civilian security organization of Algeria and exercises the Delegation General's responsibility for the maintenance of public order and respect for the law. The organization of the SNA (see FIGURE 54-1) differs only slightly from that of the SN in the metropole (see NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54, under *Sûreté Nationale*). It is headed by a Director (*Directeur*), who is assisted by a staff director (*Chef de Cabinet du Directeur*) and an assistant to the latter (*Adjoint au Chef du Cabinet*). The Director serves as the principal adviser to the Delegation General on all security questions. The SNA is divided into three main sections: the Subdirection of Active Services (*Sous-direction des Serv-*

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


FIGURE 54-1. ORGANIZATION OF POLICE SERVICES IN ALGERIA, JUNE 1960

ices Actifs); the Subdirectorate of General Investigation (*Sous-direction des Renseignements Généraux*—RG); and the Subdirectorate of the Administrative Services (*Sous-direction des Services Administratifs*). Each subdirectorate has dependent services, as indicated in FIGURE 54-1. The Subdirector of Administrative Services acts for the Director in the absence of the latter. The SNA shares with the prefectural authorities responsibility for the operation and activities of the so-called external services (*services extérieurs*), the uniformed state and municipal police units attached to the departments and communes. It also supervises, directly, the employment of the Republican Security Companies (*Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité*—CRS) and, indirectly, the gendarmery, which are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General by, respectively, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The uniforms of all these services are generally the same as those of their counter-

parts in the metropole. (For photographs, see NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54.)

Various emergency military and paramilitary forces created, trained, and controlled by the French Army supplement the work of the SNA in the countryside and to varying extents overlap and replace SNA authority in the cities. The Territorial Units were, until their dissolution in March 1960, foremost among such forces. Other organizations still in existence include the Urban Protection Units, the *Harkás*, and the farm and village autodefense units.

In newly pacified areas in the Algerian mountains and in underadministered areas in both the countryside and the cities, Specialized Administrative Sections and Urban Administrative Sections (see below) respectively share responsibility with the army and the SNA for the maintenance of order. The Specialized Administrative Sections have their own security forces, the *Maghzens*.

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1. Organization and jurisdiction of forces for the suppression of crime

a. REGULAR POLICE FORCES

(1) *Directorate of General Security in Algeria (DSGA)* — The organization of the DSGA, commonly known as the National Security Agency in Algeria (*Sûreté Nationale en Algérie—SNA*), closely parallels that of the metropolitan *Sûreté Nationale (SN)*, with the various echelons of the former generally ranking one step below their SN counterparts. Thus, the Directorate of General Security in Algeria corresponds to the General Directorate of National Security in France, and Algerian subdirectorates and services correspond respectively to metropolitan directorates and subdirectorates. Total number of SNA members is estimated at 20,000. Accurate and complete information is not available on the relative strengths of the component services of the SNA; FIGURE 54-2 presents the available data on this subject.

(a) **SUBDIRECTORATE OF ACTIVE SERVICES** —

The Subdirectorate of Active Services comprises the Central Office of the Criminal Police (*Service Central de la Police Judiciaire—PJ*) and the Central Office of Public Safety (*Service Central de la Sécurité Publique—SP*). The Active Services are also responsible for coordinating the work of the units of the Territorial Surveillance Directorate (*Direction Active de la Surveillance du Territoire—DST*), which are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General by the Ministry of the Interior.

1) Central Office of Criminal Police (PJ) — The PJ, a plainclothes police service, has the same responsibilities and is organized along approximately the same lines as the PJ in the metropole. It is responsible for the detection and suppression of crime, the investigation of all criminal, narcotic, and financial infractions of the law, acts of sabotage, and, generally, for the security of the state. Available information identifies only 408 SNA officers as PJ personnel, but full PJ strength is undoubtedly greater. Under French law, all mayors, police superintendents of whatever service, gendarmerie officers, examining magistrates, and police inspectors are ex-officio members of the PJ. Commissioners of the PJ in charge of mobile brigades are empowered to call upon state and municipal police and gendarmerie personnel in their areas for assistance.

The PJ is organized into a headquarters group (*Service Central*) and a field force of 30 or more mobile brigades assigned throughout Algeria. At the headquarters level, information on criminal activities is exchanged with other services; liaison with the International Commission of Criminal Police (Interpol) is maintained; the Criminal

FIGURE 54-2. STRENGTH OF ALGERIAN POLICE UNITS, MID-1959

REGULAR POLICE FORCES	
National Security Agency in Algeria (SNA) (includes the following totals of personnel identifiable with specific component services):	
Criminal Police (PJ).....	408
On "detached service" with DST.....	50
General Investigation services (RG).....	na
State Police.....	est 8,000
Central Police Administration.....	na
Mobile Security Groups (100 groups).....	9,329
Total SNA.....	est 20,000
Republican Security Companies (CRS) (18 companies).....	3,683
Gendarmerie Tenth Military Region:	
10th Legion of Departmental Gendarmerie.....	} 8,901
10th bis Legion of Departmental Gendarmerie.....	
10th ter Legion of Departmental Gendarmerie.....	
10th Legion Mobile Gendarmerie.....	
Municipal Police: Northern Algeria.....	na
Municipal Police in Saharan Algeria.....	*850
OTHER FORCES ENGAGED IN THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER	
Territorial Police and Urban Protection Units.....	est 120,000
Harkas.....	est 60,000
Autodéfense Units (1,200).....	est 26,000
Special Administrative Sections (SAS) (641 installations).....	2,119
Muslim protective forces attached to SAS (<i>Moghaznis</i>).....	19,600

na Data not available.

* Based on French data, mid-1957.

Identity Service (*Service d'Identité Judiciaire*) maintains complete criminal files for Algeria; separate sections handle felonies, matters pertaining to the security of the state, and infractions of economic and fiscal regulations, including smuggling and customs violations. Mobile brigades throughout Algeria operate under one of the three chief superintendents of mobile brigades (*commissaire, chef des brigades mobiles*) with headquarters, respectively, in Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, seats of the three Courts of Appeal. The organization of the mobile brigades follows the metropolitan pattern. Each brigade is commanded by a police superintendent (*commissaire*); its strength varies, with the requirements of the sector, from 8 to 21 men: 2 to 6 police officers (*officiers de police*), 1 to 5 inspectors (*inspecteurs*), and 5 to 10 agents (*agents divers*). The mobile brigades are at the disposition of the Algerian prefects (see below, under External Services).

As shown in FIGURE 54-1, the PJ functions under the judiciary service. Officers of the PJ assist the public prosecutors (*procureurs de la République*) in the investigation of criminal acts. On their own initiative they make preliminary investigations of crimes brought to their attention

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by an injured party, a third party, or by administrative officials, reporting their findings to the prosecutor within three days. Alternatively, an examining magistrate (*juge d'instruction*) may refer a reported criminal act to a commissioner of the PJ, who thereupon becomes responsible for conducting a full investigation of the crime, including subpoenaing and interrogating witnesses. When the investigation is complete, the dossier is returned to the examining magistrate for appropriate disposition. The PJ may thus be called in or recalled on a criminal investigation at any stage up to its final referral to hearing (*audience*).

2) Central Office of Public Safety (SP) — The SP coordinates the employment and activities of the various State Police units assigned to commissariats throughout Algeria (see below, under State Police). It also controls the four-company State Police Mobile Reserve, which is available for despatch in support of other State Police units as required. The Central Office of Public Safety has responsibility for the location, organization, and personnel strength of police installations (*commissariats* or *hôtels de Police*) and the delimitation of areas of jurisdiction of police commissariats. It collaborates with PJ, the Subdirectorate of General Investigation, and other services of the SNA on matters dealing with the personnel of these services operating in SP installations. The equipping, maintenance, and staffing of commissariats is the responsibility of the Subdirectorate of Administrative Services.

3) Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) — One DST brigade under a divisional commissioner (*commissaire divisionnaire*), with headquarters at Algiers, is stationed in Algeria. Little information is available on the strength of the brigade, but it is known that some 50 officers of the SNA are "on detached service" with the DST, supplementing whatever personnel is sent out from France. The DST in Algeria is theoretically at the disposal of the Delegate General, and its officers work within the framework of the SNA. In fact, however, the DST operates almost solely under the direction of the *Sûreté Nationale* in Paris. It undertakes investigations at the request of the departmental prefects or of the Delegation General, but reports its findings directly to DST headquarters in Paris as well as to the requesting office. The general responsibilities of the DST in Algeria are similar to those it has in the metropole. (See NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 56, under Directorate of Territorial Surveillance.) As the principal security service of the Republic, it is responsible for the control and suppression of foreign espionage within French territory. Its activities include the

surveillance of mail to and from Algeria, the surveillance of foreigners, and the interrogation of French employees of foreign consular offices. The DST operates fixed and semifixed radio direction-finding centers in Algeria, and has radio compass vehicles at its disposal to pinpoint clandestine radio broadcasting stations within general areas indicated by the direction-finding centers.

(b) SUBDIRECTORATE OF GENERAL INVESTIGATION (RG) — The RG is responsible for keeping the Delegation General informed on political, social, and economic developments in Algeria. It has a headquarters echelon at Algiers, a central office in each department under an officer of police superintendent rank, and subordinate posts in each major city. At the headquarters level are the Office of Central Files (*Fichier Central*); the Service of Regulations and Documentation of Foreigners (*Service de la Réglementation et des Etrangers*); the Central Office of Information (*Service Central d'Information*); and the Central Office of Air and Frontier Police (*Service Central de la Police de l'Air et des Frontières*—PAF). The Office of Central Files is the principal file organization of the SNA; the PJ files and the files of all other police services (for example, identity files and foreigners' registration files) constitute subordinate sections of the RG Central Files. The Office of Central Files is responsible for coordinating all criminal and administrative investigations in Algeria and for SNA liaison with the metropolitan police and Interpol. Sections dealing with possession of firearms, associations and movements of foreigners, and the operation of casinos and stadiums are in the Service of Regulations and Documentation of Foreigners. Within the Central Office of Information there are separate sections concerned with surveillance of political activities, sociological development, financial matters, and press, radio, and films. Sections concerned with the movement of persons into and out of Algeria, and the operation of airports and frontier posts are under the PAF. Each departmental central office controls all RG operations within its department. Representatives of departmental RG units are located at police commissariats in principal cities in each department, and at all international airports and frontier posts in Algeria. The PAF and other field units of the subdirectorate are at the disposal of the Algerian prefects.

(c) SUBDIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES — This subdirectorate operates the personnel, budget, social, and medical services of the SNA. The headquarters of the Mobile Security Groups (see below) is also located in this subdirectorate. The Service of Personnel has four sections, dealing, respectively, with 1) officer and spe-

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cial personnel, 2) uniformed personnel, 3) recruitment and training, and 4) personnel regulations, staffing, and legal matters.

(d) EXTERNAL SERVICES—The external services are those services which are placed by the SNA at the disposition of the prefects of the Algerian departments, in much the same manner as metropolitan units (for example, CRS companies, SN personnel, and gendarmerie) are placed by their respective ministries at the disposition of the Delegation General. The external services include the mobile brigades of the Criminal Police, the Air and Frontier Police and other field units of the subdirectorates of General Investigation, the State Police, municipal police units, and the Mobile Security Groups. The SNA retains supervisory and assignment authority over these units (except municipal police units), but for more effective administration all police units serving in a department are ordinarily placed at the disposition of the prefect and act under his control. The prefect in turn may delegate to his subprefects his authority over units assigned to their *arrondissements* (subprefectural jurisdictions). Municipal police units are recruited and paid by the municipal authorities but are subject to the ultimate control of the SNA, which has overriding responsibility in the field of public order. Municipal police units are being gradually amalgamated into the State Police.

Three quasi-police services, discussed below, operate in close collaboration with the external services: the gendarmerie; the Urban Protection Units (DPU); and the *Maghzens*, a volunteer Muslim force assigned to assist and protect the officers and the work of the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS).

1) State Police — The State Police (*Police d'Etat*) are responsible for the maintenance of order and the enforcement of law in the centers of population and along public roads. Roughly analogous to the public safety police (*police de sécurité publique*) of the metropole, they cooperate with, and often work under the control of the criminal police and officers of the RG. State Police units are organized into central and police commissariats (*commissariats de police*) and assigned to subprefectures throughout Algeria and to the Saharan prefectures. A mobile reserve unit of four companies, available for despatch in support of police commissariats as required, was established in Algiers in 1954. State Police personnel receive training in police work at the police school at Hussein Dey, on the outskirts of Algiers. The strength of the uniformed State Police is estimated at 8,000. The number, however, is increased each year as additional units of municipal

police are amalgamated into State Police ranks (*éstatisés*).

2) Municipal Police Units—A large number of uniformed municipal police are recruited, trained, and paid by the smaller communal governments. They perform the same functions as the State Police. Mayors, who exercise police powers under the general supervision of prefectural general secretaries in charge of police matters (see FIGURE 54-1), use the municipal police to enforce the law, investigate crimes, and apprehend violators within their jurisdictions. Units of the municipal police are constantly being amalgamated into the State Police. In the 1960 budget, provision is made for the incorporation of 23 municipal units into the State Police, and 444 SNA officers and noncommissioned officers were designated to train these units.

3) Mobile Security Groups — The Mobile Security Groups (*Groupes Mobiles de Sécurité—GMS*) are the successors of the Mobile Rural Protection Groups (*Groupes Mobiles de Protection Rurale—GMPR*), a type of rural constabulary created in Algeria in January 1955 to strengthen the forces of public order in rural areas. By the end of 1955 the number of groups had grown to 64, and the number of police to 6,000. By late 1959 a further increase to 9,500 men in 100 groups had occurred, and the GMPR were renamed Mobile Security Groups. The GMS are recruited mainly from among the ranks of Muslim veterans. They are uniformed and paid by the SNA and trained by special army personnel on detached service with the SNA. As with other police forces, units are placed at the disposition of subprefects throughout Northern Algeria, and fulfill a variety of missions ranging from actual military combat in the field in cooperation with army and gendarmerie units to guard duty at shelter camps. A typical GMS field group is composed of:

- 10 officers
- 13 noncommissioned officers
- 6 radio operators
- 6 drivers
- 60 fighting men

Usual equipment includes individual firearms, 2 jeeps, 1 or 2 trucks, radios, and additional armament and motorized and electronic equipment as required by the particular mission.

(2) *Republican Security Companies* (CRS) — The Republican Security Companies in Algeria are units of the *Sûreté Nationale* that are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General in Algeria and assigned by it, in turn, to the supervision of the SNA, which handles all of the Delegation General's police responsibilities. The CRS constitutes an elite uniformed police service

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in Algeria. It is patterned on the CRS of the metropole, which furnished the original training personnel for its organization, and it fulfills most of the same missions. The CRS forces are available to reinforce the local police in emergencies, and furnish personnel to train the newly created units. CRS officers and noncommissioned officers are in charge of training at the State Police School at Hussein Dey, near Algiers. In the past, CRS units in Algeria have participated in joint operations with CRS companies sent from the metropole.

The first three CRS companies reached Algeria from metropolitan France in 1952. They were rotated and replaced by other companies from the metropole during the following two years, maintaining approximately the same strength, until the outbreak of the rebellion in November 1954. During the first week of that month, 17 companies were dispatched to Algeria by the Ministry of the Interior, including 11 by airlift, in response to the urgent request of the Governor General for assistance in restoring order. To permit the return of the metropolitan units to France, the central government and the Algerian administration in February 1956 decided to establish organic, that is, locally recruited, CRS units. Four Autonomous Reserve Companies (*Compagnies Autonomes de Réserve*—CAR), which had been established in Algeria in October 1954, were reorganized into the first 2 organic CRS companies: numbers 193 and 194. In the following year, 6 new companies having been activated, a Central Group Headquarters was set up at Algiers, and the 10th, 11th, and 12th CRS Groups were established, respectively, at Oran, Algiers, and Constantine. Though the organic companies are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General in Algeria, these units actually constitute an integral part of the CRS establishment within the *Sûreté Nationale* in the Ministry of the Interior. As of January 1, 1960, 18 organic CRS companies and 4 motorcycle squads, with a total strength of about 4,000, were assigned to the three Algerian Groups and their Central headquarters as follows:

- Central Group Headquarters, Algiers:
 - (1 motorcycle squad in general reserve)
- 10th CRS Group, headquarters at Oran:
 - 195th and 203rd CRS companies at Oran
 - 1 motorcycle squad at Oran
 - 197th (Mostaganem)
 - 207th (Tlemcen)
 - 210th (Ain Témouchent)
- 11th CRS Group, headquarters at Algiers:
 - 193rd and 204th CRS companies (Algiers)
 - 1 motorcycle squad attached to 193rd (Algiers)
 - 198th (Blida)
 - 206th (Affreville)
 - 211th (Tizi Ouzou)

- 12th CRS Group, headquarters at Constantine:
 - 192nd and 205th CRS companies (Constantine)
 - 1 motorcycle squad attached to 192nd (Constantine)
 - 194th (Bougie)
 - 196th and 208th (Bône)
 - 199th (Sétif)
 - 209th (Batna)
 - 212th (Philippeville)

CRS personnel are quartered in military-type barracks. Each company is commanded by a captain (*commandant principal*), who is assisted by 4 officers in charge of sections (*officers principaux*), and an assistant peace officer (*officier adjoint de la paix*). Noncommissioned personnel include 4 sergeants-major (*brigadiers-chef*), 22 sergeants (*brigadiers*), 1 company clerk (*sténodactylographe*), 6 service personnel (*agents de service*), 1 laborer, and 178 enlisted men (*sous-brigadiers, gardiens*). A motorcycle squad is under the command of 1 officer; enlisted personnel include a sergeant-major, 3 sergeants, and 21 corporals and privates. Each CRS company has 15-20 trucks of all kinds, 6 jeeps, and 10-15 self-contained radios; all motorcycle squad personnel have motorcycles. Armament includes pistols, machine guns, and tear grenades.

With the creation of the local CRS companies, the units sent out from the metropole were gradually withdrawn. The number of metropolitan companies had been reduced from 20 immediately after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954 to 6 by January 1958. By October of the same year, all metropolitan units had been returned to France.

The CRS has established a notable record in Algeria. Used in conjunction with the gendarmerie, the DST, and army units, it has assisted in rounding up terrorists and controlling rioting elements in the cities, and has efficiently controlled traffic on the highways. The CRS is widely known and respected for its competence in controlling riots. It is significant that, during the rioting of May 1958 in Algiers, plotters against the Fourth Republic, including certain army officers, first arranged for the substitution of Territorial Units for the CRS forces guarding the Government General building (see FIGURE 54-3, a photo), before they gave the signal for the successful storming of the building by the mob.

(3) *Gendarmerie* — Three legions of Departmental Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie Départementale*—GD)—the 10th (Algiers), the 10th bis (Oran), and the 10th ter (Constantine)—and one legion of Mobile Gendarmerie (*Gendarmerie Mobile*—GM), the 10th (Algiers), are assigned to Algeria, the 10th military region of France. (All legions in the same military region have the same numerical designation. They are distinguished

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- NSA
- OSD
- STATE
- SENATE
- TREAS
- USAF
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FIGURE 54-3. CRS FORCES GUARD GOVERNMENT GENERAL BUILDING, ALGIERS, MAY 1958

from each other by the use of *bis* [second], *ter* [third], etc.) Regional headquarters are at Algiers. Total gendarmery strength in Algeria was 8,901 at the end of 1959; this figure was expected to be increased to approximately 10,000 during 1960. The gendarmery is recruited, trained, and administered by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, but placed at the disposition of the civil authorities—prefects, subprefects, and mayors—to aid in law enforcement. The gendarmery may perform any of the missions of the municipal police or State Police. It may also act as military police. Its civilian functions include the maintenance of public safety and security in rural districts and along the main arteries of communication. Gendarmery personnel often work under PJ officers in the detection and apprehension of criminals; all officers and certain noncommissioned officers of the service are ex-officio PJ officers. Organized along military lines, the gendarmery is commanded by picked career military officers. The smallest unit is the brigade, varying from 6 to 60 men according to the importance of the district. The brigade is commanded by a sergeant major; 5 to 15 brigades make up a section, under a lieutenant; all sections in 1 department comprise a company, under a squadron chief (*chef d'escad-*

ron). Finally, 2 to 4 companies make up a legion, which is commanded by a colonel.

b. OTHER FORCES ENGAGED IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER — In addition to the regular police forces, the situation arising from the rebellion in Algeria has led to the creation of a number of other full-time and part-time forces to support police action. The best known of these organizations was the part-time Territorial Units (*Unités Territoriales—UT*), composed mainly of Europeans but including Muslims also. These units were legally dissolved as of March 1, 1960, after the collapse of the unsuccessful settlers' revolt of January 24, 1960, because it was found that the revolt had received much active and passive support from the UT's. Most of their members, however, have been retained in "reservist units," which do periodic tours of active duty. Existing quasi-police organizations include: Urban Protection Units (*Dispositifs de Protection Urbaine—DPU*); the paramilitary Muslim auxiliary forces called *Harkas*; autodefense units; and the forces associated with the Specialized Administrative Sections, the *Maghzens*. In addition to these, an undetermined number of quasi-official and private organizations made up largely of European settlers, all allegedly dedicated to the maintenance of order, have sprung up, particularly in the cities. Some of them have enjoyed brief official approval, or were incorporated into official organizations, notably the UT's; others have been officially banned, have gone underground, or have simply disappeared.

(1) *Territorial Units (UT)* — The Algerian administration early in 1956 created the militia-type Territorial Units in an effort to combat rebel terrorism in the cities. All Algerian males of European descent up to the age of 48 were required to devote 1 day every 2 weeks to local guard duties. In emergencies, such as riots, disasters, or other civilian disturbances, Territorials were subject to call for further service. Armed and trained under army supervision, Territorials served at various key installations in most cities. Two armored units (*Unités Territoriales Blindées*) were created. The strength of the UT was estimated at between 100,000 and 110,000 men at its peak, providing an average daily duty strength of about 7,000. Owing to the nature of the operation, however, several times that number could be mobilized in a relatively short time to handle anticipated demonstrations or other emergencies. Algerians of Muslim extraction were later accepted into UT ranks, and at the time of the dissolution of the organization there were an estimated 7,000 Muslim Territorials. Opinions on the military value of the UT varied. Supporters of the system claimed that the units freed the equivalent of two regular

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Army divisions for duty elsewhere. But whatever the value of these forces in dealing with Muslim rebels, their dependability in the face of European-led demonstrations was obviously questionable. Even before the revolt of January 1960 conclusively proved the unreliability of the UT, the European demonstrations of June 11, 1957, and of May 13, 1958, showed the indifference if not the actual collaboration of the UT with the demonstrators. Reports indicate that the dissolution of the UT may have been more formal than real and that its members have retained their arms and, more or less clandestinely, their organization. What has remained of the UT since its formal dissolution is a potentially subversive force against the government but no longer a police force.

(2) *Urban Protection Units (DPU)* — The first DPU's were organized at Algiers in January 1957 by Captain Maurice Hilly and Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier, both of whom later became prominent figures in the Algerian Committees of Public Safety and the army revolt of May 13, 1958. Called at first Urban Protection Groups (*Groupes de Protection Urbaine*—GPU), the name was quickly changed to Urban Protection Units (DPU) because of the undesirable association of the initials GPU with the Soviet secret police. An organization primarily of Algerians of European background, the DPU was set up to collect information on civil disturbances and threats to public order, and to provide an armed reserve which, like the UT, could be quickly mobilized in emergencies to perform police duties. In March 1957, Serge Baret, then Inspector General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission (*Inspecteur Général de l'Administration en Mission Extraordinaire*—IGAME) (see this Chapter, SECTION 52, under Regional Government) in Algiers, published an order extending the DPU to other cities in the prefecture. Under the terms of the order, Europeans and Muslims who were not yet incorporated or who were not subject to incorporation into the Territorial Units were subject to draft into the DPU's. The DPU's were armed with small caliber weapons and organized into sections under joint police (civil) and military control. The first sections, in Algiers, were placed under a battalion commander of the 10th paratroop division of the army for training and deployment. A police commissioner was attached to each section to provide a legal cloak for its activities and to attempt to ensure that the section did not exceed its authority. The total strength of the DPU eventually reached approximately 10,000 in the Algiers area, including 80 block leaders, 800 building leaders, and over 8,000 members. The DPU's are charged with the protection of goods, persons, and installations within limited block defense areas

throughout the city. At first authorized to use their arms only within their defense areas, DPU members eventually came to be used to control and organize demonstrations, releasing CRS units for duties elsewhere. Most of the European DPU members, and many of the Muslims, are army veterans. Muslim units are said to number in their ranks many former rebels. Released from prisons and shelter camps to serve with the DPU "Muslim police," the former rebels extend a highly effective police and informer network into the Muslim quarters of Algiers.

A DPU women's auxiliary was created in February 1959. Members serve on a full- or part-time basis. Full-time duties include searching female Muslim suspects for the police and army, while part-time recruits devote three periods per week to attending lectures on civil defense (that is, antiterrorism) matters by army officers.

(3) *Harkas* — The paramilitary Muslim auxiliary forces known as *Harkas* are becoming increasingly important among the forces of order in Algeria. Considered the best solution to the problem of countering rebel activities in outlying areas, the number of *Harkis* (individual members of *Harkas*) has been increased from a few thousands in 1957 to approximately 60,000 in mid-1959. Recruited, trained, and equipped by the army, their primary mission is combat in the field against rebel detachments, although they are often placed at the disposition of the Special Administrative Sections (SAS) and work closely with the *Maghzens* (see below), which also support the SAS.

Harkis are organized into *Harkas*, which vary in size from a platoon to a company. There were approximately 700 *Harkas* in existence at the end of 1959. The usual detachment numbers 40-50 men under the command of an army lieutenant or captain. Several French noncommissioned officers assist the commanding officer. *Harkis* are well paid by Algerian standards. They may be recruited locally in a given area, or from prisoners won over from the rebellion to the French cause. Muslim Algerians released from the army are also recruited into the *Harkas*. The immediate families of *Harkis* live in army-built huts in a military camp which protects them from rebel countermeasures, and also deters *Harki* defections, of which reportedly there are very few.

Harkis are sometimes employed as local intelligence collectors and as guides and scouts in army operations. Those with local relatives often obtain valuable information on rebel activities through this source. *Harkas* often pursue small rebel bands. Ex-rebels recruited as *Harkis* are particularly skilled in rebel tactics and in recov-

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ering arms cached by the rebels. Thoroughly familiar with the terrain in the area, *Harkis* are an asset to French army units conducting local operations. *Harkis* are frequently horse- or camel-mounted; but many ride in jeeps or operate on foot, according to the terrain.

(4) *Autodefense units* — The concept of civilian self-defense against rebel attacks developed early in 1956, when the problem of protecting isolated European-owned farms and Muslim villages from terrorist attack became acute. An estimated 68% of the 4,300 isolated farms in the Oran region were abandoned between the outbreak of the rebellion and late 1956, and an additional 7% were destroyed by the rebels. Although comparable figures are not available for the other areas of Algeria, it is probable that they were as high or higher elsewhere, notably in the Constantine region. In addition, entire villages frequently became centers for rebel intelligence collection and sources of supply. To check this trend, the army was authorized to organize an autodefense system for farms and to raise and arm village home guards for the local defense of their villages.

The farm defense system is employed for the most part in valleys, where farms are close together and substantially constructed. A cavalry regiment, or other highly mobile army units, may include as many as 50 autodefense units in its subsector, all of which are plotted on a large-scale operations map at unit headquarters. A single autodefense unit is built around a central farm (*ferme pilote*) situated on high ground. A concrete observation tower, approximately 40 feet high, is located on the central farm. It is then ascertained which of the neighboring farms can be directly observed from the tower, and this determines the perimeter of the unit. A plotting diagram is maintained in the tower showing the distance and the direction of the neighboring farms which are occupied and also those which contain farm buildings but which are not occupied. The central farm is generally surrounded by barbed wire, and has radio communication with the military unit assigned to its protection. The towers normally are not manned during daylight hours but are constantly manned from sunset to sunrise. Guards are civilians, usually Muslims, and they have no other duties. Noncentral farms are also heavily armed. Rosters and logs are kept; all unusual sounds and occurrences are entered. Night inspections are made by military patrols at intervals of three or four nights, and these inspections too are entered in the log book. Army units assigned to autodefense duties can reach the most remote unit within a half hour. The farmers themselves bear all the direct costs

of the autodefense system, including all materials and payment of the civilian guards. It is estimated that the program costs many farmers as much as 10,000 new francs (about US\$2,000) per year.

The army proceeded very cautiously with the arming of Muslim guards in villages and regroupment centers. While some villages were reluctant to draw rebel attention to themselves by accepting French arms, the real difficulty lay in army fears that arms issued to the villages would find their way into rebel hands. Preliminary experiments were inconclusive. Some village and regroupment center guards promptly defected to the rebels with their weapons. In other cases, suspiciously high rates of arms "losses" and ammunition consumption rates were reported. After a slow start, however, the number of villages brought under the system has increased rapidly, more than doubling each year. The number rose from 240 in mid-1957 to 577 in August 1958, and to over 1,500 by May 1960. The average size of a village autodefense unit is 20-30 men. An estimated 26,000 villagers were under arms at the end of 1959. Guards are generally unpaid; they are armed with shotguns, and usually wear identifying articles of clothing such as a sash or armband.

Despite the phenomenal growth of armed villages, the autodefense system has not completely met the original expectations of the army. Apart from individuals and units that have defected, many units, possibly the majority, have not aggressively sought out the rebels and destroyed them, even when the latter have operated fairly openly and in small groups in the vicinity. Conceding by implication that this lack of aggressiveness on the part of the home guards may have been justified in the past for a number of reasons, the French Army High Command in September 1959 called on autodefense units to pass to the offensive against the rebels. In an Order of the Day of September 22, 1959, Gen. Maurice Challe, then commander in chief of the armed forces in Algeria, asserted that the "forces of order" (the army) had broken up the rebel formations into units which the autodefense could handle, and called for "active autodefense that will radiate out, and not autodefense that is passive and shriveled up in its shell." No marked change has been observed, however, in the activities of the autodefense units.

The success of the autodefense system remains uncertain. It does not eliminate the need for military protection, although it makes protection somewhat cheaper. The army, moreover, is limited in the amount of discipline it can impose on the system. With particular reference to the farm defense system, some troop commanders

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DOJ	NSC	USAF
DSWA	NRC	USMC

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have noted acidly that many farmers leave their farms at night and go into town to sleep. As a consequence, the Muslim guards, with no supervision except the occasional patrol checks, do little guarding.

(5) *Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) and Urban Administrative Sections (SAU)* — The first Specialized Administrative Sections (*Sections Administratives Spécialisées—SAS*) were established in Algeria in October 1955. Reminiscent of the Arab Bureaus of the 19th century, the SAS were staffed by officer-volunteers from the French Army trained in Muslim affairs, and were assigned the mission of reestablishing with the Muslim population in rural communes contacts which had deteriorated since the outbreak of the rebellion. Similar units, known as Urban Administrative Sections (*Sections Administratives Urbaines—SAU*), were later established in urban areas. (See this Chapter, SECTION 52, and CHAPTER IV, SECTION 43, for further discussion of the SAS and the SAU units.) In December 1959 641 SAS and 27 SAU installations were in existence in Algeria, staffed by more than 2,000 French officials drawn from civilian ranks and active and reserve army officer ranks.

(a) SAS AND MAGHZENS — SAS installations, particularly those located in remote or recently pacified areas, are protected by detachments of *Moghaznis* called *Maghzens*. The *Moghaznis* are Muslim fighters recruited mainly from among veterans of the French Army, and trained, uniformed, and equipped by the army. The size of the *Moghazni* detachments varies with the requirements of the installation. The following table of organization planned for SAS posts destined to be installed in some 20 pacified areas in 1960 is typical of an SAS installation:

- SAS personnel (French, or Algerians of European background)
 - 1 SAS chief
 - 1 Attaché, assistant to SAS chief
 - 2 Attachés
 - 1 Noncommissioned officer
- Maghzen* personnel (Muslims)
 - 1 Chief of *Moghaznis*
 - 3 Sergeants
 - 3 Drivers
 - 23 *Moghaznis*, 1st and 2nd class

Equipment for each *Maghzen* includes 1 jeep, 1 Renault automobile, 2 supplementary vehicles, 5 or 6 mounts (camels or horses), and 1 or 2 radio sending and receiving sets.

The *Maghzens* are responsible for the protection of the SAS installation to which they are assigned. Their duties range from acting as local police and guards to tracking down rebels, though instances of *Maghzens* engaging in field combat are relatively rare, since SAS posts are usually

installed in areas deemed to have been cleared of important rebel forces. Where needed, *Maghzens* are strengthened by *Harka* units placed at the disposition of the SAS chief by the army. *Moghaznis* appear well trained and turned out, suitably armed, and able to maintain order under the guidance of their superiors. They are reasonably well paid by local standards, and morale is said to be satisfactory, with few instances reported of defections to the rebels.

(b) SAU — The SAU's operate in the larger urban areas where contact between the municipal and subprefectural authorities and the Muslim population is limited or lacking. First established in December 1957, the SAU's are patterned after the SAS in the rural areas, provide many of the same services (medical, social, employment assistance, vocational training, education, and housing), and exercise the same controls over the Muslim population (maintenance of dossiers, imposition of a curfew, operation of an identity card system, surveillance by house and block wardens). The SAU's have no special protective forces corresponding to the *Maghzens*, but rely on the local civilian police, or in some cases on army units, for protection of their installations and maintenance of order.

2. Criminological facilities and methods

The Algerian police use the same methods and have essentially the same facilities for the detection and investigation of crimes and the apprehension of criminals as the *Sûreté Nationale* of metropolitan France. These include central and criminal files, and statistical, anthropometric, photographic, fingerprinting, and scientific police laboratory facilities manned by trained personnel. Modern armament, communications equipment, and motor transport are provided to all units, though horses and camels are still in use in many remote areas.

a. FILES — The Central File Service (*Fichier Central*), within the Subdirectorate of General Investigation, is responsible for coordinating all criminal and administrative investigations in Algeria and for communication with the metropolitan and international police services. Through Central Files—which each year distributes within and outside Algeria several hundred thousand descriptions of individuals sought by the police, or expelled from or denied residence in the territory—the Criminal Police cooperates with the metropolitan service and the International Commission of Criminal Police (Interpol) in the apprehension of international criminals, the control of counterfeiting, and the suppression of the international traffic in narcotics.

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b. **METHODS OF INTERROGATION** — The Algerian police, like the metropolitan French, tend to use modern scientific techniques of crime detection less than do police in the United Kingdom or the United States. Great dependence is placed on the confession in the solution of crimes, and the widespread use of third degree methods by civilian and military authorities is well documented. In investigating cases of terrorism, some police and army officials have attempted off-the-record justification of the use of torture on the grounds that only by such methods can the authorities obtain information in time to prevent terrorist attacks. The use of torture in Algeria has given rise to widespread controversy in metropolitan France, but is little discussed in Algeria itself. The Algerian press reflects the views of the European settlers, most of whom apparently have little quarrel with any effective method of combatting the rebellion. Opposition to torture has been voiced, however, by some French socialists and teachers in Algeria and, notably, by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in the area.

c. **USE OF INFORMERS** — The police and army make considerable use of informers, both voluntary and involuntary. The former are recruited from among the population and from among the so-called "rallied rebels" (that is, rebels who have come over to the French). According to newspaper reports, prisoners released from detention camps are required as a condition of their release and under threat of severe penalties to sign a pledge to inform the military or civil authorities of any rebel activities of which they have knowledge. The amount and value of information acquired through these sources cannot be determined.

3. Identity and registration system

The metropolitan system of registration of the civil population extends to Algeria, and most Algerians figure in the records of one of the various branches of the French Government. Virtually all Algerians of European background are registered with the authorities of the place of their birth, and bear the National Identity Card (*Carte Nationale d'Identité*), or other identifying documentation. Muslim Algerians residing in the cities, in relocated villages, or in areas under SAS tutelage are also registered. One of the first acts of the SAS or SAU authorities upon installation in an area is the taking of a census and the issuance of individual identity cards to each Muslim inhabitant. This card bears a description of the subject, with photographs, fingerprints and the subject's signature or mark. Individual dossiers are thereafter maintained on each inhabitant and additional records are made whenever

the individual comes to the attention of the authorities for medical care, social or employment assistance, or disciplinary reasons. Besides identity cards, some SAU jurisdictions issue "employment cards," which are compulsory for all male wage earners in the jurisdiction between the ages of 18 and 40. This permits closer control of the so-called "idle youths" (that is, those without employment cards), who are thought to provide a fertile field for rebel recruitment.

Rigid curfew regulations, and periodic dragnet-type operations called *ratissages*, in which houses, public places, vehicles, and streets are combed for individuals—usually Muslims—not in possession of proper documentation, complement the registration procedures and aid in suppressing terrorism in the cities. Similar roundups are conducted by army units outside the cities, in areas where clashes between rebel and French troops have occurred. All male Muslims found in such areas are brought to so-called Transit and Screening Centers for identity checking and further processing.

Many officers in charge of SAS or SAU installations appoint block wardens, who are made responsible for seeing that the inhabitants of their blocks, and only they, are in their respective houses at night, unless a pass has been issued. In the Casbah of Algeria the number of inhabitants in each house is indicated in painted figures at the entrance. An act of terrorism is followed by an immediate check of every house for the proper number of occupants.

4. Techniques of riot control

The forces of order are frequently called upon to deal with riots, strikes, and other civil disturbances in the population centers of Algeria. The outbreak of the nationalist rebellion in November 1954 had the effect of drawing off to the rebels much of the militant nationalist leadership, which, prior to that time, had been active in organizing demonstrations by the Muslim population in the cities. Hence, there has been relatively little mob activity by Muslim elements in the cities since that time. Muslim protest expressed itself during 1956 and 1957 in the form of general strikes, demonstrating solidarity in support of the nationalist cause or because of fear of FLN reprisals, but by 1957 the army had developed techniques for dealing with this tactic. The strike of the summer of 1956, which involved Muslim shopkeepers as well as trade unionists, was carried off successfully. But the week-long general strike called in February 1957 was broken by the army, which forcibly opened shops closed in violation of government antistrike orders, and arrested demonstrators and trade unionists.

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Almost all instances of rioting and mob violence since 1955 have involved mainly European elements of the population, and such instances have frequently grown out of ostensibly peaceful demonstrations organized to protest some governmental action or inaction. European demonstrations against central government policies have often had the tacit or active support of local European officials and police, who, according to observers, frequently stand complacently by while crowd passions are fanned by agitators. In such circumstances, funeral processions, for example, returning from the burial of a European victim of rebel terrorism, have become rioting mobs, attacking Muslim communities and government buildings and causing great property damage.

When the civilian police are unable or unwilling to control such disturbances, CRS and army units have proven fully capable of dealing with them, when requested or permitted to do so. The army and the CRS, moreover, by reason of their great mobility, manpower reserves, strategic locations, equipment, and training, have demonstrated special competence in riot control, and probably possess the capability to deal effectively with any civilian outburst conceivable in present circumstances. The tactics employed vary with the circumstances. A favored technique is that of channeling the rioters into less important sectors of the city where the riot in effect burns itself out.

The ability of the army and the CRS to control the civil population in urban areas, however, is no guarantee of civilian order, since many doubt whether the army itself, the key element in the situation, can be relied upon in all circumstances to put down European rioters, particularly in the event of moves by the central government that the army might interpret as foreshadowing the abandonment of Algeria by France. Army officers, notably Colonels Ducasse, Trinquier (one of the organizers of the DPU's), Thomazo, and others, with the acquiescence of their superiors, became deeply involved in the disorders of May 13, 1958, which, characteristically, began as a demonstration in memory of three French soldiers executed by the rebels. Plotting to use the disorders to prevent the investiture of the Pflimlin government, which they suspected of favoring negotiation with the rebels, responsible officers not only refused to curb rioting demonstrators, but brought about the replacement of CRS units, which might have done so, by DPU units under army control. This permitted the sacking of the Government General building by European Algerians and led eventually to the collapse of the Fourth Republic. The obvious reluctance of the army to put down the European insurrectionists in Algiers in January 1960 raised again the ques-

tion of the army's loyalty to the government, though in this case the army finally obeyed General de Gaulle's order to end the uprising.

5. Civil defense

Civil defense measures in force in the metropole extend, at least in theory, to Algeria. (See NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 55, under Civil Defense, for a discussion of civil defense in the metropole.) As a practical matter, however, the authorities in Algeria are little concerned with civil defense as defined to include measures to be taken against possible threats to the external security of the country, since no important threat to Algeria from outside the country is foreseen, apart from the problems raised by the nationalist rebellion operating against Algeria from Tunisian and Moroccan territory. The limited resources available to the French authorities for civil defense are considered to be better employed in the metropole. On the other hand, the emergency that has existed in Algeria since the outbreak of the nationalist rebellion in 1954 has given rise to many typical civil defense measures. These measures include, on the part of the civilian administration, the enactment of special decrees regulating the movement and residence of persons, the bearing of arms by civilians, the right of assembly, and the control of communications including, notably, the press. The military is charged with arming and training civil defense forces and relocation and control of the Muslim communities. Among groups enforcing civil defense measures such as these are all the units of the Algerian police organization, in particular the DPU's, the autodefense units, and, prior to their dissolution in March 1960, the Territorial Units. Among civil defense-type measures that have become commonplace since the outbreak of the rebellion are: periodic halting and searching of individual vehicles; patrolling of public roads; curfews; the constitution of and the granting of special competence to military tribunals; arbitrary searches of private homes with confiscation of material of potential value to the rebellion; and the preventive detention of suspected individuals.

6. Police personnel

Before 1955 the Algerian police constituted a completely autonomous body, having the same relationship to the Government General in Algiers as the *Sûreté Nationale* to the central government. Moreover, in addition to the State Police, there existed a large number of independent municipal police systems, the personnel of which are appointed by the mayors and paid by the local governments. A series of decrees dated January 20, 1955, placed the SNA under the *Sûreté Na-*

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tionale, and set forth the conditions of integration and reclassification of the various grades of the Algerian service into the corresponding classes of the *Sûreté*. The personnel of the two systems thus became interchangeable, though most ensuing transfers involved the movement of metropolitan personnel to Algeria rather than the reverse. Personnel of the police in Algeria were considered placed at the disposal of the Government General by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the reorganization of 1960 ended this integration and returned the SNA to control of authorities in Algeria. Although many former officials of the *Sûreté* are serving with the SNA, there is now no direct relationship between the staffs of the two organizations.

Until recently, Europeans and Algerians of European background—so-called "European Algerians"—constituted the majority of the personnel of the SNA. This preponderance, however, has been reduced as more and more municipal police services, with their high proportion of Muslims, have entered the SNA through the amalgamation program. The rapid expansion of the GMS, also predominantly Muslim in personnel though generally officered by Europeans, has further contributed to this process. Control of the police, however, has remained firmly in the hands of Europeans and European Algerians, who occupy 85% to 90% of the higher positions in the police. This stems from former policies tending to limit the number of Muslims in top positions and the consequent seniority that Europeans at present generally enjoy over the relatively recently incorporated Muslims. Moreover, most Europeans have had the benefit of more education or education more suitable for administrative positions in the French civil service than the average Muslim likely to be interested in a police career.

Despite these handicaps, however, Algerian Muslim police officers are now beginning to climb through the ranks to high positions. Their progress was nominally favored by a government decree enacted March 17, 1956, to meet what was recognized as a legitimate Muslim grievance by establishing a governmental policy of encouraging the access of Muslims into the civil service, including the police. The decree and series of implementing orders established general qualifications, including French citizenship and good moral character, to be met by Muslim candidates for civil service positions, and required that fixed percentages of all new vacancies in certain classes be filled by Muslims. These measures have broadened Muslim participation in the police organization to a small extent, but they have been of less effect in this sector of administration than in some others, notably education.

The Director of General Security in Algeria and the subdirectors of the subordinate services (Active Services, General Investigation, Administrative Services) are appointed by decree of the Minister of the Interior, normally from among the prefectural corps. However, the extensive delegation of police powers in Algeria to the military resulted in the appointment in 1958 of an army colonel, Yves Godard, to the post of Director General of the SNA. Colonel Godard was replaced in February 1960 by Jacques Aubert, [REDACTED]

The most probable reason for Godard's replacement was government dissatisfaction with the handling of the January 1960 insurrection by his security forces. Subordinate police officials are also appointed by decree of the Minister of the Interior, normally from lists of successful candidates for such appointments. Noncommissioned officers are appointed by the prefects. Other noncommissioned personnel are accepted as recruits on the basis of their performance on competitive examinations, for which Muslims, as well as Europeans and European Algerians, are eligible. All positions in the municipal police are filled by appointments of the mayor. When a municipal police unit is amalgamated with the State Police, all ranks are appropriately reclassified.

The loyalty and reliability of the police are difficult to assess in the present situation, in which many individuals holding the highest positions of trust in all categories of the public service appear uncertain where their loyalties lie. The police have thus far proven loyal to, and have followed the orders of, their superiors. They can be relied on to maintain order, within the limits of their ability, if they are ordered, or permitted to do so. There is no evidence of important Communist subversion or infiltration among the police, but there have been occasional reports of rebel penetration among Muslim personnel. The morale of all services is reported good. This applies as well to the Muslim police, despite slowness of promotions and other factors that might ordinarily be expected to affect morale adversely. The legal prohibition against strikes by the police which is in effect in the metropole extends also to Algeria.

The training, indoctrination, and efficiency of the various units of the police vary; recently incorporated personnel are on the whole neither so carefully selected in the first instance nor so well trained as regular SNA personnel. Newly incorporated municipal units, however, undergo training in SNA methods and police work given by commissioned and noncommissioned officers designated for this purpose.

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7. Police schools

Personnel of the SNA who entered their respective services in the metropole and other high ranking personnel of the Algerian police have in many cases received training at one of the principal metropolitan training establishments: the National Police School (*Ecole Nationale de la Police*—ENP); the Center of Instruction and Application of the National Security Organization (*Centre d'Instruction et d'Application de la Sécurité Nationale*—CIASN); and the National Center of Combat Sports (*Centre National des Sports de Combat*). The rank and file of the Algerian police receive their training in Algeria, either in their own units or at the Police School (*Ecole de Police*) at Hussein Dey, near Algiers. Training in Algeria is of shorter duration than in the metropole and tends to be more specific. Emphasis is placed on certain phases of instruction designed to fit the emergency situation in the area, such as antiterrorist tactics, riot control, and bomb disposal.

The ENP is located at Saint-Cyr-au-Mont-d'Or (Rhône). It provides a broad cultural, theoretical, and practical program for police officers destined for posts of responsibility in the higher echelons of the *Sûreté*—the future superintendents of police—as well as practical training for subordinate officers. Trainees live at the school; the curriculum comprises three main categories of subject matter: general culture, basic professional training, and practical work. The general culture program is intended to provide a minimal cultural background for future police superintendents (*commissaires de police*). Candidates attend lectures in history, literature, science, politics, and the arts. Professional training subjects include studies in clinical criminology, police work, and organization of the police services. Practical training includes report writing, typing, driving, photography, physical training, self-defense, and lifesaving. The duration of the course is one year for police superintendent candidates (*élèves-commissaires*) and six months for police deputies (*police adjoints*) and police officers (*officiers de paix*). As of the summer of 1959, 180 students were enrolled at the school, divided among 6 sections of police deputies, 2 sections of police officers, and 1 section of student police superintendents. Observers and auditors from present and former overseas dependencies also attend.

The CIASN, located at Sens (Yonne), provides a rigorous course of practical training for selected CRS personnel. The average duration of the course is six months. The Center has facilities for approximately 600 trainees, who live in. Emphasis is on physical training, acrobatics, res-

cue work, weapons handling, and military type discipline. Special technical training is given to motorcycle squad trainees.

The National Center of Combat Sports at Plombières-lès-Dijon (Côte d'Or) offers instruction to police officials in physical self-defense techniques. Police superintendents, police officers, and inspectors are enrolled in the school, though a principal objective is the turning out of physical training specialists who can in turn assume responsibility for the physical programs of their respective units. The duration of the course varies. About 40 trainees are enrolled in each cycle. The principal subjects taught are boxing (French- and U.S.-style), jiu-jitsu, wrestling, fencing, swimming, and rescue work. Emphasis is on methods of instruction of the subjects and the adaptation of the various disciplines to police work, rather than on individual performance.

The Police School at Hussein Dey, just outside Algiers, was established in late 1954 pursuant to a Government General decree of December 1953. It offers training in basic police work to approximately 150 State Police recruits each term. The director of the school is M. Labarré. The duration of the course is approximately two months, and special emphasis is given to mine-defusing techniques and antiterrorist tactics. CRS officers and noncommissioned officers are in charge of instruction and training. One hundred seventy trainees, graduating at the 25th commencement exercises held October 5, 1959, brought to approximately 3,500 the number of police who have received training at the school.

The army operates a counter guerrilla school near Oran. It also operates a school offering special training for personnel of the DPU at Zeralda, a coastal resort town 15 miles west of Algiers, which is the headquarters of a Foreign Legion Airborne Regiment. A police school for Algerian trainees offering training in antiterrorist tactics was reportedly established near Pont Blandin in 1955 with facilities for 200 to 250 Algerian trainees. Available information does not indicate whether this school is still in operation.

8. Attitude of the public toward the police

a. EUROPEANS — The attitude of the European Algerian population toward the police in many localities is linked to the degree of success of the police in suppressing crime, and in particular nationalist terrorism. The bulk of the police leadership, drawn from Europeans and European Algerians, can in general be counted upon to sympathize with non-Muslims against Muslims. Europeans are treated, except in those rare cases of Europeans suspected of collaboration with the rebellion, with the consideration normally shown

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to residents of the metropole by the metropolitan police. Such treatment elicits reciprocal respect from the European population, which tends to regard the police as the protector of its safety, rights, and position vis-a-vis the Muslims and the rebels. Where terrorism cannot be controlled by the local police, the latter can and usually do call upon the army for help; subsequent failures thereupon tend to be associated in the minds of Europeans with the army, or with the administration, rather than with the police.

b. MUSLIMS — Largely conditioned by the rebellion, the attitude of the Muslim populace toward the police is for the most part one of fear, resentment, and passive acceptance. Caught between pressures from FLN terrorists and European extremists alike, the apparent loyalty of the Muslims shifts to whichever side appears at the moment to offer greater security. Particularly in urban centers, such as Algiers, where terrorist activity is a constant threat (see FIGURE 54-4, a photo), police tactics toward Muslims are often harsh and discriminatory, and arise partly from a lack of communication with the Muslim population and partly from frustration over police inability to deal with recurrent terrorist attacks. Large numbers of Muslims are frequently arrested in the wake of a bomb explosion or an assassination, or for no known reason. The persons arrested are often interrogated and imprisoned without trial for long periods in civil or military detention camps. Their subsequent release, if the authorities have been unable to link them with antigovernment or terrorist activity in any manner, is often labeled amnesty. In connection with the mass arrests, homes are entered without warning and all weapons and valuables of potential value to the rebellion are confiscated.



FIGURE 54-4. BARBED WIRE BARRIER TO PREVENT TERRORIST ESCAPE, CASBAH, ALGIERS, 1956

9. Ability of the police to maintain public order and safety

Since the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954, the whole problem of the restoration and maintenance of order in Algeria has been far removed from its normal framework. The police are not, nor are they expected to be, capable of coping with all, or even an important proportion, of the threats daily posed to public order by the combined challenge of ordinary crime and the complex of criminal acts growing out of the nationalist movement. In dealing with ordinary crime, in the cities and populated areas between the cities, the police appear to be competent and to discharge their duties well. Moreover, the police continue to play a part in the suppression of terrorism in the cities and in the apprehension of terrorists. Ordinary crime, however, cannot easily be separated from other attacks on public order. The long reluctance of the French Government to recognize officially the existence of a nationalist movement has further complicated the task. In the absence of an admitted civil war or nationalist rebellion, political assassins are considered to be murderers, terrorists and bomb throwers to be arsonists and criminal assailants, and rebel soldiers to be bandits. This has placed abnormal demands on the police and the judiciary, who have the responsibility in ordinary circumstances to deal with offenses against the common law. In view of the inability of the 20,000-man police force to maintain law and order everywhere in Algeria, a division of responsibilities between the police and the military has gradually come into being. The police are in general responsible for the suppressions of criminal acts of all kinds in the cities and surrounding areas, while the army and paramilitary units (*Harkas*, *Maghzens*) assume this responsibility outside the cities. Where army units are required to supplement the police in the cities, their nominal subordination to civilian control may be assured by the procedure of placing the troops at the disposition of the civilian authorities, or by appointment of military officers to civilian posts.

C. Penal system

The French penal system, which applies to Algeria, is based on the Penal Code (*Code Pénal*), which defines violations of the law and specifies punishments for them, and on the Code of Criminal Procedure (*Code de Procédure Pénale*), which outlines the procedures for bringing criminals to justice and names the officials and courts charged with their apprehension and trial (see NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54). The prison administration, under the Ministry of Justice, administers

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the national prisons, and departmental officials are in charge of the departmental prisons. Juvenile delinquents are the responsibility of the Directorate for Supervised Education, also a part of the Ministry of Justice.

By U.S. standards, the French penal system, especially as it is at present operated in Algeria, is archaic and harsh. The codes themselves appear heavily weighted in favor of the government and against the individual. Most prisons in Algeria are old; practically all are lacking in the most basic equipment, such as plumbing. All are seriously overcrowded. Many prisoners serve out their sentences, or serve periods of indefinite detention without trial, in prison barracks, detention camps, and places of confinement other than regular prisons.

1. The Penal Code

Three types of violations are recognized by French law as embodied in the Penal Code. The least serious is the *contravention*, which may be translated as infraction. These minor offenses are tried by Courts of First Instance (*Tribunaux d'Instance*), known prior to the reforms of 1958 as *Tribunaux de Paix* (Courts of the Justice of the Peace). A small fine or a jail sentence of up to two months may be imposed upon a person judged guilty of a *contravention*.

The second type of offense is the *délit*, which corresponds roughly to the Anglo-American lesser crimes and misdemeanors. A person accused of a *délit* is tried by a Court of Superior Instance (*Tribunal de Grande Instance*). Conviction may result in a term of imprisonment of up to five years, a fine, a loss of civic rights, or any combination of these three punishments.

The most serious offense is the *crime*, that is, a felony triable in the Court of Assizes or Criminal Court (*Cour d'Assises*). Conviction may result in execution, long imprisonment plus loss of civic rights, or merely loss of civic rights, according to the punishment prescribed by law for the particular *crime*. The minimum prison sentence for a person convicted of a *crime* is five years, though time spent in detention prior to sentencing is deducted from the total time to be served.

The property of persons convicted of crimes against the security of the state may be confiscated by the state, although part of it may be left to the innocent spouse of the convicted person. In addition to suffering imprisonment and loss of civic rights a person convicted of a *délit* or *crime* may be further punished by a residence prohibition (*interdiction de séjour*), which prohibits residence in the place where the crime was committed for a period of up to 20 years. The

residence prohibition may not be imposed unless the law under which the person is tried specifically so provides and unless such a penalty is assigned by the court. The residence prohibition may be cancelled by a pardon or reduced by an administrative measure. Heavier penalties are provided for recidivists than for first offenders, and habitual criminals may be confined to special institutions for life. The law also provides some attenuation of sentence in the case of minors and aged people. Special judges try juvenile offenders under special regulations.

Under French law two categories of persons may be punished for a crime: 1) those who have committed the crime and their accomplices, who are equally liable under the law; and 2) those who helped a known criminal to flee, who could have prevented a crime or aided a person in danger at no peril to themselves but refused to do so, or who failed to testify to the innocence of a person they knew to be innocent. Persons in the latter category may be convicted of a *délit* and fined or imprisoned.

The Penal Code distinguishes between crimes against the state and crimes against individuals. The former category, defined in the Code as crimes against the security of the state, includes espionage, selling of state secrets, and inciting to revolt or otherwise threatening the security of the state. Treason, for which the punishment is death, is the most serious crime against the security of the state. Treason can be committed only by a French national, and is defined as bearing arms against France; inciting or aiding a foreign power to engage in hostilities against France; delivering troops, territory, or material of strategic interest to a foreign power; inciting or aiding troops to desert to a foreign power in time of war, or recruiting troops for a power at war with France; and establishing communication with the enemy in time of war. Other crimes against the security of the state include exposing France to a declaration of war or to reprisals by another nation; enrolling Frenchmen on French soil into foreign armies; bringing about the loss of French territory; engaging in civil war or revolt against constituted authority; employing armed force illegally; taking over or retaining a military command without proper authorization; pillaging or destroying properties belonging to the state; raising bands of persons with the intent of committing any of the aforementioned acts or giving shelter or lodging to any member of such bands; and allowing a meeting of a seditious nature to take place on one's property. The penalties attached to offenses against the security of the state vary from a minimum sentence of one year in prison to death.

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While in most matters the Penal Code has evolved in the direction of leniency, penalties for crimes against the security of the state, which are now of major importance in Algeria, have been retained unaltered and the definitions of these crimes have constantly been broadened. Thus, treason formerly was defined merely as bearing arms against France or inciting a foreign power to engage in hostilities against France. Today, however, the definition has been extended to include the other actions enumerated above, all of which carry the death penalty.

Crimes against property are also severely dealt with. Theft committed at night, by violence, on the public thoroughfare, or on railroads is regarded as a *crime* and exposes the offender to a minimum term of five years. The thief who injures his victim is liable to life imprisonment at hard labor. Penalties for arson, which are extremely severe, always involve a term of imprisonment at forced labor, and if the property set afire served as a dwelling, whether inhabited or not, the arsonist is liable to the death penalty.

2. The Code of Criminal Procedure

The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the entire procedure to be followed in the repression and punishment of crime, indicates the officials responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime, specifies the courts competent to hear various types of criminal cases, and describes how these courts must be constituted. It defines the rights of the accused during the pretrial inquiry and during trial, outlines appeal procedures, regulates the parole system, and determines the civil status of ex-convicts.

The composition of the magistracy in Algeria is the same as that in metropolitan France. Both judges and prosecutors are members of the French body of magistrates and are subject to the same regulations as their metropolitan counterparts. They are appointed by the Ministry of Justice, and are not subject to control by the Delegation General or by other authorities in Algeria. Judges are removable only for irregularities of conduct. Local prosecutors (*procureurs de la République*) are subject to administrative discipline, and are required to follow the instructions of their hierarchic superiors. They may, however, orally express their disagreement with a government case. Appointments to the lowest ranks of either branch of the magistracy are limited to French citizens 25 years of age or older who possess a law degree and have passed a professional examination.

a. INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS — The Code of Criminal Procedure divides officials exercising criminal police powers into: 1) those who by virtue of their office are primarily responsible for the repression of crime; and 2) their auxiliaries. In the first group are prosecutors assigned to Courts of First Instance, examining magistrates, who conduct the pretrial inquiries, and, under certain conditions, mayors and their deputies. The second group is composed of officers and noncommissioned officers of the police and of the gendarmerie.

Anyone observing an offense may report it to the mayor or police commissioner or to inspectors of the gendarmerie. These officials draw up an official report (*procès verbal*), stating the nature and circumstances surrounding the offense, which must be promptly transmitted to the prosecuting attorney. Ordinarily, offenses are reported to the police commissioner or gendarmerie brigade commander in authority in the locality; complaints may in some instances be made to the mayors or their deputies.

The prosecuting attorney is the key officer in the investigation and prosecution of crime. He, or one of his deputies, receives all complaints and denunciations from officials or private citizens involving possible *délits* or *crimes*. If, after a preliminary examination of the matter, he finds that the circumstances warrant, he refers the case to the examining magistrate (*juge d'instruction*) for an official inquiry. The examining magistrate first determines whether a proper charge has been presented. If so, he orders the accused brought before him, and proceeds to examine the evidence. From this point on—but not before—the accused is entitled to have his attorney present at all hearings and interrogations in his case. Neither the accused nor his attorney, however, may examine or cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise participate actively in the inquiry. The examining magistrate has broad powers to subpoena and detain witnesses, collect evidence, and to hear expert testimony.

When he has completed his inquiry, the examining magistrate prepares a summary of the evidence and his findings. If he decides that the offense involves only a *contravention* or a *délit*, he forwards this summary and the dossier to the prosecuting attorney, who prepares the formal indictment. The indictment is returned to the examining magistrate, who then either dismisses it or sends it to the appropriate court (i.e., Court of First Instance or Court of Superior Instance) for trial. If the examining magistrate decides that the offense constitutes a *crime*, he forwards his summary and the dossier to the procurator general (*procureur général*) attached to one of the

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Courts of Appeal. The procurator general prepares the indictment and submits it to the Chamber of Accusations (*Chambre d'Accusations*) of the Court of Appeal. This Chamber examines the evidence, and decides: 1) to dismiss the case; 2) to refer the case to the appropriate court for trial if the offense involves only a *contravention* or a *délit*; or 3) to accept the case and send it to the Court of Assizes for trial if it involves a *crime*.

The examining magistrate may in some cases set bail, which is forfeited if the person on bail fails to conform to the conditions of his release or if he fails to appear at a hearing or at his trial. Documents or other evidence seized by the magistrate must be taken in the presence of the accused or his representatives, or if they are absent, in the presence of two witnesses.

Decisions by the examining magistrate may be appealed to the Chamber of Accusations by the prosecuting attorney and in some cases by the plaintiff. Such appeals are generally made when the magistrate has dismissed a case or ordered indictment of the subject for an offense judged by the prosecutor less serious than warranted by the facts of the case. The right of appeal of the accused is generally limited to the matter of bail or to a challenge of the legal competence (i.e., jurisdiction) of the examining magistrate.

In view of the heavy responsibilities attached to his office, the examining magistrate is in theory an experienced jurist, free of any pressures tending to influence his decision, and a man of sufficient maturity and experience to command the respect of the police officers under his orders and to direct the investigation firmly and impartially. These principles are to some extent undermined, however, by the fact that the office of the examining magistrate is at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy. Young men often begin their careers in the judiciary as examining magistrates. Their lack of experience coupled with a heavy work schedule often causes them to turn for help to the experienced police officers nominally under their direction, or actually to delegate to police officers the responsibility for the entire investigation. Frequently, therefore, the already limited rights of the accused may be entirely neglected by a police officer anxious to secure a confession, and such extralegal practices as the third degree are on occasion employed. This is especially true in Algeria, in the interrogation of Muslims suspected of terrorist activity. These deficiencies are often criticized in the metropolitan French press (but rarely in Algeria), and have created widespread public distrust of the processes of justice.

The law attempts to limit the period during which an arrested person may remain subject to police power by requiring that in most cases he

be produced before the examining magistrate within one or two days (these periods are doubled in Algeria), unless that official authorizes detention for a longer period. However, the examining magistrate may hold a suspect, or a witness, in preventive arrest after interrogation for an unlimited period, and some suspects have thus been held for several years. If the suspect is eventually convicted, the time he has spent in preventive arrest is deducted from the total time he must serve, but if he is acquitted he has no redress. In Algeria suspects are often subjected to unlimited administrative confinement—called restriction to residence—even after acquittal by a competent tribunal. A notable case in point is that of Aïssat Idir, an Algerian trade union leader, who was arrested on May 23, 1956, on suspicion of aiding the rebellion. He was first sent to the internment center of Berrouaghia (Berrouarhia) and transferred to various other internment centers during the following three years. Brought to trial with 20 other suspected rebel collaborators, before the Armed Forces Tribunal of Algiers in January 1959, Idir was acquitted, along with 9 others of the 21 accused. Instead of being freed, however, he was ordered returned to administrative confinement, and sent to a transit center to await return to an internment center. Shortly after his arrival at the transit center, Idir suffered serious burns, from which he died several months later on July 26, 1959.*

b. CONDUCT OF CRIMINAL CASES — Violations of the law are tried in the first instance before one of three courts, according to the gravity of the offense to be tried. (See this Chapter, SECTION 52, under Court System, for a full description of the court system.) The *Tribunal d'Instance* (Court of First Instance) corresponds to the court of a justice of the peace, or a municipal court in the United States. In criminal cases, it is entitled to judge minor infractions (*contraventions*) such as traffic violations and drunkenness. It may levy a fine of up to 2,000 new francs (about US\$400), or sentence a person to jail for not more than two months. The court consists of a single judge, sitting without a jury. Appeals may be made to the *Tribunal de Grande Instance* (Court of Superior Instance).

There are 17 *Tribunaux de Grande Instance* in Algeria, one for each judicial district (*arrondissement judiciaire*). These courts consist of panels of at least three judges each, also sitting without juries. They may hear appeals from *Tribunaux*

* The French authorities stated that the burns had been incurred either as the result of an accident in which Idir set fire to his bed or in a suicide attempt. The rebels and other partisans of Idir maintained that the burns were the result of torture.

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DSWA	NRC	USMC

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d'Instance, and they take original jurisdiction in *délits*, which can involve imprisonment of up to five years. The judges decide each case by majority vote. Judgment is pronounced immediately after the trial, or at the next session of the court. A defendant not present is judged *in absentia*, and on the arguments of the prosecution only. Such cases, however, may be reopened if the defendant later appears. Cases originating in and decided in the *Tribunal de Grande Instance* may be appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Courts of Assizes have original jurisdiction in felony cases (*crimes*), but no case may be brought to trial before a Court of Assizes unless the defendant has first been indicted by the Chamber of Accusations of the Court of Appeal. Courts of Assizes are the only courts in France that make use of the jury system. The court is composed of: 1) three judges appointed *ad hoc* from the membership of the *Tribunaux de Grande Instance* (in the judicial *arrondissements* of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran the president of the court is chosen from among the judges of the Courts of Appeal); 2) either the prosecuting attorney of the *Tribunal de Grande Instance* in whose district the trial is held, or the procurator general of the Court of Appeal; and 3) a jury of nine laymen. Courts are established at the seat of the *Tribunal de Grande Instance* where a crime is to be tried. One of the judges serves as president of the court, and draws the names of the jurors by lot from the annual list of eligible jurors. The defense has the right to exclude four names from the list, and the prosecution three; the names so excluded are replaced by others.

The procurator general of the Court of Appeal, or his deputy, presents the state's case. While the procurator general has the right, with the president's permission, to question both the defendant and the witnesses directly, the defense attorney may examine and cross-examine only through the president of the court. Both prosecution and defense make their closing arguments directly to the jury, the defense speaking last. The president instructs the judges and the jury on the questions of fact and law they must answer. Judges and jury then retire to decide upon a verdict; 8 of the 12 must find the accused guilty to convict.

Acquittal or sentencing is pronounced by the president of the court. If the defendant is found not guilty, he must be freed at once, except that, as in the case of Aïssat Idir, an accused in Algeria may be returned to administrative confinement under the 1956 Law of Special Powers. In case of conviction, the verdict is unappealable and sentence must be executed within 24 hours

unless a petition is made to the Court of Cassation.

A court record (*casier judiciaire*) is maintained on all persons who have undergone trial in any court. This record is centralized and maintained at the seat of the *Tribunal d'Instance* having jurisdiction in the commune of the person's birth. It lists all matters for which a person has been tried, convictions, pardons, and commutations. Under French law all persons convicted of felonies or misdemeanors have the right to legal rehabilitation (*rehabilitation*), that is, the conviction may be erased from the record and any legal after-effects annulled. This procedure should not be confused with any program of social rehabilitation of a former convict. Legal rehabilitation is automatically granted after a period of good behavior fixed by law, and may be requested even before it automatically takes effect. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes limitations on the time within which a person may be arrested and tried for an offense as well as on the time within which a sentence must be executed. Thus, if a person escapes from jail and evades the authorities for a certain period of time, the sentence may no longer be carried out.

A petition to the Court of Cassation (*pourvoi en cassation*, or *pourvoi en révision*) may be made from the nonappealable verdict of any court to the Court of Cassation (*Cour de Cassation*) in Paris. This court is divided into five chambers, of which one is concerned with criminal matters. The criminal chamber hears cases from the Courts of Assizes in *crimes*, from the Courts of Appeal in *délits*, and from the Courts of Superior Instance in *contraventions*. The Court of Cassation does not rehear the case, but only rules on points of law. It may annul the sentence or judgment, or the entire proceedings of a lower court. Action of the latter type does not automatically exonerate the defendant, however, for the case is remanded to a Court of Appeal—usually of another region—for retrial or resentencing. A second petition may be made in cases remanded for retrial. The court must rule within 1 month and 10 days of the time a petition is made; rejection of a *pourvoi en cassation* or a *pourvoi en révision* by the Court of Cassation is final.

Cases involving the security of the state are tried by permanent military tribunals (*tribunaux permanents des forces armées*), rather than by civil jurisdictions. One of these courts is established in each of the 13 military zones of Algeria, including the Saharan departments; each court may comprise one or several chambers and may sit anywhere within the zone. A military tribunal is presided over by a civil judge chosen, if possible, from among the judges of the Court

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of Appeal of the region in which the tribunal is located, and is composed of two other civil judges from the courts of the region and six military judges. Procedure follows the Code of Military Justice, and decisions against a civilian defendant must be by at least six votes to three. Decisions may be contested through a series of military appeal courts to the Court of Cassation.

Military courts have become increasingly important in Algeria. In February 1960 the competence of these courts was extended to include "sole and full jurisdiction over all felonies and misdemeanors against the external security of the State and all felonies and misdemeanors against the common law committed for the purpose of giving direct or indirect aid to the rebels." Military courts were also empowered to try minors between the ages of 16 and 18.

3. Incidence of crime

Prior to the outbreak of the nationalist insurrection in November 1954, the French authorities considered the status of security in Algeria to be good. The total number of major crimes reported by official French sources averaged a little less than 1 per 100 of population per year. Figure 54-5 shows the number of criminal acts and arrests in Algeria for the years 1952-55, the most recent year for which data are available.

Crime reporting in Algeria is far less comprehensive than in the United States or in Western Europe. Because of the time lag in publication of crime statistics and the fact that the same type of information is not regularly provided for consecutive years, firm statistical inferences cannot be drawn from data provided by the French Government. In addition, the published crime rate since 1954 probably does not include all acts of violence connected with the uprising, because many Muslim victims of terrorist acts committed by the insurgents do not report these acts to the authorities. This circumstance, and the general blurring of the distinction between civil and mili-

tary police functions, have led to a decline in the adequacy of crime reporting.

In 1955, the Government General published data on the number of criminal—that is, terrorist—acts attributed to the insurgents. These totaled 3,400 and included:

- 71 acts of deliberate homicide against women and children;
- 1,405 acts of "savagery" (assassinations, mutilations, severe cruelty);
- 1,139 acts of vandalism against public or national institutions;
- 77 crimes against school buildings;
- 708 crimes against agricultural exploitation.

These figures were published at least in part to support the government's demand from Parliament for increased police support to suppress terrorism, but they can probably be accepted as generally accurate. Figures published by the French Government for 1959 placed at 1,448 the monthly average number of terrorist or terrorist-inspired acts committed in Algeria. This figure represents a decline from the monthly average of 1,642 for 1958. (Figures include deaths and injuries to persons and property as well as rebel extortions and demands for money.) During the first three weeks of March 1960, the following rebel terrorist activities were among those reported: a rebel band attacked a military post near Sétif, killing 5 soldiers and wounding 5; rebels in French uniforms infiltrated the barbed wire defenses of Sétif, fired on pedestrians, killed 2 Europeans, wounded 2 others, and shot a Muslim taxi driver to death; near Algiers, 2 grenades were thrown in a Muslim cafe, killing 1 person and wounding 10; at Hussein Dey (a suburb of Algiers where the State Police School is located), a taxi driver was injured by a bomb left in his vehicle by a passenger; also near Algiers, a truck was ambushed and 2 drivers killed; near Bône, 2 persons were killed and 1 wounded in the machinegunning of 2 civilian vehicles; and at Philippeville, a rebel group attacked a farm building, killing a

FIGURE 54-5. CRIMINAL ACTS AND ARRESTS, ALGERIA, 1952-55

TYPE OF CRIME	1952		1953		1954		1955	
	Acts	Arrests	Acts	Arrests	Acts	Arrests	Acts	Arrests
Acts against persons (assassinations, murders, assaults, attacks on morality)	22,168	21,097	25,533	25,072	26,045	25,407	28,272	24,866
Acts against property (armed and simple theft, arson, etc.)	26,043	14,171	22,652	11,831	29,065	12,661	23,808	9,941
Acts against public institutions (illegal possession of arms, various infractions of laws on state security)	43,718	31,101	40,720	32,961	41,987	33,301	48,850	43,570
Total	91,929	66,369	88,905	69,864	97,097	71,369	100,930	78,377

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man and his wife. Although some of the foregoing acts appear to be of a military nature, the French authorities consider them offenses against the common law. The army announced that it would cease to publish weekly figures on French and rebel casualties from military operations after February 1960, and that thenceforth only the results of important individual operations would be announced.

The ratio between the number of persons of European background and those of Muslim ancestry brought to trial for lesser crimes and misdemeanors (*délits*) before the courts was approximately 1 to 4 for the years 1953 and 1954, as shown in the following tabulation:

	1953	1954	1955
Europeans	7,836	7,720	4,959
Muslims	28,905	29,939	34,604

During the first full year following the outbreak of the rebellion, however, the ratio was approximately 1 to 7, reflecting the rise of crime among the Muslims by reason of the rebellion. The rebellion was also reflected in the sharp rise in the number of those sentenced in 1955 to imprisonment for over one year, as compared to the preceding years (see FIGURE 54-6), and the marked increase of the number of persons accused of illegal possession of arms (see FIGURE 54-7). The only statistics available on felonies, indicating those tried before the Assizes Courts of Algeria in 1955 (see FIGURE 54-8), provide no breakdown by ethnic background.

The handling of the cases of children regarded as juvenile offenders in Algeria is in general the same as in France. (See NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54, under Treatment of Juvenile Offenders, and this Chapter, SECTION 52, under Juvenile Courts.) There is no information on the ratio

of juveniles of European and Muslim ancestry processed by the courts and committed to institutions. It is probable, however, that a relatively high proportion of juveniles accorded special juvenile delinquent treatment are of European background, since there is some evidence that civil and military authorities tend to treat Muslim juvenile offenders as adults. The presence of minors of 15 years of age in detainment centers, especially the Transit and Screening Centers, has been mentioned in many reports on conditions in Algerian prisons and internment camps. Youths of 18 years and younger are said to be much sought by the FLN for use as couriers. FIGURE

FIGURE 54-6. DISPOSITION OF PERSONS TRIED FOR LESSER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (DÉLITS) BY COURTS IN ALGERIA, 1953-55

VERDICT OR SENTENCE	1953	1954	1955
Acquitted	3,648	2,755	2,793
Imprisonment for more than 1 year	1,340	1,552	4,096
Imprisonment for less than 1 year	17,261	15,779	17,917
Fined	14,492	17,123	14,757

FIGURE 54-7. MOST COMMON LESSER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (DÉLITS) TRIED BY COURTS IN ALGERIA, 1953-55

TYPE OF OFFENSE	1953	1954	1955
Illegal possession of arms	893	1,215	3,210
Assault and battery	6,912	6,059	5,572
Involuntary injuries	1,700	2,375	2,140
Theft	7,258	6,327	5,625
Embezzlement and receipt of stolen goods	1,460	1,374	554
Abuse of confidence	822	1,062	470
Rebellion	322	208	253
Criminal infractions of railroad and transport regulations	999	1,837	1,639

FIGURE 54-8. DISPOSITION OF PERSONS TRIED FOR FELONIES (CRIMES) BY ASSIZES COURTS OF ALGERIA, 1955

OFFENSE	NUMBER OF CASES	NUMBER OF ACCUSED	ACQUITTED	CONDEMNED TO DEATH	CONDEMNED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT	CONDEMNED TO CONFINEMENT OR OTHER PUNISHMENT
Persons tried in person:						
First-degree murder	80	124	15	8	13	88
Other homicides	255	356	34	2	6	314
Assault and battery	19	21	2	0	0	19
Rape	56	72	5	0	0	67
Theft and embezzlement	13	26	2	0	0	24
Arson	7	13	1	0	0	12
Other crimes	20	26	6	0	1	19
Persons tried in absentia:						
First-degree murder	2	6	2	4	0	0
Other homicides	1	1	0	0	1	0
Other crimes	4	4	0	2	0	2
Total	457	649	67	16	21	545

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FIGURE 54-9. DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES, ALGERIA, 1955

AGE GROUP AND TYPE OF OFFENSE	SEX OF OFFENDERS		ACQUITTED	ASSIGNED TO PARENTAL CUSTODY	PROVISIONAL RELEASE	SENT TO INSTITUTIONS	IM-PRISONED	FINED
	Male	Female						
Under 13:								
Felonies.....	15	0	4	9	0	2	0	0
Misdemeanors.....	435	38	58	374	5	36	0	0
13-16:								
Felonies.....	12	0	0	4	0	4	4	0
Misdemeanors.....	1,256	96	159	716	54	158	190	75
16-18:								
Felonies.....	27	2	5	2	0	2	20	0
Misdemeanors.....	1,501	113	180	590	95	144	477	128
Total.....	3 246	249	406	1 695	154	346	691	203

54-9 shows the disposition of cases of juvenile offenders in 1955, the latest year for which such data are available.

4. The prison system

Three distinct prison systems exist in Algeria: 1) the regular prison system, including establishments controlled by the Ministry of Justice, establishments for juvenile delinquents controlled by the Directorate of Supervised Education within the Ministry of Justice, and local jails and houses of detention under municipal administration; 2) the Transit and Screening Centers and the Civilian Internment Centers, under the ultimate control of the Algerian Delegation General and the departmental prefects; and 3) the Military Internment Centers, operated by the army.

The regular prison administration in France has been under the Ministry of Justice since 1911, except for a period during the Vichy regime (1940-1944) when it was placed under the Ministry of the Interior, together with the police. French prison administration is quite advanced in theory, and includes education and rehabilitation facilities. In actuality, however, conditions in the prisons, especially in Algeria, lag behind those in most Western European countries, and have become worse there since the outbreak of the rebellion, largely as the result of almost impossible demands on prison facilities.

The regular prison system in Algeria, however, is dwarfed by the extensive network of Transit and Screening Centers and Civilian and Military Internment Centers, under civil and military administration, which was created in Algeria in 1955. Designed as a temporary emergency measure to aid in the suppression of the rebellion, the internment camps and transit centers quickly outstripped their original conception and purpose, and became a quasi-permanent instrument, in many respects more nearly indispensable than the regular prison system for the maintenance of

order. At the same time, the fundamental incompatibility of this system with traditional French principles has caused concern and controversy in the metropole.

Partly in order to inform itself on conditions in Algerian detention establishments, and partly in response to chronic and widespread criticism of conditions in prisons and internment centers in Algeria, the French Government has authorized the International Red Cross to conduct periodic inspections of prisons, prison hospitals, and military and civilian internment centers in the territory. The most recent (seventh) inspection was carried out from October 15 to November 27, 1959, and a 290-page confidential report documenting conditions in each of 82 establishments visited by the Red Cross committee was submitted to the Debré government on December 15, 1959. Although the full report has not been made public, summaries of it have appeared in the press of France and other countries. Red Cross authorities, while denying responsibility for the leak, have nevertheless confirmed the accuracy of the summaries. The material on prisons and internment centers which appears below was drawn from the published summaries, which are the most important source of information on the Algerian penal system.

The total number of individuals detained in the 82 installations visited and reported on by the Red Cross was 26,134. This is obviously a minimum figure, inasmuch as the committee had been furnished the names of more than 100 installations. Furthermore, the committee indicated in its report that it was convinced of the existence of 10 or more "clandestine" Transit and Screening Centers, the names of which had not been listed by the authorities.

a. THE REGULAR PRISON SYSTEM — Algerian prisons are organized and administered in the same manner as those of metropolitan France. (See NIS 3, CHAPTER V, SECTION 54, under Prison

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System.) Algeria is the 10th penal region (*circonscription pénitentiaire*) of France. All Algerian prisons are seriously overcrowded. Sanitary conditions are generally rudimentary, though perhaps tolerable by Algerian standards. The prison death rate is considerably lower than that of the general population. Prison administration does not appear in general to be harsh, although cases of brutality, sadism, and other offenses against prisoners by guards and by other prisoners have been reported. Most penitentiary officials are former military personnel, selected by competitive examination. Personnel of the prison system are transferable between Algeria and the metropole.

The regular prison system includes: 1) central prisons (*maisons centrales* or *prisons centrales*), which are used for convicts subject to sentences of longer than one year and for so-called "Category A" prisoners (persons convicted of political offenses); 2) short-term prisons (*maisons d'arrêt*), which are occupied by prisoners serving sentences of up to one year; 3) local jails and detention houses, usually under municipal control, which are used for the detention of persons under investigation or awaiting trial; and 4) establishments for juvenile delinquents.

There are 12 important central and short-term prisons in Algeria. In the 9 prisons for which the press reported the findings of the most recent Red Cross inspection committee (see FIGURE 54-10), there was a prison population of about 10,000 persons convicted of common crimes and political offenses. More than 95% of these prisoners were Muslims; between 1% and 2% were women. In 1955, approximately 2% of such prisoners were under 20 years of age, but it is probable that this percentage has increased since the outbreak of the rebellion, in which many young Muslims are active.

The principal criticisms made by the Red Cross committee concerning these 9 prisons were of overcrowded conditions and various health problems, notably of recurrent typhoid epidemics in certain prisons. On the whole, however, conditions in the prisons were characterized as "correct." Prisoners are allowed to send and to receive mail, to receive visitors, and to receive certain newspapers. A library, canteen, and hospital are attached to each institution. Medical and hospital facilities were found to be very good in some prisons and satisfactory in the others, although in all cases the general overcrowding of the prisons has led to overburdening of facilities. At almost all penal centers in Algeria some sort of vocational training program exists, similar, though on a modest scale, to such programs in the metropolitan penal centers. Prisoners who participate in the vocational training program are paid 80 to 300 old francs (approximately US\$0.16 to US\$0.60) per day, one-third of which they may spend at the prison canteen. Rehabilitation procedures also follow the metropolitan pattern. The practice of permitting prisoners who are close to completing their sentences to leave the prison each day to work, returning to the prison only to eat and sleep, was introduced in Algerian prisons in 1954.

No information is available on the many local jails and houses of detention. The most recent data available on places of detention for juvenile offenders date from 1955. In that year there were 9 public institutions, with 775 internees, and 8 private institutions with 313 internees, for juvenile delinquents, all under the supervision of the Directorate of Supervised Education. FIGURE 54-11 shows the distribution of children in the public and private institutions for juveniles as of December 31 of that year. It is probable that

FIGURE 54-10. SELECTED CENTRAL AND SHORT-TERM PRISONS, ALGERIA, 1959

NAME	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	TYPE OF PRISON	NUMBER OF INTERNEES	REMARKS
Barberousse	Algiers	Short term	1,044	Normal capacity 1,000.
Maison Carrée	Algiers	Central	*1,471	
Berrougahia	Médéa	do	**1,497	
Oran	Oran	Short term	1,874	
Orléansville	Orléansville	Central	1,027	
Orléansville Detention Center	Orléansville	Short term	473	
Tizi Ouzou	Tizi Ouzou	do	413	
Constantine	Constantine	do	651	
Lambèse	Batna	Central	***1,725	

* 1,613 in 1955.

** 1,358 in 1955.

*** 914 in 1955.

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both delinquency and confinement of juveniles have increased over the past several years.

b. TRANSIT AND SCREENING CENTERS — Transit and Screening Centers (*Centres de Tri et de Transit*—CIT) are nominally the responsibility of the Delegation General and of the prefects of the departments in which they are located. Normally, however, they operate under army control. Following a military operation in a district in which local villagers are suspected of having aided the rebels, the troops usually round up every Muslim male in the area between certain ages and bring them to a CTT for thorough individual investigation. Under regulations currently in effect, these men may be legally detained in such centers for up to three months. In practice, however, they are held for whatever period is necessary to dispose of their cases.

At some time during the period of their detention at a CTT, usually at the beginning, prisoners suspected of withholding information on terrorist activities may be questioned at special interrogation centers located either in the CTT or at some nearby installation. At such interrogations, according to reports, the most severe methods, including various forms of torture, may be employed to obtain the desired information. Some of the reports of the use of torture appear substantiated by the International Red Cross investigations of conditions and treatment of prisoners at certain CTT's (see below). Army personnel, particularly members of paratroop units, are most frequently mentioned in connection with employment of torture. The forms of torture most often alleged to be employed during interrogations are: torture by water (involving either forcing water from a hose into the victim's stomach until disablement or, in some cases, death ensues; or alternately submerging and raising a trussed up victim from a tub of water); torture by electricity (administering shocks through electrodes or metal bands applied to the victim's wet body); and suspension (suspending a victim by his wrists, which are tied behind his back). Other forms of torture include beating, burning, and semistrangulation.

Following interrogation, the detainees may, at the end of a period of from several weeks to several months, be: 1) liberated; 2) sent to a Civilian Internment Center (see below) for investigation and eventual trial by a civil court for a political or other offense not triable by a military court; or 3) sent to a Military Internment Center (see below) for processing in connection with a military offense and eventual trial by a military tribunal. If found guilty of any offense, the detainee may be sentenced and sent to serve out

his time in one of the central prisons. If, however, the evidence is considered insufficient to support a case against the accused, or if the accused is eventually acquitted, he may be freed. In some cases, the authorities may decide that in spite of the acquittal by a court, the continued detention of an individual is in the public interest. In such cases, the detainee is simply placed under "administrative control," and may be and usually is detained in a Civilian Internment Center indefinitely under the 1956 Law of Special Powers.

The International Red Cross committee in 1959 visited and reported on 39 Transit and Screening Centers operated by the army in the three Army Corps areas of Northern Algeria and one in the Saharan Department of Saoura (see FIGURE 54-12). This number appears to be only about half of the total number of such centers listed with the committee by the French authorities. The committee, moreover, reported its certainty of the existence of an undetermined number of additional "clandestine" centers. The existence of these clandestine centers came to light as the result of statements of prisoners regarding their internment histories and, in one instance at least, by a chance encounter between the committee and a group of prisoners being taken to a camp the name of which did not appear on the committee's lists.

Of the 39 CTT's visited by the committee, 20 are in the Algiers Corps area, 9 in the Constantine area, 9 in the Oran area, and 1 in the Sahara. The greatest number and the most serious instances of abuses of the rights of prisoners were reported in connection with the Transit and Screening Centers. The Committee stated that it found conditions satisfactory in fewer than one-third of the centers in the Algiers area; average to poor in about one-third; and frankly unsatisfactory in the remainder. Among the satisfactory centers, the committee cited the camps of Beni Messous, Bou Kandoura, and the small camp of Moudjebeur. Camp Palestro near Tizi Ouzou was also cited as satisfactory, although a minor of 15 years of age was found imprisoned there. Conditions were described as fair also at Camp des Chênes, one of the clandestine camps in the Algiers Corps area, which the Committee came across as the result of a chance encounter. Since no CTT was listed in the particular area, the Committee decided to investigate. Its report stated conditions in the camp to be as follows:

... all prisoners were the men of a mountain village.

The telephone wires passing by their village had been cut on two occasions, and since the men of the village had been unable, or unwilling, to give any information on the conditions of this cutting,

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the military authority had decided to inflict one week's captivity as a penalty.

The exact number of the prisoners was 24. They had been detained at the post for 3 days already, and were assigned various fatigue duties during the daytime, including laying barbed wire. . . . There were no complaints. . . . They were quartered in a small shed located beside the railway station. . . . Some straw had been provided for them (and) they had been permitted to bring covers from their own homes. . . .

Considering the brevity of the detainment period, we do not think they were badly situated. They doubtless were receiving better food than in their own homes.

One might, however, ask certain questions regarding their administrative status as detainees. It is difficult to judge whether their status conforms with regulations in force, inasmuch as it appears to be a question of an initiative taken by a military unit in the field.

The most common criticism of the CTT's described as "less good, though not wholly bad" was that the camp authorities were unable to produce certain internees before the committee, although their names appeared on the lists of persons held. The authorities in such cases claimed that the absent prisoners were temporarily with the army for labor details or for "operational exploitation." Practically all prisoners interviewed in private complained of having been tortured at the time of their original interrogation, and in some instances, though not many, in the same camp where they were then confined. The medical member of the committee was able to examine prisoners claiming to have been tortured and appears to have been satisfied in most cases as to the truth of their claims. The committee noted the disturbing frequency of deaths among prisoners in alleged escape attempts and recommended "a very close study" of all such cases.

The CTT at Bordj Menaïel, in the Kabylie, was singled out as the worst center in the Algiers Army Corps area. Here the prisoners slept on the ground, and otherwise lived in conditions termed "disastrous." Although the camp was established in 1956, the inmates had neither mess-kits nor cutlery, and were forced to eat out of used food cans. Discipline was harsh; all isolation cells were in use. The inmates were described as "completely terrorized," and many begged the committee not to note their statements for fear that they would be beaten or killed in reprisal. The prisoners gave evidence of having been tortured during interrogations at locations near the camp. About 60 prisoners (over 10%), who were sick or in poor physical condition, had been removed from the camp before the committee visit. In one isolation cell, the committee discovered a prisoner who exhibited extensive wounds on his forehead, several blood blis-

ters in the thoracic region, rib fractures, numerous superficial scratches on both legs, and circular wounds on his wrists. The prisoner, who lay on the ground with his wounds unbandaged, stated that the injuries had been received during the course of an interrogation. He had been left unattended for 48 hours.

The committee's official report on this camp states in part as follows:

Visits by previous Committees, interviews which this Committee had with the responsible officials, and the negative attitude of the latter all confirm the impression that, as far as these officials are concerned, this [policy] represents a set purpose and that demands for improvement are useless. The Committee cannot escape the conclusion that the miserable conditions of this camp are deliberately brought about and form part of a system. While in the short run this attitude may obtain results of a sort (the Intelligence Service is said to have obtained valuable results in this manner), this attitude nevertheless is inhuman and in flagrant contradiction to elementary humanitarian principles.

The committee considered the conditions it found at Camp Bordj Menaïel sufficiently unsatisfactory to justify a request for an immediate interview with the then Commander of the Armed Forces in Algeria, General Challe, which was granted. Challe ordered an investigation, and the committee relates that on a second visit to the installation it found some improvement. It notes, moreover, a drastic reduction in the number of internees—from 524 to 373—but observes that camp officials consider the normal capacity of the camp to be 300, whereas the committee estimates the normal capacity at 150.

Many other camps in the Algiers Corps Area were criticized for the same reasons as Bordj Menaïel, though less severely. These included: Bou Gobrîne, where (in the committee's words) six deaths "had been produced" in escape attempts during the immediately preceding month; Bouira; La Bouzaréa; Cinq Palmiers; Damiette; Ferme Chenu, with its two subsidiary camps; and Paul Cazelles. In Cinq Palmiers, the committee discovered a small cell in which 6 prisoners had been confined. Three bore marks of injuries of recent origin, and one had been dead for more than 12 hours. An examination of the medical reports covering 5 prisoners who had died during the week of October 12 to 18, 1959, disclosed that all 5 had reportedly died of the aftereffects of exposure to tear gas. The committee professed astonishment that none of the victims, who had been gassed several days prior to October 12, had received either hospitalization or medical care of any kind, and that death had occurred in one case over one month after the gassing. Noting the absence

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of an infirmary, or even of bedding for the inmates, the committee suggested that individual sleeping areas on the ground be covered with wood or straw pallets. In reply, it was informed that wood was expensive and that there were no funds for the purpose. The committee protested against the general absence of medical care of the most elementary sort. It also noted that, despite the limitation of three months during which suspects may legally be confined to CTT's under present regulations, numerous prisoners had been in such centers for more than three months, and in some instances for more than a year.

The commanding officer at one CTT—Casino de la Corniche—frankly admitted to the committee his belief in the necessity of using torture. The committee report stated:

Regarding injuries inflicted during interrogations, the Gendarmerie Colonel in charge explained to the Committee that the struggle against terrorism makes indispensable certain methods of interrogation, which alone make possible the sparing of human lives, and the warding off of new terrorist acts. He assured the Committee, however, that in his sector these methods are reserved solely for certain special cases, and that they are in no respect generally applied. On the contrary, they are used only on the responsibility of an officer.

The 9 Transit and Screening Centers reported on by the committee in the Constantine Army Corps area evoked substantially the same criticisms as the Algiers group, though to a lesser degree. The committee found satisfactory to very satisfactory conditions in 6 of the centers, "bearable" conditions in a seventh, and bad conditions in the remaining 2. The 6 satisfactory centers were: Ferme Lucas, El Ksob, Calle Morris, Hamma, Ksar Thir, and Souk Ahras. The center termed "bearable but capable of improvement" was Ferme Ameziane, a "clandestine" CTT the existence of which came to the attention of the committee through statements of internees who claimed to have been interrogated there. The authorities explained that this was a "temporary" interrogation center, but the committee learned that some of the detainees had been there for several weeks, in one case as long as 55 days. Of the two unsatisfactory centers, the camp of Ouled Attalah was singled out for its "deplorable" sanitary conditions resulting from the complete absence of running water inside the camp. The report states:

It is evident that the idea of locating a CTT of such importance (337 inmates) in a fairly unhealthy region not equipped with running water is unfortunate. It would seem, moreover, that after the nearly two years that this camp has been in existence a solution should have been found.

Through statements made by internees at this center, the committee learned of the existence of several additional clandestine CTT's, eight in the Bône region alone, and mentioned these camps by name in its official report but did not visit them.

The worst camp in the Constantine area was Camp Colbert, where conditions were described as "very bad," particularly "since the camp has been in existence for three years." The committee officially complained that it had been permitted to interview only 44 internees out of the camp complement of 267. Moreover, the committee estimated the normal capacity of the center at 100.

In the Oran area, the Committee found satisfactory 6 of the 10 CTT's which it visited; these were: Beni Bahdel, Rled Zouia, Le Kreider, Nedromah, Saïda, and Sebdo. The committee cited two camp commanders in this group—one who was himself an ex-inmate of the Dachau concentration camp in Germany, and the other an officer of Muslim origin—for their intelligence and for the humanity of their administration. At Sebdo, with a prison complement at the time of 69, 1,135 prisoners had been liberated since January 1959, which suggests that this center at least had been operating in accordance with the original concept of such a center—a place in which rounded-up suspects are briefly confined, questioned, and either liberated or sent to a military or civilian installation to await appropriate disposition of their cases. Conditions were termed slightly less favorable but still satisfactory at the camps of Safsaf, Ferme Derasse, and Tiaret.

Frankly unsatisfactory conditions were reported in connection with only one camp in the Oran area, that of Telagh, near Sidi Bel Abbès. Here the committee found 42 men confined 3 to a cell in cells constructed to accommodate 1 person. Another 20 men were found huddled in a common room. The prisoners complained of being chained and hobbled by night and of having been tortured during their interrogations by intelligence officers at the camp. The committee demanded the immediate abandonment of the practice of placing prisoners in stocks at night and reports that the requested assurances were given.

The committee visited one CTT at Kenadsa in the Saharan department of Saoura and reported "a very good impression" there.

C. CIVILIAN INTERNMENT CENTERS — Civilian Internment Centers (*Centres d'Hébergement*—literally, shelter centers) came into existence in Algeria following passage of the Law on the State of Emergency (*Loi sur l'État d'Urgence*), which was enacted on April 3, 1955, under the Faure government. Article 6 of the law empowered the

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government to restrict to residence persons considered by the authorities dangerous to security and public order in Algeria. At the time of enactment, there was no question of internment or shelter camps; on the contrary, the law specifically provides: "In no case may restriction to residence result in the creation of camps where persons defined in the preceding section [those considered dangerous to the national security and public order] would be detained." Despite this prohibition, however, the Algerian administration, under the then Governor General Jacques Soustelle, established five "shelter camps" (*camps d'hébergement*) in Algeria within a few weeks of the law's enactment. In lip service to what it interpreted as the letter of the law, the government proceeded to designate these camps as the "residences" of the individuals whom it desired to imprison, and then confined them to their "residence." Persons so imprisoned soon totaled several thousand. They enjoyed at first somewhat better prison conditions than ordinary criminals: there was freedom of correspondence; visits by family members were permitted; interned government employees continued to receive their salaries, subject however, to a deduction paid to the camp director for their maintenance; and there was no forced labor.

The dissolution of the French National Assembly in December 1955 automatically abrogated the State of Emergency law. Faced with the necessity of finding some legal means to continue to hold the internees, the government had recourse to a law of July 1938, which authorized the requisitioning in time of war of persons and goods for purposes in the national interest. Although the internees challenged the applicability of this law in the absence of a state of war, the government was able to conduct a series of delaying legal actions until the continued detention of the internees was given legal sanction by the Special Powers law enacted March 16, 1956, by the Mollet government.

The Law of Special Powers in Algeria, originally scheduled to expire with the Mollet government, has been reenacted by successive governments (and in the summer of 1957 similar powers, with certain limitations, were given to the government for use in the metropole). Article 5 gives the government "the most extensive powers, in Algeria, to take any exceptional measure required by the circumstances with a view toward the re-establishment of order, the protection of persons and property, and the safeguarding of the territory." It provides that measures taken pursuant to the article, which would result in modifying existing laws, must be authorized by decree of the Council of Ministers. Under the authority of this

article, the government promptly enacted a series of implementing decrees, among them the decree of March 17, 1956. Article 7 of this decree empowered the Governor General in Algeria to order into restricted residence all persons whose activity is considered dangerous to public safety or order. Moreover, without actually authorizing the creation or continued existence of internment camps, the decrees by implication appear to confer a sort of recognition of their existence, and presumably their legality, by dropping the specific prohibition of them contained in the State of Emergency Law of 1955 and by providing further in Article 7: "The authority responsible for the maintenance of order will take all disposition to assure the subsistence and shelter of persons restricted to residence, and where indicated, their families." The last phrase appears to denote a concern for the welfare of the presumably innocent families of individuals indefinitely deprived of their liberty by administrative order. In actual practice, the government ceased payment of salaries to interned officials, and ordered the various social agencies to cease payment of allotments to families of interned persons, on the grounds that such persons were not performing their duties.

Civilian Internment Centers, all of which are in Northern Algeria, are under the control of the Delegation General. Funds for their operation came from the budget of the Secretariat General for Algerian Affairs. In 1959 the International Red Cross committee visited and reported on 13 of these centers, in which a total of nearly 10,000 persons were interned. (FIGURE 54-13 summarizes conditions in the 12 camps that were discussed in the available press summary of the committee's report.) More than half the camps were considered satisfactory as to physical conditions. The committee, however, pointed to the continued presence of seriously ill persons in many camps, despite urgent requests by the camp management for their evacuation. At the camp at Berrouaghia 5 insane prisoners, 3 suffering from tuberculosis, and 2 disabled prisoners were found. The committee also reported many other mentally sick and tubercular sufferers in other camps. One of these, Beni Messous, was set up as a sanatorium, and had more than 50 tubercular cases alone. The medical equipment at this camp was described as "very satisfactory."

The committee reported that a guard at the camp at Arcole had been discharged for having inflicted injuries on three inmates during an interrogation in May 1959. At Sidi Marouf, the committee's attention was drawn to the killing of an inmate by members of the Territorial Unit guarding the camp. Despite these incidents, the

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committee found conditions at most camps, i not meeting minimum satisfactory standards, at least notably improved since the previous inspection (in 1958) by a Red Cross mission. The camp at Tefeschoun was criticized for its general atmosphere of "psychological pressures on the internees to lead them to change their opinions," though material conditions were conceded to be "correct." The center at Bossuet was singled out for special censure. It received detainees from 10 other centers. Inmates are divided into 3 groups, according to whether the camp authorities consider them "recoverable," "dangerous" (that is, borderline), or "irrecoverable." The discipline is harsh, with cases of prolonged and frequent confinement in isolation cells. Many of the prisoners, moreover, complained of pressures and cruelties. Serious incidents occurred at Bossuet in June 1959, involving repeated interventions by a CRS unit. According to the prisoners, these incidents grew out of the refusal of 21 prisoners to attend a motion picture session arranged by the camp's indoctrination group; the camp authorities maintained that the cause was a strike instigated by a group of prisoners received from the camp at Arcole. According to the authorities, some 97 ringleaders who had been involved were placed in isolation cells. A particularly poor impression was created on the members of the committee, who complained that during the entire period of their visit they were followed by an information officer attached to the camp, who made a great show of noting the internees whom the committee interviewed.

d. MILITARY INTERNMENT CENTERS — Military Internment Centers (*Centres Militaires d'Internement*—CMI) are installations under army control and operation in which an accused may be held pending his trial by a military tribunal, or upon conviction of a military offense, may serve out his sentence. In the latter respect they are the military equivalent to the regular civilian prisons. The International Red Cross committee reported on 10 principal CMI's in Algeria, with a total prisoner population of 2,588 (see FIGURE 54-14). The committee's report on these centers was in general favorable; in 7 of them, living conditions were described as good and proper, with rigorous but humane discipline. The committee commented favorably on the professional qualifications of many of the camp commanders, and their approach to their tasks. Nevertheless, it made detailed criticism of three camps: Burdeau, a camp still under construction, which had been the scene of a hunger strike in November 1959; Thraou, where prison conditions were described as "less correct"; and Sidi Zaher, where the committee received information that various amenities

(bed linen, beds, and clothing) had been introduced only 2 or 3 days prior to its visit.

e. CONDITIONS IN PLACES OF DETENTION — The report of the International Red Cross committee indicates a wide variation in the physical, material, psychological, disciplinary, and health conditions in the Algerian detention centers. The type (regular prison, CTT, Civilian Internment Center, CMI), purpose, and location of the particular installation, and often the background and temperament of the camp commander and subordinate personnel, are important factors in these conditions. Overall conditions in the Civilian Internment Centers and in the Military Internment Centers are on the whole considerably better than those prevailing in the Transit and Screening Centers. The general criticism of overcrowding, however, applies to all installations in Algeria.

The physical plants of the various centers vary greatly. The simplest form, likely to be encountered in the case of a "clandestine" CTT, is often simply a cleared area fenced off by barbed wire, and patrolled by *Harkis*, *Moghaznis*, GMS, or gendarmerie, or by regular troops. The prisoners sleep on the ground or in tents or other improvised shelters, eat out of messkits or used food containers. In semipermanent installations, a wall approximately 20 feet high encircles the camp, with guard-towers 30 feet high and equipped with spotlights and automatic weapons located at the 4 corners. Barbed wire is placed inside and outside the camp wall, with the outer strands generally electrified. A broad white line traced on the ground indicates to the prisoners the limits beyond which they may not go on pain of being shot down. At night searchlights sweep the interior and exterior of the camp and dogs may be released in the camp streets. Barracks of wood and corrugated iron construction are laid out in rows. Each barrack accommodates 100 or more prisoners, who sleep in double- or triple-decker bunks.

Relations between the camp administration and the prisoners are very good in some instances. In many other camps the choice of personnel at all levels has been less fortunate. Many complaints are lodged against the guard personnel, many of whom are recruited from among the lower strata of European Algerians. Some of these guards have extreme racist views, and many "incidents" involving the injuring and killing of prisoners have been reported in cases when the day-to-day operation of the camp has been left in the hands of the guards. Such incidents have ranged from daily haranguing and threatening of prisoners and attempts to force unwilling prisoners to take part in saluting the French flag to in-

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spections and searches at which all occupants of a barrack are required to stand naked at attention at the foot of their bunks, saluting officers and noncommissioned officers. An atmosphere of tension prevails in many camps, particularly in those located in remote areas. Guards and prisoners are equally insecure, the former fearing an uprising by the prisoners, or a possible attack upon the camp by the rebels while the prisoners are convinced that in the event of an attack they would be automatically put to death by the guards. Prisoners may or may not be required to perform labor. In smaller, more remote camps, they may be assigned as laborers to local landowners. CTT prisoners are frequently assigned to labor details with troops.

Another factor contributing to serious tension in many internment centers, both civil and military, is heavy psychological pressure exerted upon prisoners by "psychological action," or indoctrination groups. Reeducation centers (*Centres de Rééducation*—CDR) are sometimes treated as separate and distinct camps, sometimes as part of a program in operation at most, if not all, internment camps. Aimed at the so-called "recoverable" cases, the reeducation program at the military centers attempts to win over former rebel army members to the French side. "Rallied," or won over, rebels serve as *Harkis* and army scouts. At civilian centers the aim is to convert or at least neutralize recoverable or borderline internees, some of whom may be employed as informers upon their return to civilian life. Chateau Holden, located at Douéra, near Algiers, is a center reserved for "intellectuals" with an internee population of 131, according to the Red Cross committee report.

Successes have reportedly been achieved as the result of the psychological action program, notably at military centers. Prisoners who are not won over, however, complain of physical and psychological pressures. One such account by an Algerian Muslim who claimed to have been detained at a reeducation center appeared in *L'Express*, a Paris weekly, in late 1959. According to his report, he admitted having paid 500 old francs (approximately US\$1.00) to a rebel fund collector. He states that he and 30 other male Muslims in his neighborhood were rounded up in the middle of the night and taken to a camp at Ben Aknoun. After repeated interrogations, at which he readily confessed his contribution to the FLN, he was informed that the evidence against him was not sufficient to justify a trial. He was sent instead to a reeducation center at an unstated place. At the reeducation center he was required to attend reeducation sessions held five times daily. At

these sessions, the internees first listened to simple expositions of the purpose of France in Algeria and the benefits of being on the French side. At later sessions they were required to repeat what had been said, using different words, pointing out where they had erred, and calling attention to the errors of others. Then they became members of study groups, supporting, correcting, and watching each other. At each session monitors and officers watched the prisoners for reactions and facial expressions. According to the narrator, prisoners were led to believe that their eventual release depended upon their behavior at the center and upon how quickly and sincerely they absorbed their "lessons." He states that he was released after six weeks.

A number of vivid subjective descriptions, similar to the foregoing, by former inmates of penal and detention installations, have appeared from time to time in the French and foreign press. Some are probably FLN propaganda against the French. The importance of these reports lies in their general agreement with one another, and in the fact that the responsible authorities often fail to deny specific allegations repeatedly made. The French Government statement following publication of summaries of the Red Cross report on conditions at internment centers stressed only that the FLN had not to date permitted a similar inspection of its prison camps, and noted that the report cited a "very real improvement" in the detention regime. The government thus admitted the existence of conditions capable of improvement; at the same time its invitation to the Red Cross to conduct so far seven investigations of conditions appears to indicate a continuing interest in stamping out objectionable practices, such as torture.

f. **TURNOVER AND RELEASE OF INTERNEES**—There is a large turnover of internees of Transit and Screening Centers and Civilian Internment Centers. It has been estimated that from 10,000 to 15,000 Algerian Muslims are detained on suspicion each month, and held in Transit and Screening Centers for up to 30 days. Here their identities are checked and recorded and their past and possible future usefulness to the French evaluated. They are then either released, sent to internment camps, or sent to prison to await formal trial. One estimate states that the last category represents only a small fraction—possibly 2% or 3%—of the detainees. Many more are sent to internment camps as persons considered dangerous but against whom there is insufficient evidence to refer the cases to court.

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At one level, the detention program is obviously intended to sift out and apprehend persons guilty of rebel activity. On another level, it is apparently intended to serve as a means whereby a large proportion of the male Muslim population can be inventoried and, in the process, be made aware of the scrutiny of the authorities. Thus, a sizable proportion of potential rebels, it is hoped, can be reeducated or at least neutralized.

An important point bearing on the statistics regarding internees is the fact that the number tends to remain stable. The continual inflow of new internees is matched by an outflow of internees released because no evidence has been uncovered against them, or released as "reasonable risks" after reeducation or neutralization. The authorities attempt to extract maximum propaganda value from such releases, often lumping together indiscriminately internees against whom some derogatory information is thought to exist but who are being released as reasonable risks with those whose arrests were primarily on the grounds of suspicious activity or as the result of denunciations received but against whom no evidence could be found to prove any illegal act. These releases, however, occasionally tend to create among European Algerians the suspicion that the government is being excessively lenient toward rebel sympathizers.

The internees to be liberated are not selected haphazardly. They are picked on the basis of their records in the various centers at which they may have been held, information furnished by the prefect of the place of their residence, and also according to the dossier regarding their previous activity, which is reviewed by a special commission. Candidates for release are usually required to sign, as a condition of their release, an undertaking such as the following.

PLEDGE

I, the undersigned, _____, of the village of _____, who have completed a course of civic reeducation at the Center of _____, of my own free will pledge to:

1. Work with the French Army against the *fellagha* [the rebels] and all those who support the rebellion;
2. Inform the military or civil authorities of all acts committed by the rebels;
3. Give no aid to the *fellagha*.

This undertaking is spontaneous and solemn. Any failure to meet the obligations assumed puts at stake the life of the signer, without prejudice to the sanctions which may be applied to his immediate family. Read and understood.

Signature

In a typical release ceremony all available internees were assembled in a central courtyard or assembly area to be addressed by numerous speakers, including the camp commander and members of local settlers' organizations. Those to be released were exhorted not to forget their past errors. Those not being released were encouraged to believe that their dossiers were being reviewed, and that they might be the next to be released. Candidates for release took an oath of eternal fidelity to France; several of them delivered "spontaneous" speeches of thanks. At a similar ceremony in Oran, released internees marched off to the local war memorial, placed a wreath, and observed the traditional minute of silence.

Upon release each internee is given a pass (*laissez-passer*) authorizing free circulation. Upon their return home, former internees are supervised by local SAS or SAU officers in charge of their sectors. For a period of three months or more they may be required to remain at home, and to report regularly to the authorities.

D. Reference data

The tables included in this Subsection present detailed statistical data in the general order of reference in the text.

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FIGURE 54-11. CORRECTIVE INSTITUTIONS FOR JUVENILE IN ALGERIA, DECEMBER 31, 1955

NAME OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF INTERN-EEES	NAME OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF INTERN-EEES
Public:			Private (Continued):		
Maison d'Education Surveillée de Birkadem (garçons) (Birkadem Reform School for Boys).	Algiers.....	253	Bon Pasteur de Misserghin (filles) (Good Shepherd of Misserghin Girls' Institution).	Algiers.....	29
Centre d'Observation Alger (garçons) (Algiers Boys' Observation Center).	Algiers.....	164	Centre Artisanal du Beau-Fraisier (garçons), operated by Moissons Nouvelles (New Harvests) (Boys' Vocational Center of Beau-Fraisier).	Algiers.....	48
Centre d'Observation Oran (garçons) (Oran Boys' Observation Center).	Oran.....	59	Home de Semi-Liberté d'Hussain Dey (garçons), operated by New Harvests (Hussain Dey Boys' Provisional Liberty Home).	Algiers.....	40
Centre d'Observation Constantine (garçons) (Constantine Boys' Observation Center).	Constantine...	33	Centre d'Accueil de Tlemcen (garçons), operated by New Harvests (Tlemcen Boys' Reception Center).	Tlemcen.....	29
Section Appropriée d'Orléansville (Special Section of Orleansville).	Orléansville...	42	Centre d'Accueil d'Heliopolis (garçons), operated by Equipe Sociale de Preservation de l'Enfance en Danger Moral (Social Group for the Rescure of Youth in Moral Danger) (Heliopolis Boys' Reception Center).	Bône.....	42
Internat Approprié d'Oran-Gambetta (garçons) (Special Boarding School for Boys—Oran-Gambetta).	Oran.....	14	Centre d'Accueil de Dalmatie (garçons), operated by Aide et Protection à l'Enfance Algerienne (Assistance and Protection to Algerian Youth) (Dalmatie Boys' Reception Center).	Algiers.....	42
Internat Approprié d'El-Biar (garçons de moins de 13 ans) (Special Boarding School of El Biar for Boys under 13).	Algiers.....	87	Centre d'Accueil de Mostaganem (Mostaganem Reception Center).	Mostaganem..	24
Institution d'Éducation Surveillée d'Arzew, Oran (garçons) (Arzew Reform School for Boys).	Oran.....	15			
Quartiers d'Éducation Surveillée de Chéragas et de Maison Carrée (filles)—Algiers (Girls' Reform Schools of Chéragas and Maison Carrée).	Algiers.....	108			
Private:					
Bon Pasteur d'El Biar (filles) (Good Shepherd of El Biar girls' institution).	Algiers.....	59			

FIGURE 54-12. SELECTED TRANSIT AND SCREENING CENTERS, ALGERIA, 1959

NAME OF CENTER	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF INTERN-EEES	REMARKS
Algiers Army Corps area:			
Beni Messous.....	Algiers.....	108	Conditions good. (Civilian Internment Center also located here.)
Bou-Kandoura.....	na.....	74	Conditions good.
Moudjebeur.....	Médéa.....	16	Conditions good, but committee considered deaths of two prisoners under unusual circumstances merited "additional clarification."
Palestro.....	Tizi Ouzou.....	12	Conditions satisfactory, although one minor aged 15 among inmates.
Port Gueydon.....	Tizi Ouzou.....	51	Conditions good.
Bou Gobrime.....	na.....	152	Conditions good. Six prisoners killed in November 1959 "while attempting to escape." Also Reeducation Center with 58 inmates.
Azazga.....	Tizi Ouzou.....	133	Conditions fair (acceptable).
Camp des Chênes.....	Médéa (La Chiffa).....	24	One of the "clandestine" centers discovered accidentally by the committee. Conditions fair.
Caserne d'Orléans.....	na.....	26	Conditions fair.
Casino de la Corniche.....	Algiers.....	43	Gendarmerie Colonel explained to committee necessity of torture under supervision of responsible officer.

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FIGURE 54-12 (Continued)

NAME OF CENTER	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF INTERNEES	REMARKS
Algiers Army Corps area (Continued):			
Maison Carrée	Algiers	30	Conditions fair.
Orléansville	Orléansville	194	Do.
Tizi Ouzou	Tizi Ouzou	258	Do.
Bordj Menaïel	Tizi Ouzou	524	Conditions very unsatisfactory; worst in area; living conditions "disastrous"; no messing equipment; all isolation cells full. Required 2 visits by the Committee. Internees completely terrorized, reported tortured in outlying locations. Number of inmates reduced to 373 by time of committee's second visit. Committee estimated true capacity at 150.
Bouira	Tizi Ouzou	98	Conditions very unsatisfactory.
La Bouzaréa	Algiers	15	Do.
Cinq Palmiers	Orléansville (near Warnier)	311	Conditions very unsatisfactory. 12-hour old cadaver discovered in isolation cell; 5 prisoners died of tear gas poisoning. No bed clothing, no infirmary. Officials uncooperative. Also Reeducation Center, with 405 internees.
Damiette	Médéa	na	Conditions very unsatisfactory.
Ferme Chenu	Algiers (near Blida)	101	Conditions very unsatisfactory. Also Reeducation Center.
Paul Cazelles	Médéa	104	Conditions very unsatisfactory. A Civilian Internment Center with 1,360 internees also located here.
Constantine Army Corps area:			
Ferme Lucas	Batna	220	Conditions good, but committee noted 29 listed prisoners were absent; 32 prisoners had been held beyond 3-month period; 1 killed "while attempting to escape."
El Ksob	na	137	Conditions good.
Calle Morris	Bône	72	Conditions good. Located near Fernedes-Anglais Military Internment Camp.
Hamm	Constantine	194	Conditions good.
Ksar Thir	na	276	Conditions good. Also Military Internment Center.
Souk Ahras	Bône	71	Conditions good.
Ferme Ameziane	Constantine	117	Conditions "bearable but capable of improvement." "Clandestine" camp.
Ouled Attalah	Bône	337	"Deplorable" sanitary conditions; no running water. Very poor location for camp.
Colbert	Sétif	267	Conditions very bad; worst in area. Committee complained of being permitted to interview only 44 internees of total complement of 267. Considered camp capacity to be only 100.
Oran Army Corps area:			
Beni Bahdel	Tlemcen	61	Conditions good.
Ried Zouia	na	18	Do.
Le Kreider	Saïda	28	Do.
Nedromah	Tlemcen	34	Do.
Saïda	Saïda	467	Conditions good. Also Reeducation Center with 55 inmates.
Sebdou	Tlemcen	69	Conditions good.
Safsaf	Tlemcen	65	Conditions fair.
Ferme Derasse	Tlemcen	na	Do.
Tiaret	Tiaret	56	Do.
Telagh	Oran (Sidi Bel Abbès)	182	Conditions very poor; 42 prisoners in groups of 3, in 1-man cells. Prisoners hobbled or placed in stocks at night. Tortured during interrogations. Committee demanded abolition of stocks, and recommended followup by authorities.
Saharan Department:			
Kenadsa	Saoura (near Colomb-Béchar)	216	Very good impression of conditions.

NOTE Statements under Remarks are drawn from the summary of the Red Cross report as published in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, January 5, 1960.

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FIGURE 54-13. CIVILIAN INTERNMENT CENTERS, ALGERIA. 59

NAME OF CENTER	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF INTERN-EEES	REMARKS
Berrouaghia	Médéa	1,233	Presence of many sick prisoners noted. Authorities are attempting to reorganize this center on an improved basis. A central prison is also located here.
Beni Messous	Algiers	na	Set up as a sanatorium; has over 50 tubercular prisoners. Committee noted very good medical facilities.
Arcole	Oran	784	Conditions good.
Djorf	na	698	Conditions good or greatly improved since last inspection.
Château Holden	Algiers (near Douéra)	131	Conditions good. Reserved for "intellectuals."
Lodi	Médéa	130	Conditions good or greatly improved.
Saint-Leu	Oran	674	Do.
Camp du Maréchal	Tizi Ouzou	454	Great progress since previous inspection.
Paul Cazelles	Médéa	1,360	Great progress since previous inspection. A Transit and Screening Center with 104 internees is also located here.
Tefeschoun	Algiers	1,234	Very poor impression. Committee reported considerable psychological pressures on internees "to make them change their opinions."
Sidi Marouf	Oran	995	Conditions poor.
Bossuet	Oran	1,520	Very unfavorable conditions. Bossuet is a receiving center for prisoners—including many "irretrievables"—from 10 other centers. Very harsh discipline, frequent isolations, complaints of torture. Prisoner mutiny in June 1959 necessitated intervention of CRS unit. Committee complained it was followed by an information officer attached to the camp, who noted the identity of prisoners interviewed.

NOTE Statements under Remarks are drawn from the summary of the Red Cross report as published in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, January 5, 1960.

FIGURE 54-14. PRINCIPAL MILITARY INTERNMENT CENTERS, ALGERIA, 1959

NAME OF CENTER	LOCATION (DEPARTMENT)	NUMBER OF IN-TERN-EEES	REMARKS
Boghar	Médéa	372	Conditions generally satisfactory.
Ferme des Anglais	Bône	402	Conditions generally satisfactory, but 4 internees were reportedly summarily executed in April 1959. Calle Morris Transit and Screening Center located here.
Hammam Bou Hadjar	Oran	173	Conditions generally satisfactory.
Ksar Thir	na	478	Conditions generally satisfactory. Reeducation Center and Transit and Screening Center also located here.
Tizirt	Tizi Ouzou	356	Conditions generally satisfactory; 551 internees of total of 1,200 processed released since 1957. Reeducation Center also located here.
Lamoricrière	Tlemcen	**360	Conditions satisfactory. These internees form labor brigades on the Moroccan frontier.
Ferme D.R.S.*	Tlemcen (Marnia)		
Burdeau	Tlemcen		
Tiraou	na	154	Conditions poor.
Sidi Zaher	Saïda	63	Conditions poor. Internees alleged most improvements in camp conditions were introduced 2-3 days before committee visit.

NOTE Statements under Remarks are drawn from the summary of the Red Cross report as published in the Paris newspaper *Le Monde*, January 5, 1960.

na Data not available.

* The meaning of these initials is not known.

** This number probably includes internees serving in labor brigades in the same area but residing at other, unnamed places.

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E. Comments on principal sources

1. Evaluation

The sources used in the preparation of this Section are generally accurate and adequate, although there is lack of current information on incidence of crime in Algeria.

A basic document on the organization, training, and operation of the police and gendarmery services in metropolitan France and in Algeria is *Source 9*. Accurate and detailed information on these topics is also contained in *Sources 6, 7, 10, 12, and 14*. The material on the organization and activities of quasi-police and paramilitary services, such as the Territorial Units, the Urban Protection Units, the *Maghzens*, the *Harkas*, autodefense units, and SAS installations, is from official French sources, from the French and Algerian press, and from U.S. Foreign Service reports and despatches.

Sources 1, 2, 3, 9, and 15, and the texts of French and Algerian laws and decrees as published in the *Journal Officiel de la République Française* (Official Journal of the French Republic), contain information on the French Penal Code and Criminal Procedure. *Sources 6, 7, 8, and 11* provide statistical information on the incidence of crime, the activities of the courts, and the number of inmates of central prisons and juvenile correctional institutions.

The main sources of information on conditions in Algerian prisons and detention centers of all kinds are the published summaries and extracts, believed authentic, from the seventh report of the Committee of the International Red Cross on Internment Centers of Algeria, dated December 15, 1959. Other sources on this subject are extracts from previous investigation reports, U.S. Foreign Service reports and despatches, and the 1957 report of the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices.

2. List of sources

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