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
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
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Iraq-Iran: Strategy and Effects of War of the Cities

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Special Analysis

IRAQ-IRAN:

Strategy and Effects of War of the Cities

Iraq's missile and air attacks against Iranian cities satisfy Baghdad's desire for revenge and may have a temporary sobering effect on Iran. Although Iranian leaders have made no concession to gain the cease-fire that appears to have gone into effect yesterday, they probably recognize that Iraq's attacks and Iran's revealed weaknesses have lowered Iranian morale and raised further questions about the effectiveness of the clerical regime. Both countries will try to acquire more weapons to attack or defend cities, but Iraq's long-range missiles and large Air Force will continue to give it the advantage in the near term.

Iraq probably began its missile barrage against Iranian cities to satisfy the public's desire to avenge Iran's missile attacks on Baghdad on 28 February. The intensity of the unprecedented long-range missile attacks—Iraq has fired 68 missiles to Iran's 22—probably is designed to demoralize Iranians and weaken their support for the clerical regime. Baghdad also may have hoped to goad Iran to launch a poorly prepared ground offensive that Iraq could defeat and offset the poor results from attacks on shipping in February.

Tehran responded with missile attacks on Baghdad and Mosul and limited air and artillery strikes on other Iraqi targets. At the same time, Iranian leaders have offered a mutual halt to the attacks, probably in recognition of their comparative disadvantage in the war of the cities.

Effects on Tehran

continued

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[REDACTED]

Effects on Baghdad

Iran's 22 missile strikes and air and artillery attacks in the past two weeks probably have inflicted 200 to 300 casualties in Iraq, but they apparently have not significantly affected Iraqi morale. [REDACTED] almost all the 20 Iranian missile attacks on Baghdad hit lightly populated areas southeast of the city. Tehran may have tried to strike economic and military targets there so it could claim that, unlike Iraq, Iran was not targeting civilians. [REDACTED] the attacks caused no public panic, and, although Iraq held evacuation exercises in February, no significant number of people have left Baghdad. [REDACTED]

Outlook

The success of Iraq's attacks probably has surprised and heartened Iraqi leaders, who are now more likely to attack Iranian cities in the future. They also may feel more secure in attacking economic targets, believing that Iranian retaliation would be limited. Such attacks might backfire on Baghdad, however, if Iranian anger stimulates enough enlistments to enable Iran to mount a potential decisive ground offensive. [REDACTED]

Tehran probably is worried that more Iraqi attacks will erode support for the clerical regime by demonstrating it cannot defend Iranian cities or retaliate effectively. Iran is likely to try harder to acquire more missiles and aircraft to improve its ability to retaliate. Although Iran is unlikely to launch a major offensive in response to Iraqi attacks on cities, Tehran may consider launching a small ground attack to show its determination to continue the conflict. [REDACTED]

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