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MEMORANDUM TO: Arms Control Support Group

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(C)

FROM: [REDACTED] DC/ACIS

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Arms Control Initiatives

1. I have mentioned several times that I think the Soviets will offer some new wrinkles on their arms control proposals before the November meeting. Also, more propaganda moves are likely. It seems to me that there are several key events that may provide opportunities for such initiatives. These include:

- The NPT Bilateral beginning 18 October;
- The Warsaw Pact Summit beginning 20 October;
- Shevardnadze's trip to the UNGA for the 40th Anniversary Celebrations from 21-25 October;
- Gorbachev's address to UNESCO on 24 October (which will be earlier in the day than the President's UNGA speech;
- The 1 November Dutch GLCM deployment decision;
- The final plenaries of the NST talks, which end on 1 November; and
- The Anniversary of the Russian Revolution on 7 November. (C)

18 Oct  
20 Oct

24 OCT


1 NOV

1 NOV

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2. The attached is my personal speculation about the types of things the Soviets might do. All of the items listed have either some precedent or some basis in intelligence reporting. More detailed (and more sophisticated) work on this is underway, and I'll pass it on to you as it becomes available. (C)

3. If there's anything more I can do for you here, please call. (U)



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## Possible Soviet Arms Control Initiatives

### In the NST talks:

- Table draft treaties reflecting their recent initiatives.
- Refine offensive force reduction proposals in areas of US concern--e.g., permitting additional new types of weapons, moving to limit (rather than ban) LRCMs, lower sublimits on ballistic missile RVs, proposing specific sublimit on heavy ICBMs, differentiation of types of "charges" (perhaps with a weighting scheme), introduction of INF aircraft limits that exclude US dual-capable FBS, explicit acceptance of some US LRINF missiles (along the lines of "Walk in the Woods"), or proposals for reductions in medium-range systems outside of Europe.
- Indicate "flexibility" on Defense and Space issues by: explicitly indicating a willingness to accept some SDI research (even extending to some subcomponent testing), proposing discussion to supplement the ABM treaty with new agreements covering "space-strike weapons", proposing a treaty modification to allow expanded terminal defenses, or modifying their ASAT ban to permit one type of ASAT for each side.
- Be more forthcoming in discussing verification.
- Propose procedural changes (e.g., more joint plenaries) or private discussions by heads of delegations.
- Hint more explicitly at possible walk-out or military responses if progress is not made. One known KGB officer on the Soviet delegation has begun to do this. Offer of separate INF talks could theoretically allow a walkout in START/Defense and Space groups but not INF; GLCM, SLCM systems nearing operational status could be portrayed as "response measures".

### In the SCC:

- Show greater "responsiveness" to US compliance concerns by, e.g., tabling formally the proposal made



informally to the NST delegation to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar in exchange for a US halt on facilities the Soviets allege raise compliance concerns, indicating greater willingness to address telemetry encryption (perhaps even testing a missile --e.g. an SS-X-24--without encryption), asserting that US concerns about the SS-16 have been taken care of, or providing more information about their bomber force in response to US questions about SNDVs.

--Level new charges of US noncompliance, such as: asserting formally that the SDI program violates Article V of the ABM Treaty, charging that Midgetman is a prohibited "new type", alleging that the ship-borne radar used as part of US NTM is a mobile ABM radar, or complaining that the Patriot air defense system violates the prohibition against giving such systems ABM capabilities.

--Maintaining a "business-like" attitude on supplementary issues like submarine dismantling procedures.

In other negotiations:

--More explicit indications of willingness to reach agreements in such areas as chemical weapons, non-use of force, and radiological weapons.

--Movement toward accepting the US offer to observe a nuclear test, but falling short of full agreement. (One possibility would be to offer a data exchange or expert working group.)

--Hinting at greater willingness to accept verification measures that go beyond NTM.

--Reiterating old proposals for reduction of military budgets, nuclear and chemical-weapons-free-zones, limitations on naval deployments and limits on anti-submarine patrol zones.

In public speeches:

--Publicize proposals or informal probes made in Geneva and elsewhere. The recent suggestions on INF and Krasnoyarsk are good candidates.



- Repackage existing proposals to suit the audience: e.g., MBFR, non-use of force and chemical-weapon-free zones are candidates for treatment at the Warsaw Pact Summit. This would also be an appropriate forum for revelation of a new INF initiative. Reduction of military budgets could be proposed in the UNESCO speech.
- Announcement of new unilateral moves, such as force reductions or removal of forces from "combat alert". (Examples are detailed below.)

**In private diplomacy:**

- Continue to leak new proposals to selected foreign leaders, as has already been done with The UK and the Netherlands. Other possible recipients include the leaders of industrialized countries who will meet with the President before the Gorbachev meeting, as well as key non-aligned leaders who might be lobbied by Shevardnadze at the UNGA.
- Hint at dire consequences, including a breakdown of the NST talks, if the November meeting is not "positive". A possible variant would be to hint at a breakdown of talks on bilateral issues, but indicate willingness to continue discussing issues of broader concern, such as INF.
- Private communications to Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers urging postponement of the 1 November GLCM decision. Propose "independent" verification of SS-20 numbers.
- Suggest to the US a format for documenting the November meeting; propose substantive arms control talks at a higher level than the NST delegations.

**In military forces:**

- Display of SS-20 equipment or missiles to substantiate claim that missiles have been taken off alert. Further underscore claim by opening launcher garages, dismantling garages, launchers or missiles.
- Unilaterally dismantle or remove from alert status other INF forces, such as old SS-4 IRBMs, SS-N-5 SLBMs, SCUD B short-range ballistic missiles (which are being replaced by the new SS-23), or older



intermediate-range bombers.

- Unilaterally dismantle older ICBM launchers at a rate in excess of that required to compensate for claimed deployment of SS-25s. Continue, or accelerate, dismantling of older heavy bombers.
- Unilaterally withdraw military units from Eastern Europe.
- Stage major military exercises, including probes by nuclear delivery aircraft and live launches of strategic and INF missiles.
- Deploy operationally the SS-NX-21 SLCM and SS-CX-4 GLCM; deploy additional missile-equipped submarines near Europe or North America.
- Conduct an ASAT test, ostensibly in reaction to US actions; conduct a demonstration of a laser system.